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Abstract
Balance sheet policies have become the primary policy lever of several central banks in the wake
of the international financial crisis. However, with inflated central bank balance sheets, and
global economic conditions returning to normal, the future of balance sheet policies needs to be
considered. In this thesis I aimed to define a role for balance sheet policies in the monetary
policy toolkit, especially with regard to financial stability. First, I developed an explicit definition
of balance sheet policies and their channels of transmission to help resolve the confusion clearly
visible in the academic literature and popular media. Second, I explored the changing nature of
central bank operational frameworks, which identifies several new regimes. Third, I developed
a dynamic general equilibrium model that implements supply-side financial frictions and the
salient features of balance sheet policies.
My first empirical chapter employed a time-varying parameter vector autoregressive (TVP-
VAR) model to establish the nature of the relationship between central bank liabilities and the
overnight policy rate. Four countries with different monetary policy regimes were considered.
It was found that a clear negative relationship between these variables exists only in the case
of one regime, namely the reserve regime. This result indicates that the introduction of new
operational frameworks for central banks have challenged the traditional model of monetary
policy implementation. The practical implication of the decoupling of interest rates from
reserves is that central bank balance sheets potentially can be used alongside conventional
interest rate policy.
In the last two chapters of the thesis a dynamic general equilibrium model was developed,
equipped with a heterogeneous banking sector, endogenous default and collateralised lending
on the part of the central bank. Within this framework, changes along the dimensions of size
and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet were integrated. Increasing the size in
this model significantly contributed to financial stability. However, when used in conjunction
with interest rate policy, it could cause conflicting effects. Changes in its composition establish
local supply effects, which means that long-term interest rates are depressed, an explicit goal of
many asset purchase programmes. Changing the composition has an impact beyond that for the
change in size, relaxing borrowing conditions even more than a pure injection of liquidity.
ii
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Opsomming
Balansstaatbeleide het ná afloop van die internasionale finansiële krisis die vernaamste beleid-
shefbome geword van verskeie sentrale banke. As gevolg van vergrote sentrale bank-balansstate
en die globale ekonomiese toestande wat teruggekeer het na normaal, moet die toekoms van
balansstaatbeleide egter heroorweeg word. In hierdie tesis is my doel om ’n rol te definieer
vir balansstaatbeleide in die monetêre gereedskapskis, met spesifieke aandag aan finansiële
stabiliteit. Eerstens het ek ’n eksplisiete definisie van balansstaatbeleide en hulle oordragkanale
ontwikkel, om sodoende die verwarring te help opklaar wat duidelik sigbaar is in die akademiese
literatuur en die populêre media. Tweedens het ek die veranderende aard van die sentrale
bank se operasionele raamwerk ondersoek en verskeie nuwe bestelle geïdentifiseer. Derdens het
ek ’n dinamiese algemene ekwilibriummodel ontwikkel wat aanbodkant-finansiële wrywings
implementeer, tesame met die kenmerkende eienskappe van balansstaatbeleide.
My eerste empiriese studie het ’n tyd-variërende parametervektor-outoregressiewe (TVP-VAR)
model gebruik om die aard van die verwantskap tussen sentrale banklaste en die oornag-
beleidskoers te bepaal. Vier lande met verskillende monetêre beleidstelsels is oorweeg. Daar is
gevind dat ’n duidelike negatiewe verhouding tussen dié veranderlikes net bestaan in die geval
van een stelsel, naamlik die reserwestelsel. Dié resultaat dui daarop dat die ingebruikneming
van nuwe operasionele raamwerke vir sentrale banke die tradisionele model van monetêre belei-
dsimplementasie bevraagteken. Die praktiese gevolg daarvan om rentekoerse te ontkoppel van
reserwes is dat sentrale bank-balansstate potensieel saam met konvensionele rentekoersbeleide
gebruik kan word.
In die laaste twee hoofstukke van die tesis is ’n dinamiese algemene ekwilibriummodel ontwikkel,
wat ’n heterogene banksektor insluit, asook endogene wanbetaling en gekollateraliseerde uitleen
aan die kant van die sentrale bank. In hierdie raamwerk is veranderings geïntegreer oor die
omvang van die grootte en samestelling van die sentrale bank. Indien die omvang van die
balansstaat in hierdie model vergroot word, het dit aansienlik bygedra tot finansiële stabiliteit.
Wanneer dit egter saam met ’n rentekoersbeleid gebruik word, kan dit teenstrydende gevolge
hê. Veranderings in die samestelling het gelei tot plaaslike voorsieningsgevolge, met die gevolg
dat langtermynrentekoerse afwaarts gedwing word, wat ’n uitdruklike doel is van baie bate-
iii
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verkrygingsprogramme. Die uitwerking van ’n verandering in die samestelling het ’n groter
impak getoon as ’n verandering in omvang, en het uitleentoestande selfs meer verslap as ’n
suiwer inspuiting van likiditeit.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past twenty years the world’s major central banks have been largely successful
at bringing inflation under control. While it is premature to suggest that inflation is
no longer an issue of great concern, it is quite conceivable that the next battles facing
central bankers will lie on a different front.
— Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler (2000)
In his 1979 article, entitled The Anguish of Central Banking, Arthur Burns lamented the ability
of central banks to address the worldwide disease of inflation, despite central bankers having
“potent means for fostering stability of the price level” (Burns, 1979). In the years that followed
academics, central bankers and policymakers came together to combat this disease, all but
reaching a cure. In fact, as argued by Goodfriend (2007b), the progress of monetary policy
“is a remarkable success story”. However, not all were convinced, and as argued by Galí and
Gertler (2007), “despite the recent successes, we cannot be certain without further experience
how resilient these frameworks will prove as new kinds of disturbances hit the economy”.
Caution was warranted, as less than a year later the financial crisis called the contributions of
monetary policy into question. The words of Bernanke and Gertler (2000) ring almost prophetic,
heralding perhaps another era of anguish for the central banker.
In response to the crisis, central bankers aggressively pursued expansion, with interest rates
driven close to zero in many countries. With conventional monetary policy tools exhausted,
balance sheets of central banks - previously relegated to regulating the effective overnight policy
rate - assumed the role of protagonist in the post-crisis monetary policy narrative. In this chapter
I endeavour to explain why balance sheet policies will become an intricate part of the future of
monetary policy, especially as it pertains to achieving financial stability. The literature on the
topic of central bank balance sheets is vast, with theoretical contributions on different aspects of
1
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balance sheet policy spanning back to the end of the Second World War. With such a wealth of
research, one might ask what possible contributions are left to be made. This chapter addresses
that question, not only identifying a gap in the literature, but also offering suggestions on how
one could approach the problem.
1.1 Rationale
In 2007 the United States Federal Reserve held less than $1 trillion worth of assets on its balance
sheet. Today that number is in excess of $4.6 trillion (Feroli et al., 2016). During this period the
Bank of England purchased assets to the value of £375 billion (Emerson, 2016). The Bank of
Japan is expanding the monetary base - which is already at U416.5 trillion at the time of writing
- at an annual rate of U80 trillion (De Michelis and Iacoviello, 2016). Finally, the European
Central Bank (ECB) is the latest in a succession of central banks to adopt a quantitative easing
(QE) program. The size of the program is unprecedented, with monthly injections of e60 billion
(Breuss, 2016). The numbers quoted tell only a part of this story, as the composition of balance
sheets has undergone dramatic change, with many central banks allowed purchases of private
sector assets beyond their normal operations (Pattipeilohy, 2016).
Owing to the controversy1 surrounding their implementation, balance sheet policies such as
quantitative easing are a topic now familiar to many outside of monetary policy circles. Surpris-
ingly, balance sheet policies are ill-defined in academic research, and more so in the popular
media. There exist several conflicts and inconsistencies in the definition of central bank balance
sheet policies, which is compounded by the fact that implementation differs across central bank
operational frameworks. Unfortunately, this translates into a broad misunderstanding of the
purpose and capacity of these policies.
In a general sense, balance sheet policies can perform three actions. First, central banks can use
balance sheet expansion to reflect an accommodative monetary policy stance, in conjunction
with a commitment to a certain short-term policy rate (Woodford, 2012). In some cases, such
as the one in which the nominal short-term policy rate reaches the zero lower bound, balance
sheet policy can act as a temporary substitute to traditional monetary policy. Second, they can
help prevent the damage caused by sudden sharp movements in international capital flows.
Finally, they are capable of improving conditions for financial stability. Research in this thesis is
concerned primarily with the implications for financial stability of implementing balance sheet
policies. (Pattipeilohy, 2016)
1The introduction of QE was perceived as a bailout of the very financial institutions that caused the crisis and
exposed central banks to credit risk, in turn threatening their fiscal independence.
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While financial stability has always been of great concern to policymakers and scholars alike,
it was only in recent years that its import has been elevated to match that of price stability
(De Gregorio, 2012). Several policy suggestions, with respect to financial stability, have been
proffered to monetary authorities; however, they have not consented to a resolution (Blanchard
et al., 2013). The short-term interest rate as the conventional tool of monetary policy is limited
in its scope to address financial stability. This is due, in part, to the fact that interest rates are a
blunt tool against the buildup of financial imbalances accompanying movements in asset prices
and credit aggregates (Bernanke, 2011).
In addition, as stated by the Tinbergen rule, “if the number of policy targets surpasses the
number of instruments, then some targets may not be met” (Tinbergen, 1952). In other
words, one should not overburden policy tools with too many targets, as this impedes the
proper functioning of the instrument concerned. In line with this reasoning, several developed
countries have enacted balance sheet operations, by altering the size and composition of their
balance sheets, to address dysfunctional markets (Bernanke, 2011).
Most of the empirical research on the topic of balance sheet policies have been directed at
financial markets and the broader macroeconomic impact. In particular, there are two broad
classifications of empirical studies on this topic. First, there are studies that look at the short-
term influence of balance sheet policies implemented around the time of the crisis, specifically
the impact on longer-term interest rates and interest rate spreads. Research in this area usually
takes the form of event studies, with more recent papers using time-series analysis to determine
the effect. Second, research is being done on the macroeconomic effect of these policies, looking
at different measures of real activity, such as gross domestic product (GDP), inflation and
unemployment among others. For this analysis, there is a large contingent of different models
used.
In terms of theoretical developments, there are also several dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models that try to model the specific channels through which balance sheet
policies can affect both financial markets and real activity. In particular, there is a collection of
models that looks to emulate the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) implemented by developed
economies. One of the attractive features of these models is their ability to provide a mechanism
to evaluate the potential balance sheet policy impact, through country-specific calibration and
estimation.
3
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1.2 Problem Statement
Macroeconomic theorists from all research spheres are trying to introduce greater scope for
financial markets in their modelling frameworks. In particular, a recent strand of models, which
incorporate financial frictions, has been developed with the purpose of replicating the effect
of balance sheet operations on the macroeconomy. However, most of the work looks only
at the impact on the real economy, with only a small number dealing with financial stability
implications. This thesis aims to extend the current generation of dynamic general equilibrium
macroeconomic models in a significant way, by allocating a non-trivial role to balance sheet
operations in harnessing the objective of financial stability.
This is a significant development, as currently there is limited scope for conventional monetary
policy to address financial instability. Macroprudential regulations have been offered to com-
plement monetary policy. However, balance sheet policies could provide another useful tool in
the policy arsenals of central banks. With the development of new operational frameworks, it
might be possible to incorporate balance sheet policy alongside the traditional monetary policy
mechanisms (not only in the case of a liquidity trap).
The purpose of this thesis then is threefold. First, to bring clarity to what is meant by balance
sheet policies and also explain how they fit into the monetary policy narrative. Second, to
establish the conditions under which balance sheet policy can be used in conjunction with
the short-term nominal interest rate (i.e. conventional monetary policy). Third, to build a
dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates a measure of financial stability as well as
the different aspects of balance sheet policies. Importantly, this means including all dimensions
of balance sheet policy, translating to both changes in the size and composition of the balance
sheet of the central bank. Ultimately, I want to determine what the financial stability impact
would be of implementing different balance sheet operations.
1.3 Outline and Approach of the Thesis
This dissertation can be divided into four distinct sections, each exploring a different dimension
of balance sheet operations. This section delineates the different chapters of the thesis, exploring
the central questions in each chapter and the methodological approach used. It also acts as a
roadmap for the thesis, providing a general overview of each section and its relative contribution.
Also, the results of specific chapters are discussed briefly, with a more in-depth discussion
deferred to the individual chapters; ultimately, these are summarised in the conclusion.
4
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1.3.1 Chapter 2, 3, 4: Balance Sheet Policies
A reading of the literature on balance sheet policies quickly reveals that there is a general level
of confusion as to what these policies are capable of, the transmission mechanisms at play, the
definition of the different types of balance sheet policies and the drawbacks associated with
implementing them. The goal of this chapter is to unravel the often abstruse writings on the
subject and give a clear idea of what balance sheet policies are, providing clarity as to the
different dimensions, against the backdrop of different central bank operational frameworks.
In these three chapters, I present a balance sheet policy narrative through a mixture of chronolog-
ical and thematic literature reviews. I start the dialogue by referring to the earliest incarnations
of balance sheet policies, which entails a survey of the pioneering balance sheet policy actions
taken by the Bank of Japan in the early 2000s. This case study provided me with a point of
departure from which to commence the search for an appropriate balance sheet policy typology.
Properly defined, a typology provides greater clarity to the reader as to the finer details on what
constitutes different types of balance sheet policy. Importantly, the typology also provides a
platform for the conversation on the proposed transmission channels.
The financial crisis was the catalyst to the large-scale adoption of balance sheet policies in
developed and emerging economies. However, each country is distinct in its motivation for
employing balance sheet policies, which led me to consider the rationale for adopting them in
several countries that have done so. Hence, I tried to identify why they differed in the type
of policy implemented. Country-specific scenarios gave me a better idea of the scope of the
policy practiced. Once the narrative on balance sheet policies was set, I looked at the empirical
evidence as to their efficacy in achieving their stated goals. The review of empirical evidence
on balance sheet policies in several developed economies gave me an idea of optimal policy
combinations, revealing which policy was most appropriate to use, given certain circumstances.
Finally, I identified several of the unforeseen complications encountered with the application of
balance sheet policies.
1.3.2 Chapter 5: Liquidity Effect
In this chapter, I look to uncover how monetary policy is implemented internationally. The
purpose of this is to discover which operational frameworks will deliver a possible decoupling
of a central bank’s balance sheet from the policy rate. Decoupling here is the independent
movement of the interest rate and central bank balance sheet, providing two distinct monetary
policy tools.
The analysis was conducted through several time-series methods, but the utilisation of a time-
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varying parameter vector autoregressive (TVP-VAR) model was the preferred approach. This
approach to VAR modelling is specifically relevant to this topic as I wanted to determine the
nature of the relationship between interest rates and central bank liquidity (i.e. reserves),
while also considering whether it would be stable over time. An alternative approach that
was employed is that of a traditional VAR model. However, this requires a, largely arbitrary,
splitting of samples for each country into sub-samples according to identified monetary policy
regimes. Even though these regimes can be identified by consulting the relevant literature, the
partitioning into sub-samples is subjective. Another method of tracking the time-varying nature
of changes in the relationship, namely rolling regressions, was also used.
In particular, I implemented a TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility, as proposed by Primiceri
(2005). This model has become widely used to evaluate several crucial macroeconomic ques-
tions. The important contribution of this approach is that is allows the researcher to “capture
the potential time-varying nature of the underlying structure of the economy in a flexible and
robust manner” (Nakajima, 2011). The assumption that VAR coefficients will be constant across
changes in monetary policy implementation is not realistic, which was an important reason for
adopting the TVP-VAR framework.
In addition, one of the primary concerns of VAR models is that of over-parametrisation (Koop
and Korobilis, 2010). Bayesian methods, as utilised in TVP-VAR models, introduce a solution to
this problem by relying on shrinkage (i.e. imposing restrictions on parameters and shrinking
them to zero). Multivariate time-series models with high multi-dimensionality are particularly
difficult to solve, but due to improvements in computational power, this problem has been
largely resolved. Through the use of Bayesian priors one can include multiple time-series
variables in a sensible way without serious concern about over-parametrisation.
1.3.3 Chapter 6: Model
The workhorse macroeconomic model, utilised by the majority of central banks, is the standard
New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. In general, eco-
nomic theorists have to make assumptions that reduce complex real-world interactions into
easily digestible mathematical equations. However, the assumption that financial markets are
perfect and complete has come under scrutiny after the recent financial crisis (Roger and Vlcek,
2012).
This assumption implies that agents (and thereby the asset pricing kernel) will not necessarily
be affected by government purchases of assets. Agents may perceive balance sheet operations
as a reshuffling of assets between the private sector and the central bank (Cúrdia and Woodford,
6
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2011). This assumption originates from the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), who believed
in the irrelevance of the composition of the firm’s balance sheet. The problem is that the
inclusion of this theorem into modern macroeconomic models limits the scope for financial
intermediation; and thereby the transmission of credit market conditions to real economic
activity (du Plessis, 2012; de Walque et al., 2010). With hindsight it is palpably clear that the
exclusion of the banking sector in analytical macroeconomic models was a mistake. However,
the opportunity to correct this error has presented itself.
The dynamic general equilibrium model proposed in this dissertation draws on the work of
Goodhart et al. (2006). This piece of work is the culmination of years of research, and several
other articles are linked in the model’s construction (see, for example, Aspachs et al. (2006a);
Tsomocos and Zicchino (2005); Aspachs et al. (2006b); Goodhart and Tsomocos (2006)). One of
the most important contributions of their body of work has been the inclusion of a heterogenous
and endogenous banking sector.
Goodhart et al. (2006) abstract from the representative agent approach in modelling the
banking system. This allows the interaction of banks on the interbank market and thereby the
possibility to model the reaction of commercial banks to certain shocks. The failure of banks, or
endogenous default as it is referred to by Goodhart et al. (2006), is one of the primary features
of this model. Failure is a function of the risk preference of banks in this system, with the riskiest
banks being assigned the highest probability of default. These failures are not isolated events
in this model and have system-wide implications for the survival of other banks. Some other
highlights of the model include a non-trivial role for money, frictions in consumer credit markets
and the possibility of the violation of capital requirements (Goodhart et al., 2006). Since the
publication of this paper, several authors have adopted it to explore various macroeconomic
issues.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is the introduction of non-trivial balance sheet
operations in a DSGE model with financial frictions. Goodhart et al. (2011) incorporate the
monetary base into their financial fragility framework and analyse its potential for use as a
prudential policy tool. My model builds on these ideas but is different along two dimensions.
First, it is set in a dynamic general equilibrium framework, similar to that of de Walque et al.
(2010). Second, it includes collateralised lending from the work of Schabert (2015), which is
considered to be a less arbitrary method for modeling balance sheet expansion. Alterations to
the collateralised lending (haircut) mechanism of Schabert (2015) also allow the possibility
of decoupling the balance sheet from the policy rate, in order to see how these policies could
operate independently from one another.
7
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1.3.4 Chapter 7: Model with Long-term Bonds
Having established a dynamic general equilibrium model with some attractive aspects, such as
financial frictions and balance sheet expansion, the important question became, what would be
the effect of changes in the composition of the balance sheet? In particular, what would happen
if a portfolio balance effect were introduced, through the purchase of long-term securities?
The post-crisis discourse indicates that the composition of balance sheets matter (du Plessis,
2012). It is, therefore, imperative to determine what changes in the composition of the balance
sheet mean for financial stability. Several countries have already broadened their asset portfolio
to include several public and private sector securities. I glean from this that central banks
have tried to influence the balance sheets of banks in the private sector through the issuing of
liabilities, of which central banks are the monopoly suppliers (Brink and Kock, 2009).
Theoretically, employing credit easing transmits to the real economy through the signalling
and portfolio balance channels (du Plessis, 2012). The portfolio balance effect reflects how
the accumulation of assets by central banks might induce a change in the relative spreads of
various assets in financial markets (Tobin, 1969)2. The theory is that if the central bank holds
large amounts of a particular reserve, it forces private banks to hold less of it and more of other
types of assets, referred to as the local supply or scarcity effect3. This type of scenario exists
only when agents in the private sector are not perfectly indifferent among assets (Cúrdia and
Woodford, 2011). Central banks often point to the fact that risk profiles are likely to be different
among a selection of assets, which would mean that assets are not always perceived as perfect
substitutes (Joyce et al., 2012a).
For this chapter I am interested in the implications of changes in the composition of the balance
sheet of the central bank for financial stability. In order to achieve this, one needs to present
a model that contains some form of imperfect asset substitutability. In general, there are two
modelling approaches. First, there are models that try to impose some type of restriction on
intermediation, in the vein of Gertler and Karadi (2011). Central bank intermediation performs
the function of financial intermediaries in this setup, which creates the appropriate friction,
allowing the central bank to transform illiquid assets on the balance sheets of private investors.
Second, we have ‘preferred habitat’ models, in which a certain class of investors are interested
only in investing in a certain segment of the yield curve. Models in this tradition include those
of Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Chen et al. (2012a). My approach most closely resembles that
of Chen et al. (2012a). The contribution from this chapter entailed incorporating their model of
long-term securities into the framework from Chapter 6. This provided the ability to look at
2This forms part of the portfolio balance channel and is also known as the asset substitution effect.
3This still falls under the portfolio rebalancing mechanism, it is simply a subcategory of the channel.
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purchases of long-term securities by central banks.
1.3.5 Chapter 8: Conclusion
In this chapter I summarise the results obtained from the models, identifying the tangible
contribution of the thesis to the literature, as well as the potential for practical application.
This chapter also allows the space to highlight some shortcomings of my approach and then to
briefly discuss plausible research avenues that could stem from this thesis.
9
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Chapter 2
Balance Sheet Policies I: Early History and
Theory
The central bank’s balance sheet has ‘always’ been a policy tool, especially in open
economies where central banks hold foreign reserves. . . The use of QE and other uncon-
ventional tools in the recent past has just made us study these issues better, learn more
about their effects, and so become more confident about using them in the present and
in the future.
— Ricardo Reis in the CFM Survey (2016)
Central banks across the globe have resorted to unconventional monetary policy (UMP), in
light of the fact that conventional expansionary interest rate policy alternatives have been
exhausted. However, balance sheet policies are not considered all that unconventional. In
particular, as illustrated in this chapter, it is the choice of asset markets targeted by central
bank purchases that makes a balance sheet policy unconventional (Borio and Disyatat, 2010).
In the US, for example, the Federal Reserve Act allows the central bank to buy and sell assets
“without regard to maturities but only in open markets” (D’Amico et al., 2012). This implies that
the Fed could undergo purchases of long-term government debt without contravening this act,
while still staying within the realm of what is considered conventional. However, large-scale
asset purchases of private sector securities extend the balance sheet of the bank beyond its
‘Treasuries only’ protocol1, moving it into unconventional territory (Woodford, 2012). Even
before the current crisis, there were examples where the usage of central bank balance sheets
were considered normal.
1The central bank is only supposed to carry Treasuries on the asset side of the balance sheet. However, Treasuries
can be of different maturities.
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2.1 Early Balance Sheet Policy (Post-War Period)
In the broadest, sense balance sheet policies can be viewed as any balance sheet action taken by
the central bank that attempts to affect asset market conditions beyond adjusting a short-term
interest rate (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). Derivatives of modern balance sheet policy were first
implemented in foreign exchange intervention, long before the current financial crisis2. The
management of exchange rates is not of specific interest to the balance sheet narrative explored
in this thesis. Nevertheless, foreign exchange intervention is referenced to demonstrate that the
use of balance sheets by central banks, beyond that of interest rate management, preceded the
response to the international financial crisis.
These operations of central banks in the post-War period were primarily performed by developing
countries in an attempt to exert pressure in an ever-changing exchange rate environment. They
can be defined as central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, the buying/selling
of foreign currency to affect the exposure of private agents. Exchange rate policy is especially
prominent in emerging Asia, with South Korea, Thailand and China identified as examples
of countries that have managed to intervene in foreign exchange markets through sterilised
purchases3 of foreign assets (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). More recently, reserve accumulation
(expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet) has been a characteristic of developing countries
in the aftermath of the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, in attempts to resist the appreciation of
their domestic currencies (Filardo and Grenville, 2012). With that considered, the next section
introduces the first part of our discussion on modern central bank balance sheet policy, which
was spearheaded by Japan in a concerted effort to avoid deflation.
2.2 The Zero Lower Bound (1990s)
2.2.1 The Lost Decade and the Liquidity Trap
Balance sheet measures were thrust into the spotlight during the 1990s, owing to the derailment
of the Japanese economy following a period of rapidly increasing prosperity. Japan’s ‘lost
decade’ refers to the prolonged economic slump experienced since the early 1990s. A dissection
of the slowdown identified several causal factors: a protracted period of overly accommodative
2Exchange rate policy is one of the least mentioned balance sheet policies (Borio and Disyatat, 2010).
3The central bank might intervene in the foreign exchange market by purchasing local currency, through the
sale of foreign exchange reserves; that, in this case, cause an appreciation. However, this reduces money supply,
which could be deflationary. In order to sterilise these purchases, the central bank can conduct open market
operations to increase the money supply.
12
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monetary policy; a banking crisis (on the back of non-performing loans); and an asset-price
bubble collapse (Ito and Mishkin, 2006)4. During this decade, specifically in the period between
1992 and 2002, the Japanese real economy grew at a meagre rate, slightly above 1% on
average (Ueda, 2005)5. In 1995, in response to anaemic growth and budding deflation, the
Bank of Japan (BoJ) brought interest rates close to the zero lower bound (ZLB)6. Despite
the expansionary efforts of the monetary authority, three large Japanese banks7 failed due to
sustained capital losses and, in concert with the Asian financial crisis of 1998, this heralded the
start of deflation8 (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). This called for a reduction of the interest rate to the
ZLB and ignited fears that a “liquidity trap” might emerge (Okina and Shiratsuka, 2004).
As first mentioned by Keynes (1936) and later formalised by Hicks (1937), once the nominal
policy rate reaches a level close to zero, the central bank might find itself in a liquidity trap;
this is defined as a low interest rate environment in which liquidity injections are rendered
ineffective because money and bonds have become perfect substitutes. Traditional Keynesian
thinking on monetary policy9 accepts that, once in a liquidity trap, the central bank becomes
impotent with respect to its ability to stimulate economic activity10 (Hicks, 1937).
Japanese central bankers grappled with the potential loss of their primary policy lever and
the possibility of chronic deflation. However, as argued by Krugman (1998) at the time, the
conclusion that central banks are powerless at the ZLB is far from categorical. He proved,
using an IS-LM framework, that a sustained increase in “outside money”11 at the ZLB can have
an inflationary impact on the economy, increasing both the general price level and output
(Krugman, 1998). In order for this increase to be effective, the central bank is required to
commit to future increases in the monetary base (Krugman, 2000). In other words, public
expectation needs to be guided by the actions of the central bank, in order for the expansionary
policy to work when interest rates have hit the ZLB (Bernanke, 1999).
4For a good review of the events that led to this downturn, see the article by Ito and Mishkin (2006).
5It should be noted that during this period, population growth was declining, which translates into a better
overall picture of growth in per capita terms (Economist, 2008).
6The term zero lower bound has become a bit of a misnomer with recent developments of negative nominal
interest being implemented in several central banks (Feroli et al., 2016). However, I have kept the term as it
reflects the discussion at the time. In addition, it should be noted that in several instances during the discussion of
the financial crisis that I refer to ZLB, but it could be that the interest rate is 10-30 basis points above this. In a
practical sense, this is considered an effective ZLB by the market participants (Gerlach and Lewis, 2010).
7These banks were Hokkaido Takushoku, Long-term Credit, and Nippon Credit.
8In other words, this is a negative rate of inflation. Usually, this is considered a troubling economic position, as
agents in the economy defer consumption and investment, causing economic growth to stall indefinitely.
9This type of thinking emphasises the belief that the only instrument available to the central bank is its control
over the short-term policy rate, usually described with the use of an IS-LM type of model.
10This is thought of as the Keynesian challenge of monetary policy, whereby the claim is that monetary policy is
ineffective at combating recessions (“pushing on a string”).
11Outside money is money without corresponding liability.
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Figure 2.1: Japanese growth, inflation and interest rates
Source: Bank of Japan
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2.3 ZIRP and QEP in Japan (1999 - 2006)
2.3.1 Zero Interest Rate Policy (1999 - 2000)
The BoJ implemented several nonstandard monetary policy measures in an attempt to spur
economic growth and avoid deflation, in line with the policy recommendations made by
Krugman (1998). In 1999, in the wake of the currency crises experienced by many South-
East Asian economies, the BoJ adopted a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), with a commitment
to keeping the uncollateralised call rate at a level of zero “until deflationary concerns are
dispelled”12. Implementing such a policy is supposed to shape public interest rate expectations,
indicating the ‘easy’ stance of monetary policy. Achieving success with this measure requires
transparency and continued communication on the side of the central bank (Woodford, 2012).
In 2000, the BoJ believed the Japanese economy to be in recovery, with forecasts of the
consumer price index (CPI) indicating the possibility of at least zero percent inflation (Momma
and Kobayakawa, 2014). Despite protestation from academics and private sector economists, the
central bank reneged on their zero rate commitment at the first signs of growth, and increased
the call rate by 25 basis points (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). However, economic conditions rapidly
12As stated by Governor Hayami at a press conference on April 13, 1999. This is known as a conditional
(state-dependent) commitment, and is one of the first examples of forward guidance - albeit rather weak in its
implementation
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worsened in 2001 with the burst of the global ICT bubble13, and the BoJ reversed their rate
increase with the declaration that ZIRP would continue until the “inflation rate becomes stably
above zero” (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). Reneging on the zero rate commitment severely damaged
the credibility of the bank for several years afterwards 14. The next section considers the
repercussions of the BoJ’s decision and the eventual usage of QE in an attempt to change public
perception of their resolve to combat deflation.
2.3.2 The Quantitative Easing Program (2001 - 2006)
Having blemished their reputation, the BoJ adopted a quantitative easing program (QEP) in
March 2001 to complement their renewed ZIRP, trying to bolster their expansionary commit-
ment. Quantitative easing (QE) as utilised by the BoJ primarily entailed providing reserves
in excess of those needed to keep the interest rate at the ZLB15. This approach to monetary
easing was supported by several academics, such as Krugman (1998), Meltzer (1998) and
McKinnon and Ohno (1997). However, there were dissidents who believed that this type of
policy would have fiscal implications, with the central bank exposed to unwanted investment
risk in potentially volatile asset markets (Fujiki et al., 2001). This issue is becoming increasingly
important as central banks across the world extend their balance sheets to include a wider
range of securities. It also raises the issue of central bank independence, which is discussed at
the end of the chapter. In addition, there are concerns that the balance sheet expansion will be
ineffective and ultimately lead to high levels of inflation.
A simple definition of quantitative easing is an increase in the size of the central bank’s balance
sheet. In the case of Japan, this translated into switching of the policy instrument from the
short-term interest rate to the current account balance (CAB)16(Ito and Mishkin, 2006). The BoJ
framed its approach as a three-pronged attack. First, it set a target for current account balances
in a stepwise fashion, starting with U5 trillion17 in 2001 and steadily increasing this over four
years to between U30 and U35 trillion (Momma and Kobayakawa, 2014). This amounts to
increasing base money in the economy with the target of supplying the economy with a surplus
of liquidity.
13Refers to a speculative bubble that formed as the result of a sudden increase in equity values of Internet-based
companies. It is also known as the dotcom bubble.
14The paper by Ito and Mishkin (2006) discusses the market behaviour during this period, which points to the
loss of confidence in the central bank’s ability to conduct policy.
15In Chapter 5 on the liquidity effect, I discuss the mechanism by which open market operations determine the
interest rate.
16This refers to the commercial bank balances held at the central bank and should not be confused with the
current account on the balance of payments.
17Which is in excess of the required balances of U4 trillion, providing the name ‘excess reserve targeting’.
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Second, as a corollary to the first arm, the central bank committed to providing liquidity in
excess of the banks’ reserve requirement, to keep expectations on the short-term interest rate
fixed at zero. Under this commitment the BoJ also made clear the conditions under which
ZIRP would be lifted (Momma and Kobayakawa, 2014). The specific condition in this case
was achieving a positive inflation rate and maintaining it for a prolonged period. Third, the
purchase of long-term Japanese government bonds (JGBs) was conducted gradually; monthly
outright acquisitions started at U400 billion in August 2001, and eventually reached a level of
U1200 billion in October 2002 (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). This third prong still operated under
the guise of quantitative easing, as the asset purchases were not sterilised18 by concomitant
sales of short-term debt, a topic that is covered in more detail in the section on balance sheet
typologies.
In addition to quantitative easing, from 2003 to 2006 the BoJ temporarily implemented credit
easing through intervention in asset markets; this entailed changing the composition (asset
side) of the central bank’s balance sheet by buying asset-backed securities (ABS). The BoJ
made it clear that this intervention was done in the spirit of financial market stabilisation and
should not be considered under the banner of monetary policy. In general, the reason the
BoJ implemented credit easing was to depress long-term interest rates and thereby encourage
interest-sensitive economic activity19. In 2006 the BoJ, believing that inflation was sufficiently
entrenched, announced its plan to terminate unconventional policy arrangements (Shiratsuka,
2010). A successful exit from QE relied on clear communication of the policy stance of the BoJ.
In this period, the intentions of the BoJ were made clear to stakeholders, with the specific goal
of preparing financial institutions for the withdrawal of liquidity.
2.3.3 Shaping Market Expectations: Hayami vs Fukui
At this point it is necessary to make a distinction between policy conducted under Governors
Hayami (1998 - 2003) and Fukui (2003 - 2008). Before 1998, at the start of Hayami’s term,
policymakers had little practical experience in dealing with a liquidity trap (apart from the
Great Depression). During that period, the first round of quantitative easing was implemented
and appeared largely to be ineffective. The problem was the policymakers’ failure to signal
the nature of their policy commitment and in so doing to disarm deflation (Ito and Mishkin,
2006). It has been argued that this was because QE was conveyed as a temporary measure,
18Sterilised in the context of balance sheet policy usually refers to actions by the central bank that counteract a
cash injection resulting from asset purchases (Woodford, 2012). In the case of Operation Twist, for example, an
increase in long-term Treasuries was met with a decrease in short-duration debt; which is a ‘cash-neutral’ operation.
Alternative strategies implemented by central banks to sterilise purchases are the use of term deposit facilities and
reverse repurchase agreements (Ihrig and Meade, 2015).
19This mechanism is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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without proper support from a tentative administration. The credibility of the bank was harmed
under Governor Hayami, as market participants were not always certain of the direction policy
would take. Indeed, as pointed out by Ito and Mishkin (2006), Hayami constantly changed his
position without providing the proposed mechanism of operation.
In 2003, when Governor Fukui was appointed, he immediately changed the message portrayed
by the central bank, by ratcheting up quantitative easing measures to reinforce the claims of
an expansionary policy commitment (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). Communication strategies were
significantly more transparent under the leadership of Fukui. The necessary conditions for
an exit from the ZIRP were explicitly stated. The change in rhetoric was found immediately
to have an impact on the recovery of the financial sector, with a more protracted rebound of
real variables (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). Forward guidance under Fukui was more successful
because announcements left little room for interpretation as to the position of the bank, with
the commitment of the bank being linked to actual and not forecasted values of CPI (Momma
and Kobayakawa, 2014).
Empirical evidence suggests that QE under Fukui was effective in establishing market expecta-
tions on future short-term interest rates, and ultimately on the long-term rates (Ugai, 2007).
The most profound impact of the change in rhetoric was on the financial markets and the
state of the banking sector, with the real economy showing only slow signs of recovery, which
suggested that the blockage in transmission was between nonfinancial and financial sectors (Ito
and Mishkin, 2006). Up until this point, it was not necessary to be specific about balance sheet
policies, as the types implemented in Japan before the financial crisis were sufficiently simple,
fitting easily into broad classifications. However, as we delve deeper into what balance sheet
policies encompass, it might be useful to have an appropriate typology toolkit.
2.4 Making Sense of Balance Sheet Typologies
The Japanese experiment generated a discussion on the role of monetary policy in a deflationary
environment. In what follows, I discuss some of the most important theoretical contributions
on the topic. These contributions were used to answer questions posed during the financial
crisis in 2008. The implications of central banks being constrained by the ZLB is highlighted
in the academic works of authors such as Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Blinder (2000),
Clouse et al. (2003), Svensson (2003), Orphanides and Wieland (2000), Eggerston and Wood-
ford (2003) and the seminal article by Bernanke et al. (2004). In general, there are several
instruments available to the central bank once the interest rate reaches the ZLB, most of which
were implemented in the case of Japan, with varying degrees of success.
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In the literature there are several classifications of balance sheet policy tools beyond interest
rate policy. Bernanke et al. (2004) first identified three plausible policy tools to use once the ZLB
is reached: (i) the management of public expectations on the course of interest rates, through
communication strategies; (ii) changes in the size of the central bank balance sheet; and (iii)
changes in the composition of the central bank balance sheet.
Woodford (2012) aggregates these tools into two streams, namely forward guidance and
balance sheet policies. I am primarily interested in the latter, which entails changes in the size
(quantitative easing) and composition (credit easing) of the central bank balance sheet. A more
detailed taxonomy proposed on these balance sheet policies is that of Borio and Disyatat (2010),
which is discussed in Chapter 2.4.2.1.
2.4.1 Expectations/Forward Guidance
Among the first authors in the modern literature to consider seriously the consequences of a
deflationary trap, is Krugman (1998, 2000). He contends that the appropriate solution to a
deflationary environment is to manage expectations, something that was poorly implemented in
the early years of the Japanese deflation. Several authors in the literature, such as Eggerston and
Woodford (2003), Svensson (2003), and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) agree that this is the best
strategy to employ in order to escape a liquidity trap. Central banks in this predicament need
to convince markets that they will commit to a higher rate of inflation in the future, allowing
expectations to form around the objective of persistently easy monetary policy. Krugman (1998)
suggests that the central bank set a high inflation target20 over the medium term in order to
stabilise expectations.
Krugman’s suggestion was met with resistance, as a high inflation target is at odds with the
idea of price stability. The work by Eggerston and Woodford (2003) points out that once the
economy emerges from the deflationary environment, a time-inconsistency problem would
emerge. Given the central bank mandate to maintain price stability, the policymaker would be
admonished for aiming for a high inflation target; Krugman (1998) refers to this as committing
to “being irresponsible”. In other words, owing to time-inconsistency, the public would expect
the central bank to renege on its high inflation rate commitment and the economy would fail to
move from its deflationary environment.
The Japanese experiment can be understood as an example of such time-inconsistency. When
faced with a slightly positive inflation rate, the central bank increased the call rate above the
ZLB, claiming that financial markets had stabilised. This action severely damaged the credibility
20Krugman (1998) suggests a medium-run target of 4% for fifteen years
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of the monetary authority, and when the economy moved back into a deflationary environment,
the newly appointed Governor had to look to unconventional policy in conjunction with a policy
rate commitment to boost economic growth and avoid deflation. The Japanese example shows
that sometimes announcing the target is not enough to pin down expectations. In order to
increase the credibility of its commitment, the central bank might have to combine elements of
balance sheet policy with an inflation target, which is referred to in the more modern literature
as forward guidance (Woodford, 2012).
2.4.2 Changes in Size and Composition
Central banks were created with the unique ability to issue bank reserves, making them the
monopoly supplier of bank money in the economy (Goodhart, 1988). These liabilities of the
central bank can be generated freely, without cost or limit. It is important to remember that, as
Lord Cobbald reputedly said, the “Central Bank is a bank, not a study group” (Goodhart, 2011,
p. 146). Central banks are responsible for the provision of liquidity to the banking system,
which acts as liquidity insurance that filters through to households and firms via commercial
banks (Tucker, 2014). In this regard, post-war monetary policy was initially concerned with
the management of the central bank’s balance sheet (Friedman, 1964). In recent years, the
focus has shifted to guidance of the nominal short-term policy rate. However, as argued by
du Plessis (2012), “determining the level of a policy interest rate is not a necessary function
of the central bank”. The international financial crisis has refocused the attention of central
bankers of balance sheet policies as part of the monetary policy toolkit.
There are several typologies of balance sheet policy, depending on the source being consulted.
In the most general sense, balance sheet policies operate along the dimensions of size and
composition. Increases in the size of the balance sheet usually mean “open market operations
on short-term government debt, outright purchase of long-term bonds (or equities), or through
unsterilized purchases of foreign currency” (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). However, quantitative eas-
ing has become synonymous with the expansion of the central bank balance sheet (particularly
the monetary base) without changing the composition of assets. Quantitative easing in this
sense entails the purchasing of assets by the central bank, leaving the type of assets on their
portfolio unchanged, while increasing reserve liabilities on the other side of the balance sheet
(Lenza et al., 2012). Some authors, such as Woodford (2012), refer to this as ‘pure’ quantitative
easing, while Reis (2009) calls it quantitative policy. Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) refer to this
as reserve-supply policy, which is the choice of reserves in the system. In essence, these are open
market operations where central bank liabilities (reserves) are traded in return for Treasury
securities.
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Credit/qualitative easing is generally perceived as balance sheet management aimed at altering
the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2011). In this
setting, the size of the balance sheet remains the same but the underlying portfolio of assets
changes from conventional assets held to include a variety of ‘unconventional’ assets, ranging
from long-term government debt to private sector securities (Lenza et al., 2012). One central
banker, that was adamant about the distinction between quantitative and credit easing, is
Bernanke (2009). He argues that,
The Federal Reserve’s approach to supporting credit markets is conceptually distinct from
quantitative easing (QE), the policy approach used by the Bank of Japan from 2001
to 2006. Our approach - which could be described as ‘credit easing’ (CE) - resembles
quantitative easing in one respect: It involves an expansion of the central bank’s balance
sheet. However, in a pure QE regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves,
which are liabilities of the central bank; the composition of loans and securities on the
asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet is incidental.
This typology is quite broad and is sometimes an inaccurate representation of policy intent;
in other words, it does not always encapsulate the nuance of specific policy actions. My
discussion of the balance sheet policies used during the financial crisis requires a more precise
classification. As we will see, changes in the composition of the balance sheet of the central
bank often accompany increases in size, if purchases are unsterilised. It becomes increasingly
difficult to map the textbook view of changes in size and composition onto policy actions taken
during the financial crisis (Lenza et al., 2012).
2.4.2.1 A More Precise Typology
A more granular classification is probably better suited to the identification of different balance
sheet policies. I use the typology of Borio and Disyatat (2010) who have a four-fold classification
that includes exchange rate policy, quasi-debt management policy, credit policy and bank
reserves policy. This typology is summarised by Figure 2.2.
First, exchange rate policy, which is briefly described in the first section of this chapter, is not
considered further. Second, quasi-debt management policy entails central bank intervention in
the market for public sector debt. Policy in this sphere operates mainly on the composition of
private sector balance sheets, with the aim of altering the composition of government securities
held in the hands of private agents. In general, the aim is to alter the yield curve on Treasury
securities. Policy in this vein could translate into interest rate risk for the central bank as it take
on riskier long-term government debt.
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Third, credit policy refers to targeted purchases of private assets in specific markets in order to
affect private sector balance sheets. During the financial crisis, this type of policy was employed
to “enhance market liquidity, reduce risk spreads, promote new issuance, and increase private
access to credit” (Meier, 2009). Credit policy often exposes the central bank to credit risk on
private sector claims, an issue that is covered in more depth in the discussion on the measures
used in the financial crisis. Finally, bank reserves policy requires increasing liabilities, by setting
a specific target for bank reserves, independently from what happens on the asset side of the
central bank balance sheet.
Quantitative easing, for example, in the case of Japan (2001 - 2006), in this taxonomy is seen as
a combination of bank reserves policy and forward guidance (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). There
are also elements of quasi-debt management policy, with the purchase of long-term Japanese
government bonds, in the latter part of the QE program.
Defining QE as merely an increase in the size of the balance sheet loses some of the nuance
involved; however, such simplifications will sometimes be made to facilitate model construction.
It is important to understand not only the general classification, but also the channels of policy
transmission, in order to comprehend why policy actions are performed. In the following section
I discuss some of the most important transmission channels for balance sheet policies.
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2.5 Transmission Channels
Up to this point, I have abstained from discussing the transmission mechanism, but the balance
sheet policies used by the central bank during the crisis rely on an understanding of transmission
channels (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). In this section I discuss, in greater
detail, the transmission channels through which balance sheet policies - specifically quasi-debt
management and credit policies - are thought to affect financial markets and a broader range of
macroeconomic indicators. In particular, they are thought to have three direct effects, through:
(i) asset yields/prices; (ii) money market rates; and (iii) market confidence/expectations, as
depicted in Figure 2.3 (Cova and Ferrero, 2015).
There are diverging theories on the channels through which balance sheet policies are trans-
mitted to the broader economy. However, there is some consensus that there are two primary
channels: the signalling channel and the portfolio balance channel, with several plausible
subchannels (Bernanke et al., 2004; Borio and Disyatat, 2010). It should be noted that this
classification is not exhaustive and includes primarily the main channels of transmission as
well as some relevant subchannels. Only the relevant channels are discussed here, as there are
several taxonomies in the literature, with differing levels of complexity. Figure 2.3, which is
adapted from Cova and Ferrero (2015), is provided to give a summary of potential transmission
channels and effects.
2.5.1 Portfolio Balance Channel
The most natural setting for balance sheet policies when the interest rate has reached the ZLB is
the portfolio balance channel. Several policymakers such as Bernanke (2009), Yellen (2011),
and Bean (2011) specifically mention this channel in conducting large-scale asset purchases
during the recent crisis. The portfolio balance effect refers to the ability of the central bank to
affect term, risk, and liquidity premiums (i.e. overall yields) through open market operations
(Bernanke et al., 2004). More simply stated, it describes “how the purchase of a given asset
pushes up the price of that asset and its substitutes” (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). A large part of
modern research on balance sheet policies focuses on this channel, with a rich vein of literature
dating back to the late 1950s. It is important to mention that the portfolio balance channel
(PBC) itself is multidimensional, with a further subdivision normally entailing a discussion
on the scarcity and duration risk channels (D’Amico et al., 2012). These mechanisms are
individually explored.
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2.5.1.1 History of the Portfolio Balance Channel
The literature on the portfolio balance channel originates largely from the discussion surround-
ing the Fed’s ‘bills only’ policy, which it adopted in 1953. Within the confines of the Federal
Reserve Accord, the central bank could conduct open market operations only through the
trading of short-term Treasury securities (D’Amico et al., 2012). The logic, as presented in
Riefler (1958), was that the central bank could steer expectations on the long-term interest
rates through its control over the path of the short-term rate. This meant that movements in the
short-term rate would transmit through the interest rate structure, by its influence on market
expectations, to steer the long-term rate, all without intervention in long-term markets. This
is referred to as the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, which is
normally depicted using a yield curve21 (Thornton and Guidolin, 2008).
Criticism on the exploitable link between short- and long-term asset markets emerged in the
academic literature, with an early critique of the bills-only approach provided in the work of
Culbertson (1957), Conard (1959), and Ascheim (1961). The Kennedy administration was
supportive of this assessment of the bills-only policy and ratified Operation Twist in 1961 in
order to affect the term structure of interest rates, which entailed increasing the amount of
long-term securities on the balance sheet of the central bank. In principal, this policy to change
the composition of the central bank balance sheet was aimed at decreasing the long-term rate
by increasing the supply of long-term bonds relative to short-term bonds (D’Amico et al., 2012).
Control over the long-term rate was considered important, as aggregate demand is influenced
by more than just the short-term interest rate, which is pointed out by both Keynesians (Tobin,
1969) and monetarists (Brunner and Meltzer, 1973; Friedman and Schwartz, 1982)22. This
approach is juxtaposed by the current quasi-debt management strategy followed by central
banks to depress long-term Treasury rates23.
2.5.1.2 Preferred Habitat / Scarcity Channel
Although Operation Twist was initially judged to be largely ineffective24, it acted as a catalyst
for the further development of a theoretical literature on the term structure of interest rates.
In particular, it inspired Culbertson (1957) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966) to establish the
21A yield curve reflects the relationship between bonds with similar ratings but different maturities (Strohsal,
2013). It is usually upward sloping, as longer maturity bonds are supposed to have a higher yield.
22The idea that several asset yields should be taken into consideration is at the heart of the monetarist
transmission mechanism.
23It is easy to observe the heritage of the newly implemented LSAPs in the US, with the maturity extension
program accompanying QE2 also referred to as Operation Twist.
24Initial studies showed an insignificant affect on long-term rates. However, a recent article by Swanson (2011)
shows that an event-study approach reveals a significant reduction in long-duration security yields.
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“preferred habitat” approach. This is a market segmentation theory that points to the fact that
investor clienteles might have a preference for assets of a specific maturity, and that the “interest
rate for a given maturity is influenced by demand and supply shocks local to that maturity”
(Vayanos and Vila, 2009). Notably, this establishes a positive correlation between asset yields
and the relative supply of long-term securities25 (Strohsal, 2013).
It is generally accepted that generating portfolio balance effects relies on imperfect asset substi-
tutability26. As stated by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), “if the liquidity or risk characteristics of
securities differ, so that investors do not treat all securities as perfect substitutes, then changes
in relative demands by a large purchaser have the potential to alter relative security prices”.
Under the assumption that assets are imperfect substitutes, Tobin (1961, 1969) was among the
first to illustrate that a large buyer, such as the central bank, could alter the supply of assets
- with different maturities or liquidity - and thereby plausibly influence asset yield patterns.
In this narrative the purchase of securities by the central bank will increase the amount of
one asset relative to others in the private sector portfolio. In response to these open market
operations, the public will rebalance their portfolio to include more of the scarce (often riskier)
assets, which raises their price and lowers their yield; this is often referred to as the scarcity /
local supply channel (Bernanke et al., 2004).
Initial discussions on imperfect asset substitutability and the related portfolio balance effects
centred on the ability of the central bank to affect long-term asset yields through the scarcity
channel. This mechanism relies on the fact that there are limits to quantities of a certain asset
that investors can buy (Dai et al., 2013). In fact, as mentioned, this was the idea behind
Operation Twist in the 1960s, which entailed a change in composition of the balance sheet in
order to affect term structures. Quasi-debt management and credit policy27 relies on imperfect
asset substitutability in order to work; with securities of different maturities and risk profiles
treated as imperfect substitutes (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). Theoretically, there are several
reasons why assets are not perfect substitutes, with the most frequently cited justification being
related to investor maturity preference and the pricing of duration risk (Joyce et al., 2012a)28.
In the preferred habitat model investors have specific preferences for assets of a certain maturity
(segment of the yield curve / investment horizon), such as the preference of pension funds
to invest in longer-dated securities (D’Amico et al., 2012). Purchases by the central bank in
this model matter for bond yields, as private sector agents will try to rebalance their portfolios
25There are some caveats, with the magnitude of the correlation dependent on the risk aversion of arbitrageurs.
26Some of the most prominent early contributions in the work on imperfect asset substitutability can be found in
the work of Friedman (1956) and Tobin (1961, 1969).
27Primarily changes in the composition of the balance sheet of the central bank
28The introduction of transaction costs, capital constraints, and other financial frictions could in combination
generate this result (Bernanke et al., 2004).
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once open market operations have been performed on specific market segments (D’Amico et al.,
2012). This is illustrated in the general equilibrium models of Andres et al. (2004), Vayanos
and Vila (2009), Harrison (2012), and Chen et al. (2012a). All these papers feature a preferred
habitat approach and construct a segmented market model with imperfect asset substitution.
Generally, these models have two types of agents: I refer to them as preferred habitat investors
and arbitrageurs, as stipulated in Vayanos and Vila (2009)29. Preferred habitat investors are
inclined to purchase securities of a certain maturity30, while arbitrageurs are not limited to a
particular investment horizon. The model of Andres et al. (2004) puts the ideas of Tobin (1969)
into a general equilibrium setting, modelling preferred habitat investors who are interested only
in marketable, long-term fixed-income securities (D’Amico et al., 2012). With this, they try to
capture the idea that changes in the relative supply of assets can generate price changes.
Targeted purchases of assets of certain maturities can create shortages in that market segment
which cannot be resolved completely through asset substitution. This creates a scarcity in these
assets, which forces market prices to change. Some refer to this as the safety premium (asset
scarcity) channel, as described by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)31. Evidence
is provided by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) that in a preferred habitat envi-
ronment which operates only in the space of safe assets, the presence of investors in long-term
safe assets lowers the yield on those assets32. Investors in this setting are willing to pay a safety
premium for assets with a low default risk.
The model of Andres et al. (2004) highlights the importance of the heterogeneity of agents in
establishing imperfect asset substitutability. However, in this model the possibility exists that
arbitrageurs can eliminate the trades made by long-term bond investors, which would yield an
irrelevance result. In their work Vayanos and Vila (2009), try to elicit portfolio balance effects by
making the arbitrageurs risk averse33. Risk aversion, or even capital constraints on arbitrageurs,
could limit arbitrage in these markets so that asset prices are indicative of segmented investor
valuations (IMF, 2013).
29Andres et al. (2004) refers to them as restricted and unrestricted households, but the idea is the same. In his
model the restricted household (preferred habitat investor) is only allowed to purchase long-term securities, while
the unrestricted household (arbitrageur) has access to both short- and long-term assets.
30Normally long-term safe assets with zero risk for default, such as those invested in by pension funds (Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011).
31The asset scarcity channel pertains only to liquid, safe assets, such as Treasury bonds.
32Empirical evidence is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
33An alternative would be to place a credit constraint on investors, as in (Gertler and Karadi, 2011)
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2.5.1.3 Duration Risk Channel
In the model presented by Vayanos and Vila (2009) there is another portfolio balance mechanism
at play, besides the scarcity effect, called the duration risk channel, also emphasised by Gagnon
et al. (2011). Fixed income assets like long-term government bonds usually carry a term
premium, as they are susceptible to future movements in the interest rate (Bowdler and
Radia, 2013). The uncertainty associated with longer term securities is called duration risk.
Intervention by the central bank in long-term asset markets, for example, changes the duration
risk.
If the central bank were to purchase a large quantity of long-term bonds in a specific market
segment, it would decrease duration risk (making the investors’ portfolios safer) by removing a
portion of long-term securities and thereby reducing long-term yields. Importantly, this effect
flattens the entire yield curve (spread between long- and short-maturity bond yields), instead of
just the segment where purchases were made, as in the scarcity channel (Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). This duration risk channel was thought to be of great importance
during the recent financial crisis. The model of Chen et al. (2012a) is an extension of the work
of Vayanos and Vila (2009) and attempts to develop a DSGE model of the large-scale asset
purchase programs of the US. They found that the programs achieved the greatest success in
reducing risk premia; or, in other words, operating through the duration risk channel.
2.5.1.4 Reserve- vs Supply-induced Portfolio Balance Effects
As first pointed out by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), as well as later argued by Woodford
(2012), a ‘pure’ form of quantitative easing exists, whereby the change in the size of the central
bank balance sheet only entails a shift in reserves. In a recent paper Christensen and Krogstrup
(2016) make a distinction between reserve- and supply-induced portfolio balance effects. The
supply-induced portfolio balance channel is the one usually stressed, whereby the relative
change in assets supply results in a change in the price of close substitutes.
However, there might also be a reserve-induced portfolio balance channel that reflects the
effect from ‘pure’ quantitative easing, where an increase in reserves will increase a broad range
of asset prices. In particular, the idea is that this reserve-induced channel might impact on
long-term yields. According to Christensen and Krogstrup (2016) the reserve-induced portfolio
balance effect can only be identified with “a substantial increase in the amount of central bank
reserves, [which] is achieved without acquiring any long-lived securities or close substitutes
thereof”. This channel is thought to exist because of one special property of reserves, they can
only be held by eligible banks.
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Using a specific case study of the Swiss National Bank, they are able to identify the overall impact
from the reserve-induced portfolio balance channel. They find that it contributes significantly
to decreasing the yield on long-term rates, without impacting on long-term Swiss bonds or
their close substitutes. It is then argued that this reserve-induced channel might have played a
substantial role in driving down long-term rates in the the QE programs implemented by the
US, UK, ECB and Japan in recent years.
As originally argued in Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) and later reiterated by Kandrac and
Schlusche (2015) and Christensen and Krogstrup (2016), increases in reserves can have an
impact on the broader economy beyond changing the relative supply of assets. Little research
has been performed on this component of the portfolio balance channel. However, with central
banks across the globe significantly increasing reserves in the last decade, more research will
try and determine the position of reserves in the range of transmission channels.
2.5.1.5 The Irrelevance Result and the Portfolio Balance Channel
During the 1970s and 1980s the expectations theory was the prevailing doctrine on long-term
interest rate determination (D’Amico et al., 2012). In fact, in this period few researchers and
policymakers were convinced about the relevance of balance sheet policies along the portfolio
balance channel. While the expectations hypothesis was instrumental in guiding beliefs about
the term structure of the interest rate, the work of Wallace (1981) contributed significantly to
the exclusion of the portfolio balance channel from formal economic models. He postulates that
open market operations - in an economy with complete markets, where government bonds of a
certain maturity are exchanged for assets of different maturity - have no real economic effect,
often referred to as the irrelevance result or Wallace neutrality34.
Naturally, a prime example of where agents are thought to be indifferent among options is at the
ZLB. Once this bound is reached and the central bank decides to intervene through a purchase
of short-term bonds, the market will react by balancing its portfolio toward money holdings
(Krugman, 1998; Svensson, 1999). In this setting the central bank asset purchases have no
impact on the real economy because both assets are largely risk free and bear no interest.
Owing to the irrelevance result (and the dominance of the expectations hypothesis), the portfolio
balance mechanism has been largely missing from modern New-Keynesian macroeconomic
models. Asset pricing in the traditional New-Keynesian model, see Woodford (2003), is usually
framed in terms of two assets, money and bond holdings. In the case of consumers being
indifferent between holding money versus bonds, agents consider the assets to be perfect
substitutes at the ZLB (Bowdler and Radia, 2013). This explanation, which is similar to that of
34Sargent and Smith (1987) corroborate the message of Wallace (1981).
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the Ricardian equivalence or Modigliani-Miller theorem, hinges on the fact that private sector
agents will internalise the asset acquisitions of the central bank (Bean et al., 2010).
The model of Eggerston and Woodford (2003) formalises the irrelevance result in a general
equilibrium setting with the nominal interest rate at the ZLB, proving that in frictionless financial
markets, balance sheet actions are ineffective. Operations are considered even neutral in the
exchange of reserves for longer-term securities (Chen et al., 2012a). In the absence of frictions,
assets purchased by the central bank are equivalent to reserves, implying no policy impact.
However, there is little practical support for this result (Bean et al., 2010).
In a response to criticism of their earlier work, Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) developed a model
that considers the potential of a central bank balance sheet as a policy tool. This model is similar
to that of Eggerston and Woodford (2003) but includes vital credit frictions that generate the
desired non-neutrality in credit policy. In terms of the typology of Borio and Disyatat (2010),
credit policy can work when supply-side frictions are imposed; however, there is no role for
quasi-debt management in this model.
2.5.2 Signalling Channel
One of the most important tools at the disposal of the central bank is its ability to shape the
expectations of market participants (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). The signalling channel
is the primary channel through which monetary policy is thought to affect the longer-term
interest rates when assets are perfect substitutes (D’Amico et al., 2012; Joyce et al., 2014).
Asset purchases by the central bank, as argued by Eggerston and Woodford (2003) , could lower
long-term bond yields if they serve as a commitment device to keep the short-run policy rate
lower in future35. In other words, they reveal information that changes market expectations
about key factors that determine the asset’s price. These factors include “expectations regarding
the future course of policy, relative scarcities of different assets or their risk and liquidity profiles”
(Borio and Disyatat, 2010).
Clouse et al. (2003) argue that if the central bank purchased a large number of long-term
bonds and then raised the short-term rate, it would expose itself to capital losses on the assets
purchased. Financial market participants might view these purchases as a credible commitment
not to deviate from its easy monetary policy stance; that is, if they believe that these losses enter
into the central bank’s objective function (Bowdler and Radia, 2013). Interestingly, signalling
affects all bond rates, since the lower yield on Treasury securities is thought to affect all rates
in the market via the expectations hypothesis (as previously discussed) (Krishnamurthy and
35This might mean keeping the rate below what is prescribed by an interest rate rule, such as the Taylor rule.
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Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). Empirical evidence on the signalling channel is given in Chapter 4.
2.5.3 Liquidity Channel
A potential third channel is called the liquidity channel and is mostly applicable when financial
markets are dysfunctional (Bowdler and Radia, 2013). In this channel the central bank purchases
long-term illiquid securities and issues reserves, with reserves being more liquid than long-term
securities. Distressed financial markets generally result in a decrease in wholesale funding,
which leaves many firms liquidity constrained. Central bank asset purchases when financial
market functioning is impaired can increase investor liquidity and reduce the liquidity premia
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). This means that yields on the most liquid assets
will increase, relative to other assets. During the crisis other plausible transmission channels
were suggested, but at the moment there is no consensus over their inclusion in a larger typology.
These channels are described as they are encountered throughout the rest of the thesis.
2.6 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed the various dimensions of balance sheet policy. The primary contri-
bution of this chapter, as with most literature reviews, is to aggregate relevant passages in the
literature in such manner as to construct a coherent narrative. First, I provided an historical
account on the use of balance sheet policies, with specific reference to the case of Japan. Oper-
ating under threat of deflation, with conventional policy tools exhausted, encouraged Japanese
authorities to experiment with new monetary policy instruments. Not only did this provide a
training ground for the development of their quantitative easing program, it motivated research
on a topic long-forgotten.
In retrospect, the Japanese experience provided invaluable preparation in dealing with the
global collapse. In response to the crisis, several central banks had no choice but to relinquish the
usage of their nominal overnight interest rate as policy tool, quickly shifting policy responsibility
to their balance sheets. For example, once the zero lower bound was reached in the US, large-
scale asset purchases and establishment of liquidity facilities were expeditiously carried out.
The rapidity of response might have been slowed if it were not for the lessons learnt in Japan.
While it is widely understood that during the crisis central banks used their balance sheets to
restore order to dysfunctional financial markets - and more broadly the monetary transmission
mechanism - the nature of these policies and their implementation is often severely misunder-
stood. Correcting confusion with respect to balance sheet policy implementation and channels
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of transmission was a central objective of this review. In order to facilitate understanding,
balance sheet policies were codified in terms of both broad and narrow typologies. In the
broad sense, balance sheet policies are conducted along the dimensions of size and composition,
while the narrow typology captures greater nuance with reference to asset classes affected by
operations. Precise definition is important, as future discussion on the channels of transmission
rely on a narrow understanding of balance sheet policies.
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Chapter 3
Balance Sheet Policies II: Financial Crisis
and Policy Response
The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not
formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the
most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow
of a doubt, what is laid before him.
— Leo Tolstoy (1894)
In the years preceding the global financial crisis it was argued that the science of monetary
policy was starting to develop, owing to contributions of “rigorous theory and empirical work”
(Mishkin, 2007). A consensus had been reached. The success of inflation targeting meant
that “monetary policy could sustain low inflation with low unemployment on average, and
with infrequent, mild recessions” (Goodfriend, 2007b). The last decade has proven that the
consensus might have been premature, with declarations of monetary policy as science quickly
quashed. What was previously thought to be certain, was perhaps a case of academic hubris.
3.1 The Financial Crisis (2007 - 2008)
The initial deflation diagnosis in Japan caused lively debate in the academic community as to
the possibility of its incidence in other industrialised nations (Eggerston and Woodford, 2003).
With interest rates already low in many developed countries in response to low inflation and
slowed economic growth in the industrialised world, the possibility of a binding constraint on
interest rate policy became a sobering reality. This was particularly true in the case of the USA,
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with concerns over deflation being resurrected with the recession in 2001.
An extensive literature emanated from this discourse, revealing potential policy predicaments
and complementary solutions. Naturally, one of the concerns with a liquidity trap is that
real interest rates will be too high to stimulate economic activity1. Several strategies were
proposed as alternatives when short-term interest rate policy is constrained by the lower bound.
An examination of the literature shows that, in order to combat this deflationary trap, an
appropriate communication strategy, often in conjunction with nonstandard policy measures, is
a suitable cure (Bernanke et al., 2004)2. The biggest challenge, then, faced by central banks
(especially those who suffer from a lack of credibility) is to convince the public that they are
willing to commit to a sustained future expansionary policy. However, central bankers and
academic economists, under the influence of the overwhelming success of the much-lauded
New Neoclassical synthesis in monetary policy, have lost interest in the topic of deflationary
traps (Goodfriend, 1997; Woodford, 2003).
3.1.1 Flexible Inflation Targeting
After the initial rush of research on Japan, economists considered the idea of deflation as no
more than a passing theoretical curiosity (Woodford, 2012). Progress in terms of monetary
theory instilled a confidence that even in advanced economies with low rates of inflation and
interest, the ZLB would not plausibly be reached (Orphanides and Wieland, 2000). This false
sense of security came from the apparent success of monetary policy in taming inflation (in
terms of its level and variability) during the period known as the Great Moderation. This period,
between the mid-1980s and 2007, was characterised by decreased business cycle volatility
and low and stable inflation in most of the developed world. Apparent advances in theory,
corroborated by empirical evidence, led researchers and policymakers to state that monetary
policy had ventured into the territory of being called a science3 (Clarida et al., 1999; Mishkin,
2007; Galí and Gertler, 2007; Goodfriend, 2007a; Taylor, 2007b).
It was believed that the focus of monetary policy in controlling inflation, by managing expec-
tations of future policy rates (and thereby the long-term rate), made these advances possible
(Svensson, 2003). In other words, optimal monetary policy was centred around the concept of
a flexible inflation targeting regime with a symmetric target4. Under such a system, deflation
1This is if we calculate real interest rates to be the sum of the nominal and inflation rates, as specified by Fisher
(1930).
2This strategy was referred to by Svensson (2003) as a foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap.
3In fact, the famous 1999 article by Clarida, Gali and Gertler is called The Science of Monetary Policy: A New
Keynesian Perspective. The idea of the economist as a scientist is challenged in the article by Mankiw (2006), who
likens economists more to problem-solving engineers.
4According to the flexible inflation targeting framework, optimal monetary policy steers to a constant long-run
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could be avoided. Generally, a nominal anchor has two important features that could help in
avoiding deflation. First, an inflation targeting regime was believed to have better fixed the
expectations of the market on the nominal anchor, in the process helping to avoid deflation
(Woodford, 2003). Once again, for this strategy to be successful, communication on the part
of the central bank is crucial. A commitment to a nominal anchor removes policy flexibility,
improving the accountability and transparency of the policy.
Second, as argued by Ahearne et al. (2002), modern economies in a low-inflation environment
faced with a negative shock could apply an aggressive reduction in the policy rate and thereby
avoid the liquidity trap. Research by Harrigan and Kuttner (2004) on optimal monetary policy
in Japan, using a Taylor rule, revealed that a credible nominal anchor (specifically an inflation
target) would have guided their policy formulation so as to avoid the situation. Academics and
government officials alike agreed that the economic slump of Japan in the 1990s was poorly
handled by policymakers, in that the BoJ did not react swiftly and aggressively enough in the
years preceding the deflationary spiral to prevent it (Ito and Mishkin, 2006). As stated by the
previous BoJ Governor, “the low growth in Japan following the bursting of a bubble was often
simply interpreted as a unique episode caused by a failure to implement bold policy measures
in a prompt manner” (Shirakawa, 2013).
Empirical evidence presented by Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Jinushi et al. (2000), McCallum
(2003), and Taylor (2001) indicates that policy was too tight after 1992 and that the policy rate
should have been reduced much earlier. Studies on the efficacy of policy were focused on policy
rate rules and the credibility that these rules afford (Blanchard, 2011). In particular, optimal
monetary policy during this period was conducted with a focus on Taylor rules. In this setting,
the optimal level of the short-term interest rate was determined by the distance from the output
and inflation gaps (Taylor, 1999). Central banks before the crisis paid great attention to output
gaps and inflation expectations, often neglecting issues of financial instability and the formation
of asset bubbles (Shirakawa, 2013).
3.1.1.1 Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability
A monetary regime that produces aggregate price stability will, as a by-product, tend to
promote stability of the financial system.
— Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe (2002)
Historically, policymakers were concerned with both price and financial stability. In fact, as
argued by Goodhart (1988), central banks were initially created to prevent financial crises and
average rate of inflation. Fluctuations in the short-run are tolerated in order for policy to affect real activity, but
inflation should not move away from the established long-run level for too long (Woodford, 2012)
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bank failures that resulted from the “free banking” systems. However, there are several reasons
why discussions on the central bank’s role in achieving financial stability have been muted.
First, the financial sector risk was not taken into account in determining the appropriate stance
of monetary policy, as central banking was too narrowly focused on price stability (Borio,
2011). It is argued that the capacity of the central bank to combat asset price movements
and the build-up of financial instability with conventional policy tools is limited (Woodford,
2010). The magnitude of the change in the nominal short-term interest rate might have to be
quite large to combat asset price movements. This might be detrimental, as it could derail the
inflation objective. For example, in their seminal article Bernanke and Gertler (2001), argue
that monetary policy should be concerned only about factors that could plausibly influence
inflation projections5. In their study they found that the central bank gains relatively little from
responding to asset price movements, and it should consider asset price fluctuations only in
its capacity to affect the forecast of inflation, referred to as the “benign neglect” approach. In
addition, the increase in the interest rate might impact asset classes beyond the one where a
bubble is developing (Woodford, 2010). This means that perhaps targeted instruments, such as
macroprudential regulation, would be more appropriate.
In fact, after the financial crisis there was a resurgence in the literature on the interaction of
monetary policy and financial stability. In an article by Smets (2014), he argues that “price
stability has proven not to be a sufficient condition for financial stability and lack of financial
stability can have large negative feedback effects on price stability”. In his article he calls
for macroprudential regulation to run complementary to monetary policy in dealing with the
buildup of financial imbalances. Monetary policy should be able to lean again the wind in the
short-run, coordinated with macroprudential policy, while focusing on price stability in the
medium-term (Smets, 2014).
Second, measurement of the build-up of risk has been problematic. For example, it has proven
almost impossible to identify asset price ‘bubbles’6 until they have burst. Without a proper
method for identifying bubbles, it is not considered worthwhile for the central bank to try and
lean against asset price increases through contractionary policy. This has led academics and
policymakers alike to suggest mopping up after the bubble has burst. However, as evidenced
by the recent crisis, this might prove too costly. On the other hand, one thing gained from the
crisis is that the overvaluation of an asset and the accompanying drop in price is not always the
issue that needs to be addressed. The important consideration is the development of systemic
risk that poses a threat to the health of the overall financial system, in other words, the joint
failure of systemically important financial institutions. In this sense there have been significant
5Before the financial crisis, this was referred to as the Jackson Hole Consensus.
6A situation in which the price of an asset exceeds its fundamental value.
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improvements in the measurement of risk to financial stability (Woodford, 2010).
Third, central banks generally adhere to the principal of one instrument for one target, often
referred to as the Tinbergen principle. Relying on only the policy rate as the tool of monetary
policy means that central banks have no power to navigate the financial stability space. One
tool for two goals creates “conceptual and practical” confusion as to the ultimate objective,
with communication becoming increasingly difficult (Svensson, 2012). Finally, regulation was
thought to complement monetary policy and thereby take care of financial stability concerns,
with microprudential regulation acting the as key policy tool. However, once the crisis had hit,
this idea surrounding the tools available to the monetary authority with respect to financial
stability changed dramatically, bringing the balance sheet of the central bank into contention
(Blanchard, 2011).
3.1.2 Tension Before the Collapse (2007)
In early 2007 there were signs of an impending financial crisis, stemming from turmoil in the
sub-prime mortgage market in the USA. Housing and credit bubbles had formed due to several
factors, with a low interest environment in the US, the increasing use of structured finance,
and deficient financial regulation considered proximate causes. This section is not an in-depth
discussion on the most likely causes and mechanisms underlying the crisis; it is simply an
overview of the relevant contributing factors. Giving a detailed account of the financial crisis is
a difficult endeavour; as Gary Gorton (2012) puts it, “the wave of research on the crisis has
already exceeded any single reader’s capacity, with the pace of new work only making it harder”.
In fact, in a report to Congress in 2010 to explain the origin of the financial crisis, Mark Jickling
(2010) identified 26 potential causes. Undoubtedly the list of causes has grown since then, and
a discussion on each potential contribution is unfeasible.
3.1.2.1 Low Policy Rate Environment
The low policy rates of the early 2000s in the US were the result of historically low inflation
during the Great Moderation and an active attempt by the Fed to dispel deflationary concerns in
the wake of the mild 2001 recession7. In fact, Taylor (2007a) argues that rates were significantly
lower than prescribed by rule-based optimal monetary policy mechanisms, such as the Taylor
rule. Such an environment could plausibly induce a risk-taking attitude of investors in several
ways, which Borio and Zhu (2012) call the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy.
7After the bursting of the dotcom bubble.
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Conventionally, when yields on safe assets are low, investors substitute toward higher-yielding
risky assets, a phenomenon that was recorded in the build-up to the crisis, described as a
“search-for-yield” (Rajan, 2005; Shirakawa, 2013). This was compounded by the fact that
perceived risk was at an all-time low during the Great Moderation, as suggested by several
measures of implied volatility (Bean et al., 2010). In addition, as argued by Adrian and Shin
(2008) and Adrian et al. (2010a), the increase in the price of risky assets improves the balance
sheet position of financial intermediaries8 and encourages them to take on more debt (either
through the extension of loans or the acquisition of securities), which in turn fuels further
asset price increases. This effect is amplified by the pro-cyclical capital requirements of the
Basel II accord. Over time, owing to the limited number of ‘safe borrowers’ in an economy and
the depressed interest margins of commercial and investment banks, increased loan provision
translates into increased funding of risky projects, inducing a leverage cycle (Bean et al., 2010).
3.1.2.2 Securitisation
In order to frame better the context of the incentive structure faced by financial institutions, it
is important to discuss the topic of securitisation and the introduction of structured financial
instruments. In a low interest rate environment, where financial institutions were in a search-
for-yield, they were incentivised to create structured financial instruments to boost profitability.
Financial engineering allowed the transformation of a group of illiquid and possibly risky assets
(such as mortgages) into an apparently low-risk security, through a process called securitisation
(du Plessis, 2011).
3.1.2.2.1 Definition and History Traditionally, banks needed to fund loans issued to bor-
rowers through the collection of deposits. Modern banking has grown significantly in terms of
the sources of funding available, which now “include bond financing, commercial paper financ-
ing, and repurchase agreement (repo) funding” (Bord and Santos, 2012). A vitally important
change in the lending structure of banks is the shift from the originate-to-hold model of lending
to the originate-to-distribute framework (du Plessis, 2011). In the originate-to-hold model,
loans are kept on the balance sheet of the originator, which provides an incentive to control
the quality of the loan. The benefit of this model, as discussed in Ramakrishnan and Thakor
(1984), Diamond (1984) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), is that banks are able to monitor
borrower activity. With the originate-to-distribute model, “loans are pooled, tranched, and then
resold via securitization” (Brunnermeier, 2009). Modern banks, therefore, are more concerned
with convincing potential investors of the quality of the loans underlying the asset pledged
8Commercial banks are looking to retain constant leverage ratios, but investment banks do not mind increased
leverage in a boom period.
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(du Plessis, 2011)9. Credit ratings agencies helped to bridge the information gap between
investors and financial institutions selling bundled cash flows.
According to Andersen et al. (2013), “[s]ecuritization means selling securities whose principal
and interest payments are exclusively linked to a pool of legally segregated, specified, cash
flows (promised loan payments) owned by a special purpose vehicle (SPV)10”. In this setting,
an SPV (i.e. the issuer) buys the rights to the cash flow of the pooled assets from an authorised
loan originator (Gorton, 2015). Securities formed from the pooling of assets are referred to as
asset-backed securities (ABS). After being packaged and assigned credit ratings11, these ABS
are sold in capital markets to fund the purchase of the loan portfolio (Andersen et al., 2013).
In the US this process led to the creation of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which entailed
collecting mortgages and bundling them into a security. Initially, securitisation of this type was
performed only by government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Due to the potential credit risk borne by these GSEs, the approval of mortgage loans was
subject to a set of guidelines. Mortgage loans that fell within a prudent set of parameters were
referred to as standard conforming loans (du Plessis, 2011).
The restrictions on loan eligibility were not politically popular, as the inability to qualify for
conventional mortgages excluded a large portion of the population. In response, new mortgage
classes, such as Alt-A and sub-prime mortgages were created, which allowed those with poor
credit histories to be considered for loans (Taylor, 2008). The lowering of lending standards
was considered largely to be a political initiative intended to increase homeownership among
low-income households (Wallison, 2009). Due to their risky nature, interest rates on nonprime
loans are significantly higher than the rate on prime loans (Acharya and Richardson, 2012).
One of the major contributing factors to the sweeping defaults and foreclosures of 2007 and
2008 was that a substantial proportion of subprime mortgage loans had adjustable rates, which
were unwittingly structured in such a way as to create systemic risk. Adjustable rates meant that
loans were offered at a fixed rate for a short period (a teaser rate), usually for the first two to
three years, after which the rate floated at a variable rate with an additional premium (Acharya
and Richardson, 2012). Financial institutions understood that a rate increase would result in
either defaulting or refinancing for many clients. However, as long as the underlying asset
price was increasing, borrowers could use capital gained from the appreciation as collateral
to refinance their homes12 (Gorton, 2008). With this mechanism in place, the probability of
9Investors need to be convinced, as banks are off-loading the risk associated with these loans onto investors.
10SPVs in this context are legal entities created to fund a large pool of assets, by buying the right to cash flows
from financial intermediaries.
11Interestingly, securities created in the process of securitisation are considered ‘credit enhanced’, which means
that the rating is higher than the underlying asset pool (i.e. unsecured debt from the originator)
12Interestingly, refinancing of existing mortgages formed the bulk of origination in the sub-prime mortgage
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systemic default seemed remote.
3.1.2.2.2 MBS and Derivatives Along with adjustable rate mortgages and the reliance on
appreciating house prices, the type of securitisation performed before the crisis also significantly
contributed to systemic risk, as it “eroded loan quality” and caused a “lack of transparency about
the quality of the loans” (Jaffee et al., 2009). Usually, the issuer of the security divides it into
tranches, and each tranche is assigned a specific credit rating. AAA-rated, senior tranches were
considered the safest investment by credit rating agencies13. Ratings were based on both the
individual probability of default (i.e idiosyncratic risk), as well as on the correlation of default
across all securities in the pool (i.e systematic risk) (Gorton, 2010). Market participants looking
for low-risk, stable investments - such as pension funds - looked to the safer senior tranches,
while riskier investors purchased securities from the lower-rated and higher-yielding tranches.
The most basic form of MBS is referred to as ‘pass-through’. A pass-through security is usually
created by pooling a selection of assets and then allowing the sale of shares or participation
certificates, allowing access to the pool. Shareholders then are passed through a pro-rata portion
of the cash flow generated by the pool (Andersen et al., 2013). However, in order to generate
an even greater selection of investment products, several mortgage derivatives were created.
Among the most popular derivatives were the collateralised debt obligations (CDOs)14.
The complexity and lack of transparency generated by securitisation is not fully appreciated
until one delves into the topic of CDOs. Cash flow generated from the different tranches of
MBS was often further segmented into structured asset-backed securities called CDOs, with
sub-prime mortgages (i.e. the debt obligation) offered as collateral. While the structure of
CDOs can be explained in different ways, I follow the layout of Gorton (2008) and Jaffee et al.
(2009).
First, CDOs are divided into high-grade, mezzanine and equity levels. The majority (more than
95 per cent) of the cash flow from the top three tranches of MBS (AAA, AA, A) was directed at
senior high-grade CDOs (Jaffee et al., 2009). Mezzanine CDOs are usually formed from the
middle, riskier tranches of the MBS. Equity CDOs are formed from the bottom tranche and are
considered junk bonds, or “toxic waste” (Brunnermeier, 2009). In this setup the high-grade
CDOs get paid first in the case of a default, with mezzanine paid next and the equity tranche
paid only after the others receive payment15.
market (Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2008).
13Tranches range from the safe senior level to risky junk bonds, with the yield increasing as you move to the
riskier tranches.
14While it is rather confusing, a CDO is still considered an MBS.
15Referred to as a waterfall structure, where the benefits go to the top first and then flow down.
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Second, adding another level of complexity, both the high-grade and mezzanine levels are
portioned into discrete tranches, with different ratings of default risk assigned to each tranche
(Acharya and Richardson, 2012). The equity tranche is usually held by the issuing bank, in
order to monitor borrowing activity (Brunnermeier, 2009). On average, the more senior levels
are divided into six or seven tranches. Effectively, this means that within the mezzanine CDO,
which is formed from riskier MBS tranches, it is possible to create an AAA-rated MBS. With
increased demand for AAA-rated securities, this type of financial engineering was encouraged.
Third, the middle portion (normally AA and A rated securities) of mezzanine CDOs were often
repackaged as CDO2, which also delivered a significant portion of AAA-rated securities (Jaffee
et al., 2009). As revealed during the crisis, correctly assigning risk to these structured securities
is exceedingly difficult.
A lack of transparency, and a belief in the financial engineering16 underlying the creation
of CDOs led credit rating agencies to incorrectly assign inherently risky assets the highest
possible credit ratings. This was, in part, because agencies believed the potential for large-scale
default was improbable17 (du Plessis, 2011). Needless to say, ratings agencies underestimated
the risk associated with these securities and their derivatives, which became evident when
delinquencies started to increase in response to a turn in the housing market in 2006 (Ashcraft
and Schuermann, 2008). Unfortunately, many securities firms held large quantities of these
opaque assets on their balance sheets18.
3.1.2.2.3 Credit Default Swaps Security buyers could also try and protect their potentially
risky investments by purchasing a credit default swap (CDS) contract. With a credit default
swap, the seller of a CDS contract asks the protection buyer to pay a nominal fee (credit swap
premium) to assume the credit risk associated with a security19. In the case that a negative
credit event - such as a default - occurs, the seller of the CDS contract needs to pay the principal
and interest on the referenced obligation, while the buyer delivers either the referenced asset or
a settlement worth the market value of the bond (Acharya et al., 2012).
Before the crisis, CDSs were quite popular for insuring against the credit risk associated with
CDOs and other MBS. In fact, the CDS market was one of the most rapidly growing markets
before the crisis. In 1998 the notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts was about $180
billion, expanding to a high of $62 trillion in 2007 (Acharya et al., 2012). According to data
16Market participants believed that the Gaussian Copula formula used was representing risk probabilities
accurately.
17Credit rating agencies were also incentivised to assign high ratings. If they did not abide, financial institutions
would simply move their business to another agency.
18Usually the purchases of these assets are financed through repurchase agreements with commercial banks
(Adrian and Shin, 2010)
19This fee payment occurs periodically until the maturity of the CDS.
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from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the current size of the market is around $12
trillion. The size of this market meant that in the case of a large-scale default, it might not be
possible for the sellers of CDS risk contracts to meet their obligations. In this subsection some
of the most important components of securitisation are detailed. What follows is a discussion
on how these elements contributed to financial intermediation in the shadow banking system.
3.1.2.3 Shadow Banking System
Initially, the term shadow bank, which was coined by Paul McCulley in 2007, referred to “risky
off-balance-sheet vehicles hatched by banks to sell loans repackaged as bonds” (Economist,
2016). However, shadow banking in its current incarnation has taken on a different meaning.
There are multiple definitions on what constitutes the shadow banking system. Broadly speaking,
as stated by Bernanke (2012),
Shadow banking, as usually defined, comprises a diverse set of institutions and markets
that, collectively, carry out traditional banking functions - but do so outside, or in ways
only loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions.
The primary function of the shadow banking system involves maturity transformation, in which
“‘opaque, risky, long-term assets” are converted into short-term liabilities (Adrian et al., 2010b;
Chan, 2012). In the chain of financial intermediation, purchases of MBS and CDOs by financial
institutions, through off-balance-sheet structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits,
are usually financed through repurchase agreements with commercial banks. Lending by the
commercial bank, in turn, is funded through issuing short-term liabilities. Financial commercial
paper (CP) is a popular form of short-term paper offered by these banks (Adrian and Shin,
2010). Buyers of these liabilities include money-market mutual funds (MMMFs), often with
household savers as shareholders.
Credit intermediation from shadow banking activities grew to equal that of commercial banks
(i.e. traditional depository institutions) in the years before the crisis (Bernanke, 2013). Securi-
tised portfolios were considered a source of collateral for funding under the shadow banking
system. In addition, abiding by the Basel II accords, banks had to fulfil a certain capital adequacy
ratio, with the safest tranches of ABS requiring less capital. During that time the economy
became reliant on seemingly low-cost shadow banking activities to supply short-term liquidity.
These activities were facilitated by the use of off-balance-sheet vehicles.
3.1.2.3.1 Off-Balance-Sheet Activity As a point of clarification, structured investment vehi-
cles (SIVs) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits are types of special purpose
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vehicles. These vehicles allow institutions to remove debt from corporate balance sheets, which
reduces the exposure of their balance sheet to risk, often making them appear safer then they
actually are. SPVs are legal entities that are created with one specific goal in mind. Earlier in the
chapter I discussed SPVs that are involved in the process of securitisation, creating investment
vehicles such as CDOs, CDSs and MBS. Securitised debt in this form is not kept on the balance
sheet of the bank. Whereas the SPVs in securitisation are fully mechanical/robotic in their
function, SIVs and ABCP conduits are actively managed companies. For example, the function
of SIVs is to sell short-duration bonds, such as commercial paper, to MMMFs, which generates
funds that are used to purchase long-duration securities - such as ABS - with high credit ratings
(Gorton and Metrick, 2010).
SPVs were first mentioned in the process of securitisation, with operations being conducted off
the balance sheets of banks. There are several benefits associated with conducting business in
this manner. First, securitisation avoids the potential for bankruptcy20. SPVs are constructed
in such a way as to make the possibility of bankruptcy - voluntary or involuntary - sufficiently
small (Gorton and Metrick, 2010). Second, off-balance-sheet securitisation is not subject to
regulatory capital requirements, which affords them access to relatively cheap debt financing.
Third, structures are put into place to avoid adverse selection21. Some of the prominent features
incorporated to eliminate adverse selection are eligibility criteria and warranties on the loans,
as well as the maintenance of an equity position in the security by the originator (Gorton and
Metrick, 2010). Finally, transparency is inherent in an SPV, with its portfolio being completely
known (i.e. full disclosure is provided in terms of its balance sheet).
3.1.2.3.2 Leverage The increase in off-balance-sheet activity effectively allowed many finan-
cial institutions to avoid capital requirements. However, this also entailed an almost unrestricted
increase in leverage. The ratio of assets to capital (equity) on a bank’s balance sheet is known
as leverage. When debt is in excess of equity, a bank is considered highly geared/leveraged
(Adrian and Shin, 2010). In other words, increases in debt financing relative to capital financing
increase the leverage. Equity is more costly to generate than debt, with servicing costs on
debt being tax-deductible (Ingves, 2014). Firms that finance assets with debt, as opposed
to equity, also improve their return on equity. This can be seen by the fact that leverage, in
terms of financial institutions, is considered to be pro-cyclical, which means a “strongly positive
relationship between changes in total assets and changes in leverage” (Adrian and Shin, 2010).
Leverage is key to credit provision as it decreases financing costs for firms, as long as earnings
20The paper by Klee and Butler (2002) provides a comprehensive account of how SPVs are structured in order to
avoid bankruptcy.
21In this setting, adverse selection might occur because loan originators have more information as to the quality
of the loans selected for the portfolio purchased by the SPV.
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exceed borrowing costs. However, the downside to excessive leveraging is that it can amplify
liquidity spirals, as explained in the last part of this section.
While banks were already highly geared, the on-balance-sheet activities were regulated. One
of the primary reasons why shadow banking grew so explosively is the fact that it was not
prone to the same regulatory oversight as traditional banks. In particular, the creation of
off-balance-sheet investment vehicles allowed banks to effectively circumvent risk-based capital
adequacy ratios. This allowed these institutions to become highly leveraged off their balance
sheets, while still conforming to regulatory capital requirements.
3.1.2.3.3 Regulation In the years leading up to the crisis, Alan Greenspan purposefully
attempted to deregulate markets in the US, with the belief that they would be able to self-
regulate. In this narrative, financial firms are the best equipped to regulate their own actions,
with government regulation seen as cumbersome and inefficient (Born, 2011). The self interest
of market participants would rule out excess, with tremendous amounts of government resources
needed to perform this action effectively, possibly without improving the final outcome. In
addition, several mechanisms were put into place by financial institutions to prevent excessive
risk-taking. For example, balance sheets with securitised assets were considered healthy, as
they contained assets with high credit ratings and therefore relatively low capital requirements
(Bernanke, 2012). The creditworthiness of counterparties is based on the health of the balance
sheet, which according to credit rating agencies and insurance companies, was considered safe
(Gorton, 2014).
An emphasis on deregulation helped the largely unregulated shadow banking sector to rapidly
evolve to match the size of the traditional banking sector. Several of these unsupervised
financial institutions, outside of the commercial banks, achieved the same level of systemic
importance (Born, 2011). The size of these institutions, linked with reduced regulation, had
several important implications that contributed to the crisis.
First, there was limited regulatory oversight on the risk-taking behaviour and risk management
strategies in the shadow banking system. While there was a degree of market discipline imposed
by market participants, it did not halt the development of systemic risk (Bernanke, 2012). In
addition, the fact that there was no statutory authority limited the information available with
regard to underlying risk.
Second, regulation focused mainly on microprudential supervision, which meant that authorities
were concerned only with the safety of individual financial institutions (i.e. idiosyncratic risk)
(Adrian et al., 2010b). After the crisis, macroprudential policy, which is directed at systemic
risk, became the focal point. Interestingly, before the crisis, in many advanced economies,
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governments did not even have the authority to “limit systemic risks that could result from the
collective behaviour of financial institutions and markets” (Bernanke, 2012). Not only did this
contribute to the build-up of risk, but also to the ability of policymakers to combat it.
Finally, the procyclical nature of the Basel II accords, with capital requirements becoming easier
to satisfy with the rise in asset prices, helped to fuel the asset market bubble (Goodhart et al.,
2010). This allowed banks to increase their leverage in good times and, unfortunately, made it
more difficult for them to maintain the requirement in times when credit was tight. In general,
the booming economy led most financial institutions to hold less capital than they needed, with
the potential for loss amplified in the case of a bust (Gorton, 2014).
In addition to the incentivised gearing through regulation, the central bank also contributed
by creating moral hazard through its capacity as lender-of-last-resort (Gorton, 2010). Market
participants were under the impression that once a crisis emerges, they would be considered
too-big-to-fail. This belief was institutionalised, in part, from the Bagehot principle, in which
the central bank is obligated to assist financial institutions regarded as systemically important.
‘Bagehot’s dictum’, as summarised by Tucker (2009), is that “to avert panic, central banks should
lend early and freely (i.e., without limit) to solvent firms, against good collateral, and at ‘high
rates”’.
3.1.2.4 Housing Market Collapse
At the start of 2007, house prices were on a downward trajectory, accompanied by a wave of
foreclosures, as teaser rates on adjustable-rate mortgages came to an end. Sweeping defaults
raised the question as to the values of a wide range of mortgage-related securities. Private
sector agents found it increasingly difficult to determine their own risk exposure, especially
when it came to off-balance-sheet investment vehicles (Bernanke, 2012). This section describes
the amplifying factors that transformed the turmoil in the housing market into a full-blown
financial crisis. Brunnermeier (2009) identifies four crucial amplification mechanisms. However,
only the first two are relevant to our discussion.
First, a negative shock to asset prices could severely impact the balance sheets of borrowers.
Highly leveraged investors facing a decline in asset prices could potentially trigger a loss spiral.
This is best explained by an example, as in Brunnermeier (2009). Let us consider investors who
purchase assets to the value of $100 million with a haircut of 10%. In order for the investors
to purchase these assets, they need to put up $10 million of their own capital, while funding
the rest with debt. In this case, the leverage ratio is calculated at 10. Suppose a shock to the
economy causes the asset price to decline, which leaves the market value of the investors’ assets
at $95 million. In this case, the decrease in the value of the assets has caused the investors’
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capital to decline, from $10 million to $5 million.
The loss in capital experienced by the investors mean that they must reduce their asset position
in the market, in order to retain the same leverage ratio. In this case, the bank has only sufficient
capital to hold $50 million worth of assets. The investors are now forced to sell $45 million
worth of assets in order to achieve this position. However, the sale of these assets further
depresses the price, which leads to an iterative process of asset sales and price reductions. In
this example haircuts are kept constant but in the case of the crisis a margin spiral also emerged.
During periods of financial distress, borrowers tend to increase haircuts, which means that
investors need to offer up more capital to purchase assets. This intensifies the effects of the
loss spiral. Together the loss and margin spiral form what is referred to by Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) as a “liquidity spiral”.
Losses experienced were concentrated “disproportionately at key nodes of the financial system,
notably highly leveraged banks, broker-dealers, and securitisation vehicles” (Bernanke, 2012).
Due to high leverage, the losses quickly consumed the capital of these institutions, leaving
them only debt and causing broad-scale insolvency. Following this there was an attempt to
deleverage, but due to the inability to sell mortgage related securities in repo markets, this
prompted sales into illiquid markets. Fire sales of assets outside of the housing market ensued
as banks scrambled for liquidity in order to meet the capital requirements of the Basel II accord
(du Plessis, 2011). Sales decreased prices on assets sold, which further weakened balance
sheets. Rapid asset sales further promoted the unwillingness to lend, as counterparties exposed
to toxic assets were considered desperate.
Second, shocks to the economy can operate through the lending channel (Brunnermeier, 2009).
The balance sheets of borrowers form only one side of the equation. Supply-side constraints
generate shortages in liquidity, which means that lenders might not be able to meet demand,
even if borrowers are solvent. Lenders with limited amounts of capital might start to hoard
liquidity in a precautionary manner, in fear of worsening financial conditions. Uncertainty as to
the asset positions of other intermediaries made these banks hold on to their assets.
This behaviour could be explained with reference to the repo market. As previously discussed,
this is the link in the financial intermediation chain whereby financial institutions convert
their long-term illiquid assets into short-term debt with commercial banks. In order to obtain
short-term funding, financial firms offer their mortgage securities as collateral. A halt in
the process of intermediation resulted from uncertainty as to the quality of assets offered as
collateral. In other words, liquidity from the interbank markets was drying up as commercial
banks were becoming increasingly unwilling to provide liquidity, in the fear that they would not
see repayment (Acharya and Richardson, 2012). Commercial banks responded by increasing
the haircut requirements on collateral. This effectively shut many financial institutions out of
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the wholesale market, as they were unable to transform their illiquid securities into short-term
debt. Trust in the ability of counterparties to meet their obligations was broken (du Plessis,
2011).
The trend of asset price increases precipitating a crisis is a familiar one, as according to the work
of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), most of the economic crises of the past two centuries have been
preceded by rapid credit expansion and the accompanying creation and collapse of bubbles.
In other words, asset price increases and excessive risk-taking created distorted incentives for
banks and accelerated credit expansion and overall leverage to abnormal levels (Adrian and
Shin, 2011). In conjunction with lax regulations and information problems in assessing the
underlying value of asset-backed securities, this created the perfect storm for a financial crisis.
Eventually, the realisation dawned that even with inflation targeting, the focus on price stability
is not a guarantee against financial instability (Borio, 2011).
3.1.3 Creating Liquidity Facilities (2007)
During 2007 the Federal Reserve responded to the credit crunch by cutting the policy rate
incrementally on several occasions, in order to stimulate activity. The extent of the crisis was
not known at this time, but owing to the experience of Japan, it was crucial for the central
bank to be aggressive in its approach to easing (Ahearne et al., 2002). Credit ratings agencies
placed several securities backed by subprime mortgages on credit watch, while various financial
institutions (in the US and abroad) started reducing their exposure to MBS.
Once the Fed realised that dysfunctional financial market conditions were not improving, it
further decreased the policy rate in the hope that it could avoid a recession. However, pressure
in the financial market did not abate, and liquidity shortages on the interbank funding market
became commonplace, with large spikes in the LIBOR-OIS22 spread, referred to as “illiquidity
waves” (Sengupta and Tam, 2008)23. A widening of the bid-ask interest rate spread generally
means that collateralised borrowing is constrained (Dicecio and Gascon, 2008).
In order to address the widening spread between the overnight and interbank rates24, the Fed
introduced a variety of liquidity facilities. This credit policy was meant to operate primarily
through the liquidity channel, providing liquidity to distressed financial institutions (Sack,
22Bid-ask interest rate spreads.
23Several significant events contributed to these illiquidity waves. These include the emergency funding to UK
mortgage lender Northern Rock (85 bp), several writedowns by large American investment banks such as UBS
and Lehman Brothers (108 bp), and the eventual sale of Bear Sterns to JP Morgan Chase in March of 2008 (83
bp). However, by far the largest increase in spread came from the failure of Lehman Brothers in October 2008; a
massive 365 basis points.
24Usually of maturities beyond the short overnight rate. Indicative of a liquidity premium.
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2009). The first in the long line of broad-based liquidity facilities created by the Fed was the
Term Auction Facility (TAF) for depository institutions, which was established in December
200725. At roughly the same time, similar actions were undertaken by other central banks, such
as the Bank of Canada, BoE and ECB26. The TAF is considered the first implementation of the
central bank balance sheet. It can be filed under a change in the composition of the balance
sheet27; this is a sterilised operation whereby assets and liabilities on the balance sheet are
increased in equal amounts.























































Source: Bank of Japan; St Louis Federal Reserve Bank; European Central Bank; Bank of England
3.1.4 The Collapse of Lehman Brothers (2008)
In 2008 the housing bubble burst, with the decrease in housing prices resulting in increased
delinquencies and foreclosures (Bernanke, 2008). Mortgage markets experienced a significant
downturn, and financial institutions exposed to these markets were heavily affected, suffering
25This facility was similar to the normal discount window, but it was anonymous. This avoided the stigma
attached with going to the discount window; which is one of the reasons that the interbank market liquidity dried
up in the first place (Wheelock, 2008).
26Swap lines were also established with ECB and Swiss National Bank, in order to improve global credit flow.
27Considered a type of ‘credit easing’, as defined by Bernanke et al. (2004), or ‘credit policy’ as defined by Borio
and Disyatat (2010)
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losses in terms of capital and liquidity (Labonte, 2015). Affected institutions became increasingly
reluctant to extend loans of any type to consumers and firms, which had a particularly severe
impact on residential construction (Bean et al., 2010). The extent of the impact was exemplified
by the fact that even two GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, needed massive intervention
(Bernanke, 2009).
In order to improve credit conditions, the central bank reduced the policy rate even further, as
seen in Figure 3.2. In March 2008, with funding markets’ liquidity constrained, the Federal
Reserve started a securities lending program28, called the Term Securities Lending Facility
(TSLF). This program entails the swap of Treasury securities for other eligible securities, which
is essentially a change in the composition of the balance sheet of the central bank. This facility
is different than the TAF in that it includes a wider range of eligible securities, including several
forms of agency debt and MBS (Dicecio and Gascon, 2008).
Finally, in addition to the TAF and TSLF, the Fed introduced the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF), an initiative that was initially different from the TSLF in that it accepted an even
broader range of investment-grade securities as collateral. At this point in the crisis narrative,
the balance sheet measures used were not considered strictly unconventional. These measures
entailed an increase in the range of eligible collateral and counterparties, but purchases were
highly collateralised and considered within the normal purview of central bank operations
(Bean et al., 2010).
The US experienced the largest share of the turmoil, with many crucial financial players
becoming heavily distressed and highly geared. Heavy involvement in the securitisation of
mortgage-backed securities meant that investment bank Bear Sterns would be sold to JP Morgan
Chase at a fraction29 of its pre-crisis market value, a deal brokered by the New York Fed, which
also provided the necessary term financing (Bernanke, 2009). In addition, several firms that
werelinked to mortgage markets, such as the large savings and loan association IndyMac30,
started to collapse. Even the support provided to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was not sufficient,
and they had to be taken into conservatorship, with the Treasury providing massive liquidity
injections (Bernanke, 2009).
Fears of a systemic collapse was on the cards with continued liquidity frictions in the wholesale
market and increasing risk premia. Unfortunately, the position of Lehman Brothers (one of the
largest players in the US shadow banking system) was unsalvageable; despite efforts on the part
of monetary and fiscal authorities, they filed for bankruptcy in September 2008. This bankruptcy
28Started in unison with several other G-10 central banks.
29Their value dropped from more than $133 per share to below $2 per share after the crisis. The intervention of
the Fed meant that Bear Sterns would be acquired for a more reasonable $10 per share.
30Independent National Mortgage Corporation.
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raised concerns for the solvency of other financial institutions with similar asset profiles, such
as the insurance company AIG31 (which was eventually bailed out at the cost of $85 billion)
and investment bank Merrill Lynch (which was acquired by the Bank of America). In a strategic
move to avoid further default, large investment firms Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were
approved to become bank holding companies, with direct access to the term lending facilities of
the Fed. At this point, market participants had lost faith in highly leveraged financial institutions
to meet their obligations, and coordination failures emerged (Falagiarda and Saia, 2013).
Shock waves from this event were felt across the globe, and policymakers started to comprehend
the magnitude of the crisis. Central banks worldwide realised that if key institutions were
allowed to fail, it would have a catastrophic impact on financial markets. Monetary and fiscal
authorities across the globe started implementing expansionary policy measures, specifically
with the goal of providing liquidity to financial institutions. As interest rates started circling the
ZLB in December 2008, monetary authorities realised that they would have to provide stimulus
through balance sheet policies (Labonte, 2015).













































Source: Bank of Japan; St Louis Federal Reserve Bank; European Central Bank; Bank of England
31Heavily invested in CDS. Default triggered the repayment on all the CDS contracts extended. This was simply
too much to bear.
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3.2 Four Balance Sheet Stories (2008 - 2016)
The fall of Lehman Brothers was the catalyst that escalated balance sheet operations by central
banks across the globe. This section chronicles different liquidity management strategies
implemented by four influential central banks, namely the Fed, ECB, BoE and BoJ. It is important
to gain some perspective on the balance sheet policies used by different countries, in order
to determine whether there are some common trends. The goal of this section is to highlight
the policies that have been used most widely and that have enjoyed the greatest longevity and
success. This section is complemented by the next chapter, where the empirical evidence on the
stated balance sheet policies implemented are discussed. Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 and
Figure 3.6 represent the different balance sheets of the four countries discussed. In addition,
each figure contains country-specific timelines of the events mentioned in the section.
3.2.1 USA: The Federal Reserve
3.2.1.1 Liquidity Facilities
In most developed countries, banks can deposit or withdraw liquidity in the primary market, with
the central bank, or in the secondary/interbank market (Catalão-Lopes, 2010). Open market
operations32 conducted with the central bank are secure, while the liquidity traded between
banks carries some risk. A number of different facilities were established in order to quell fears
over a pending recession and the potential collapse of secondary markets. Credit intermediation
in the modern era increasingly is performed in financial markets, as only commercial banks have
access to the relatively inexpensive funding provided in the federal funds market (Bernanke,
2009). The Fed was one of the first central banks to enact liquidity facilities to provide relief to
struggling financial institutions and repair dysfunctional markets.
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse, the Fed created the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
(ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), which was guaranteed by the
Treasury (Fawley and Neely, 2013). The amelioration in short-term funding markets, especially
that of commercial paper, was not realised. The Reserve Primary Fund, a large money market
fund, had heavy investment exposure to Lehman Brothers, with the default causing its net asset
value to drop below $1, which is referred to as ‘breaking the buck’. As a result, there was a flight
to quality, from high-yielding prime money market funds toward those that held Treasuries
(safe government securities) only (Adrian et al., 2011). In an effort to avoid a bank run in
32Also those conducted with standing facilities
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money markets, the Fed established the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), purchasing
high-quality commercial paper (Fawley and Neely, 2013).
The failure of commercial paper funding translates into increased difficulties in meeting the
credit needs of businesses and households, for institutions outside of the Fed’s discount window.
This liquidity facility extended the discount window to all issuers of commercial paper. Liquidity
facilities like these provide backstop funding in dysfunctional markets. Increased liquidity,
through the so-called liquidity channel, provides assurance to both the issuer of the commercial
paper and the investor that short-term debt obligations will be met, but does not guarantee the
solvency of firms (Adrian et al., 2011).
The establishment of these facilities entailed an increase in the size as well as a change in
composition of the balance sheet of the central bank, and could have had potential fiscal
consequences33. Creating these types of facilities was the first among many steps by the Fed
that moved it out of the territory of conventional easing, as it entailed the purchase of assets
that could expose the central bank to credit risk. In other words, these actions heralded
the start of credit policy in the US, with the intention of targeting specific market segments
in purchasing private sector assets (Bernanke, 2009). In addition, these were also the first
unsterilised purchases, indicating an extraordinary expansion of the balance sheet (Fawley and
Neely, 2013)
3.2.1.2 QE1
After allowing Lehman Brothers to fail, the Fed realised that other large investment banks were
credit constrained and afforded them the opportunity to borrow at the discount window, giving
them a direct credit line to the central bank (Bernanke, 2009). However, the credit extended
through various liquidity facilities and the extension of lender-of-last-resort services to a wider
range of counterparties was not enough to turn the tide (Fawley and Neely, 2013). Even after
establishing liquidity facilities in order to combat rapidly deteriorating conditions in short-term
funding markets, the Federal Reserve could not independently reverse the fortune of financial
markets, and as a recourse it solicited fiscal cooperation. In other words, the Fed was pressed
to coordinate its efforts with the Treasury. In early October Congress passed the Emergency
Economic Stabilisation Act, which established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to the
value of $700 billion, in aid of financial stabilisation (Bernanke, 2009). The objective of this
stimulus was to clear toxic assets from the balance sheets of financial institutions, in order to
avoid over-leveraging and potential fire sales.
33Concerns were raised over the fiscal independence of the central bank.
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Having reduced the federal funds rate close to the zero lower bound (0.25 %), the Federal
Reserve believed that to further stimulate economic activity, it would have to utilise another tool
in its policy arsenal, namely unsterilised purchases of government sponsored enterprise (GSE)
debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to the total of $600 billion (Gagnon et al., 2011).
This first round of quantitative easing or large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), referred to as QE1,
was implemented on the 25th of November 2008. In addition to this initial purchase, in March
2009 the Fed increased QE1 purchases, which consisted mostly of GSE debt ($100 billion), MBS
($750 billion) and long-term Treasury bonds ($300 billion). The total assets purchased in QE1
cumulated to a value of more than $1.75 trillion (Fawley and Neely, 2013).
The housing market and related institutions were the primary target of these policy actions, with
more than 80% of total purchases being related to the housing credit market (Fawley and Neely,
2013). In terms of the transmission channel, the Fed was looking towards the portfolio balance
channel to reduce term premia on long-term assets, a channel that was explicitly mentioned by
Bernanke (2009). It utilised both credit policy (GSE and MBS) and quasi-debt management
(long-term securities) to achieve this goal. Importantly, even though the quantity of bank
reserves increased in these operations, they did not constitute ‘pure’ quantitative easing, as it
wasn’t the explicit target of the central bank (Borio and Disyatat, 2010)34. The last part of this
section contains a discusses on the empirical evidence of the efficacy of the different programs
employed.
3.2.1.2.1 TALF At the same time that QE1 was implemented, the central bank created the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which is a loan program that entices investors
to purchase AAA-rated commercial MBS. This facility was the last in the line of the Fed’s special
liquidity facilities (Sack, 2010). It differed from most of the other liquidity facilities35 in that
it looked to provide support for market-based credit intermediation, rather than providing
liquidity to commercial banks. It was specifically aimed at reviving securitised credit markets,
opening up securitisation channels and thereby improving the “availability and affordability of
credit for households and small businesses” (Bernanke, 2009). Two features that were unique
to this facility were that TALF loans were non-recourse36 and of longer maturities (Sack, 2010).
In addition, TALF was available to a wide array of counterparties, thereby increasing the reach
of the program.
34This point was emphasised by Bernanke (2009) who refers to QE along the lines of credit than quantitative
easing.
35It differs in structure from the TAF, TSLF, PDCF and AMLF, but shares some similarities with the CPFF.
36Collateral can be provided to the Fed; they do not have to repay the loan if the value of the collateral falls.
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3.2.1.3 QE2
Financial market turmoil subsided toward the latter part of 2010, with asset prices rising and
private sector balance sheets being bolstered (Edmonds et al., 2010). However, despite the
magnitude of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, unemployment remained persistently
high and disinflation continued unabated (Yellen, 2014). As emphasised by policymakers,
the stagnating economic situation warranted a second round of easing in November 2010,
to improve economic performance and quell some deflationary concerns (Fawley and Neely,
2013).
The second round of quantitative easing was different from the first in that the Fed looked
only to purchase $600 billion in long-term Treasury debt, with purchases occurring in monthly
instalments of $75 billion. In other words, the central bank was following a quasi-debt
management strategy, with the goal of working through the scarcity channel to influence long-
term security yields (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). In particular, the Fed wanted to push up prices
and thereby drive down yields on long-term Treasury bonds, which in theory, would work to
increase inflation expectations (Yellen, 2014). In addition, policymakers committed to keeping
the federal funds rate close to the ZLB, enacting a forward guidance strategy.
3.2.1.3.1 Operation Twist In September 2011 there were concerns that a double-dip re-
cession was looming, with growth still slow and signs of distress in global financial markets.
Amelioration called for another round of easing but, instead of further outright purchases of
securities, the central bank experimented with maturity transformations similar to those of
Operation Twist in 1961. On 21 September, in what was officially called the Maturity Extension
Program and Reinvestment Policy, the Fed sold $400 billion in short-term securities with a
matching purchase of long-term securities (Fawley and Neely, 2013). With this policy the central
bank attempted to ‘twist’ the yield curve, by reducing long-term rates relative to short-term
ones.
The implementation of this quasi-debt management strategy was different than before in that it
took place without expansion of the monetary base, entailing only a change in composition of
the assets on the balance sheet. In other words, the revived Operation Twist differs from QE2
in that liabilities (reserves) increased with the purchase of long-term assets during QE2, while
there was no increase in liabilities in the MEP, but rather a change in the type of assets held by
the central bank (Fawley and Neely, 2013). Operation Twist was extended in June 2012 with
another $267 billion worth of long-term government securities purchased to “make broader
financial conditions more accommodative”37.
37Quoted from the Federal Reserve Press Release on the 20th of June 2012.
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3.2.1.4 QE3
Policy efforts to reduce persistently high unemployment rates were considered partially success-
ful. However, the labour market remained sluggish,38 featuring a significant unemployment gap.
The third round of quantitative easing was aimed directly at improving economic conditions,
with a specific focus on reinvigorating the labour market (Fawley and Neely, 2013). Purchases
of MBS were made on a monthly basis, to the tune of $40 billion. In addition, the central
bank reinvested principal payments of MBS, which accounted for another $45 billion dollar
monthly injection into long-term treasury securities. This translated into an increase in holdings
amounting to $85 billion per month (Yellen, 2013). This initiative is similar to QE1 in the
variety of assets purchased, but distinctly different with regard to the communication of assets
purchased (Fischer, 2015a).
QE3 entailed a more open-ended structure, citing no total amount of assets that would be
purchased, but rather a commitment to continue purchasing assets at regular intervals until
labour market conditions improved. At first, the condition for exiting this commitment was
vague, with the FOMC relaying a scenario in which there was “significant improvement” in
labour market conditions (Yellen, 2015). At a later stage, it was announced that the pace at
which purchases were to be conducted would be data dependent; in particular, they were looking
toward conducting purchases until the unemployment rate went below a certain threshold (in
this case it was 6.5%)39.
3.2.1.4.1 Tapering On 22 May 2013, Ben Bernanke revealed that the pace of asset purchases
might start slowing before the end of the year if labour market conditions continued to improve.
It was projected that a reduction in the unemployment rate below the suggested threshold
would possibly be achieved in 2014. Shortly after Bernanke’s statement, financial markets
reeled at the thought of a potential taper. Further distortions in economic conditions were felt
outside the borders of the US, specifically in developing countries, with large capital outflows
emanating from these countries40.
Taking note of the strong adverse reaction to the tapering announcement, the Fed made it clear
on 18 September 2013 that it did not have any immediate plans to reduce the asset purchase
programs. This alleviated some of the pressure following the initial suggestion of winding
down QE3, with emerging markets enjoying the greatest relief (Kumar and Barua, 2013). The
eventual start of the taper took place on 18 December 2013, with purchases down from $85 to
38The housing market was also depressed during this period, but the focus of QE3 was on improvements in the
labour market position.
39This target was announced at the FOMC.
40This is an issue I discuss in the concluding chapter of the thesis.
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$75 billion dollars a month. At this time, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC)
also announced that QE3 would be tapered at a suggested rate of $10 billion at each successive
meeting, outlining a complete winding down of the purchasing program by October 2014.
3.2.1.5 Normalising Monetary Policy
Since the start of the financial crisis, the central bank accumulated a large portfolio of long-term
securities41, with the federal funds rate being close to the ZLB for more than six years (Yellen,
2015). At the start of 2015, with the US economy showing signs of recovery, questions as to the
normalisation of monetary policy and a potential increase of the short-term policy rate came to
the fore. As discussed previously, if policy is too accommodative for too long, it could create an
environment where excessive risk-taking takes hold. Some interest rate rules that take both
unemployment and output gaps into account had already necessitated increases in the policy
rate. However, the reading of these rules depends on the definitions of historical inflation and
natural rates of employment (Yellen, 2015). The experience of Japan has taught policymakers
not to be too hasty in coming out from under the ZLB.
The “conditions for liftoff”, as Stanley Fischer (2015b) puts it, are sufficient improvements in
the labour market42 and confidence in the fact that inflation will move to the 2% objective
in the medium term. In December 2015 the Fed increased the federal funds rate by 25 basis
points, which marked the first increase in the policy rate in a seven-year period where it was
kept near the ZLB (Yellen, 2016). One of the newfound challenges faced by the central bank is
conducting monetary policy with an elevated balance sheet. Owing to the size of the balance
sheet43, traditional repurchase agreements will fall by the wayside and normalised monetary
policy will entail setting of the interest on excess reserves (a mechanism discussed in both
Chapter 4 and 5).
In addition to the interest on excess reserves, the Fed will also be conducting overnight reverse
repurchase agreements, with a wide range of eligible counterparties44. This overnight facility
will create a soft floor on money market rates. These issues will be discussed in more detail in
the last part of Chapter 4, where I consider the possible drawbacks of implementing balance
sheet policies. In the next section I look at the policy response of the ECB to the financial crisis.
41Current assets are at $4.5 trillion, up from $900 billion before the crisis.
42To the point where full employment is reached, as stated by Yellen (2015).
43With more than $3 trillion in excess reserves.
44At this point it includes money market funds, depository institutions, broker dealers and government sponsored
enterprises (Fischer, 2015a).
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3.2.2 EU: European Central Bank
3.2.2.1 The European Banking System
In order to appreciate fully the policy response of the European Central Bank (ECB), it is
necessary to set the stage as to the position of Euro area banks before the crisis, as their
structure differs in significant ways from the US economy. Several systemic balance sheet
vulnerabilities were present in the EU before the crisis. European banks have increasingly
developed a reliance on wholesale funding, but not to the extent of the US (Pill and Reichlin,
2014). In the years leading up to the crisis, approximately 30% of external funding for
firms originated from financial markets in the EU, while in the US this figure was closer to
70% (Trichet, 2009; Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). Naturally, the development of other
sources of external credit meant that the ratio of loans to traditional deposits started to decline
(Giannone et al., 2012).
In addition to an increased dependence on external market-based funding, banks started to use
newly developed financial instruments and processes. In particular, European banks started
to use off-balance-sheet vehicles, securitisation and several structured financial products (Pill
and Reichlin, 2014). Several European bank balance sheets were also contaminated with
asset-backed securities that originated in the US, but fortunately exposure was limited. Despite
all these concerns, the structure of the European economy was still largely bank-based (Cour-
Thimann and Winkler, 2012). In fact, it was postulated by Padoa-Schioppa (2004), before the
crisis, that the Eurosystem would be able to survive a run on secondary markets, as its funding
originated mostly from primary markets.
Outside of the exposure to flighty assets, the EU had its own unique problems to deal with.
Importantly, the cross-border exposure of banks to wholesale funding had increased significantly
since the inception of the monetary union. Supervision at the national level meant that
retail markets remained segmented, but cross-border funding markets became more active,
with increased financial integration (Pill and Reichlin, 2014). In particular, larger economies
with slow and steady growth found opportunities to finance the demand for credit in smaller
developing nations (González-Páramo, 2011). Unfortunately, this meant that imbalances on the
current and financial accounts of many Euro area countries were exacerbated; this was a large
contributor to the sovereign debt crisis.
Successful financial integration resulted in a narrowing of spreads in the sovereign bond
market45, which would usually be indicative of a decrease in the market’s pricing of sovereign
45At one point before the crisis the spreads were what Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012) refer to as, “quasi nill”
among the sovereigns of the Euro area.
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risk (Ehrmann et al., 2010). However, it is thought that the compression of the spread could
have been due to the involvement of the ECB, with their mandate providing an inherent
guarantee against the failure of a sovereign entity (which further promoted risk-taking and
moral hazard) (Pill and Reichlin, 2014). Taking this structure into consideration, I provide an
overview of the traditional format of monetary policy implementation and the manner in which
the central bank amended its approach to address mounting concerns.
3.2.2.2 Monetary Policy Implementation at the ECB
In contrast to the fixed-rate open market operations of the Fed, monetary policy at the ECB
is usually conducted through refinancing operations in an auctioning process. In this setup
the ECB sets a liquidity cap, and the lowest bids are accepted, which is referred to as the
variable-rate tender procedure (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). In June 2000 the ECB
switched from fixed- to variable-rate tenders, in response to overbidding in the fixed-rate
system46 (Catalão-Lopes, 2010).
In general, the ECB offers two types of collateralised lending options, differentiated by maturity.
Main refinancing operations (MROs) are the primary mode of policy conduct; they have a
maturity of one week and are auctioned weekly. More recently, the bank introduced the longer
term refinancing operations (LTROs), which at first were presented with a maturity of three
months; these are auctioned once a month (Vogel, 2016)47. In the months before the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, the ECB tried to address building pressure by introducing reductions in
the MRO interest rate48. It became evident that policy rate cuts were not going to provide
the necessary stimulus in constrained credit markets, which prompted the ECB to implement
several liquidity management measures49. These measures formed part of the first phase of
the policy response of the ECB, namely the Enhanced Credit Support program, which is be
discussed subsequently.
In terms of the ECB policy response to the crisis and the surrounding fallout, four phases
are identified50. First, liquidity management operations started as early as 13 months before
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, in September 2008. The demise of this institution heralded
46This system was not with full allotment.
47Practically, the ECB also uses fine-tuning operations (FTOs) with the objective of steering interest rates toward
the policy rate target.
48They also varied the interest rate corridor, initially decreasing it from 200 basis points to 100 basis points.
49They correspond with the label of exceptional liquidity provision as classified in the typology of unconventional
policies by Szczerbowicz (2015). Unconventional policies here fall under the banner of either exceptional liquidity
provision or asset purchases. In the typology of Borio and Disyatat (2010), exceptional liquidity provision is
classified under credit policy.
50These coincide somewhat with those identified in Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012) and Pill and Reichlin
(2014).
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the start of the global financial crisis and heightened the intensity of management required,
which involved several alterations and additions. This approach is referred to by Trichet (2009)
as enhanced credit support (ECS). Second, an equally important event for the Euro area is
the sovereign debt crisis that started in May 2010, specifically as a result of developments in
the Greek economy. This phase also included the resurgence of the debt crisis, with several
other member states experiencing similar difficulties to that of Greece, in June of 2011. Third,
the current ECB president, Mario Draghi, famously stated that the ECB was committed to do
“whatever it takes” to salvage the Euro. Finally, the last phase is considered the one in which
quantitative easing measures were adopted, in January of 2015.
3.2.2.3 Phase 1: Enhanced Credit Support
Financial distress in the Eurozone following the Lehman Brothers episode was exhibited in
the widening of several interest rate spreads, such as the Eurbor-OIS spread51 (Fawley and
Neely, 2013). The widening of spreads was indicative of the increased counterparty risk,
emanating from the uncertainty with respect to the health of the balance sheets of financial
institutions. The interbank market in the case of the ECB extends beyond several borders
and therefore segmentation becomes an important issue. Counterparties in this setting may
find it difficult to participate in the interbank market, based on the “perceived riskiness of
their sovereign” (González-Páramo, 2011). Despite initial liquidity provisions, the volume of
interbank lending remained lacklustre “because of mounting insolvency and liquidity risks
exacerbated by asymmetric information” (Rodríguez and Carrasco, 2014).
In May 2009 the ECB formulated their actions with regard to liquidity management, in the form
of the ECS program. The goal was to provide liquidity to the banking sector and remedy the lack
of counterparty confidence. As mentioned before, the banking sector was becoming more reliant
on wholesale funding. However, the ratio of loans to traditional deposits (leveraging) had not
reached the level of the US, with the traditional banking sector still playing an important role in
the extension of credit. Therefore, to address dysfunctional markets, the ECB opted to target
the banking sector aggressively with the ECS program. According to Trichet (2009), “enhanced
credit support constitutes the special and primarily bank-based measures that are being taken
to enhance the flow of credit above and beyond what could be achieved through policy interest
rate reductions alone”.
51Spread between a secured (Eurbor) and unsecured (OIS) money market rate. Indicates the premium that
agents are willing to pay for security; a safety premium.
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3.2.2.3.1 Five cornerstones Jean-Claude Trichet, who was president of the ECB at the time,
identified five policy cornerstones of the ECS program (Trichet, 2009). First, in early 2008
the ECB introduced the Fixed Rate Procedure with Full Allotment (FRFA) program. The FRFA
gave commercial banks access to unlimited amounts of liquidity against eligible collateral at
the main refinancing rate, provided they were financially sound (González-Páramo, 2011).
This often-overlooked policy shift is considered by several ECB central bankers52 to be the
most significant liquidity management operation conducted to retain the health of the financial
sector. Liquidity risk generated by elevated lending rates in interbank markets posed a threat to
many financial institutions. Liquidity provision under this strategy aimed to facilitate interbank
lending and, by extension, increase the availability of credit to households and firms (Falagiarda
et al., 2015).
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi53 refers to the FRFA as “endogenous credit easing”, in that banks can meet
all their liquidity needs, with peak demand before the crisis reaching e95 billion (Rodríguez
and Carrasco, 2014). In this setup the ECB sets the MRO refinancing rate, and interbank market
rates are variable (determined by supply and demand) (Catalão-Lopes, 2010). Fluctuations in
the quantity demanded reflects market sentiment, with high liquidity demand indicative of the
strain in interbank lending54. In addition to the mere provision of liquidity, this mechanism
works by providing liquidity more cheaply than the market price; which in turn drives down
money market rates (González-Páramo, 2011). Immediately following the collapse, banks began
to overbid in terms of price of the MROs, in an attempt to secure liquidity. Overbidding pressure
prompted the ECB to discontinue traditional refinancing operations of all maturities (MROs and
LTROs) and replace them with fixed-rate tenders (Szczerbowicz, 2015). However, this resulted
in severe overbidding on the amount of liquidity, as there was no associated penalty55.
Second, in addition to the FRFA, supplementary LTROs with a six-month maturity were instituted
before the crisis, with the first round met with a fourfold oversubscription of bids, and e442
billion was eventually supplied (Trichet, 2009; Darracq-Paries and De Santis, 2015). In June
2009 12-month LTROs were created to cater for commercial bank preferences for assets of
longer maturities (Fawley and Neely, 2013)56. This can help address maturity mismatches
where banks are looking for investments in longer-term bonds, but only finding funding in
the shortest end of the market. It reduces the uncertainty involved in laying out investment
strategies. Policy is designed with the expectation that banks will use long-term credit to fund
52Such as Trichet (2009) and González-Páramo (2011)
53Member of the Executive Board of the ECB from 2005 until 2011.
54Which would also show in interest rate spreads, with the spread between secure/unsecure assets widening.
55Importantly, some of the excess liquidity went into Eurozone debt securities, which exacerbated the problems
presented in the debt crisis. This overbidding was also the reason why the ECB initially switched to variable rate
tenders in 2000.
56The first auction closes with more than 1000 bidders, indicating increasing demand for LTROs
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long-term asset investment, rather than supply short-term liquidity.
Third, the list of assets eligible for collateral was extended by lowering the ratings threshold.
Allowing a wider range of collateral affords banks the opportunity to refinance a larger portion
of their balance sheet 57 (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). Previously illiquid assets can now
be transformed, potentially preventing liquidity shortages in secondary markets. In addition to
the type of collateral, there is an increase in the number of counterparties that can take part
in the refinancing operations (Trichet, 2009). Fourth, international swap lines allow financial
institutions to address foreign currency funding (Falagiarda et al., 2015). Cooperation among
central banks is key in this respect.
Finally, the Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP) was created, with these purchases being
the ECB’s first foray into asset purchases (Falagiarda et al., 2015). The first round of covered
bond purchases, called CBPP1, amounted to e60 billion and took place between July 2009
and July 2010. A supplementary round of purchases, CBPP2, took place between November
2011 and October 2012. However, the number purchased was almost negligible during this
round, amounting to less than e17 billion in total (González-Páramo, 2011). Trichet (2009)
states clearly that covered bond purchases were not considered quantitative easing, as they
would not result in an expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet. He believed that there would be
an “automatic sterilisation”, with a simultaneous reduction in purchases of LTROs. However,
according to the data, the balance sheet of the bank did not remain unaltered, and expanded by
30% in the most acute phase of the crisis, which indicates that sterilisation was not complete
(Rodríguez and Carrasco, 2014).
In comparison with the Fed, the ECB was a latecomer to the asset purchase party, as QE1 was
already well under way during this time. This was because the US had to respond more swiftly,
as financial institutions were exposed directly to mortgage markets: they had greater flexibility
in the economy58, and the funding structure revolved around money markets for funding, as
opposed to the more traditional banking sector (Trichet, 2009). The reason for implementing
CBPP hinged on two factors. First, it allowed the opportunity to address maturity mismatches
between assets and liabilities (Trichet, 2009). Second, covered bonds markets are important
and these securities are different from most asset-backed securities in several ways. They are a
form of recourse debt, whereby the bond holders can collect from the issuer of the bond and
are entitled to the underlying collateral pool. In addition, underlying collateral is held on the
consolidated balance sheet of the bond issuer, similar in spirit to originate-and-hold mortgages
in the US (Fawley and Neely, 2013).
57In July 2009 eligible securities totalled e12.2 trillion.
58The labour market in particular is more responsive in the US.
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3.2.2.4 Phase 2: Sovereign Debt Crisis
In October 2009 it was revealed that Greece had been misreporting statistics with respect to
their debt. This deception meant that interbank lending to Greek banks dried up, which raised
concerns over Greek solvency (Pill and Reichlin, 2014). Uncertainty surrounding the fiscal
position of the country translated into a sharp decline in the demand for Greek government
bonds and, as a result, sovereign spreads widened against several countries in the Eurosystem.
The possibility of sovereign debt default was on the cards as the economy struggled to find
funding to meet debt payments. This was problematic for the ECB, as default would have meant
an exit from the Euro area, which in turn could have spread to other countries in a similar
fiscal position, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). In
addition, the portfolios of several countries, such as Germany and France, were heavily exposed
to Greek debt.
This sovereign debt crisis spurred a fire-sale on several Euro area government bonds. In
order to contain the crisis and avoid financial contagion, several emergency facilities were
created. The adjustment program consisted of bilateral loans from Eurosystem countries
(European Commission) and support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 59 (Pill and
Reichlin, 2014). Despite these attempts to boost sovereign solvency, interest in Greek debt
remained stale. In the face of mounting pressure, the ECB was forced to act60 and provided
ancillary support through the creation of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), injecting
liquidity into dysfunctional markets through the purchase of sovereign bonds in secondary
markets61 (Szczerbowicz, 2015). SMP is considered a sterilised purchase program62 and did
not expand the balance sheet of the bank, which classifies it as credit policy (Fawley and Neely,
2013). Communication under this purchase program was limited, with no details on the bonds
purchased, counterparties or length of the scheme made available to the public (Szczerbowicz,
2015).
The ECB justified the SMP on the grounds that it would restore the functioning of the monetary
policy transmission mechanism and relieve tension in sovereign debt markets (Falagiarda et al.,
2015). In practice, they were preventing a Greek default, by aggressively removing debt from
the market. More importantly, the ECB brokered debt restructuring for private debt holders (Pill
and Reichlin, 2014). However, this was a symptomatic treatment and public finance remained a
topic for concern throughout the Eurosystem. Contagion had spread to Ireland in 2010 and
59This was later formalised in the form of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability
Mechanism (ESM).
60The European Commision, IMF and ECB form part of what is referred to as the “troika”, three institutions that
aided in preventing default in the Eurozone.
61The ECB is prohibited from purchasing sovereign debt in primary markets through Treaty provisions.
62Purchases were sterilised through ‘Fixed Term Deposits’ (Rodríguez and Carrasco, 2014).
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Portugal in 2011, which meant that the ECB had to step in as a lender-of-last-resort for these
sovereigns. Within the SMP, the ECB spent a total of e219.5 billion on Euro zone government
bonds, but this was not spent according to paid-in capital; rather, it focused only on vulnerable
countries, and thereby, spread the risk (Szczerbowicz, 2015). Shortly after the effective bailout
of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, there was a discussion as to the fiscal health of the Italian and
Spanish economies. The ECB had enough funds at its disposal to assist some of the smaller
member states, but the default of large countries like Italy and Spain would have been far
beyond the reach of the monetary authority.
3.2.2.5 Phase 3: ‘Whatever it Takes’
At the start of the financial crisis, the ECB highlighted the fact that nonstandard policies were
temporary, only to be used as long as they were considered necessary. However, by late 2011
fears of a sovereign debt crisis were reignited, as the solvency of Italy and Spain was considered.
Sovereign bond prices plummeted and significantly altered the balance sheet positions of several
banks in the Euro area (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). The widening of sovereign yield
spreads reflected the fact that market participants believed economies could potentially be
leaving the monetary union. In order to preserve the union, unconventional policies became
a more permanent fixture in the ECB’s policy toolkit (Falagiarda et al., 2015). Mario Draghi’s
(current president of the ECB) first response was to reinstate the SMP, which had been dormant
since the bailout of Portugal in early 2011(Pill and Reichlin, 2014). In addition, he announced
the creation of 36-month LTROs, as well as the second round of covered bond purchases (as
mentioned before) (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). The LTROs were specifically aimed at
sovereign debt, providing liquidity over the medium term.
Talks arose about the exit of certain countries from the monetary union and the ensuing
reversibility of the Euro. In response, in July 2012, Draghi famously stated that the central bank
would do “whatever it takes to save the Euro”. The ECB followed through on the commitment
with the announcement of the Outright Money Transactions program in September 2012 (Pill
and Reichlin, 2014). Under this scheme, which officially replaced the SMP, the ECB agreed to
intervene in secondary sovereign bond markets if this became necessary.
The OMT differed from the SMP in several ways. First, an important improvement on the SMP
was that purchases of sovereign debt in the secondary market63 would be conditional, with the
ECB buying debt only once countries had accepted and met the conditions for structural and
fiscal reform set by the European Commission, ECB and IMF (often referred to as the “Troika”)
63The ECB is prohibited from purchasing debt directly from governments, and needs to purchase debt from
investors.
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(Fawley and Neely, 2013). Second, the ECB was more transparent about communicating its
purchase strategies and there would be no “ex ante quantitative limits” on the purchases once
conditions had been met (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). Third, the focus of the OMT
was on shorter-term bonds, whereas the SMP focused on longer-term securities (Szczerbowicz,
2015).
Similar to the function of the SMP, the OMT was established to improve the functioning of
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The OMT is considered to be credit policy, with
purchases sterilised similarly to those of the SMP. Interestingly, the OMT has, to date, not
been used. However, it was considered successful in that it acted as an insurance mechanism
against redenomination risk, signalling the commitment of the bank to prevent the exit of
struggling member states (Pill and Reichlin, 2014). In fact, the mere announcement of the OMT
reduced risk premia and brought sovereign spreads closer to one another (Szczerbowicz, 2015).
Focusing more on communication with the general public seems to be part of a new strategy
employed by the ECB.
3.2.2.6 Phase 4: A New Framework
Deflationary pressure became of particular concern with the steady decline of inflation since the
start of 2012. The ECB, under the guidance of Mario Draghi, developed a multifaceted strategy
to boost economic growth in what can be considered a new framework64. This framework
is similar to that implemented in other central banks and combines forward guidance with
credit and quantitative easing. Forward guidance, which forms an important part of this new
framework, made its first appearance in July 2013, when the ECB made it clear that rates were
going to remain low for an extended period of time (Falagiarda et al., 2015). By May 2014
the deposit rate, the lower bound on the policy rate, had dipped below the ZLB, and interbank
rates followed suit. However, even negative rates failed to reignite interbank activity and spur
economic growth (Valiante, 2015). In response, the ECB unveiled its credit easing package in
June 2014, which was mostly an extension of measures implemented in the ECS program. The
package consisted of targeted LTROs, an Asset Backed Security Purchase Program (ABSPP) and
another round of covered bond purchases, CBPP3 (Falagiarda et al., 2015).
Targeted LTROs are a new loan facility that is intended to encourage banks to extend credit
to the private sector by reducing financing costs (Blot et al., 2015). These 48-month TLTROs
are supposed to provide banks access to a source of low-interest-rate funding for the following
four years. The ECB hoped that these would entice banks to lend to the real economy. They
64Can be considered new in the sense that it moved outside its single mandate to focus on price stability. Now
considers economic growth as well.
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are specifically aimed at small to medium-sized nonfinancial firms (Szczerbowicz, 2015). They
differ from previous LTROs in that the amount a bank can acquire is provisioned on the amount
of loans extended to the nonfinancial private sector in the Euro area (Blot et al., 2015). However,
these TLTROs did not have an immediate impact on the economy, which provided an incentive
for the ECB to enact a more rapid-acting mechanism, namely a private asset purchase program.
ABS purchases and CBPP3 were meant to supplement the TLRTOs. They were meant as a
direct intervention in secondary bond markets, purchasing the securities of European firms and
residential real estate loans to affect long-term bond yields. At this point the asset purchases
were still sterilised and limited to private sector debt. However, in 2015 the central bank
announced an extension of the program, called the Extended Asset Purchase Programme
(EAPP) that would signal the movement to quantitative easing. The ECB claimed that it was
merely expanding an existing program of asset purchases, but under the EAPP, unsterilised
purchases were added, moving from the passive management of liquidity demand to a more
active intervention (Breuss, 2016).
In March 2015 the ECB announced, as part of the EAPP, the Public Sector Purchase Programme
(PSPP), the first instance of QE in the Euro area. This program diverged from previous attempts
in two distinct ways. First, it would start purchasing bonds issued by “Euro area central
governments, agencies and the European institutions”, which meant intervention in primary
markets for sovereign debt (Falagiarda et al., 2015). Second, the scale of the program was
unprecedented, with liquidity provided by the ECB under the EAPP amounting to e50 billion a
month65, with a conditional commitment to keep it in place until inflation met the mandated
medium-term objective (around 2%) (Breuss, 2016). This was estimated to be at the end
of March 2017, with a total of e1500 billion bought in total. This program was met with
significant resistance, as it was felt that it contradicts the conventions of the EU Treaty, blurring
the line between fiscal and monetary policy. PSPPs were distributed according to paid-in capital,
to avoid them being just a redistribution of risk between member states (Krampf, 2016). The
next section looks at at how balance sheet policies were implemented in the United Kingdom.
3.2.3 UK: Bank of England
Balance sheet policy implemented in the UK is not significantly different from that of the US.
Policy comprised the creation of several liquidity insurance facilities and successive rounds of
quantitative easing. The timeline of implementation of rescue efforts by the Bank of England
(BoE) is also relatively in line with that of the Fed’s actions. Before introducing the measures
used during the financial crisis, it is worth looking at how the BoE conducts monetary policy
65Of purchases, 88% are sovereign bonds, and 12% are the bonds of supra-national institutions.
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under normal circumstances, as it settled on a new monetary framework in the build-up to the
crisis.
3.2.3.1 Sterling Monetary Framework
The BoE revised its operational framework for monetary policy in 2006. Management of the
balance sheet was now coordinated under the Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF). This new
system revolves around the use of reserves, standing facilities and open market operations. It
has all the qualities of a reserve regime66 whereby banks decide on how many reserves to hold,
which means liquidity issue is demand determined (Cross et al., 2010).
In contrast with the single mandate of several other central banks in developed economies,
the BoE has an explicit dual mandate, with two objectives specified under its new operating
framework (Joyce et al., 2012a). The first of these is the pursuit and maintenance of the CPI
inflation target in the medium run, which is set at 2%. In normal times this is achieved through
setting the policy rate. Second, the BoE is tasked with reducing the cost of disruptions to the
functioning of commercial banks, which is done through the provision of liquidity insurance
(Cross et al., 2010). Taking into consideration the objectives of this framework, I consider the
actions taken by the BoE to abide by its mandate.
3.2.3.2 Initial Response
The spill-over from the crisis significantly affected the UK economy, with real activity slowing
and financial market mechanisms being broken. However, the pressure from failing financial
markets was felt in the UK even before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Northern Rock, a
British bank, asked the BoE for liquidity support in September 2007. However, in February 2008
Northern Rock was nationalised in order to save it from a run on the bank67. At the height of
the crisis, several large UK banks, such as Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Royal Bank
of Scotland (RBS), were found to be highly leveraged and dependent on wholesale funding.
Large-scale intervention was required to save these struggling institutions, with HBOS getting
acquired by Lloyds TSB with the aid of public capital. Lending conditions deteriorated, with
solvency concerns about these large financial firms.
As a result of the evidence on policy implementation from the Japanese experience, the BoE
reacted quickly to provide monetary policy support (Joyce and Woods, 2011). As a first line
66These monetary policy regime characteristics are defined in the second chapter of the thesis
67This is a situation under which depositors wish to withdraw their deposits. It could result from coordination
failure, as in the Diamond and Dybvig result.
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of defence, interest rates were radically reduced from 5.75% in July 2007 to 0.5% in March
200968, as seen in Figure 3.2. In addition to interest rates cuts, several liquidity facilities were
created and amended during this time. Similar to the liquidity facilities in other countries, those
of the BoE were targeted at specific markets. In December 2007 the BoE announced a change
to its existing three-month repo open market operations69, with an extension on the range of
assets viable as collateral to include AAA-rated MBS and covered bonds (Cross et al., 2010).
These newly formed longer-term open market operations (OMOs) were referred to as extended
collateral long-term repos (ELTRs) and were initially offered at monthly auctions of £10 billion.
The BoE also formed two liquidity insurance schemes to provide liquidity to the banking sector,
namely the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) and the Discount Window Facility (DWF). The
SLS and DWF are off-balance-sheet collateral-swap initiatives that allow banks to swap high-
quality illiquid securities (such as MBS) for UK treasury bills (Cross et al., 2010). Under these
programmes the banks pay a fee according to the quality of the asset offered for the swap
arrangement, in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour. Finally, as a result of tension arising
in US markets, the BoE engaged in temporary foreign currency swap lines with the Fed, to meet
dollar-denominated obligations.
3.2.3.3 Asset Purchase Facility
In January 2009 Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury announced the creation of the Asset Purchase
Facility (APF). Operations were conducted through a limited company called the Asset Purchase
Facility Fund (APFF), a legal entity that is fully under the control of the BoE (Joyce et al.,
2012a). HM Treasury conducted both credit and quantitative easing through this fund. At first,
the BoE was authorised to conduct purchases of up to £50 billion worth of high-quality private
sector assets; however, private asset holdings reached a peak of only £3 billion. This credit
easing was meant to increase the availability of corporate credit. Easing was justified on the
grounds of the lender-of-last-resort function of the bank, as espoused by Bagehot. Purchases
were sterilised70 through sales of short-term gilts, which means this is a pure credit policy
(Fawley and Neely, 2013). These liquidity provisions are considered similar to those conducted
by the Fed under their CPFF program.
68Which is effectively the ZLB for the bank
69The BoE introduce longer-term repos (3, 6, 9 and 12 month) in 2006; similar in operation to the LTROs of the
ECB
70In other words, for every asset purchased, short-term gilts were sold to offset the increase in the size of the
balance sheet.
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3.2.3.4 QE1
Despite aggressive easing the BoE felt that it would not be able to meet its mandated medium-
term goal of 2% CPI inflation. The second operation under the APF was performed in March
2009 with the bank’s explicit quantitative easing program to help achieve their policy objective.
More specifically, the bank adopted a combination of bank reserves policy and quasi-debt
management policy, increasing the size of the balance sheet through the purchase of £200
billion of assets71 in the first round of easing. UK government bonds (gilts) of varying maturity
(mostly from 5 to 25 years) formed the majority of the purchases (Steeley, 2015).
Quantitative easing as implemented by the BoE was intended as a liquidity injection to induce
spending in the economy, in order to generate an inflationary effect (Joyce and Woods, 2011).
Purchases72 were financed by reserves, which translated into a fourfold increase in the monetary
base from March to November 2009 (Cross et al., 2010). The backing by central bank money
meant that this now was considered part of monetary policy. Since reserves in excess of
voluntary targets were being issued, and the policy rate was near the ZLB, the SMP ceased its
normal functioning. Policy was being conducted based on the size of the program, similar to
that of Japan under QEP. Purchases continued until February 2010, when the MPC decided not
to further increase the size of the balance sheet (Steeley, 2015).
At the same time as the first round of QE, the BoE implemented several changes to their ELTRs,
with an increase in the amount available for auction, as well as inclusion of securities backed by
mortgage assets and corporate bonds. These credit easing operations reached a peak of £180
billion in January 2009 (Cross et al., 2010).
3.2.3.5 QE2/3
Two years after the first round of QE the second round was started. In October 2011, the BoE
conducted a further £75 billion worth of purchases. It was considered a necessary measure to
keep inflation in line with its mandate. This increase occurred parallel to fears of a sovereign
debt crisis in the Euro area. By May 2012 the second round came to an end, with a total of £125
billion purchased; bringing the total of QE to £325 billion (Steeley, 2015). The third round of
QE quickly followed the second, due to a contraction of GDP between the last quarter of 2011
and the first quarter of 2012. Purchases under QE totalled £375 billion by July 2012 (Fawley
and Neely, 2013).
In order to improve lending conditions the BoE and HM Treasury constructed the Funds
71Initially set at £75 billion, but later expanded.
72Loans to the fund.
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for Lending Scheme (FLS). This scheme shares many similarities with the TLTRO program
implemented by the ECB, and is thought to be the inspiration for that policy initiative. One of
the differences between the FLS and TLTROs is that the BoE is able to coordinate its efforts
with the Treasury in order to avoid significant losses, whereas the ECB has no single centralised
Treasury (Steeley, 2015). Next, I look at the most recent monetary policy developments.
3.2.3.6 Current Policy Stance
British monetary authorities have not had reason to implement large-scale changes to their
balance sheet since QE3. Data from the first quarter of 2016 puts inflation at 0.5%, which is
not close enough to the 2% target. However, the price level is expected to increase over the
next year, as uncharacteristically low food and energy prices start to unwind. Economic growth
has been positive, but modest. Forecasts by the BoE predict a slowdown toward the end of the
year, in response to mounting pressure from the recent EU referendum result (Bank of England,
2016). In light of this evidence, the members of the MPC (May 2016) have voted to keep
interest rates unchanged at 0.5% and the QE purchase limit at £375 billion (Emerson, 2016).
3.2.4 Japan: Bank of Japan
We have already covered the pre-crisis history of the BoJ’s balance sheet policy. This section
looks at the policy approach of the BoJ in the last decade, namely 2007 to 2016. The Japanese
economy had just started to recover before the start of the crisis, but fortunately some of the
policy tools had been tested before, so policymakers had some notion of how to approach
macroeconomic shocks.
3.2.4.1 Japanese Banking System
The Japanese economy showed signs of recovery following its slump in the early part of the new
millennium. In response, the BoJ started to unwind some of its unconventional measures, with
quantitative easing coming to an end in 2006 (Kuttner, 2014). However, the financial crisis
of 2008 resulted in a large negative shock, slowing economic growth significantly (Takahashi,
2013). Interestingly, the response of the BoJ in terms of financial markets was modest compared
with other central banks, with unconventional policy not being adopted at first73. The primary
reason is that Japanese banks and financial firms were not heavily invested in US mortgages
73In fact, the central bank has been criticised for the fact that it did not adopt aggressive unconventional
measures in response to the unfolding of the crisis.
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or structured financial products, such as credit default swaps. In other words, they did not
have toxic assets on their balance sheets. This was due, in part, to reform in the banking sector
following the banking crisis of the 1990s (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). Japanese banks were
focused on traditional banking activities, instead of the dissemination of securitised financial
products. In addition, liabilities were mostly financed though the deposit base, with only 10%
of financing derived from wholesale markets (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012).
Spreads on unsecured interbank markets remained relatively stable in the wake of the fall of
Lehman Brothers, especially in comparison with other countries. The Tokyo interbank market
rate (TIBOR), for example, showed little volatility. Transmission of the crisis was primarily
through international capital movements, with the position on the capital, current and financial
accounts deteriorating during this period (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). This indicates that
the crisis affected the economy through decreased exports, showing the reduced global demand
and appreciation of the yen74, rather than contagion in the financial markets (Takahashi, 2013).
Capital outflows translated into a sharp decrease in the Nikkei stock index, translating into
a decrease in the asset values of Japanese banks, which hold a substantial portion of their
high-quality capital in stocks (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). Despite the limited impact on the
Japanese banking system, the economy experienced a sharp decline in growth, registering one
of the greatest falls in GDP among OECD countries, as seen in Figure 3.1.
3.2.4.2 Initial Policy Response
The BoJ and the Financial Services Agency (FSA) started to react to the movements in the
financial markets in September of 2008. In line with the path of other central banks, the BoJ
implemented reductions to the prevailing policy rate in order to stimulate activity. In addition
to the rate cuts, several measures were implemented to prevent further financial market distress.
First, the BoJ agreed to swap lines with the Fed75, in order to satisfy the increasing liquidity
demand for US Dollars (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). Second, in October 2008 the BoJ
suspended the “sale of stocks purchased from financial institutions on the stock exchange”76.
The motive for the suspension was to create space to monitor market developments. Third,
changes were made to the securities lending facility. Usually, this facility allows repurchase
agreements on JGBs, but in October 2008 the list of eligible collateral for repurchase operations
was increased77. This also heralded the return to JGB purchases, which last occurred in 2002
74Appreciation of the yen occurred because the monetary base in Europe and the US was increasing at a faster
rate than that of Japan. In addition, the yen was thought to be a less risky currency, as can be seen by looking at
volatility indices, which meant a further appreciation in the currency (Takahashi, 2013).
75Fixed-rate auctions were conducted, with full allotment.
76Taken from a statement released by the BoJ on the 14th of October 2008.
77The list now included floating rate JGBs, inflation-indexed JGBs and longer term 30 year JGBs.
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(Fawley and Neely, 2013).
Fourth, the BoJ showed interest in facilitating corporate financing, which was supported by the
creation of a new credit facility called the “Special Funds-Supplying Operations to Facilitate
Corporate Financing”, which here will be called the SFSOs. Institutions are allowed unlimited
3-month loans at the uncollateralised call rate using this facility, which is similar to the FRFA
of the ECB (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). The facility involved an expansion of the balance
sheet of the bank and constituted quantitative easing (Fawley and Neely, 2013). In addition
to the loan provision of this facility, the BoJ announced temporary purchases of commercial
paper and corporate bonds, a form of credit easing. The downside of these purchases was the
exposure to credit risk. The initial response of the BoJ was a combination of the credit easing
imposed by the US and the elastic supply of loans applied by the ECB. In general, the Japanese
and ECB focus appeared to be more on the banking sector, as opposed to the bond market focus
of the US (Fawley and Neely, 2013).
By the end of 2008 the BoJ started to use its newly established ‘complementary deposit facility’,
which provided interest on excess reserves78 at a fixed rate, similar to the deposit facilities found
in the Eurozone since 1999, and introduced in the US in 2008. This facility creates a floor on the
uncollateralised call rate and pays interest on reserves held at the central bank. Toward the end
of 2009 and the start of 2010 the BoJ decided to retire some of its temporary stability initiatives
and replaced SFSOs with fixed rate operations (FROs) (Vollmer and Bebenroth, 2012). The
newly introduced policy differed in that loans were not provided in an unlimited amount, with
an initial amount of U10 trillion in 3-month maturities being allocated79 (Fawley and Neely,
2013). In addition, under FROs a wider range of eligible collateral was accepted.
In April 2010, with the economy still experiencing slow economic growth, the BoJ proposed
an initiative to boost growth through the provision of funds to financial institutions. By June
2010 the final details of the Growth Supporting Funding Facility (GSFF) were presented. Under
this program eligible institutions were to submit proposals for one-year loans, with a possible
extension to four years (Ueda, 2013). The quantity of loans under this framework was limited
to U3 trillion. This program was extended in June 2011, with U500 billion worth of credit
being made available. Inflation persisted close to zero per cent, and in September 2012 the BoJ
increased the credit available from U3.5 to U5.5 trillion (Shirakawa, 2013).
78Interest rate was 0.1% in December 2008.
79This was later extended to U20 trillion worth of 3-month maturity loans and U10 trillion of 6-month maturities.
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3.2.4.3 Comprehensive Monetary Easing
The initial efforts of the BoJ were quite mild and, as a result, in October 2010 the Japanese
economy was still struggling to recover from the financial crisis. In order to remain transparent
regarding its policy approach, the BoJ announced a more aggressive three-pronged compre-
hensive monetary easing program (Kuttner, 2014). This program marked the first attempt of
the BoJ at large-scale usage of its balance sheet to rectify market conditions. First, it entailed
lowering of the uncollateralised overnight call rate, such that it was back to the ZLB (Vollmer
and Bebenroth, 2012). Second, clarification was provided for the conditions under which the
bank would exit its ZIRP program. Third, it involved the introduction of the Asset Purchase
Program (APP).
The APP consists of both credit and quasi-debt management policies, with private and public
assets purchased (Kuttner, 2014). However, the focus was primarily on private sector securities80,
in order to reduce the spread between private and sovereign debt yields (Takahashi, 2013).
With this program, the bank focused on reducing risk instead of term premia, similar in style
to QE1 in the US. In the period from October 2011 to December 2012, additional purchases
were made under the program, this time with more of a focus on the purchases of long-term
government bonds. The problem with the APP was that it was quite small compared with the
equivalents other countries. This seemed to indicate a lack of commitment on the side of the
BoJ to implement an aggressive easing program (Kuttner, 2014).
As witnessed by the data on GDP in 2012, it seemed that the measures implemented by the
BoJ were somewhat successful in promoting growth. However, the third quarter of 2012 was
met by a contraction in growth, which prompted further policy action. Purchases under the
APP were once again attempted, with U11 trillion worth of public and private assets purchased.
In addition, a new framework was created to further promote lending. This new facility is
called the Stimulating Bank Lending Facility (SBLF). In December 2012 Shinzo Abe became
Prime Minister and announced an economic stimulus package in response to poor growth;
this approach is often referred to as ‘Abenomics’ (Haidar and Hoshi, 2015). Three arrows are
stipulated under this policy framework. The arrows of this package are flexible fiscal policy,
bold monetary policy and structural reform. This plan gave rise to a shift in the thinking on
monetary policy implementation (Fukuda, 2015).
80Such as commercial paper (CP), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), corporate bonds, exchange-traded
funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) (Kuttner, 2014).
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3.2.4.4 Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing
In March 2013 the BoJ appointed a new Governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, who was sympathetic to
the goals of the incumbent government and critical of the passive approach followed by the BoJ
in the past (Haidar and Hoshi, 2015). Similarly to Mario Draghi, the new central bank Governor
indicated his resolve in ending chronic deflation and spurring economic growth (Takahashi,
2013). A new, more radical set of easing measures was suggested to replace the CME program.
In April 2013 the BoJ introduced the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE)
program. It entails some strong commitments on the part of the BoJ, with Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe referring to the shift in monetary policy as a regime change (Kuttner, 2014). First, the
bank announced an explicit inflation target of 2%, with the idea of reaching this within two
years. This is aimed at changing the public’s deflationary mindset (Takahashi, 2013). Second,
it announced quantitative easing in the form of open-ended expansion of the monetary base
to aid in achieving the stated inflation target. Initially, a total of about U60-70 trillion per
year was set; this was to replace the APP (Haidar and Hoshi, 2015). This expansionary policy
commitment also generates the expectation of a higher rate of inflation.
Third, as a qualitative measure, the bank would conduct purchases of longer-term securities,
in an attempt to increase the duration of bonds held on the banks portfolio (Kuttner, 2014).
This marked the first time that the BoJ used credit easing to lower long-term rates. The balance
sheet of the bank has grown significantly since the adoption of QQE, with most of the purchases
coming from long-term JGBs. Purchases under the QQE program were increased to U80 trillion
annually in October 2014, with the goal of increasing inflation more rapidly; this amendment is
often referred to as QQE2. Under these expansions, the balance sheet of the bank has almost
doubled in size (De Michelis and Iacoviello, 2016).
3.2.4.5 Negative Interest Rates
In January 2016, amid declining oil prices and depressed growth of emerging market economies,
the BoJ announced that in order to meet its price stability target it was going to make an
amendment to the QQE program so as to include negative nominal interest rates (De Michelis
and Iacoviello, 2016). Adopting negative rates is not entirely new, and has been used before by
central banks in Europe, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden (Bech and Malkhozov, 2016). QQE
with negative interest rates (QQEN) operates along three dimensions. Under this designation
there are three tiers to the policy rate, with a positive, zero and negative rate applied to different
portions on the current accounts of the financial institutions that interact with the BoJ. A positive
rate is applied to existing balances with the BoJ, while the zero rate is applied to required asset
holdings (De Michelis and Iacoviello, 2016). The negative interest rate is then applied to the
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balance of the current account in excess of the previously mentioned accounts. Thus far, the
NIRP has been met with criticism and a disappointing response from financial markets, with an
increase in the deflationary mindset.
3.3 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter framed the narrative of events surrounding the financial crisis and the policy
response of key central banks to the global collapse. My approach was chronological, as it
agrees with the development, razing and rebuilding phases associated with the crisis. The
buildup of financial imbalances in the US as a result of ‘ultra-loose’ monetary policy, formation
of a housing price bubble, deregulation of financial markets, growth in securitisation and an
increasing reliance on shadow banking activities for credit provision, culminated into a perfect
storm. The housing market collapse triggered a large-scale macroeconomic response that quickly
spread beyond US borders. This chapter not only recounted these events, but considered the
attempts to rebuild once the initial shock receded. The reactions by central banks were mixed
and largely based on the exposure to the US financial markets. In the case of the United States
the response was swift and of great consequence, while other countries were afforded the
opportunity to be more measured in their attempts. The next chapter looks to evaluate whether
policy responses were correct, with empirical evidence provided as to their success.
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Chapter 4
Balance Sheet Policies III: Empirical
Evidence and Policy Consequences
An economist is a man who, when he finds something works in practice, wonders if it
works in theory.
— Walter Heller (1979)
In his last public interview as Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, quipped that “the
problem with QE is that it works in practice but it doesn’t work in theory” (Saft, 2014). In order
to determine whether QE does indeed work in practice, this chapter is dedicated to a discussion
on the empirical evidence as to the efficacy of balance sheet policies. In addition, the potential
side effects from implementing such policies will be fleshed out.
4.1 Empirical Evidence
Following the discussion on balance sheet policies, I verify, through an analysis of the empirical
evidence, the practical application of the implemented policies. The literature in this regard
draws primarily on event studies1 and econometric analyses of episodes surrounding the most
recent financial crisis2. I will divide the discussion thematically, looking at the impact of these
policies on different dimensions of the economy.
1This approach looks at a specific event, such as an announcement of a QE program. Researchers then consider
movement in a variable of interest immediately following the event (Martin and Milas, 2013).
2The reason being that balance sheet policies were in full force during this time. We have limited exposure to
these measures in the rest of the post-war period, as they remained mostly in the realm of theory (except for the
Operation Twist experiment in the USA during the 1960’s under the Kennedy administration).
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Generally, we believe that central banks expand their balance sheets during periods when the
policy has reached the ZLB (Woodford, 2012). The earliest form of quantitative easing was
implemented by Japan, under its quantitative easing program (QEP). After the financial crisis,
this unconventional measure was implemented by several advanced economies. The most
prominent examples have been that of the US and UK, which to date have expanded their
balance sheets by the largest amounts in relative terms (Gambacorta et al., 2014).
4.1.1 QEP in Japan
I begin my analysis by looking at the success of the Japanese QEP, which was the earliest
example of a ‘pure’ quantitative easing program3. Expanding the supply of bank reserves in
this case was done to supplant the use of the policy rate in conducting monetary policy, since
the policy rate had reached the ZLB (Gambacorta et al., 2014). Increasing the size is similar
in nature to a reduction in the policy rate, having the common goal of stimulating economic
growth through. As suggested by quantity theorists, with this approach one would readily be
able to see increases in nominal spending (Bernoth et al., 2015). The pressing question is
whether this policy has generated the predicted effect in practice.
Econometric analysis of the Japanese policy experiment in the early part of the millennium
indicate that it was rather ineffective in impacting the real economy (Ugai, 2007). Exploration
of the economic aggregates reveals that this policy had limited impact. In spite of the monetary
expansion, economic growth (and nominal expenditure) remained persistently low. More
importantly, deflation appeared to be unaffected. The Japanese economy slowly started to
recover toward 2006, quite long after the initiation of the program. However, further evaluation
reveals that although the policy might have been unsuccessful in generating real activity, it
might have been effective in shaping expectations as to the future path of the policy rate, shown
by longer-term interest rates decreasing throughout the early part of the 2000s.
This might be explained in part by the change in rhetoric of the central bank with regard to
policy communication. Under the QEP, the credible commitment from policymakers to ZIRP
comes from the fact that they are eliminating the possibility of increasing the policy rate in
future (without first decreasing the excess reserves in the economy). This could mean that
eventually the promise of the central bank to keep rates low was transmitted through the
expectations channel, from short- to longer-term rates (Woodford, 2012). After the crisis the
BoJ moved away from simply using quantitative targets for reserves with their CME program,
signalling that they did not have much confidence in QEP.
3Woodford (2012) defines ‘pure’ QE as a change in the size of the balance sheet of the bank without any
accompanying compositional changes.
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4.1.2 LSAPs in the US
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Fed was the first to undertake increases in its
monetary base. Large-scale asset purchase programs were a combination of quantitative and
credit easing, with unsterilised purchases of both private and public securities. QE implemented
by the Fed differed dramatically from the QEP of Japan, both in terms of magnitude and rhetoric.
There was a clear communication strategy, with the goal of lowering expectations with respect
to the future policy rate (Gagnon et al., 2011).
The literature on the effects of QE can be divided broadly into two categories. The first is
the research that aims to look at the short-run policy impact, mainly through the effect on
asset yields. Research in this category is mostly characterised by event studies, although
attempts have been made to quantify effects through time-series analysis. These studies usually
utilise high-frequency data, capturing the immediate effect of announcements4 concerning QE
programs on financial variables (Meinusch and Tillmann, 2015). The second is a longer-term
look at the impact of QE on the broader macroeconomy. Initial evidence on aggregate nominal
expenditure shows little to support the idea that QE had an immediate impact on the real
economy. In the case of the US, the size of the balance sheet was almost quadrupled in the first
four years after the crisis, with only a modest increase in the growth of nominal GDP (Woodford,
2012). However, the stated short-term objective of QE was to reduce market yields of long-term
bonds, which would then eventually translate into increased availability of credit to firms and
households (Woodford, 2012).
4.1.2.1 Effect on Long-term Security Yields
Econometric proof as to the existence of a reduction in long-term rates (flattening of the yield
curve) through LSAPs5 has been easy to come by, but proper identification of the transmission
channels has been more difficult (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). Modelling the
complete transmission mechanism through which long-term rates operate has proven difficult,
as the mechanism is poorly understood. Generally, the effect of central bank asset purchases on
longer-term asset yields can be thought to affect two elements: a risk premium of some kind
and the average short-term interest rate expected over the term to maturity (Gagnon et al.,
2011)6. With the portfolio balance channel, asset purchases look to affect long-term interest
4Once point of contention in these studies is the length of the event “windows”. They normally range anywhere
from 30 minutes to 3 days. A short window may perhaps miss some of the market reaction, while a longer window
could include market effects unrelated to the announcement.
5Especially in the earlier rounds of QE, when the announcements were a complete surprise to market participants
6As an example, in the purchase of long-term government bonds, the two components of the decomposition are
the term premium and average short-term interest rate over the maturity of the bond (known as the risk-neutral
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rates through their impact on risk premia. Purchases of assets with long durations are swapped
for bank reserves, to affect the relative supply of long-term assets and, thereby, the asset yield.
According to a statement by the Fed Chairman at the time, Ben Bernanke, the Fed intended for
LSAPs to work through the portfolio balance channel (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014). In the case
of the signalling channel, the mechanism works by changing expectations about the future of
the short-term rate (Christensen and Krogstrup, 2015).
Several event studies, such as those by Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011), D’Amico et al. (2012), Glick and Leduc (2012), Rosa (2012), and Neely
(2015), have determined that the Fed was successful in reducing long-term rates through
its spectrum of QE initiatives. Combining time-series and event-study methodologies, the
study by Gagnon et al. (2011) is among the earliest to try and capture the portfolio balance
effects of QE1. The identification strategy in the event-study methodology relies on the fact
that announcements were a surprise to market participants. Immediate shifts in asset prices
following these announcements show the true pass-through to bond yields, as opposed to the
effect of anticipated monetary policy (Rogers et al., 2014).
Using the Kim-Wright term-structure model and event-study methods, the study of Gagnon
et al. (2011) reveals that positive QE announcements cause significant reductions in the long-
term interest rates of several securities. In particular, they found that the 10-year Treasury
term premium dropped significantly in response to QE1 announcements, with the response of
longer-term interest rates on MBS and agency debt showing an even stronger reaction7. They
assert that while asset purchases were effective at lowering risk premia, they failed to shape
expectations as to the future of the short-term policy rate (Gagnon et al., 2011). Emphasis is
placed on the portfolio balance channel while reducing the role for a signalling channel. The
results of Gagnon et al. (2011) are reinforced by the term-structure estimates of Hamilton and
Wu (2012), who find a large and significant portfolio balance effect in a preferred habitat model,
similar to that of Vayanos and Vila (2009).
Findings provided by the event study of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) suggest
that the portfolio balance channel8 is the most important driver of the reduction in long-term
rates, but that the signalling and liquidity channels also contribute significantly9. Empirical
evidence provided by Woodford (2012) indicates that there is a strong signalling channel
component. In fact, Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) contest the claim of Gagnon et al. (2011)
that the signalling channel is unimportant, citing concerns over small-sample bias in their
term-structure model. Their revision of the model of Gagnon et al. (2011) aims to correct for
rate) (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014).
7This is not surprising considering that QE1 focused primarily on purchases of these securities
8Although they refer to it as the safety channel
9The liquidity channel does not appear significant in QE2.
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bias and statistical uncertainty. Estimates from this revised process illustrate the extent to which
the signalling channel was understated in previous attempts. The paper by Gagnon et al. (2011)
only credits about 30% of the movement of long-term rates to the signalling channel, while
Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) identifies the value to be between 30% and 65%.
4.1.2.2 Effect on the Real Economy
While some models focused on the short run impact on asset yields, others tried to determine
what impact QE has had in the longer-run on the real economy. During the crisis the policy
rate reached the ZLB, which meant that economies had to switch to LSAPs. It is important
therefore to verify whether these programs that supplant the traditional policy tool would be
able to spur economic growth and prevent deflation (Baumeister and Benati, 2013). Several
econometric methods have been used in this pursuit, such as SVARs, TVP-VARs, Markov-
switching VARs (MS-VAR), large Bayesian VARs (LBVAR), FAVARs and panel VARs (P-VAR) (Bork,
2015). Unfortunately, the small sample size has made these evaluations difficult to accept.
Preliminary results of a counterfactual constructed by Chung et al. (2012) reveal that without
the policy intervention, the economy would have experienced decreased growth and inflation,
in addition to increased unemployment. Similar results were reached with the DSGE models of
Del Negro et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2012a), which incorporate the effect of LSAPs on the
broader macroeconomy.
Baumeister and Benati (2013) used a TVP-VAR to measure the impact of a 60 basis point increase
in the 10-year term spread, which results in 0.9% lower GDP, 1 percentage point lower inflation
and the unemployment rate increased by 0.75 percentage points (Baumeister and Benati, 2013).
In order to determine whether output and price levels react to LSAPs in the US, Weale and
Wieladek (2014) used a BVAR model with several different identification specifications. In this
setup they found a positive and significant effect on the real economy resulting from an asset
purchase shock, with a 0.36% increase in real GDP and 0.38% increase in CPI from the purchase
of a government bond worth 1% of nominal GDP (Weale and Wieladek, 2014).
Another approach is that of Meinusch and Tillmann (2015), who used a Qual VAR (QVAR) model,
in which they found that QE had been effective in stimulating real activity. With a similar result,
Bork (2015) found a significant impact on the real economy resulting from the LSAPs using a
dynamic factor model. He found that “industrial production, capacity utilization, inflation, and
employment have significantly positive responses, and unemployment is significantly reduced”
once an unconventional policy shock is applied (Bork, 2015). In addition, in the case of a
counterfactual, Bork (2015) found that a significant downturn in the economy was avoided by
the asset purchases.
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4.1.3 QE in the UK
Once the traditional monetary policy route was exhausted, the BoE used QE to promote
growth, and FLS to inject liquidity and address dysfunctional financial markets; this most closely
resembled the strategy followed by the US (Churm et al., 2015). Similar studies were performed,
with the results resembling those of the US. Policies were primarily differentiated by the size of
the programs implemented, with the QE of the BoE being much smaller in comparison to that
of the US. Programs looked at in this section, as used in the UK, are QE and FLS. Studies are
grouped according to their impact on the economy.
4.1.3.1 Effect on Long-term Security Yields
In a similar fashion to that of the research for the US, event studies were first used to attempt
measuring the short-term effect of gilt purchases on the yield spreads in the UK economy.
Relative to research on the unconventional measures of the Fed and ECB, studies on the policy
actions of the BoE are limited. Important contributions in this literature include Meier (2009),
Meaning and Zhu (2011), Joyce et al. (2012b), Breedon et al. (2012) and Churm et al. (2015),
with most of the research focusing on the first phase of quantitative easing. Research performed
on the UK economy is largely comparable to that of the US in terms of methodology.
Casual empirical observation reveals that the range of credit facilities and quantitative easing
mechanisms put into play in 2009 resulted in increasing asset prices as well as significant
decreases in the yields of both government and corporate bonds (Joyce et al., 2012b). Early
studies that estimate the immediate impact on financial markets, through an event-study
approach, are those of Meier (2009), Joyce et al. (2012a) and Meaning and Zhu (2011). Using
counterfactual analysis (constructing scenarios in which policy did not occur), Meier (2009)
found that initial QE announcements resulted in a reduction of gilt yields by between 35 and
60 basis points. In the work of Joyce et al. (2012a), they found that longer-term gilt yields fell
by at least 100 basis points in total for the period 2009 - 2010, with a similar narrowing in
corporate bond yields.
In utilising the event-study methodology there is a general disagreement in the literature
about the exact approach to follow. However, most studies agree that QE contributed to the
lowering of yields, as was the case for the US, especially with regard to longer-term securities.
In addition, there is a consensus that the portfolio balance channel, which is sometimes
decomposed into local supply and scarcity effects, is the primary channel of operation (Joyce
et al., 2012b). Increased transparency with respect to QE policy changes in the UK has meant
it has become increasingly difficult to identify the impact of announcements on bond yield
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spreads (Mclaren et al., 2014). Event studies, in particular, rely on the surprise component of
policy announcements. Widely anticipated policy announcements dampen market reactions,
which has led some research to show a decrease in the ability of purchases to affect asset prices
(Churm et al., 2015). More recent studies, such as those of Butt et al. (2012), Mclaren et al.
(2014) and Churm et al. (2015), attempt to evaluate the relative impact of the QE2 program,
looking specifically at the financial market impact of this policy.
In terms of the effect on broad money aggregates, Butt et al. (2012) found that the effect
has been largely the same over time, with transmission channels being the primary difference.
Using a principal components model and counterfactual analysis, Churm et al. (2015) found
that even though there was a significant reduction in gilt yields with QE2 across medium- to
longer-term gilts, the registered impact across all yields was substantially lower than found
during QE1. Mclaren et al. (2014) believe that an explanation for the decreased impact of
QE2 is the decrease in contribution from the signalling channel. In their study they found
that the local supply effect (an element of the portfolio balance channel) is similar over time,
between 40% and 60% of changes in asset yields, suggesting that other transmission channels
are responsible for the change.
In addition to estimating the impact of QE2 on asset yields, the article by Churm et al. (2015)
looks at the newly developed FLS. In particular, they are interested in the scheme’s influence on
marginal funding costs, similar to the study of Kapetanios et al. (2012). The conclusion reached
by Churm et al. (2015) is that the introduction of FLS resulted in a drop in bank wholesale
funding spreads.
4.1.3.2 Effect on the Real Economy
There is a dearth of literature on the broader macroeconomic implications of asset purchase
programs in the UK. Kapetanios et al. (2012) use a variety of models, such as BVAR, MS-VAR
and TVP-SVAR, to determine the real economy impact of the QE programs. Empirical results
suggest that the programs that were implemented greatly improved economic conditions, and
that in their absence GDP and inflation would have been much lower, perhaps even reaching
negative values. Conservative estimates of the positive effect on real GDP puts it at 1.5%, while
inflation rose by at least 1.25% as the result of QE. Similar estimates are found in the work of
Baumeister and Benati (2013).
In their paper Weale and Wieladek (2014) impose an asset purchase shock in a BVAR framework,
worth 1% of nominal GDP, to determine the effect on the real economy, which delivered a
0.18% increase in real GDP and 0.3% increase in CPI. Also utilising a BVAR model, Churm
et al. (2015) conducted an out-of-sample forecast to determine how the landscape of the UK
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economy would have differed if QE had not been implemented. An assumption was made,
based on event-study evidence that the stimulus reduced spreads by up to 45 basis points. In
other words, the counterfactual scenario assumed that QE2 reduced the yield spread by 45 basis
points. Stimulating the economy through asset purchases was found to have the equivalent
impact of reducing the policy rate by between 1.5% and 3%, which roughly increased nominal
GDP by 0.6% over one year and inflation by between 0.25 and 0.6 percentage points. Churm
et al. (2015) also studied the impact of a lower marginal funding cost, as the result of FLS. They
found that the impact of the scheme is similar to that of QE2, with a 0.8% increase in GDP
growth and a 0.6 percentage point increase in inflation, after a year from the start of the policy.
4.1.4 LTROs, SMP, OMT and PSPP in Europe
The ECB also implemented liquidity injections and asset purchases throughout the crisis, but
these were mostly sterilised operations and did not increase the size of the balance sheet.
The first instance of expansion of the balance sheet was through the Public Sector Purchase
Programme, which was implemented in 2015. Unfortunately, due to the fact that this program
was announced only quite recently, there is little relevant research on the topic, with the work
of Altavilla et al. (2015) being the only published research on the topic. However, there are
several studies that look at the financial market impact of the ECB’s policy initiatives. Usually,
these studies look at one of three markets, namely, money markets, covered bond markets and
sovereign bond markets (Szczerbowicz, 2015).
Early attempts by the ECB to rectify the position of failing financial markets were focused
primarily on LTROs. The impact of these exceptional liquidity provisions on interbank lending
was studied through basic regression analysis in the work of Abbassi and Linzert (2012),
(Angelini et al., 2011) and Brunetti et al. (2011). From these studies the general consensus is
that the introduction of a range of LTROs did not contribute significantly to reducing relevant
money market spreads. In other words, this policy avenue was not particularly useful in
combating financial market instability.
Of particular importance is the liquidity provided under the 3-year LTROs10, which Carpinelli
and Crosignani (2015) refers to as the “largest liquidity injection ever conducted”, totaling $1.37
trillion to 800 banks. They show that these liquidity injections positively affected Italian credit
supply.In a similar study Andrade et al. (2015) found that these LTROs positively impacted
credit extension in France. In addition, García Posada and Marchetti (2015) argues that
VLTROs increased loan supply in Spain. Szczerbowicz (2015) found that only 3-year LTROs
10These are also known as very long-term refinancing operations (VLTROs) (García Posada and Marchetti, 2015).
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(in combination with ZIRP) contributed to removing some of the tension in stressed interbank
markets, which is consistent with the result of Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2015).
Lenza et al. (2012) consider the macroeconomic effects of unconventional policies implemented
during the period of enhanced credit support, before the creation of the SMP. Using a large
BVAR model to construct a counterfactual, they determined that facilities created under ECS
(specifically looking at FRFA) helped to reduce money market spreads, which translates into
improved financial market health (Lenza et al., 2012). In addition, the ECS operated in
much the same way as conventional monetary policy, by increasing industrial production by
2% and decreasing the unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage points. The BVAR analyses of
Giannone et al. (2011) and Baumeister and Benati (2013) corroborate the evidence that policy
intervention supported market functioning by reducing money market spreads, thereby restoring
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, which helped to increase real activity across
the Eurozone.
Asset purchase strategies of the ECB during the sovereign debt crisis were subject to fierce
academic and policy debate. The overwhelming majority of papers turned to the evaluation of
the sovereign bond market impact of policies implemented, specifically focusing on SMP and
OMT. In general, these papers looked toward the effect on asset yield spreads and the volatility
associated with yields (Eser and Schwaab, 2016). Importantly, the ECB intervened in failing
secondary sovereign debt markets, which had broader implications for the Euro area as a whole.
I first evaluate the impact of the SMP and then the OMT (which later replaced the SMP).
The SMP was considered a temporary initiative to help stabilise the Euro economies and prevent
the collapse of the monetary union. The language used by the ECB described measures that
were used to restore the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Eser and Schwaab, 2016).
SMP, unlike QE in the UK and US, was not intended to be a replacement for the short-term
overnight interest rate. In other words, it was meant to normalise the movement of sovereign
bond yields, not to be an accommodative monetary policy. As a result, studies rarely consider
the broader macroeconomic implications of the program, as it was not intended to boost growth
or deter deflation (Szczerbowicz, 2015).
According to several studies, the initial announcement of the SMP and OMT had a powerful
effect on sovereign bond yields, with the program acting as a commitment to save the monetary
union. Sovereign bond spreads for the Eurozone periphery narrowed significantly following
the announcements, as documented by Pattipeilohy et al. (2013), Krishnamurthy et al. (2014),
Ghysels et al. (2014), Pooter et al. (2015), Acharya et al. (2015) and Falagiarda and Reitz
(2015). However, it is argued by Eser and Schwaab (2016) that the announcement effect was
not the primary driver, with actual bond purchases being more impactful in terms of lowering
yield spreads and yield volatilities of sovereign bonds.
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Using a panel regression, the ‘impact identification’11 strategy performed by Eser and Schwaab
(2016) on daily data reveals that bond purchases by the ECB under SMP decreased 5-year bond
yields across a range of countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis12. In general, the SMP
appears to have had a stronger impact on the shorter end of the yield curve. Szczerbowicz (2015)
used internal ECB data and found that purchases within the SMP and OMT had significantly
lowered covered bond and sovereign yield spreads.
According to Eser and Schwaab (2016), SMP operated through three primary channels. First,
reduction of liquidity risk premia through the lender-of-last resort function of the ECB. Second,
local supply effect, whereby reducing supply in a specific market increases price on that asset
and lowers the yield. Third, the default risk, which is reduced trough country specific asset
purchases to help avoid sovereign debt default. Interestingly, since the SMP was temporary
in nature, and did not contain any information as to the policy stance of the ECB, we do not
expect any signalling effect from these purchases (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). In the work of
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014), they found that the dominant channels through which sovereign
bond yields were affected by the SMP and the OMT were through default risk and sovereign
bond segmentation (local supply) effects.
More recently, the work of Altavilla et al. (2015) looked at the impact of the Asset Purchase
Program. The APP contains the PSPP as one of its policy arms, with the PSPP being the first true
instance of unsterilised balance sheet expansion implemented by the ECB. They found that this
APP resulted in a sizeable reduction in yields across a wide range of assets. In addition, these
effects seem to intensify with an increase in the maturity and riskiness of the targeted asset.
Estimates of the yield impact delivered an average reduction of 30 to 50 basis points on bonds
with a 10-year maturity. Driffill (2016) found that APP resulted in the reduction of 10-year
government bond yields in troubled economies, reducing differentials between countries of the
Euro area.
A comprehensive event study by Falagiarda and Reitz (2015) looked at spillovers to Central and
Eastern Europe from the range of nonstandard policy measures implemented by the ECB since
2007, including the newly formed APP. They found a strong announcement effect emanating
from the SMP, while the OMT and PSPP had a limited impact. They identify the primary
channels of transmission for nonstandard policies as the portfolio balance, signalling and
confidence (redenomination risk) channels (Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015).
11This exploits both cross-sectional and time series components of the data. Yields might have risen in many
of the countries in the sample due the announcement, however, using this strategy we are concerned only with
relative movements.
12These countries include Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
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4.1.5 CME and QQE in Japan
I end the balance sheet policies narrative with the empirical evidence supplied on the Japanese
economy. Since the adoption of the QEP in 2001, several other central banks have emulated
the strategy, incorporating unconventional policy measures as part of their policy toolkit.
Evidence as to the efficacy of nonstandard policies implemented is becoming more abundant.
As previously stated, most of the research has been on the LSAPs of the US. However, the
introduction of CME and especially QQE has garnered the attention of several international
researchers.
4.1.5.1 Effect on Long-term Security Yields
As in the other sections on empirical evidence, most of the research has been conducted to
determine the short-term financial market impact of asset purchases. Schenkelberg and Watzka
(2013) found that QE under CME resulted in a reduction of long-term interest rates, in a
similar manner to that of LSAPs in the US. Transitory increases in output and inflation were
also observed with this SVAR approach. Rogers et al. (2014) examine the effect of several
nonstandard policy announcements on asset prices, with policy shocks resulting in a reduction
of 10-year JGBs and corporate bond yields. Although this was not necessarily the intended
effect from asset purchases, with the BoJ explicitly stating that it wanted to affect the real
economy, specifically inflation.
Interestingly, the study of Ugai, Hiroshi (2015) points out that the signalling channel was
important in the dissemination of the effect of CME, but this channel does not appear to be
important under QQE. In particular, QQE caused a sharp depreciation of the yen, which is
thought to operate through the portfolio balance channel. The yield of longer maturity JGBs
declined with the introduction of QQE, but this reduction did not filter through to corporate
bond yields (Ugai, Hiroshi, 2015). The study of Hausman and Wieland (2015) also found that
the yen experienced a strong depreciation under Abenomics, as well as an increase in Japanese
stock prices.
4.1.5.2 Effect on the Real Economy
One of the stated objectives of Abenomics has been to reach an inflation target of 2% in the
space of two years (De Michelis and Iacoviello, 2016). This target was not reached, but inflation
has turned positive for the first time in 15 years, indicating that it has been somewhat successful.
In their paper, Hausman and Wieland (2015) show that the approach of the BoJ with Abenomics
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was successful in providing a small increase to output, but inflation remains well below the
intended target. However, they believe that the cost of the program is justified. Matsuki et al.
(2015) showed, using an MS-VAR, that expansion of the balance sheet resulted in lowering
short-term market rates and increasing inflation. De Michelis and Iacoviello (2016) used both
VAR and DSGE analyses to conclude that the nonstandard policies implemented by the BoJ
have been effective in the battle to overcome deflation; however, due to credibility concerns,
the BoJ has not reached its intended target. Bolder measures are required if real activity is to
be bolstered and deflation defeated (De Michelis and Iacoviello, 2016).
4.2 Other Implications of Using Balance Sheet Policies
Balance sheet policies were undoubtedly crucial policy instruments during and after the financial
crisis. Nonetheless, all remedies have side effects; it is simply the severity that differs. Concerns
over unintended consequences of balance sheet policies were first voiced with the initial rounds
of QEP in Japan. However, due to the unprecedented scale and pervasive usage of balance sheet
policies after the financial crisis, concerns over the potential ramifications have been amplified.
Some of the potential adverse consequences include international spillover effects, loss of
central bank independence, the creation of moral hazard, permanently inflated balance sheets
(no exit strategy), inflation and the depreciation of currency. These potential consequences are
discussed in this section, with a focus on the primary disadvantages recorded from recent policy
experiments.
4.2.1 Central Bank Independence
British economist David Ricardo wrote in 1824 that governments should never be entrusted
with the power to issue paper money, as this would ultimately lead to inappropriate servicing
of public debt. His solution was to establish an independent monetary authority not subject
to political influence. In fact, the central bank should “never, on any pretence, lend money to
Government, nor be in the slightest degree under its control or influence” (Ricardo, 1888). In
the rest of this section I aim to show that political intervention in the process of money creation
could severely affect the functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism, potentially
causing inflation to become unmanageable.
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4.2.1.1 Types of Central Bank Independence
There are different concepts of central bank independence. Two broad classifications emerge
from the literature. First, independence of objective, or goal independence, allows an organisa-
tion to determine which objectives to pursue, without input from political authorities (Ćorić and
Cvrlje, 2009). Central banks do not generally have goal independence, as this would encourage
opportunistic behaviour and lacks accountability, allowing the monetary authority to restructure
goals so as to allow deviations from predetermined objectives13.
Second, one of the attractive features of the modern central bank is that it is free to achieve its
mandate without regard for political agenda, using whichever instrument it chooses (Bernanke,
2010). Being able to use the tools of monetary policy to achieve stated goals without interference
is at the heart of what is called instrument (or operational) independence.
Instrument independence is a multidimensional concept. The ability to pursue policy objectives
requires the central bank to have political, technical and financial independence. Political
independence means that central banks do not receive assistance or take instruction from
government bodies in pursuit of their stated goals. Technical independence refers to the ability
of the central bank to use monetary policy tools as they see fit. In addition, they are not allowed
to use these tools for goals outside of their mandate, such as the monetizing of government
debt. Finally, financial independence means that the central bank has to have control over its
own balance sheet, with a budget separate from that of the government (Buiter, 2009).
4.2.1.2 Motivation for Central Bank Independence
There are several reasons government needs to be seperated from the monetary authority. First,
political intervention in the operations of the central bank can potentially damage the credibility
of the monetary authority. While the central bank might be committed to a low inflation target,
the fiscal authority could cause a deviation from this objective by using policy to pursue higher
growth. Political authorities, as argued by (Orphanides, 2008), are tempted to seek inflationary
conditions, with a potential trade-off in the short-run between an immediately realised increase
in economic activity and higher inflation down the line14. Policymakers have a vested interest
in creating jobs and boosting economic growth in the present, even at the risk of increasing
inflation in the future, especially during election years (Corsetti and Dedola, 2013).
13Interestingly, the Fed has a limited form of goal independence, vaguely assigned the dual mandate of achieving
maximum employment and price stability. The Fed has much room to move in its interpretation of maximum
employment (Ćorić and Cvrlje, 2009).
14This relationship is depicted by the Phillips curve, which illustrates the potential for a short run trade-off
between inflation and employment. Taylor (1998) categorises this relationship as one of the five things we know
for sure about economics.
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Public policymakers who systematically push the economy beyond its productive capacity could
plausibly set in motion a spiral of increasing inflation and inflation expectations, without an
associated improvement in real economic conditions (Bernanke, 2010). In other words, inflating
the economy to achieve higher output will only end up causing higher inflation, without any
gain in economic activity in the longer-run15. The disadvantages of deviating from a stated
policy objective are well recorded, both theoretically and empirically. A wealth of knowledge
gained from the ‘time-inconsistency’ discourse advises monetary authorities to abide by their
mandate16.
Second, a fiscal authority with control over the central bank may attempt to print money to
service a budget deficit (Bernanke, 2010). Monetisation of debt through the printing of money
by the government eventually leads to high levels of inflation and volatility in the economy.
Politicians might run budget deficits and accumulate debt with the idea that future governments
will carry the cost, or perhaps that debt can be reduced through inflation (Orphanides, 2008).
The only way in which the government could retain control over money creation is if the
public trusted it not to pursue growth objectives to the detriment of price stability. However, in
lieu of this trust of the public, it would be better to designate the role of price stability to an
independent organisation (Orphanides, 2008).
4.2.1.3 The Role of Central Bank Independence
The discussion on the effectiveness of monetary policy in combating inflation intensified during
the 1970s. This period was characterised by high levels of inflation and low economic growth,
referred to as stagflation. Researchers, policymakers and the public wanted an explanation as
to the sudden impotence of monetary policy with regard to lowering inflation and boosting
economic growth. It was a commonly held Keynesian belief that increasing inflation on the part
of the monetary authority would reduce unemployment17. However, inflation persisted in con-
junction with deteriorating real macroeconomic performance, despite central bank intervention
(Berger and Kißmer, 2013).
It was in response to these events that the literature on time-inconsistency and rational expec-
tations emanated18. Arguments originally developed by Friedman (1968), Lucas (1976) and
Kydland and Prescott (1977) were later confirmed by Barro and Gordon (1983), who found
15The reason for this is that private agents with rational expectations anticipate attempts to exploit the rela-
tionship and adjust inflation expectations upward, arguments originally made by Thomas Sargent and Robert
Lucas
16Notable contributions are that of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
17Known as the Phillips curve trade-off, which was first suggested by Phillips (1958) and later popularised by
Samuelson and Solow (1960).
18Although it is a fascinating literature, it is not worthwhile delineating all the relevant arguments in this section.
91
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
that monetary authorities were, in fact, setting inflation targets too high, pushing economies
beyond their natural levels of output. This caused inflation to increase without the resulting
growth benefits. The agreed-upon cure was to implement a price stability objective for the
central bank, which now had instrument independence. This episode is remarkable in that
academic research was effective in bringing about changes to monetary policy practice that
resulted in a new consensus on how policy should be conducted.
The new consensus assigned central banks the mandate of achieving price stability. As high-
lighted by theory, achieving this goal depends heavily on central bank independence, trans-
parency and accountability (Bernanke, 2010). Inflation targeting, through adopting the inflation
rate as a nominal anchor, greatly decreased inflation and output volatility. Empirical evidence
supports the idea that central bank independence is key to achieving desired inflation out-
comes19. It is therefore not surprising that dissidents of unconventional policy measures identify
the potential loss of central bank independence as too costly to ignore.
4.2.1.4 Balance Sheet Policies and Central Bank Independence
Balance sheet policies immediately raise concerns about the independence of the central
bank. I identify two broad streams of argument made in the literature about the impact of
unconventional monetary policy on central bank independence. There is some overlap between
these categories, but they are largely distinct from each other. First, there are discussions about
the budgetary independence of central banks with the introduction of asset purchases. Second,
a large literature has formed on the portfolio management of assets purchased by central banks
after the crisis. In the next section, I discuss some suggestions made to quell these fears.
4.2.1.4.1 Budgetary Independence In the previous section, it was established that instru-
ment independence is vital in achieving price stability. However, with the start of the crisis, it
is not the loss of the freedom to use the tools of monetary policy that is mourned20; instead,
budgetary or financial independence has become the focus of discussion21. In normal times,
central banks have a certain structure to their balance sheet. Liabilities consist primarily of
currency and reserves, while the asset side contains Treasury securities (Dudley, 2013). As the
central bank did not hold private sector assets, there was no credit risk on the portfolio. It is
possible for the central bank to hold long-term government bonds, which implies some interest
19The related literature includes, but is not limited to, Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992), Summers
and Alesina (1993) and Cukierman et al. (2002).
20Sometimes referred to as technical independence. The central bank still has technical independence, even
when the policy rate reaches the ZLB.
21According to certain definitions, financial independence forms part of operational independence.
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rate risk. However, as these long-term bonds are usually held to maturity, it eliminated much
of the associated risk (Dudley, 2013). Notably, central banks typically secure some degree of
profit, which they then remit to the Treasury.
Unconventional monetary policy can have fiscal consequences. Large-scale asset purchases
and maturity transformations could plausibly be unfavourable for the central bank’s asset risk
profile, and the level of profits remitted to the Treasury (Rossi, 2013). This is of particular
relevance if central banks wish to intervene in financial markets outside of the traditional
banking sector (Goodfriend, 2007a). Purchases of private sector assets (such as MBS) and
long-term government securities result in the central bank adopting the risk associated with the
asset.
Broadly speaking, two types of risk are created, credit risk and interest rate risk. First, credit
risk is considered the most damaging, as the central bank has little control over private asset
markets. Purchases of these private sector securities expose the central bank to the volatility of
the associated markets. Second, increasing long-term debt translates into greater interest rate
risk. Normally, these assets would be generating income for the central bank, as has been the
case in most countries. This means that the government receives seignorage revenue from these
investments, as illustrated in the case of the US in Figure 4.1. However, if long-term interest
rates increase, or money market investments turn sour, there could be a cessation of the stream
of seignorage revenue.
Earnings from these securities could also be negative (creating a budget deficit), which means
the central bank could experience losses. Increasing interest on reserves, as in the US, makes
this situation even worse, as interest needs to be paid on this debt (Dudley, 2013). Small,
temporary, losses experienced by the central bank should not, however, be a cause for concern,
as the burden could be shifted by increasing remittances at a later stage when the central bank
becomes profitable again (Del Negro and Sims, 2015). However, in the case of the recent crisis,
the sheer size of asset purchase programs amplified the potential budget risk. If losses are large,
the bank might not be able to retain control over its balance sheet.
One of the most hotly debated topics at the moment, is whether central banks should be allowed
fiscal support when the “system’s net worth at market value is negative” (Del Negro and Sims,
2015). In order fully to appreciate this discussion, a distinction needs to be made between fiscal
support and fiscal backing. Fiscal support is defined as the “commitment by the treasury to
recapitalize the central bank if necessary”. Fiscal backing, however, refers to the behaviour of
the fiscal authority to ‘back’ the inflation target set by the central bank, making sure inflation is
guided primarily through monetary policy (Reis, 2015). Fiscal backing is coordinated behaviour
that cannot be managed by the central bank on its own (Del Negro and Sims, 2015). As
illustrated in the literature, for the price level to be uniquely determined, fiscal authorities need
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to limit their interference in monetary policy affairs (Woodford, 2003).
Fiscal backing does not imply fiscal support, and vice versa. At the moment few countries have
fiscal support when it comes to making losses from investments in private credit markets. Some
central banks, like the BoE, are indemnified fully by the Treasury against any loss occurring from
their unconventional monetary policy spending, while other central banks have constructed
charters to deal with negative dividends (Reis, 2015).
However, if the central bank receives no recapitalisation, this might influence its ability to
conduct policy. If the government does not tolerate losses, then the central bank cannot
guarantee price stability (Goodfriend, 2014). Without the support, the central bank would try
to influence inflation in order to devalue its stock of outstanding debt, which means perhaps
allowing more inflation than needed (Belke and Polleit, 2010). Seignorage revenue generated
(i.e. printing money) could settle their debt, but at the cost of inflation, which means that
they are not pursuing their policy objective. This option can cause severe reputational damage;
potentially undermining established trust in the ability of the central bank to achieve its policy
objective.








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Billions of Dollars
Source: Annual report of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
After implementing quantitative easing
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4.2.1.4.2 Asset Management and Moral Hazard During the financial crisis, several lending
facilities were created by central banks, often in close coordination with fiscal authorities. The
financial institutions selected to receive credit were based on apparent need. However, because
of the coordination with government agencies, this opened up the possibility that the selection
of market intervention could have a political agenda (Bordo, 2010). One concern is that in
the pursuit of this seignorage revenue, the government could perhaps try to influence the
investment decision of the central bank, potentially forcing it to contradict its mandate (Del
Negro and Sims, 2015).
While the goal of most central banks, which adopted nonstandard policies, has been to persuade
private banks to lend, it has unearthed another interesting problem. Intervention in credit
markets can create unnecessary speculation and associated volatility in asset markets (Plosser,
2009). Influencing asset prices and credit allocation also gives the central bank a lot of
power. In practice this has allowed the central bank to behave like a large investor in specific
market segments, managing a relatively large portfolio of assets that affects market activity.
Unfortunately, this makes it the target of political pressure, opening it up to lobby groups.
The ability to intervene in specific market segments also creates moral hazard, allowing institu-
tions to believe that they will be bailed out at the first sign of distress, inherently promoting
even riskier behaviour. As I have mentioned in my discussion on the crisis, one of the reasons
the financial agents engaged in risky behaviour is that they believed banking institutions to
be of such systemic importance that they would not be allowed to fail. The central bank’s
lender-of-last-resort function, for example, institutionalises this idea, stating that struggling
financial institutions need to be provided support. In addition, if the central bank is responsible
for banking supervision, then it will need to use taxpayer money to fund the strategic resolution
of these institutions (Rossi, 2013).
4.2.1.5 Suggestions
Several suggestions have been put forward as to how one could resolve issues on central bank
independence. In general, central banks need to be transparent when it comes to the link
between the fiscal and monetary authority, showing that a coordinated effort is taking place.
It is essential that the objectives of policies be explained in detail, in order to leave no doubt
about the policy direction. One solution, as mentioned before, is for governments to provide
fiscal support (indemnifying losses) in the unlikely event of central bank budget deficits. This
could be done through the creation of an institution that absorbs losses, such as in the case of
the BoE.
Another suggestion is that of Bernanke (2010), who believes that the same independence
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should be extended to unconventional policies as that enjoyed by the conventional monetary
policy measures. In other words, one would try to remove the influence of government when it
comes to nonstandard policies; for example, assigning the central bank some financial stability
objective to reach using unconventional tools, without interference from the fiscal authorities.
Finally, there is a proposal for the delineation of fiscal and monetary authorities in handling
the assets of the balance sheet of the central bank. Non-treasury securities can form part of the
fiscal budget, while the central bank is left with Treasuries on its balance sheet. This resolves
some of the issues over the exit strategy and its interaction with price stability (Plosser, 2009).
With that, I now move to the topic of exit strategies with respect to unconventional monetary
policy.
4.2.2 Exit Strategies
Assets on the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve have grown by more than 5 times in the last
nine years, from a value of $869 billion in August of 2007 to $4.6 trillion in July 2016. While
growth was not quite as aggressive in the majority of developed countries, there have been
significant expansions. A fourfold increase of the assets for both the Bank of England and the
Bank of Japan have been recorded, while the Swiss National Bank has experienced an increase
in the size of its balance sheet from “20% of nominal GDP to more than 80% of nominal GDP”
(Ihrig and Meade, 2015). Economic growth and increased inflation in countries with bloated
balance sheets has raised the question as to how these economies will return to the usage of
their conventional policy instruments. In fact, these pressures have forced the Fed to exit from
its LSAPs, implementing a normalisation program in October 2014.
4.2.2.1 The New Normal
Economic recovery might initiate a process in which commercial banks start lending out their
reserves, which means credit conditions might become excessively easy, impacting broader
monetary aggregates and perhaps increasing inflation (Peersman, 2014). Two broad strategic
approaches have been proposed22 to deal with the exit from balance sheet measures. The first
strategy entails selling off financial assets that were purchased during the crisis and thereby
flushing the economy with liquidity. The second entails the maintenance of reserves at their
current level (or perhaps slightly below), while increasing the policy rate through the usage of
interest on reserves.
22There are technically more approaches, but they generally tend to fall within these two categories.
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4.2.2.1.1 Shrinking the Balance Sheet 23 In order to pursue price stability and conventional
monetary policy instruments, central banks will have to consider the possibility of withdrawing
liquidity extended during the crisis. In other words, they will want to return to a ‘normal’
balance sheet, before regaining control over their policy instrument. Historically, the size of the
Fed’s balance sheet, for example, is around 6% of GDP, as opposed to the current 26% (Ihrig and
Meade, 2015). Rapid reduction in the size of the balance sheet to return to these relatively low
pre-crisis levels seems improbable and unrealistic, given how long it took to accumulate these
assets (Kliesen, 2013). However, as discussed in the previous section, if the size of the balance
sheet remains significantly elevated, the increase in the interest rate could hold problems with
regard to remittances to the Treasury (Kliesen, 2013).
Furthermore, reducing the assets on the balance sheet is usually relatively straightforward, with
the central bank conducting open market operations, trading Treasuries for reserves. However,
in an attempt to remove toxic assets from the balance sheets of financial institutions, several
central banks have traded illiquid assets for Treasuries. This has changed the composition of
central banks’ balance sheets to include a large volume of risky assets, such as MBS. If the market
is not ready to accept the return of these assets, it might distort financial market functioning.
Exiting from unconventional policies could lead to capital gains or losses, depending on the
relative value of the securities sold (Bernanke, 2010). In the case of the Fed, they have suggested
holding MBS and related securities until maturity. However, this significantly increases the time
taken to normalise the balance sheet, with the average maturity of the Fed’s asset portfolio
calculated to be around 10.4 years (Williamson, 2015).
Clear communication with respect to exit strategy is important if central banks want to reduce
their ‘footprint’ in money markets (Frost et al., 2015). Distortions could arise in certain market
segments if the central bank intervenes for too long. Continued provision of liquidity to certain
sectors translates into an increased role in financial intermediation on the part of the central
bank, which could potentially “reshape the financial industry over time in ways that are difficult
to anticipate in advance” (Ihrig and Meade, 2015). The possibility of cheap money without the
possibility of an exit in that segment of the market may result in private sector agents staying
away, preventing a return to normal in those markets (Plosser, 2009).
4.2.2.1.2 Interest on Excess Reserves (IOER) Due to the increase in the liabilities of the
central bank, commensurate with the increase in assets, this translates to an increase in the
monetary base. As Milton Friedman (1963) argues, if “high powered” (i.e monetary base) is
permanently elevated, it will eventually lead to a higher price level24. In such a case the central
23The original idea was to call this section “Honey, I Shrunk the Balance Sheet!” Cooler heads prevailed.
24A phrase often used to describe this situation, is that “too many dollars chase after too few goods”
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bank is tasked with eliminating excess liquidity or faces the consequence of increased inflation
expectations (Peersman, 2014). However, using interest on reserves could potentially dampen
the effects associated with increased liabilities, as banks will store some of their reserves with
the central bank. Although implementing interest on reserves appears to be a new idea, it could
be viewed as a reformulation of the ‘Friedman rule’, which tries to eliminate social inefficiencies
associated with positive nominal interest rates (Friedman, 1969).
This rule, concerning the optimum quantity of money, is often interpreted to mean that the
nominal interest rate should be set to zero at all times. However, the efficiency condition of
the Friedman rule seeks to eliminate the interest rate differential between the opportunity cost
of holding money and the cost of creating additional money (Chari, 2010). Applying this rule
when interest paid on reserves is not factored into the equation means that the nominal interest
rate needs to be set to zero, because the central bank creates money in a virtually costless
manner. In the case where the bank can pay interest on reserves the efficiency condition adapts
to allow for a positive nominal interest rate equal to the interest on reserves to be set (Cúrdia
and Woodford, 2011). In other words, it is through interest on reserves that the policy rate can
be increased (through a de facto increase of the interest rate floor), without having to draw
down the central bank balance sheet (Woodford, 2012). In the case where central banks do not
pay interest on reserves, they might need to unwind their balance sheet completely before they
can conduct increases in the short-run nominal policy rate.
One concern raised about the usage of interest on reserves is that central banks and financial
markets alike have no experience with it. Communicating policy objectives might be difficult
and lead to uncertainty, which could generate volatility in the stock of reserves (Chari, 2010). In
addition, while paying interest on reserves allows the central bank to change the level of reserves
independently from the interest rate25, these changes outside of interest rate movements might
be misinterpreted by financial institutions as signalling a certain stance of policy that contradicts
the movement in the conventional instrument (Chari, 2010).
In addition to the outright sales of financial assets, as previously discussed, there are a few more
ways in which central banks can avoid the potential volatility involved with issuing interest
on excess reserves. However, I discuss only the two most popular options26. First, mopping
up excess liquidity could be done by establishing a depository institution at the central bank
that allows customers access to term deposits. Financial institutions would then be able to
trade their interest-bearing reserves for more attractively priced deposits that are held at the
25See the discussion on the decoupling principle in Chapter 5.
26Besides the two options discussed, central banks could increase the reserve requirement, which forces banks to
hold a portion of their reserves as deposits (Labonte, 2015). Central banks could also adopt term reverse purchase
agreements, which are a longer term version of the overnight reverse repos discussed in this section (Ihrig and
Meade, 2015).
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central bank for different agreed-upon periods of time (i.e. three months, six months, and so
forth). This would mean that the central bank offers a service whereby it transforms reserves
into short-term deposits (Chari, 2010). As deposits are held at the bank for longer time periods,
this would avoid the volatility associated with interest paid on reserves. However, this strategy
carries the potential for interest rate and rollover risk.
Second, reverse repurchase agreements (RRPs)27 as supplementary tool has been suggested
(Frost et al., 2015). These RRPs are similar to normal open market operations, but instead
of injecting liquidity into the economy through the purchase of Treasuries (or other assets),
the central bank withdraws reserves through the sale of assets on its balance sheet (Labonte,
2015). However, the creation of a RRP facility that allows (potentially unlimited) access to
safe, short-term assets carries some risks. In the short run, a potential drawback is that during
periods of financial stress there might be a large movement to purchase central bank securities
(a flight to quality), shifting liquidity away from financial and nonfinancial institutions and
thereby crowding out private spending (Ihrig and Meade, 2015). In the longer run, a large RRP
facility poses the same problem as that of normal unwinding of the balance sheet, with the
central bank potentially exerting influence on market segments, if the liquidity withdrawal is
great enough28.
This solution seems to have gained some traction in the US. In 2014 the Fed announced that, as
part of their normalisation approach, they would engage in these RRPs once the interest rate
was increased29. With the interest rate increase in December 2015, the Fed started full-scale
implementation of RRP agreements as part of its Policy Normalization Principles and Plans
(Ihrig and Meade, 2015). The next section discusses, in more detail, the approach of the Fed,
with specific reference to RRPs.
4.2.2.2 Normalisation at the Fed
Interest paid on reserves is a crucial component in both corridor and floor regimes, but the
discussion on its usage has only taken hold that the Fed has adopted it as part of its normalisation
27Repurchase agreements can be viewed as collateralised loans. It is an agreement between two parties to
purchase and then repurchase assets at a specific price and date. Calculating the difference in price between the
sale and resale determines the interest rate (cost) of the transaction (Labonte, 2015).
28There is disagreement in the literature about the influence exerted on financial markets as a result of Fed
intervention. It is argued that if markets are not highly segmented that the relative contribution of the Fed’s
purchases will be a drop in the ocean, with economic activity in asset markets being too great for the central bank
to make a difference. However, if market segmentation is significant, the central bank might be able to influence
that segment. However, there is little consensus in the literature as to the degree of market segmentation, with
precise definitions difficult to obtain (Chen et al., 2012a).
29In fact, RRPs were first suggested to the FOMC in July 2013 and have been used in an experimental fashion
since September 2013, with several variations of overnight RRP operations conducted to determine the effect on
short-term interest rates (Frost et al., 2015).
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strategy. While the Fed has legally been able to implement the policy tool since 2008, it has not
been fully utilised. It is only recently, in 2014, that the FOMC indicated that this would be key
to monetary policy normalisation, utilising it as an interest rate floor to accompany the increase
in the policy rate (Ihrig and Meade, 2015). In addition, the Fed has introduced supplementary
tools, such as reverse repurchase agreements to introduce greater control over the federal funds
rate (Frost et al., 2015).
4.2.2.2.1 Reverse Repurchase Agreements One part of the conversation that has not been
fleshed out until now, is the mechanism and design of the reverse repurchase agreement. The
rest of this section is devoted to explaining its qualities and potential uses. As stated before, RRPs
are a lending agreement between the central bank and a relevant counterparty. However, there
are key differences between RRPs used currently by the Fed and the repurchase agreements
conducted before the crisis (Ihrig and Meade, 2015).
First, overnight RRPs are offered at an “offering rate” announced by the central bank before
agreements are structured. Eligible counterparties have time to decide - by comparing this
rate to comparable market rates - whether they would like to bid. Initially the Fed accepted
a fixed-rate, full-allotment structure (similar to that of the ECB) on these RRPs, but this was
replaced by the fixed-rate capped-allotment structure (Frost et al., 2015). With FRFA, the
amount of liquidity withdrawn is only limited by the size of the assets on the balance sheet of
the central bank. However, this carries the risk, as previously stated, of a flight to quality in
times of financial stress. This led the Fed to the auction model, where a cap is placed on how
much an individual institution can bid, as well as on the overall size of the operation (Ihrig
and Meade, 2015). At the time of writing the individual cap was set at $30 billion, while the
aggregate limit was $300 billion30.
Second, one of the observed anomalies in adopting the IOER framework was that the effective
overnight federal funds rate often moved below the IOER, as seen in Figure 4.3. In theory
this is not supposed to be possible, as in a perfectly competitive market without bank balance
sheet costs, any difference between the money market rate and the IOER is subject to arbitrage
(Anderson and Huther, 2016). While many nonbank institutions (thought of as lenders /
suppliers of reserves) such as money market funds and government-sponsored enterprises, are
“statutorily prohibited from earning IOER”, it was believed that arbitrage profits generated would
be enough to steer market rates toward the IOER (Anderson and Huther, 2016). This means
that depository institutions (the borrowers of reserves) with access to IOER would borrow funds
from nonbanks and then deposit them at the central bank to make a profit. This process would
lift the short-term market rates to equalise the IOER.
30The results of the bids can be found at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/temp.cfm.
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It appears that depository institutions are subject to several frictions31 that have prevented
arbitrage from being complete. In this setting, nonbanks awash with excess liquidity were
willing to deposit their funds with depository institutions at a level below the IOER (Armenter
and Lester, 2015). For arbitrage to occur, depository institutions must expand their balance
sheets to accommodate the increase in reserves, which carries certain procedural fees and
costs32. As stated by Potter (2015), balance sheet expansion created “frictions that have made
IOER act more like a magnet that pulls up short-term interest rates than a firm floor beneath
them”.
The Fed established an RRP facility in order to “supplement the magnetic pull of changes in the
IOER rate” (Potter, 2015). One of the unique properties of the RRPs is that the central bank can
decide which institutions are eligible to take part in these operations. Potentially included in
this set of market participants are nonbanks33 that are active in short-term money markets. In
this sense, the eligible counterparties for RRPs can exceed those that can hold IOERs.
This widening of counterparties is useful, because the central bank can now set the interest
rate on RRPs for financial and nonfinancial institutions without access to IOER. Setting the RRP
slightly below the IOER allows the Fed to purchase reserves from nonbanks, and removes the
incentive to lend funds to other market participants at below the rate they receive at the Fed
(Ihrig and Meade, 2015). Nonbanks prefer to deal with the central bank, as this is a riskless
secured loan, as opposed to the unsecured loans in over-the-counter markets (Rosengren, 2016).
Setting the overnight RRP interest rate and then accepting reserves from eligible counterparties
should help increase competitiveness in money markets and thereby firm the floor beneath the
federal funds target (Ihrig and Meade, 2015). In principal, market participants in the federal
funds market will not have any incentive to lend below the overnight RRP, which means it acts
as a supplement to the IOER in controlling the federal funds rate (Frost et al., 2015).
Testing done at the Fed as to the effectiveness of RRPs has yielded positive results. In particular,
overnight RRPs have been effective in firming the short-term interest rate floor. One of the
design features which I haven’t mentioned is the potential to control the band between RRPs
and the IOER, which helps keep the federal funds rate under control. This is best explained
with an example, which is demonstrated in the next section.
31These frictions include balance sheet costs associated with accepting deposits and credit limits on cash lenders.
See the discussion in Martin et al. (2013), Potter (2015) and Armenter and Lester (2015). In an attempt to
formally show this behaviour, the paper by Armenter and Lester (2015) construct a model in which markets are
not perfectly competitive, with depository institutions subject to search frictions.
32Fees payable to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) based on total assets net equity, liquidity
requirements and costs associated with increasing bank capital and (Frost et al., 2015). In addition with Basel III
there are likely to be leverage ratios and further inclusion of rules from the Fed
33The Fed currently has 164 counterparties for RRPs. These include primary dealers, banks, money market funds
and government sponsored enterprises (Frost et al., 2015). A list of counterparties is provided at www.ny.frb.
org/markets/expanded_counterparties.html
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Figure 4.2: The Fed’s exit strategy
Before the interest rate increase After the interest rate increase
Source: Ihreg (2015)
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4.2.2.2.2 Practical Example In order to provide a practical example and expand on the
mechanisms used, this section provides a look at how the Fed has implemented its normalisation
strategy. In 2015 the economic outlook - in terms of employment, output and inflation - had
102
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
improved to such an extent that the Federal Open Market Committee decided it was time to
implement monetary tightening, through an increase of the federal funds rate by 25 basis
points34. In addition, a band of 25 basis points was established around the target. As indicated
in Figure 4.2, the hybrid regime of the Fed now has the following properties.
First, the interest on excess reserves, which is currently set at 25 basis points above zero, forms
a soft floor on the policy rate. Second, the federal funds rate target is set at the top of the target
band, equal to the IOER. Third, the introduction of the overnight reverse repurchase rate at 25
basis points below the IOER. With this setup, one expects the effective federal funds rate, and
other short-term markets, to be contained within the band established as the result of arbitrage
(Ihrig and Meade, 2015).
From the data representation in Figure 4.3 one can see this realised. The overnight nonfinancial
commercial paper interest rate provides an idea of the interest rates on nonfinancial firms
without access to the IOER facilities of the central bank. For these nonfinancial firms the market
rate is close to the RRP rate. On the other hand, the Treasury general collateral financing (GCF)
repo rate represents a market related interest rate that takes only a few nonbank institutions
into account. This rate better reflects the notion that market rates move in line with the IOER
rate, as opposed to the narrative suggested by the effective federal funds rate.
There are several undesirable effects from policy normalisation. In terms of the domestic
economy, unwinding of the balance sheet and using tools like RRPs can lead to an increased
footprint in financial markets, disrupting financial intermediation. However, policymakers
should not only be concerned with secondary effects in their own markets; they should consider
that policies implemented and disbanded could have potential international spillovers. The next
section discusses the potential impact that policy initiatives can have on the rest of the world.
4.2.3 International Spillover Effects
The explosive growth of the balance sheets of advanced economies has led to a rapid increase
in global liquidity (Tillmann, 2016). Owing to the increasing interconnectedness of global
economies a significant portion of this liquidity spilled over to emerging markets. The magnitude
of the liquidity shock leads one to believe that these spillover effects could be potentially severe.
Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, referred to the expansionary policies of advanced economies
as creating a “monetary tsunami”35. Although some emerging economies have profited from
these unconventional policies, the reality is that it leaves a large portion of them exposed to
34The targeted federal funds rate is provided at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
openmarket.html
35Which is also the title of the article by Fratzscher et al. (2012).
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market volatility and current account reversals. Spillovers from balance sheet policies have
been a source of lively debate between researchers and policymakers, and in this section I frame
some of the pertinent arguments.
While many countries have experienced a substantial boom in economic activity as the result of
these policy actions, it has often come at the cost of severe disruptions to several key markets.
Financial markets, in particular, are prone to distortion as a consequence of increased risk taking
on the part of both foreign and domestic investors. This is illustrated by the portfolio balance
channel where purchases of long-duration securities cause a substitution toward higher yielding
assets. The search-for-yield by investors from developed economies often leads them to direct
their capital flows to emerging markets, where returns are relatively higher (Banerjee and Basu,
2015).
Inflows of capital typically are welcomed, in moderation. However, large inflows can be quite
volatile and create temporary stock market booms36. In addition, they tend to drive up prices
of certain assets artificially, leading to asset bubbles and lower yields in the affected countries
(Morais et al., 2015). As a result, looser financial conditions in the country receiving capital
flows can develop, which promotes risk seeking by domestic investors (Lavigne et al., 2014).
It has been argued that the exchange rate channel also has an important role to play (Park et al.,
2015). Capital outflows could cause a depreciation in the currency of the country implementing
the policy. This could improve the competitiveness of the advanced economy by making its
exports relatively cheaper. On the other hand, asset purchases would mean greater demand
for emerging market products, potentially offsetting the effect of the appreciation (Lavigne
et al., 2014). The next section provides an overview of the empirical evidence from studies on
international spillovers.
4.2.3.1 Empirical Evidence
The idea of spillovers across financial markets is not a new one. The literature on monetary
spillovers is present in the work of David Hume in 1742, while early modelling of these
phenomena dates back to the contributions of Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963). The reason
for the intense study of spillovers and capital flows is their ability to generate crises. Since the
Second World War, there have been several crises that have been initiated by strong capital
inflows and then accompanied by sudden reversals. Examples of these are the tequila crisis
in Mexico in 1994-95, the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Russian default in 1998,
36In an interesting quote by Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), they state that “bonanzas are no blessing for advanced
or emerging market economies. In the case of the latter, capital inflow bonanzas are associated with a higher
likelihood of economic crises (debt defaults, banking, inflation and currency crashes)”.
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the Argentine crisis in 2001 and the South American economic crisis of 2002 (Powell, 2013).
However, empirical research on the topic of international spillovers in the case of the recent
financial crisis is still limited. Researchers have been able to determine that the magnitude and
speed at which the policies of advanced economies are being transmitted to emerging markets
is unprecedented, with the relative impact of channels of transmission not known (Ghosh and
Saggar, 2016)37.
At this stage almost all of the studies focus on the cross-border impact of the US large-scale asset
purchases. Two strands of research on the effects of QE have emerged. First, a literature has
developed on studying the impact of the announcement of QE by utilising high frequency data;
this usually entails the use of event study methodology. Second, several studies consider the
broader macroeconomic impact of QE with monthly and quarterly data. Econometric techniques
are normally variants of the VAR methodology, and are often applied to panel data. I discuss
the empirical evidence from each strand in turn.
4.2.3.1.1 High-Frequency Data Using intraday data on futures prices Glick and Leduc
(2013) identify the surprise component from the announcement of QE, and found that it caused
a significant depreciation of the US dollar in relation to other major currencies. They argue,
however, that the effect is not dissimilar to that of a conventional monetary policy shock of
equal size. However, in a later study, Glick and Leduc (2014) amend their result, using a new
approach to identifying policy surprises. They found that monetary easing through balance
sheet expansion has roughly three times the impact as that of an equivalent interest rate shock38.
In other words, balance sheet policy has more “bang per policy surprise on the value of the
dollar” than previously (Glick and Leduc, 2014).
Fratzscher et al. (2013) look at the impact of QE1 and QE2 (as implemented by the Fed) on
international financial markets, looking specifically at the effect on interest and exchange rates.
A unique dataset of high-frequency portfolio flows allowed them to track capital injections
across a wide range of countries. They found that QE1 caused an appreciation of US currency,
with large-scale withdrawals of capital from emerging markets, which resulted in increased
equity and bond prices in the US. However, QE2 seemingly caused a depreciation of the US
dollar and an outflow of capital to EMEs.
Bauer and Neely (2014) make use of event studies and dynamic term-structure models to evalu-
ate the contribution of the signalling and portfolio balance channels in affecting international
37By this, I mean that the relative strength of the channels is not known. The effect of the spillover could be
positive or negative depending on which effect dominates. Some of the relevant channels are the exchange rate
channel, the domestic demand channel and foreign financial conditions.
38Naturally, this is a comparison to the period before the ZLB was reached, as that was when the last shock was
applied to conventional policy instruments.
105
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
bond yields. They found that the relative impact on bond yields from LSAPs is similar to the
movement experienced as a result of conventional monetary policy surprises. Neely (2015)
looked at the impact of QE in developed economies, focusing on the cross-border financial
market impact. He used an event-study approach in conjunction with a portfolio balance model
and found a substantial impact on international markets, decreasing yield spreads across all
countries considered. In a similar vein, the work of Rogers et al. (2014) focused on the effect
of unconventional policies on asset prices (using daily and intradaily data) in a selection of
developed economies. They found that there are significant, but asymmetric, cross-country
spillovers where the “effects of US monetary policy shocks on non-US yields are larger than the
other way round” (Rogers et al., 2014).
4.2.3.1.2 Lower-Frequency and Panel Data Chen et al. (2012b) used a global VAR to
determine the financial market impact of QE. They found that QE increased global asset prices
across a wide range of assets, such as sovereign and corporate bond yields. According to
this study, emerging markets, in particular, experienced increased capital flows, greater credit
extension and inflationary pressure. Lim et al. (2014) used a panel model for capital flows.
They found significant spillover effects to developing countries through the portfolio balance,
signalling and liquidity channels from the US LSAP programs. Bowman et al. (2015) used a
VAR, and their results indicate that the effect of QE has not outsized that of normal monetary
easing. In order to determine the relative contribution of quantitative easing, Alpanda and
Kabaca (2015) developed a two-country DSGE model. They found that the effect of QE is larger
than that from conventional monetary policy, with increased asset prices in the rest of the world.
A newly released article by Tillmann (2016) tries to quantify the effect of QE on emerging market
economies. He sets up a Qual VAR39, that inputs information from QE announcements into a
traditional VAR setting. Tillmann (2016) finds that QE has significantly impacted emerging
economies, specifically along the dimensions of “capital flows, exchange rates, equity prices and
bond prices”. Using a global VECM, Chen et al. (2015) also found that QE significantly affected
emerging markets, contributing to the overheating, but also recovery, of several economies after
the financial crisis. They believe that unintended international spillovers from balance sheet
policies could be an important source of global financial instability in future, which leads us to
our discussion on tapering.
39As first utilised in Dueker (2005).
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4.2.3.2 Tapering
In my discussion on exit strategies, the idea of unwinding balance sheet measures was in-
vestigated. Recently, concerns have been vocalised, by emerging market economies such as
India, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, about the phasing out of these balance sheet
measures (Tillmann, 2016). As evidenced by the ‘taper tantrum’ of 2013, balance sheet policies
can have a large effect on international markets in highly globalised markets (Aizenman et al.,
2014). As a result of this announcement, sovereign yields in many emerging market economies
increased, stock market indices registered large drops, and currencies depreciated (Bowman
et al., 2015). In addition, sharp reversals of capital flows were recorded in several Asian and
Latin American countries (Nechio, 2014).
Contractionary policy in advanced economies, which signals the transition to higher global rates,
could mean a more pervasive reversal of capital flows (Mishra et al., 2014). Reversals could
have a substantial impact on emerging markets, causing sudden stops when capital returns
to advanced economies. While external factors are important for spillover effects, one also
has to consider internal domestic macroeconomic fundamentals40 (Nechio, 2014). Although
it is possible for countries with strong fundamentals to be affected by spillovers, the general
consensus is that those countries have a greater tendency to weather volatile capital movements,
as agreed by Ahmed and Zlate (2013), Aizenman et al. (2014), Sahay et al. (2014), Rai and
Suchanek (2014) and Basu et al. (2014).
Conflicting evidence is reported with respect to the effect of tapering on countries with ‘deeper’
financial markets. Eichengreen and Gupta (2015) argue that countries with greater ‘financial
depth’ are exposed to large capital movements, due to the relative ease with which flows can be
injected and withdrawn. On the other hand, Aizenman et al. (2014) find that countries with
more sophisticated financial markets were better positioned. They attribute this, in part, to the
fact that these countries normally have stricter macroprudential policies with respect to capital
flows.
The lesson one can draw from this is that in order to overcome problems of the exit from
balance sheet expansion, there needs to be greater international monetary policy coordination.
Advanced economies need to communicate their exit strategies clearly, to prevent market
overreaction. Emerging markets can insulate themselves from shocks, by adhering to stricter
macroprudential rules with regard to credit flows. In addition, weaker economies need to
improve the position of their fiscal and current accounts, as having stronger fundamentals could
provide a buffer against the greatest shocks to capital flow.
40Usually determined by the health of the fiscal and current account.
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4.3 Chapter Conclusion
As frequently mentioned, the financial crisis was a widespread disaster that resulted in an untold
disruption of the world economy. Befitting the size of this event, authorities responded with
policy actions of an unprecedented magnitude. Owing to the degree of monetary intervention,
it seems prudent to reflect on these policy actions. Academic discussion as to the potential
policy impact and transmission is a useful starting point, but it needs to be consolidated with
appropriate empirical evidence. Success of policies implemented, and the proposed channels of
transmission, are presented in this chapter. The consensus is that balance sheet policies were
successful in avoiding even larger disturbances to economic activity, and in some cases restored
function to failing markets. There is still disagreement as to the specific channels through which
balance sheet policies operated, but their overall success is consented.
From this discussion it is evident that the usage of central bank balance sheets will become
the norm in many advanced economies experiencing financial distress. Adopting these policies
when financial markets are dysfunctional, and traditional policy tools have outgrown their
usefulness, is easy to motivate and considered a necessary evil. However, it uncertain to what
extent these measures will be used in normal times. Concerning normal times, the last part
is a discussion on the broader implications, such as international spillovers and central bank
independence. Most importantly it includes a discussion on how policy is to move forward with
inflated balance sheets.
In a recent article Ihrig and Meade (2015) state that the new implementation of monetary
policy with interest on excess reserves and reverse repurchase agreements, as implemented by
the Fed, means that the way we understand and teach economics to future generations will
fundamentally change. The next chapter takes a look at the textbook narrative of monetary
policy implementation and how it could possibly change to reflect future developments.
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Part II
Empirical Work and Model Construction
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Chapter 5
Liquidity Effect
Following the on-going financial crisis, central banks are now probably on the verge of a
further, fourth, epoch, though the achievement of a new consensus on their appropriate
behaviour and operations may well be as messy and confused as in the two previous
interregnums.
— Charles Goodhart (2011)
In his paper on the changing role of central banks, Goodhart (2011) identifies three stable
epochs of central banking, with the most recent, third epoch, dating from the 1980s to 2007.
The anguish of central bankers was unmistakable in the interregnum before this epoch (Burns,
1979). Despite access to powerful tools of monetary policy, and a willingness to use them,
central bankers could not contain the persistent inflation of the 1970s. Fortunately, this inspired
cooperation on the part of academic researchers and policymakers alike, bringing about a period
of sustained price and output stability. The position of central banks during the 1970s can
then be juxtaposed with the current interregnum. Given this setting, one can ask, will a new
epoch require a similar paradigm shift? In this chapter I consider such a shift in thinking about
monetary policy, highlighting important changes to the conventional operational frameworks of
central banks.
5.1 Introduction
Monetary policy, post Bretton Woods, saw the emergence of the short-term interest rate as the
primary policy instrument. However, in the wake of the financial crisis, balance sheets have,
again, become part the monetary policy toolkit, now empowered to perform more than an
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automated role in policymaking. The present-day incarnation of balance sheet policy differs in
character, though, from historically used balance sheet mechanisms. We now observe that under
certain monetary policy regimes, balance sheet policies operate independently from movements
in the central bank policy rate1. The independence of these monetary policy tools contests the
conventional wisdom on the role of central bank balance sheets in policymaking (Borio and
Disyatat, 2010). One of the implications is that balance sheets potentially could be used to
extend the policy reach of central banks to promote financial stability.
To appreciate fully the changing role of balance sheets in policymaking one needs to look at
the history of monetary policy implementation. Since the Second World War there has been
a significant evolution in the way monetary policy is conducted. During this period central
banks adopted several operational frameworks. Monetarism, which was dominant in monetary
policy implementation from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, emphasised the ability of central
banks to exert tight control over the money supply. This gave rise to use of several quantitative
concepts2 as preferred operational targets in this era. Operational targets of monetary policy3
refer to some class of economic variable that the central bank can control using its monetary
policy tools. Central banks utilise three tools toward this end, namely, reserve requirements,
standing facilities and open market operations (Bindseil, 2004).
This monetarist view coincides with the textbook model of monetary policy implementation,
which largely is shaped by the experience of the United States (US). According to this view,
central banks actively practice their influence over the money supply in order to pursue their
intermediate target4 and ultimately economic objectives (Keister et al., 2008). However, since
the early 1980s central banks have shifted their focus away from quantitative targets toward a
short-term interest rate5.
This textbook narrative underlines the fundamental link between the balance sheets of central
banks and monetary policy (Keister et al., 2008). In this framework, central banks can use
1This comment might appear vague or even inaccurate for the first time reader on the topic, but the conditions
under which this occurs will be identified further on in the text.
2Such as the monetary base, reserves of banks, total volume of open market operations, non-borrowed reserves,
excess reserves, free reserves and borrowed reserves (Bindseil, 2004).
3We know that “there are essentially three main types of operational targets: (i) a short-term interest rate
(pre-1914, and post 1990 the dominating type of operational target, and in between also playing at least implicitly
an important role). (ii) A quantitative, reserve related concept - officially in the US the operational target in the
period 1920-1983. (iii) A foreign exchange rate, for central banks which peg their own currency strictly to a
foreign one” (Bindseil, 2005).
4According to Bindseil (2004) an “intermediate target is an economic variable that the central bank can control
with a reasonable time lag and with a relative degree of precision, and which is in a relatively stable or at least
predictable relationship with the final target of monetary policy, of which the intermediate target is a leading
indicator”.
5Some central banks, such as the Bank of England have never adopted quantitative targets and have always
relied on the use of a short-term interbank rate (Bindseil, 2004).
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the available monetary policy tools, generally open market operations, to make the short-term
market interest rates effective. These operations entail a change in the level of reserves6 to
bring about changes in the interest rate (Disyatat, 2008; Kahn, 2010). The negative causal
relationship between central bank reserves and the short-term interest rate is known as the
“liquidity effect” (Kopchak, 2011).
A substantial body of empirical work has sought to identify a clear and stable link between
several components of central bank balance sheets and key policy interest rates (Friedman and
Kuttner, 2010). The results have been mixed. Some authors have found significant liquidity
effects for the US economy in the 1980s and early 1990s 7. However, when the analysis is
extended beyond this timeframe one finds that the relationship fades. This has important
implications for the understanding of how monetary policy implementation works in the 21st
century. Theoretical models of monetary policy implementation stress the negative relationship
that exists between liquidity and interest rates, but in modern central bank practice, we do not
necessarily see clear evidence of this.
Several explanations have been posited to explain the disappearance of this liquidity effect in
recent years. The implementation of new operational frameworks at central banks is often
the reason that is put forward for the fading out of this effect. It has been suggested that
because of innovations in conducting of monetary policy that interest rates and reserves have
been decoupled, which means that various levels of reserves can exist for a given interest rate.
The independent movement of these policy targets has been referred to as the “decoupling
principle” (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). This has far-reaching implications for the future conduct
of monetary policy, as it provides the central bank a new tool with which to pursue additional
economic objectives.
The objective of this chapter is to establish the empirical validity of the decoupling principle
by analysing the relationship between short-term nominal interest rates and selected central
bank balance sheet variables in four countries, each with different operational frameworks.
Several empirical methods were used in order to assess the nature of the liquidity effect in
the selected sample of countries. First, a simple rolling regression was used to illustrate the
potential liquidity effect in each country over time. Second, an identified VAR was used to
determine the effect of a shock to different quantity concepts on the relevant policy interest
rate for different subsamples. Third, a time-varying parameter VAR (TVP-VAR) with stochastic
volatility was constructed, which combines the time-varying properties of the rolling regression
and the structural nature of a VAR analysis.
6Reserves take the form of both bank deposits and vault cash held at the central bank.
7Studies primarily have focused on the United States.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Chapter 5.2 contains a literature review on the liquidity
effect. This review provides a context for the rest of the discussion in the chapter. Chapter 5.3
provides a discussion on the different operational frameworks of modern central banks. This
section also endeavours to undertake a descriptive analysis of the decoupling principle in the
sample of countries. Chapter 5.4 provides empirical evidence of the decoupling principle.
Chapter 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The Liquidity Effect
According to the traditional/textbook view of monetary policy implementation, central banks
conduct open market operations8 in order to steer the short-term market interest rates toward
the bank’s policy interest rate target (Friedman and Kuttner, 2010; Ihrig and Meade, 2015). The
mechanism underlying monetary policy conduct within this framework is often illustrated with
the aid of a graph, as in Figure 5.1. The explanation turns on the interaction of a negatively
sloped money demand curve, mdt , with a perfectly inelastic money supply curve, m
s
t . The money
supply curve is vertical because the central bank is a monopoly supplier of money or reserves
(Ihrig and Meade, 2015). In this model mt is the log of nominal money, d indicates demand
and s, supply. These money demand and supply functions are usually expressed analytically,
in addition to the graphical presentation. The following money demand and supply relations,
similar to those found in Pagan and Robertson (1995), will prove useful for exposition. These
equations are:
mdt = α1 + α2rt + ε
d
t (5.1)
mst = β1 + β2rt + ε
s
t (5.2)
where r is a short-term non-negative nominal interest rate and εdt and ε
d
t are mutually uncorre-
lated demand and supply shocks. In equilibrium, mdt = m
s





within this framework will bring about changes in the level of the interest rate and/or level of
money in the economy. One could ask, what would happen in the case where β1 ↑⇒ ms ↑ (i.e.
expansionary monetary policy)? An increase in β1 would result in a decrease in rt if α2 < 0
and β2 ≤ −α2 because dr/dβ1 = (α2 − β2)−1. It is established that α2 < 0 as mdt is downward
sloping and it is assumed that β2 = 0, which means that mst is perfectly inelastic
9. The changes
8This is achieved by buying or selling reserves/quantity aggregates to depository institutions (i.e. expansion or
contraction of the money supply)
9The shape of the supply curve in this model is assumed to be vertical, although some Post-Keynesian authors
have suggested that a horizontal supply curve is more realistic.
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induced are illustrated in Figure 5.1; one can see that increasing the money supply10 drives
down the nominal interest rate11. The negative response of the interest rate to an increase in
the money supply is referred to as the “liquidity effect” (Friedman, 1972)12. Because central
banks retain a monopoly over the supply of outside money, the existence of this effect allows
















Figure 5.1: This figure presents expansionary monetary policy in the traditional model of
central bank interest rate setting. Changes in the ms curve cause a move along the md curve. A
rightward shift in ms increases the quantity of money and depresses the level of the nominal
non-negative short-term interest rate
The negative relationship between mdt and rt is a crucial component in this monetary policy
narrative, and has resulted in a substantial body of work to investigate the empirical validity
of the claim (Friedman and Kuttner, 2010). Some of the earliest attempts to capture this
negative relationship were unsuccessful (Litterman and Weiss, 1984; Sims, 1986; Mishkin,
10Shifting the mst curve to the right
11Once the demand for money reaches the elastic portion of the curve, changes in the money supply will not
bring about significant changes in the interest rate. This is normally referred to in the literature as a “liquidity trap”
(Hicks, 1937)
12Friedman (1968) described this mechanism in his famous presidential address: “Let the Fed set out to keep
interest rates down. How will it try to do so? By buying securities. This raises their prices and lowers their yields.
In the process, it also increases the quantity of reserves available to banks, hence the amount of bank credit, and,
ultimately the total quantity of money. That is why central bankers in particular, and the financial community more
broadly, generally believe that an increase in the quantity of money tends to lower interest rates”.
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1986). However, several articles (Reichenstein, 1987; Thornton, 1988; Sims, 1992; Leeper and
Gordon, 1992; Gali, 1992; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992),
provide evidence of a link between short-term interest rates and several monetary aggregates,
in particular the monetary base, M1 and M213. Leeper and Gordon (1992) had a large impact
on the liquidity effect discourse. They found a statistically significant liquidity effect, but it
was highly dependent on the subsample used. In addition, the size of the innovation in money
aggregates required to induce a change in the interest rate was implausibly large. This failure
to provide robust and economically significant estimates of the liquidity effect is referred to as
the “liquidity puzzle”14 (Leeper and Gordon, 1992).
Several authors have argued that the fragility of Leeper and Gordon (1992)’s results were due
to incorrect model specification - specifically, the use of monetary aggregates as explanatory
variables. Christiano et al. (1994) argue that bank reserves could serve as a more appropriate
independent variable. They constructed a vector autoregressive (VAR) model15 and estimated
the response of the short-term interest rate to shocks on non-borrowed bank reserves16. With this
model, they established a significant and persistent liquidity effect. This outcome led Gordon and
Leeper (1994), among others, to reconsider their estimation method and variable specification,
and they now include a measure of reserves in their model identification. Consequently, they
found strong evidence for a liquidity effect. Pagan and Robertson (1994) tried to evaluate the
econometric methods used to obtain these results and found that due to improperly motivated
identification strategies, evidence from these studies is weak at best. They devote the majority
of their analysis and criticism to the article of Gordon and Leeper (1994).
The conflicting evidence in the literature led Strongin (1995) to examine the operational
procedures of the US Federal Reserve. Strongin (1995) found that the lion’s share of changes to
the supply of reserves are made to prevent the market rate from deviating too far from the policy
rate. These actions taken by the central bank are known as liquidity management operations17.
In other words, it was becoming more difficult to isolate the exogenous policy actions of the
Federal Reserve, and central banks in general, as the fine-tuning of liquidity management
13The monetary base is defined as the sum of vault cash, currency in circulation and the reserves deposited by
private banks with the central bank (Bindseil, 2005).
14There are four ‘puzzles’ in empirical macroeconomics. In other words, situations in which the data does not fit
the underlying theory. The four puzzles are, the price, liquidity, exchange rate and forward discount bias puzzle
(Vinayagathasan, 2014).
15This is the standard method used for estimating the magnitude and significance of the liquidity effect in the
literature.
16Non-borrowed reserves are equal to total reserves minus borrowed reserves, where borrowed reserves are
loans/credit extended to depository institutions (which is normally located on the asset side of the central bank’s
balance sheet).
17These operations entail the provision and withdrawal of liquidity available to private banks. Repurchase and
reverse repurchase agreements traditionally are conducted to alter liquidity levels.
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operations became more frequent and efficient. Strongin’s (1995) strategy to identify supply
shocks entailed constructing a new reserve measure. He generated this variable by dividing
non-borrowed reserves by total reserves. Redefining the independent variable in this fashion
revealed a significant and persistent liquidity effect (Strongin, 1995). Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) extended the model of Strongin (1995) to allow for different operating procedures.
They present a preferred just-identified biweekly model and found a highly significant liquidity
effect.
During the mid-1990s various central banks moved away from “quantity-based operating
procedures, toward a focus on explicit interest rate targets” (Friedman and Kuttner, 2010).
This change meant that the policy interest rate would no longer be endogenously determined
through exogenous movements in the supply of reserves. Instead, central banks would rely on
the announcement of an explicit policy interest rate and a credible commitment to maintaining
it. The introduction of new monetary policy regimes whittled down the remaining evidence
of the liquidity effect. The only line of research to yield any significant liquidity effect during
the late 1990s was that of James Hamilton (1996; 1997; 1998), who advocated the use of
high-frequency data.
Hamilton contributes to the literature by applying an unanticipated shock to the forecasting
error of the Federal Reserve, instead of the actual level of reserves, on the last day of the
maintenance period18. The choice of a forecasting error as an explanatory variable starts at the
level of liquidity management operations. These operations entail making reserves available
each day for depositing institutions. The amount of reserves needed is unknown, so the central
bank attempts to forecast the demand for reserves. Deviations from this forecast, the forecast
error, are supposed to alter the position of the economy along the demand for money, mdt , curve
(i.e. supplying more/less than required in the market shifts the short-term market interest rate).
Applying shocks to this variable replicates the liquidity effect. However, to affect a quantifiable
movement in the interest rate required a tremendous shock to the level of reserves (which left
some to question the economic significance of the result).
Thornton (2005; 2006; 2010) provides a critique on the work of Hamilton. He agrees with
the finding of a liquidity effect, using data at a daily frequency, but emphasises that the effect
is “statistically significant but quantitatively unimportant" (Thornton, 2006). These findings
are reinforced by the work of Carpenter and Demiralp (2006a,b), who used a methodology
similar to that of Hamilton (1997), estimating the liquidity effect with high-frequency data. The
effect is significant but trivial, with a 1 billion dollar shock to non-borrowed reserves on the
18The maintenance period is a timeframe during which depository institutions must maintain a specified level of
funds.
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final day of the maintenance period delivering a 3.5 basis point movement in the interest rate
(Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006b). This indicates that “the change in balances necessary for
even a 25-basis point change in the funds rate would lead to implausibly large open market
operations” (Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006b).
The most recent strand of liquidity effect literature acknowledges the decrease of the effect over
time. Judson and Klee (2010) indicate, for example, that the liquidity effect has “attenuated
considerably with time”. They test their hypothesis by looking at high-frequency data in a
sample ranging from 1995 to 2007. They posit that successive changes in policy practice,
especially in the 1990s, have resulted in the disappearance of the observed liquidity effect.
Several other viewpoints are considered as to why this effect has decreased. Kopchak (2011)
makes the argument, similar to the one advocated by Strongin (1995), that the difficulty in
isolating the exogenous policy actions of the Federal Reserve, and central banks in general, has
increased with time, as fine-tuning of liquidity management operations becomes more frequent
and efficient. Furthermore, the forecasting ability of central banks has improved greatly with
the introduction of modern account monitoring technology (Judson and Klee, 2010). Another
argument is that the liquidity effect may have waned in developed economies because of the
growing importance of non-bank lending institutions in the setting of market interest rates. This
evolution has been facilitated by the “relaxation of legal and regulatory restrictions” in financial
markets (Friedman and Kuttner, 2010). Innovations in the financial sector certainly have a role
to play in the ongoing liquidity puzzle. However, it seems that the main contribution comes
from the changes in monetary policy implementation.
Finally, the liquidity effect may have disappeared because of the shift in monetary policy
implementation toward the announcement of a target policy rate. According to Guthrie and
Wright (2000) the central bank announcement of a certain policy rate, rather than open
market operations, is responsible for the conducting of monetary policy. They refer to these
announcements as “open mouth operations”. Borio (1997) reaches a similar conclusion about
the importance of policy signals, in a study conducted on monetary policy implementation in
industrialised countries. A verbalised credible commitment by central banks to counter any
deviations from the policy rate focuses the expectations of financial actors around the specified
target. In this way market rates may change without any liquidity operations ever taking place
(Borio, 1997). The vital point in this discussion is that it appears that in recent years, changes in
reserves have played an increasingly insignificant role in the implementation of monetary policy.
The discussion in the next section provides insight into some of the operational frameworks that
are currently used. Four countries, each with a different operational framework, are considered.
117
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.3 Changes in Monetary Policy Implementation
The discussion in the preceding section has alluded to the changing nature of monetary policy
in the post-war era. This section provides some additional background information as well as a
context for the discussion of the most popular operating procedures that central banks currently
employ. During the 1950s through to the late 1960s, traditional Keynesianism dominated the
policy space. However, the 1970s saw the rise of monetarism and with it the targeting of
monetary aggregates by several central banks. A monetary target was the obvious choice for
monetarists, as the tools of monetary policy enable central banks to “determine the total amount
of money in existence or to alter that amount” (Friedman, 1959, p. 24). This meant adopting
a precise level of reserve/money quantity as the operational target for the central bank, with
the intermediate target being a monetary aggregate, for example M1. The money multiplier
was at the heart of the transmission mechanism by which an adjustment in a reserve or money
quantity would bring about changes in a specified monetary aggregate (Bindseil, 2004). By
controlling this monetary aggregate, the central bank could exert pressure on inflation and
other key economic indicators.
In the early 1980s, several central banks adopted a new operational target, a short-term policy
interest rate. The shift toward a new policy instrument paradigm was heavily influenced by
William Poole’s (1970) seminal work on the instrument problem19. Poole utilised a stochastic
IS-LM model to illustrate that the policy interest rate was the superior policy instrument with
which to negate the impact of a large shock to the monetary sector (Poole, 1970). In the wake
of this paper, three dominant monetary policy regimes emerged20. These regimes all use the
announcement of the policy rate as the primary policy tool (Guthrie and Wright, 2000). The
main difference between regimes is the mechanism by which interest rates are made effective.
These regimes are discussed next, in turn.
In the traditional model of monetary policy, as propounded in Chapter 5.2, interest rates are
determined endogenously through manipulation of the money/reserve supply. However, since
the early 1990s, central bank operations have been approached in a slightly different manner.
Two broad/stylised operational frameworks emerged. First, the reserve regime, which retains
some of the components of the traditional model. The reserve regime relies on the use of reserve
requirements (which usually must be met on an average basis over a specified maintenance
period) and a publicly announced policy rate (Whitesell, 2006). Either this policy rate or the
rate that the central bank charges can then be targeted (Brink and Kock, 2009).
19Poole should be referring to operational targets, as neither the interest rate nor money/reserve quantities are
policy instruments. This has been the source of much confusion in the literature.
20The three regimes of monetary policy implementation are the reserve, corridor and floor regimes
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In the case of a policy target, the central bank determines the level that it would like the
overnight rate to be, based on prevailing economic conditions, and it then uses liquidity
management operations to steer the rate toward this target. According to Ennis and Keister
(2008), “central banks aim to adjust the total supply of reserve balances so that it equals demand
at exactly the target rate of interest”. This requires an estimation of the demand for reserves21.
Errors in forecasting demand are thought to lead to movements away from the target rate. If
central banks are not able to consistently hit the target, the credibility of the communication
mechanism of the bank is questioned (Ennis and Keister, 2008). In the case where the rate is
the one that the central bank charges, the central bank creates a “shortage of bank reserves in
the money market through levying a cash reserve requirement and draining liquidity through
open-market operations, and then refinances the shortage by lending funds to banks at its policy
interest rate” (Brink and Kock, 2009). This approach is usually followed by developing countries
with less active interbank markets.
Second, some advanced economies employ a corridor or floor interest rate regime. In this
regime the central banks often use interest rate targets. The most noticeable difference between
corridor/floor and reserve regimes is the use of standing facilities. Some reserve regimes may
employ a penalty rate or overnight lending facilities that act as an upper bound to the interest
rate. However, in corridor and floor regimes, interest is paid on reserves through a deposit
facility. This means that there is a lower bound placed on the interest rate. The mechanics of
both these regimes is described in Chapter 5.3.1 and Chapter 5.3.2, respectively.
5.3.1 Reserve Regimes
Reserve regimes rely on the use of a reserve requirement and liquidity management operations
to make the announced interest rate effective. The reserve requirement is usually greater
than the working (settlement) balances of private banks (Borio, 1997). The reserve regime,
in comparison with corridor/floor regimes, most closely resembles the traditional framework
of monetary policy implementation, where “changes in reserve supply systematically result in
movements in the relevant interest rate” (Friedman and Kuttner, 2010). However, liquidity
management operations in this regime play a purely “technical and supportive role” and
they “neither impinge upon, nor contain any information relevant to, the overall stance of
policy” (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). The question is whether the market for bank reserves is
insulated from these operations. This is emphasised by Borio and Disyatat (2010) as one of the
21One of the sources of demand, apart from reasons of statutory compliance (i.e. the reserve requirement), is
the usage of reserves to facilitate large inter-bank settlements (Brink and Kock, 2009).
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preconditions for decoupling the interest rate from the level of reserves. Central banks need to
“engage in offsetting transactions that ‘sterilise’ the impact of the operations on the amount of
reserve balances” (Borio and Disyatat, 2010)22. When the market for reserves is insulated from
the interest rate, two changes to the traditional framework seem plausible.
First, central banks are either operating on the (almost) perfectly elastic or inelastic portion of
the mdt curve and the argument in favour of negative interest rate elasticity becomes tenable
(Friedman and Kuttner, 2010). Figure 5.2 depicts this alteration, demonstrating the inability of
reserve changes to induce proportional shifts in the interest rate once mdt becomes sufficiently
horizontal. Essentially, interest rates are unresponsive to changes in reserves, as found in the
liquidity effect literature for the USA.
Second, substantial interest rate changes do not necessarily require any movement in the supply
of reserves. The announcement of the policy interest rate allows central banks to set their rate
(or target) instantaneously and precludes the use reserves to shift the interest rate. In Figure 5.3
the entire md schedule shifts outward in response to the announcement of a higher policy rate.
22Another way to decouple would be to ensure that changing reserve holdings have no impact on the policy rate.
This would be achieved by, for example, implementing a policy rate floor, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.3.2
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Private banks react to the policy stance signal of the central bank. Woodford (2000) argues
that “there need not be a stable relation between this overnight interest rate and the size of the
monetary base in order for the central bank to effectively control overnight interest rates”. This
notion that interest rate movements happen regardless of the level of reserves is referred to as
the anticipation or announcement effect (Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006a; Fullwiler, 2008).
The reserve regime has been quite popular with developing countries and a selection of advanced
economies. In the sections to follow there is an historical overview of the monetary policy
landscape of my sample of countries. In terms of reserve regimes, I will be looking at two case
studies, South Africa (SA) and the United States of America (USA)23, whereas Canada and
Norway can be broadly categorised as countries that employ remuneration on reserves. This
historical approach serves two purposes. First, it provides a context for my empirical analysis,
which facilitates a richer interpretation of the results. Second, the vector autoregression analysis
in Chapter 5.4.3 requires a logical demarcation of subsamples, which is elicited from the
country-specific narratives.
23It should be noted that the operational framework of the US changed to a hybrid system in 2008, with the
advent of the financial crisis.
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5.3.1.1 South Africa
South Africa has had several monetary policy regimes since the Second World War. The
Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa (aka the
De Kock Commission Report) identified five distinctive monetary policy phases between 1945
and 1985. The first three phases occured between 1945 and 1965. The fourth phase, from
1965 to 1981, was characterised by the “use of direct monetary control measures” (Mollentze,
2000). Aron and Muellbauer (2007), in their classification of South African monetary policy
regimes, refer to the period from 1960 to 1981 as a liquid asset ratio-based system, which
entailed quantitative controls on interest rates and credit. In this regime “commercial banks held
particular assets defined as ‘liquid’ as a specified minimum proportion of deposits” (Naraidoo
and Gupta, 2010).
This regime was in place till the early 1980s and was replaced by the cash reserves-based
system in 1985 (Gidlow, 1995). This period corresponds to the fifth phase identified by the De
Kock Commission, the transition to a more market-related monetary policy regime. Mollentze
(2000) states that the “monetary authorities deliberately started to pursue a policy of allowing
interest rates to vary more readily as the forces of demand and supply changed in the market”.
In this regime the intermediate target was flexible monetary aggregate ranges, based on a
broad definition of money (M3). The operational framework remained intact until 1998;
however, there was a significant philosophical change in the focus of the central bank with the
appointment of Dr CL Stals as governor in 1989.
Since 1998 the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has followed a reserve regime with an
announced policy rate charged on overnight lending. The repurchase rate (i.e. repo rate) is
the SARB’s operational target (Brink and Kock, 2009). This rate is made effective through
the creation of a shortage in the money market. This process starts with the daily reserve
requirement imposed on private commercial banks. All loans extended by the SARB to these
depository institutions, to meet their liquidity requirement, are refinanced at the repo rate24.
The SARB can easily maintain this shortage in the market for reserves as it is the monopoly
supplier of its own liabilities. Several tools, such as reverse repurchase agreements and
debentures, are at the disposal of the SARB for this goal. An increase (decrease) in central bank
liabilities (assets) would be associated with an increase in the money market shortage (i.e. the
draining of liquidity). Brink and Kock (2009) have the following to say on this,
24Which is determined by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
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Any transaction between the banking sector and the central bank that results in a
credit entry into a bank’s account at the central bank, results in a creation of new
money-market liquidity which, if no further transactions are undertaken, increases the
bank’s reserve balances with the central bank (i.e. increases the monetary base).
An important distinction needs to be made between the different types of liabilities found on
central bank balance sheets. The unwinding of the central bank’s balance sheet is not entirely
under the control of the SARB. According to Disyatat (2008), the “precision of their control
depends largely on the degree with which the autonomous factors can be anticipated by the op-
eration desk on a daily basis”. Therefore, control relies on the balance of passive/autonomous25
and active/non-autonomous26 liquidity management.
The liabilities side of the balance sheet can generally be divided into these two broad categories.
If one considers the case of South Africa, the autonomous factors include the notes and coins in
circulation and deposits by banks at the SARB. On the other hand, SARB debentures and reverse
repurchase agreements are considered non-autonomous and under the full control of the central
bank (Brink and Kock, 2009). In South Africa, the relative contribution of non-autonomous
factors (i.e. open market operations) has been on the decline, with government deposits27
becoming a significant component since 1998 (Brink and Kock, 2009). Non-monetary elements
now comprise more than 60 per cent of liabilities.
My empirical models, in Chapter 5.4, explore the dimensions of the relationship between
non-borrowed reserves28 and a relevant short-term interest rate. In the textbook model of
monetary policy implementation, one would expect a clear and stable negative relationship
between the level of non-borrowed reserves and the repo rate. Short-term interest rates, such as
the bank rate, are usually “influenced by changes in the supply of non-borrowed cash reserves”
(Schoombee, 1996).
5.3.1.2 USA
The Federal Reserve is, in all eventuality, the most extensively studied central bank in the
world. Several comprehensive works, for example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer
25Factors that central banks retain no control over.
26Factors that central banks actively manage.
27These deposits are semi-autonomous.
28Non-borrowed reserves generally are calculated as total reserves minus borrowed reserves. Borrowed reserves
are found on the asset side of the balance sheet, normally referred to as loans, borrowing, liquidity provided, etc.
In the case of South Africa borrowed reserves were defined as the total liquidity provided (i.e. money market
shortage).
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(2010), map out the entire history of the Fed in meticulous detail. The focus of the world on
the practice of the Fed has led many central banks to adopt policies that are closely aligned. It
is therefore interesting to look at the different operational frameworks and targets that the Fed
has utilised in the post-war era29. Romer and Romer (2004) posit the theory that fundamental
changes in policy have been the result of changes in the outlook of policymakers carrying out
that policy. They found that the objective of Fed chairpersons largely has remained the same,
but the methods employed to reach their intended targets have been clearly distinguishable.
An appropriate way then to differentiate between monetary policy regimes in the US is by
considering the different terms of each chairperson. In fact, several papers that try to empirically
identify monetary policy regime switching in the US found that changes in policy outlook
coincide with changes of the incumbent chairperson (Sims and Zha, 2006; Bae et al., 2011).
There have been seven Federal Reserve Chairpersons since the 2nd of April, 1951, when William
McChesney Martin, Jr. took office (Romer and Romer, 2004). The official position of the Fed
during the Martin era was one of ‘free reserves targeting’, where free reserves are equal to the
difference between excess and borrowed reserves (Bindseil, 2004). Several monetary policy
instruments were used actively in this era, including frequent changes in reserve requirements,
open market operations and the discount rate.
In February of 1970, Arthur Burns was inaugurated (Romer and Romer, 2004). The Burns
era also opened with a quantitative operational target, the reserves on private deposits. The
intermediate target, M1 growth, was achieved by altering the reserve position of the Fed. Burns
acknowledged the importance of the federal funds rate in the implementation of monetary
policy. In the second half of the decade, the funds rate was constrained to a narrow band30 and
became the implicit operational target of the Fed (Meulendyke, 1988).
Paul Volcker became the chairperson of the Board of Governors in October 1979. He was
tasked with the ostensibly insurmountable objective of overcoming double-digit inflation. In
order to combat the high and persistent inflation episode of the 1970s31, Volcker adopted an
aggressive contractionary policy stance. For Volcker, this meant taking a monetarist approach,
substituting away from interest rate targeting to non-borrowed reserves as operational target
(Meulendyke, 1988; Bindseil, 2004). In 1983, the Fed changed their operational target once
again, to borrowed reserves coupled with a five per cent band around the federal funds rate.
Alan Greenspan, who became chairperson in August 1987, was probably the most influential
central banker in history. Greenspan continued to use the operational targets of the Volcker era
29Especially after 1951, when the Fed gained its independence from the government with the Federal Reserve
Accord.
30Movements from this band were corrected through market intervention.
31Also known as the Great Inflation.
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until 1990. Afterwards, a gradual movement toward a federal funds target was undertaken. By
1994 the process was completed, and a federal funds rate target was explicitly announced after
each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting (Bindseil, 2004). Ben Bernanke, who
became chairperson in February 2006, adopted a hybrid regime in 2008 with the advent of the
financial crisis. The most recent chairperson, is Janet Yellen, who took office in February 2014.
During her term, the Fed increased the federal funds rate in December 2015. This was the first
rate increase since 2006.
The mechanics of implementation are highly similar to those of the South African case. The
primary difference is in the setting of the short-term interest rate. In the case of the Fed, the
FOMC announces a target for the federal funds rate and instructs the Open Market Trading
Desk (OMTD) at the New York Federal Reserve to carry out market operations to achieve the
target rate. The OMTD conducts the operations by “estimating the quantity of reserves that will
be demanded given the FOMC’s target federal funds rate and supplying the reserves required to
meet that demand at the target federal funds rate” (Kahn, 2010). Forecasting demand is not a
precise science, and deviations from the forecast result in volatility of the effective federal funds
rate.
5.3.2 Corridor, Floor and Hybrid Regimes
Corridor and floor regimes do not require the levying of reserve requirements to make the
targeted interest rate effective; standing facilities are used instead 32. Most central banks have a
lending facility and could establish an interest rate ceiling. This interest rate charged on the
lending facility, set above the target rate, imposes a “penalty on depository institutions that
borrow from the central bank rather than in the interbank market” (Kahn, 2010). However, in a
corridor regime, the standing facilities provide both a ceiling and floor to the target interest
rate. The floor, which is established under the target rate in a corridor system, is a depository
facility where private banks can deposit reserves and receive a fixed rate of interest on these
deposits (Keister et al., 2008). The spread between the ceiling and floor rates is usually narrow
and is called the “interest rate channel, tunnel or corridor” (Whitesell, 2006).
Both the upper and lower interest rate limits are presented in Figure 5.4. In a symmetric
channel/corridor regime, the target will be set in the middle of the deposit and lending facility.
In other words, the upper and lower limits form a symmetric band around the target rate. This
is often referred to as a pure corridor regime, and is implemented by countries like Canada and
32For the purpose of this paper, a corridor or floor regime with a reserve requirement is referred to as a hybrid
regime
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Sweden. In this regime the aim of the central bank is to “keep total reserves in the banking
system at zero, or marginally higher than zero” (Syrstad, 2012). Figure 5.5 is a graphical
representation of the corridor system in Canada. This corridor system has been in place since
1995, to avoid excess interest rate volatility. The Bank of Canada was forced to move temporarily
to a floor system between 2009 and 2011.























The floor regime differs from the corridor system in two distinct ways. First, the deposit rate is
set equal to, instead of below, the central bank’s target rate (Keister et al., 2008). Second, the
reserve supply is chosen to intersect the flat portion of the demand curve depicted in Figure 5.4.
In other words “the central bank must provide the banking system with so much liquidity
that the overnight rate approaches the central bank’s deposit rate” (Bernhardsen et al., 2010).
Norway and New Zealand are examples of countries that have implemented such a regime.
Figure 5.6 provides a look at the Norwegian floor system. As stated in Chapter 5.3.1, one of the
conditions for decoupling is that changes in reserve holdings have no impact on the policy rate,
as per the floor regime.
Several authors (Goodfriend, 2002; Keister et al., 2008; Borio and Disyatat, 2010; Bowman
et al., 2010; Kahn, 2010; Lavoie, 2010; Ireland, 2012) have suggested that under floor regimes
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the ‘decoupling principle’ is most readily observable. Goodfriend (2002) was the first explicitly
to formulate this hypothesis. He believes that under a floor regime the central bank could
potentially target any quantity of reserves, as long as liquidity is in excess of the amount required
to keep the policy rate equal to the interest paid on reserves. To maintain this floor regime,
the central bank has to satiate the banking system with reserves at all times. In this setting
the policy rate is theoretically controlled by the level of interest on reserves (Kopchak, 2011).
Following the recent decision by the Fed to impose interest on reserves, Keister et al. (2008)
claim the central bank “has ‘divorced’ the quantity of money from the interest rate target and,
hence, from monetary policy”. This divorce leaves the central bank two independent policy
instruments, namely the policy rate and the quantity of reserves. Ireland (2012), for example,
believes that under a floor regime, “the traditional short-run liquidity effect, associating a
monetary policy tightening with higher interest rates brought about through a reduction in the
supply of reserves, vanishes”.
In reserve regimes, depository institutions are required to hold non interest-bearing reserves,
which represent an opportunity cost to these banks (Kahn, 2010). The distortion created by this
tax on reserves was highlighted by Friedman (1959), who argued for the payment of interest
on reserve balances at the market rate. Friedman believed that “central-bank reserves are a
valuable transactions medium” and that “they should be made available in elastic supply and
not taxed” (Kashyap and Stein, 2012). This entails remunerating private banks for reserve
balances held at the central bank. The opportunity cost of holding money is also a central
concept in the Friedman rule for the optimum quantity of money, which advocates setting the
nominal interest rate to zero to address the distortion (Friedman, 1968; Cúrdia and Woodford,
2011).
Several developed nations find themselves utilising a combination of interest on reserves and a
modified non-negative Friedman rule (especially since the financial crisis). This combination of
interest rate floor and reserve requirement forms part of what is considered a hybrid regime33.
In the case of the US after 2008, for example, where interest rates were driven to the floor
of the interest rate corridor, the system resembles an application of a non-negative Friedman
rule34. Pure corridor and floor regimes are not subject to these drawbacks as only settlement
(working) balances are held by private banks (Borio, 1997).
33Countries with a corridor system and reserve requirement are also referred to as hybrid regimes
34This discussion is further explored in the previous, where I discuss the exit strategy currently implemented by
the Fed
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5.3.2.1 Canada
The Bank of Canada’s operating framework has been relatively stable since the 1950s. Monetary
policy has been implemented through the conventional method of manipulating the supply of
reserves (or settlement cash in the case of Canada) to influence the overnight cost of financing
(Armour et al., 1996). However, a few deviations from a focus on short-term interest rates
as an operational target have been recorded. These departures normally are prompted by
prevailing economic conditions, driven by volatility in the exchange rate. Seeing that Canada is
a commodity-rich small open economy, it is subject to abrupt movements in the exchange rate.
A floating exchange rate regime was implemented between 1950 and 1962. During this period
the bank rate was floating35 and the bank exercised control over mandated bank reserves to
perform open market operations (Laidler et al., 2010).
The Canadian dollar came under pressure during the late 1950s, which instigated a futile
attempt at foreign exchange intervention. In 1962, and up until 1970, the Bank of Canada
relinquished its monetary policy independence in order to maintain an exchange rate peg to the
US dollar. In the late 1960s a “surge in demand for Canadian exports accentuated the rising
trend in the Canada/US-dollar real exchange rate, and the classic tension between incompatible
goals for the exchange rate and the domestic economy became overwhelming” (Laidler et al.,
2010). Canada’s third monetary policy regime was enacted in 1970 with the floating of the
exchange rate.
The oil-price shocks of the 1970s brought elevated inflation, along with reduced economic
activity. The Bank of Canada responded by adopting “monetary gradualism” (Lange, 2010).
This ‘monetary gradualism’ meant that the central bank was “committed to effect a gradual
reduction in the mean and the variance of the growth rate of the money supply (Ml) and to
maintain it thereafter at a low and stable level to establish a low and steady rate of inflation
in the long run” (Fortin, 1979). Policy decisions were linked closely to the monetary policy
position of the Fed at the time, which tried to establish control over monetary aggregates, and
from 1979 to 1982, “the conduct of policy was complicated by shocks to M1 demand, erratic
U.S. monetary policy and volatility of the exchange rate” (Armour et al., 1996).
As a result of these developments, money growth targeting was abandoned in 1982 (Laidler,
1999). Growth of M1 was still used as an indicator variable after 1982, but it lost its place
as part of the formal operating framework of the central bank. In the period from 1982 until
the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in 1991, it was believed that the Bank of Canada
35It was set at 25 basis points above the average yield on three-month treasury bills at the Federal government’s
weekly auction.
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Figure 5.5: Canadian corridor system of monetary policy implementation
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piggybacked on US policy and had an implicit exchange rate target (Bordo and Redish, 2006).
The year 1982 also heralded the return of active short-term interest rate management to control
inflation (Dib, 2002).
The 1990s are of special interest in the conduct of monetary policy in Canada. Some highlights
include the introduction of inflation targeting, in 1991; the phasing out of reserve requirements,
in 1992-1994; the shifting from the Bank rate to the “target for the overnight rate”, in 1994;
the introduction of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS), in 1999; and fixed dates for
announcing policy decisions, in 2000 (Bordo and Redish, 2006). In 1994 the bank introduced
the payment of interest on settlement balances, the final component of its symmetric corridor
operating system36. Standing facilities for overdrafts and deposits formed a 50 basis-point
operating band for the overnight rate. In 1999, with the advent of the LVTS, the target for the
overnight financing rate was defined as the midpoint of the band, to reduce volatility in interest
rate movements. Important changes in operating procedures during the 1990s are shown in
Figure 5.5.
5.3.2.2 Norway
Monetary policy implementation in Norway following the Second World War was characterised
by a belief in the ability of the central authority to fine-tune the economy through coordinating
its available instruments. Policies were conducted in a similar fashion to those of the several
other countries under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, before the tumultuous
events of the Great Inflation. The breakdown of Bretton Woods, in 1973, meant a floating
exchange rate for the Norges Bank. Supply side shocks in the 1970s pushed inflation levels
beyond the control of the monetary authorities, and the economy entered a price/wage spiral.
Several exchange rate interventions (devaluations of the krone) were enacted, but this could
not sufficiently bolster economic growth (Gjedrem, 2001). The high levels of inflation that
accompanied the economic downturn indicated that monetary policy was not functioning
effectively. The realisation dawned that a new policy framework needed to be adopted. In 1985
the Norges Bank gained greater independence through legislation, and subsequently, in 1986,
the Bank established a fixed exchange rate as nominal anchor (Svensson et al., 2002).
The crisis in the European Monetary System in 1992 “revealed the built-in weaknesses of a fixed
exchange rate regime in a world of free capital flows and deep financial markets” (Gjedrem,
2001). Because of the crisis the Norges Bank was forced to move back to a floating exchange
rate regime. The exchange rate operated in a narrow band following the crisis, but in 1996
36The Bank rate forms the ceiling in this corridor system, 25 basis points above the target overnight rate.
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Figure 5.6: Norwegian floor system of monetary policy implementation
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exchange rate volatility increased precipitously. This episode proved that fine-tuning operations
were, to a certain extent, ineffectual in the case of Norway. The Norges Bank realised that
in order to maintain a stable exchange rate it would need to stabilise inflation through the
management of price expectations. Consequently, in March of 2001, Norway turned to inflation
targeting.
The adoption of inflation targeting does not translate into the use of open market operations.
The policy rates used by the Norges bank are those of its standing facilities. Two interest rates
are of importance here, the interest rate on sight deposits (i.e. the deposit rate) and the interest
rate on overnight loans (i.e the lending rate). These two rates form a corridor for the shortest
money market rates. The Norges Bank supplies enough liquidity to the banking system to ensure
that the “sight deposit rate is the banking system’s marginal rate and the key policy rate in the
Bank’s conduct of monetary policy” (Olivei, 2002). This is the essence of the floor system, in
which the target rate equals the rate charged at the deposit facility. Figure 5.5 illustrates this
floor system. Since October 2011 the Norges bank has introduced a new component to the
floor system, called a reserve quota. Under this regime, the central bank provides only a limited
quantity of liquidity (quota) at the deposit rate. Deposits made in excess of this amount receive
a lower rate of interest.
5.4 Empirical Evidence
5.4.1 Data
Country m p y r Date
RSA NBR CPI IP Banker’s Acceptance 1986m01 - 2012m01
USA NBR CPI IP Federal Funds 1959m01 - 2013m04
CAN ER CPI IP Overnight 1975m01 - 2013m01
NOR TL CPI IP NIBOR 1973m01 - 2011m03
Table 5.1: South Africa: Data from the South Afican Reserve Bank; USA: Data from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Canada: Data from Bank of Canada and Statistics Canada
(CANSIM Tables); Norway: Data from Norges Bank and Statistics Norway; NBR = Non-
borrowed Reserves (Total Reserves - Borrowed Reserves); ER = Excess Reserves; TL = Total
Liquidity; CPI = Consumer Price Index; GDP = Gross Domestic Product; IP = Industrial
Production Index
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The data used are monthly observations and are summarised in Table 5.1. In all countries the
measure of the price level is the consumer price index (CPI). The level of real income, a proxy
for business cycle activity, is measured in all countries by either industrial or manufacturing
production (IP). All variables are logged, except for the various interest rates. First-order
differences were taken with respect to the logged values of the price level (CPI) and several of
the non-stationary liquidity measures (TL, NBR, ER)37.
5.4.1.1 Liquidity Measures
Several liquidity measures were used in the analysis. These variables were selected based
on data availability. They were tested for the presence of a unit root through an Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. However, in the case of the VAR specification, the liquidity variables
were often left in level terms, even when non-stationary, as it is believed that the transformation
of variables is not always necessary when integrated of order one. The theory is that in large
samples, OLS is still consistent regardless of whether the VAR contains integrated components
(Fung and Gupta, 1997). Variables that needed to be seasonally adjusted were smoothed using
the X-12 ARIMA package in Eviews. Figure 5.7 presents the selection of liquidity variables.
Several calculations were necessary to obtain the relevant liquidity measures. In the case of the
USA, all measures were readily available and were extracted directly from the Federal Reserve
Database. The non-borrowed reserves series was discontinued, which limits the availability of
data. Information pertaining to reserves for South Africa was gathered from the SARB’s online
database. Non-borrowed reserves (NBR) for South Africa were calculated as total reserves with
the SARB minus the total liquidity provided by the SARB. Due to data availability, NBR was
calculated only for the period 1986m01 to 2012m02. In the case of Canada, excess reserves
were calculated as reserves in excess of the statutory minimum reserves required to be held
by chartered banks. Excess and total reserves are equal after 1994m07, since the reserve
requirement was phased out in July 1994. The data was gathered from the CANSIM tables,
available from Statistics Canada. For Norway, NBR was not calculated; total liquidity (which is
domestic sight deposits) was used instead. Data was gathered from the Norges Bank’s website.
The sample period for Norway ends in the third quarter of 2011, as this marks the start of the
quota regime.
37The growth rate (first difference) of the liquidity measures was not always used, but was used in the cases
where the inclusion of the variable in level terms resulted in an unstable VAR.
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5.4.1.2 Interest Rates
Different money market rates were used in the analysis. In general, the shortest market rate was
used. However, since the data is presented at a monthly frequency, the nuances of daily shifts
in interest rates were lost. In the case of the USA, the effective federal funds rate was used.
For South Africa, the interest rate with the most observations is the Bank rate. The problem I
encountered with using the Bank rate was that it is determined by the SARB for the most part,
and not endogenously in the market. Other available interest rates are the 90-Day Banker’s
Acceptance rate (BAR), the 30 Day Treasury Bill rate (TBR) and the South African Benchmark
Overnight rate (SABOR). Ideally, one would like to use SABOR, as it is the shortest market rate.
However, data for SABOR was available only from September 2001, which greatly reduced my
sample size. Therefore, I decided to use the Banker’s Acceptance rate in my analysis. Figure 5.8
illustrates how these rates relate to each other. The Money Market Funds or Overnight Rate is
used in Canada, and in Norway the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR)38 is used.
5.4.2 Rolling Regression
The regression equation is a dynamic version of the static equation used in Chapter 5.2 to
explain the liquidity effect. The empirical specification for this dynamic regression model tries
to link interest rates to liquidity, output growth and inflation.
rt = α + βirt−i + δimt−i + ηigt−i + θipt−i + φixt−i + εt, εt ∼ (0, σ2ε) (5.3)
where, rt is the interest rate, mt represents liquidity, gt is real output growth, pt is inflation,
xt is the foreign exchange rate and εt is the error term. The lag length for each country was
determined primarily by a general to specific approach of adding lags to the model up to the
point where the introduction of additional lags delivered statistically insignificant results. The
information criterion was also used to determine whether deepening the lags would contribute
to improved homoscedasticity of the errors39. The lag length for the different specifications
varied between two and four lags. One of the shortcomings of the specification is that it does
not consider country-specific historic events, such as banking crises (Norway), major political
events (South Africa), and so forth.
A rolling (or moving window) regression was performed for all four countries. A rolling analysis
of a time series is often used to determine model stability over time (i.e. whether a parameter
38The shortest form of interest rate (i.e. Tomorrow/Next) was used, which is the equivalent of an overnight rate.
39The results from these tests are not provided.
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is constant over time) (Zivot and Wang, 2006). In my case, a parameter estimate of liquidity,
δ, was computed over a moving window, where the size of the sliding window was fixed at
fifty months and incremented by one month. Several regressions were performed using this
technique, each providing a parameter estimate at a different time window. By using this
method, one can see the spatial variations in the sample. Only a specific sample of observations
was taken into account in each window. Data outside this window have no influence and were
not taken into account. Observations within this window were weighted equally (Zivot and
Wang, 2006). This time-varying parameter model provides insight into the changing nature of
the relationship between interest rates and liquidity. More advanced state-space models, such
as the TVP-VAR model in Chapter 5.4.4, were used to provide a more accurate description of the
true nature of δ. The function of the rolling regression was to confirm the time-varying nature
of the parameters of the model.
5.4.2.1 Results
In this section the results of the rolling regressions for all four countries, with country-specific
liquidity measures, are depicted and discussed. Figure 5.9 shows the rolling regressions for
all four countries, with previously defined liquidity variables of interest40. The results for each
country are discussed in turn.
5.4.2.1.1 South Africa The rolling regression with respect to non-borrowed reserves took
place over a small sample period, from 1986 to 2012. The results are not definitive, with
parameter estimates on both sides of the horizontal axis. The confidence interval indicates
that there is most likely no effect of non-borrowed reserves on the interest rate in this sample.
Several other, broader liquidity measures, like high-powered money (MB) and the money supply
(M1 and M2), were also tested, and are shown in Appendix A. However, the tests revealed
relatively little new information, as a similar trend is recorded for these variables. In other
words, analyses undertaken with a range of liquidity measures, from narrow to broad monetary
aggregates, illustrates no concrete evidence for a stable or persistent relationship with the
Banker’s Acceptance rate.
5.4.2.1.2 USA The relationship between NBR, in the second panel of Figure 5.9, and the
federal funds rate is consistently negative until we reach the moving window samples ending
40Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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in 199241. There are point estimates along the series where the relationship turns positive,
but these observations are scattered. The segment between 1992 and 2008 shows a stable
parameter value centred on zero, indicating little to no relationship between the federal funds
rate and non-borrowed reserves. A similar trend is seen when other liquidity variables are used.
Exact inference pertaining to the interdependence of interest rates and liquidity will not be
hazarded. However, it would be appropriate to say that the relationship has changed with time
and that the response of the federal funds rate to movements in liquidity has been dampened.
In 2008 the Fed transitioned to a floor regime, paying interest on reserves equal to the target
funds rate.
5.4.2.1.3 Canada The third panel in Figure 5.9 shows the results from a rolling regression
on the Canadian data. The liquidity measure used in this instance is excess reserves. The
motivation for using this liquidity measure is attributed to the paper on the liquidity effect in
Canada by Fung and Gupta (1997). They determine that excess cash reserves, as a liquidity
variable, is the appropriate measure to use for Canada and delivers a significant liquidity effect.
Non-borrowed reserves are believed to be inappropriate in the Canadian institutional setting.
According to Dingle et al. (1972), “in the short run the central bank seeks to influence the asset
holdings of chartered banks and interest rates in the money market by adjusting the supply of
excess cash reserves in relation to the continually changing level desired by the banks”. This
sentiment is reinforced by White and Poloz (1980), who believe that the “Bank of Canada
influences changes in the short-term interest rates by supplying quantities of excess cash reserves”.
The literature, therefore, suggests that “cash management by the banks focusses on excess
reserves” (Clinton, 1991).
The graph illustrates that capturing a liquidity effect is plausible for regression window samples
ending before 1995. However, after these observations the relationship seems to wither. This
result speaks to the transition to a corridor system. One can postulate that after this transition
the Bank of Canada appears to have successfully insulated the market for bank reserves from
their open market operations, and thereby have dulled the accompanying liquidity effect. In
addition, broader monetary aggregates do not show signs of a significant and stable relationship
with the overnight rate, as shown in Appendix A.
5.4.2.1.4 Norway As previously stated, NBR was not calculated for Norway. A proxy for
this variable, referred to as total liquidity, was used. Total liquidity was calculated as the sight
41The inference of a negative relationship is tentative as the upper bound of the confidence interval indicates the
possibility of a slightly positive relationship.
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Figure 5.9: Rolling regression results for four countries
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deposits made at the Norges Bank. An analysis of the relationship between total liquidity and
the short-term interest rate reveals that an sporadic liquidity effect is plausible. The positive
values recorded in the late 1980s and early 1990s is in part attributable to the Norwegian
banking crisis that peaked during 1991 and 1992. A systemic failure of the banking system
resulted in a frantic pursuit of liquidity during this period. The transition to a floor regime in
2001 shows up clearly in the graph. It is possible to state that in this selected sample, after
2001, there is little to no effect on the interest rate from fluctuations in the level of liquidity
holdings. Looking at the movement of the parameter estimates for high-powered money, in
Appendix A, one observes a resemblance to the results obtained for total liquidity.
5.4.3 Structural Vector Autoregression
Vector autoregressive (VAR) models have been the workhorse of empirical macroeconomics
since the early 1980’s (Kilian, 2011)42. In his iconic Econometrica paper43, Sims (1980) first
suggested the usage of VAR models in favour of the large-scale simultaneous equation models
of the time. These large macroeconometric models were remnants from the Cowles Commission
and often involved hundreds of equations, where identification was achieved through the
exclusion of variables without economic, or statistical, prejudice (Bjørnland, 2000). Sims
was especially critical of the “incredible identifying restrictions” imposed by econometricians
in these large structural models, as these restrictions had no theoretical basis (Sims, 1980).
In addition, he suggested to shift the focus from structural to reduced-form models, where
endogenous variables are modelled jointly. An extensive literature has developed around the
idea of reduced-form VAR models, as discussed in Watson (1994) and Lütkepohl (2011).
Early attempts at VAR modelling were considered atheoretical, as outlined by Cooley and
LeRoy (1985). Developing a structural model requires believable restrictions on certain variable
coefficients, to generate mutually uncorrelated structural shocks. It was only in the work of
Sims (1986), Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986) and Blanchard (1989) that
a more structural approach to VAR modelling started to develop. As explained by Kilian
(2011), a structural approach involves “identifying assumptions that must be motivated based
on institutional knowledge, economic theory, or other extraneous constraints on the model
responses”. Initially, restrictions were made in terms of short-run relationships, but the work of
42There is a detailed discussion on the impact of VAR models on empirical macroeconomics in the work of
Canova (1999)
43This paper is one of his contributions to “empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy” that
eventually led to him being awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2011. He shared the prize
with Thomas Sargent.
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Blanchard and Quah (1989) helped extend this to include long-run dynamics. The literature on
identification is ever expanding, with a gamut of restrictions possible, ranging from short-run,
long-run, sign or even heteroscedasticity restrictions. In the next section the methodology
for the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) is briefly described, which is followed by a
discussion on the identification strategy implemented.
5.4.3.1 Methodology
The structural model of the economy is represented by the following simultaneous equation
system44,
Ayt = F1yt−1 + . . .+ Fsyt−s + ut ut ∼ N(0,ΣΣ) (5.4)
where t = s+ 1, . . . , n. In this specification yt is a k × 1 vector of variables that summarise
the state of the economic system (i.e. observed variables), while ut is a k × 1 vector of the
orthogonal (iid) structural shocks, whereby,
Σ =

σ1 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 σk

F1, . . . , Fs is a k × k matrix of coefficients, and the matrix A is a square (k × k) matrix of
structural parameters that indicates the contemporaneous relationships in the model. In this
paper, the vector yt contains current observations on four variables. The variables in the system
are [r,m, y, p], where r is a short-term interest rate, m is the liquidity measure, y is the growth
in real output and p is inflation.
We are unable to estimate the equation because the system is not observable. Instead we
transform the equation into the following estimable reduced form:
yt = B1yt−1 + . . .+Bsyt−s + A
−1Σεt, εt ∼ N(0, Ik) (5.5)
where Bi = A−1Fi for i = 1, . . . , s. Equation 5.5 is the vector autoregression (VAR) representa-
tion of the structural model. The explicit variance-covariance decomposition, as presented by
A−1Σεt, will prove useful in the discussion of time-varying parameter VARs in the next section
(Primiceri, 2005).
44As presented in (Nakajima, 2011).
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5.4.3.2 Identification Strategy
According to the structural VAR approach, a proper identification strategy requires imposing
restrictions on the structural parameters found in the A matrix. Restrictions imposed in this
matrix should reflect the contemporaneous feedback between the elements of the matrix. The
simultaneous relations are identified recursively, with a lower triangular structure of the form:
A =

1 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0
a31 a32 1 0








5.4.3.2.1 Restriction. The primary restriction imposed is that the short-run policy rate reacts
contemporaneously to output, prices and reserves.
Identification in the liquidity effect literature originates from the research on the monetary
transmission mechanism, illustrating how monetary policy is thought to be implemented and
transmitted. A substantial literature has developed around the impact of monetary policy shocks
on real activity. In fact, the monetary transmission channel must be one of the most vigorously
studied mechanisms in empirical macroeconomics. The emphasis on understanding how the
use of monetary policy instruments transmit to the broader economy is crucial to policymakers
and research economists alike. An extensive survey on the impact of monetary policy in the US
is conducted by Christiano et al. (1999), with similar work done for the Euro area by Peersman
and Smets (2001), and low-income countries by Mishra and Montiel (2013).
The identification scheme used in this chapter is similar to that of Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992). The restriction can be blocked into two parts. First, the effect that output, prices and
reserves have on the policy rate. In terms of the first block, the explanation provided in the
literature is that the central bank cannot respond immediately to changes in real activity (Arias
et al., 2015). In this setup, the central bank takes information on the current level of output and
prices into account when making decisions as to its policy stance. This informational assumption
was first suggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). However, this idea has been contested by
the fact that central banks do not have monthly data available on output and prices (Christiano
et al., 1999). Another way to view this, is that output and prices (endogenous macroeconomic
variables) react to changes in the policy rate, with a lag.
Second, the response of the interest rate to the liquidity measure. In this ordering the central
bank will, for example, adjust the level of liquidity with changes in the current effective interest
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rate, which means that a shock to the liquidity measure “reflect exogenous shocks to monetary
policy” (Christiano et al., 1999). Another feasible ordering would have been (y, p, r,m)′, such as
that of Christiano et al. (2005). However, results remained qualitatively similar, despite changes
in these short-run restrictions45. Decisions about the level of liquidity will therefore be made
taking into consideration the contemporaneous changes in the interest rate. In addition, the
level of liquidity is contemporaneously influenced by the price level and real economic output.
5.4.3.3 Results
This section discusses the impulse response functions from my SVAR. The shock was applied
to selected liquidity measures. Only narrow measures of money were used in the analysis, as
these measures are believed to carry the most information on the behaviour of relevant market
participants. The first step in estimating the VAR was to determine the appropriate lag length.
In this regard, the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
were used for each model. The results from the tests are not reported. AIC often suggests lags
in excess of 12 for the models that span the entire sample, but the SIC suggests a more modest
lag depth of between 10 and 12. The related literature suggests 12 lags, which appears to be
consistent with the findings of the SIC. In the case where different subsamples were used the
suitable lag length was found to be between 4 and 6.
Monetary policy regime sample periods
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5
RSA 1965 - 1980 1980 - 1989 1990 - 1998 1998 - 2012
USA 1959 - 1970 1970 - 1979 1979 - 1987 1987 - 2006 2006 - 2013
CAN 1963 - 1970 1971 - 1982 1983 - 1991 1992 - 2000 2000 - 2012
NOR 1973 - 1985 1986 - 1992 1993 - 2000 2001 - 2011
Table 5.2: Subsamples identified from country-specific literature
The different subsamples identified from the literature for each country are presented in
Table 5.2. The actual subsamples used are in bold; these are in line with the specified dates but
are subject to data availability. The IRFs only demonstrate the effect of an innovation on money
to the relevant short-term interest rate. The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval
around the point estimates of the IRFs. One generally considers the result to be significant if
both the upper and lower confidence bands appear on the same side of the horizontal (zero)
45Several plausible alternative orderings were tried with no reversal of sign or significance encountered.
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line (Fung and Gupta, 1997). The transmission to the broader economy is not important for
our analysis.
5.4.3.3.1 South Africa Figure 5.10 represents the impulse response functions (IRFs) from
the VAR estimation over different sample periods. The liquidity variable enters the VAR equation
in levels, and the VAR satisfies the stability condition, whereby all eigenvalues lie within the unit
root circle. The first panel represents the entire sample. In this sample a delayed liquidity effect
is captured. However, the second panel indicates the presence of a liquidity puzzle, whereby a
negative relationship between money and the interest rate is not readily observable. The second
panel corresponds to the period before the adoption of inflation targeting (i.e. 1998), while the
third panel is the post-IT sample. The response shown in the third panel is similar to the first,
with the post-IT sample potentially the biggest driver of the IRF of the whole sample. In terms
of sensitivity analysis, several VAR specifications were tested, using different interest rates and
liquidity variables. Obtaining a significant liquidity effect with other liquidity measures was
rare and normally occurred with a lag. There is little evidence that this relationship has been
stable and persistent across monetary policy regimes.
5.4.3.3.2 USA The results obtained from the VAR estimation for the USA agree with the
findings in the literature. Figure 5.11 reveals that the relationship of the federal funds rate and
non-borrowed reserves remains negative and eventually disappears once a hybrid / floor system
is adopted. The results are compelling and indicate that in the USA there is some evidence of
a decoupling of the balance sheet. This result is not surprising as most of Bernanke’s term as
Fed chairperson has involved an unprecedented expansion of the balance sheet, while nominal
interest rates were pushed close to the zero lower bound.
5.4.3.3.3 Canada When excess reserves are used as the measure of money, in Figure 5.12,
a liquidity puzzle is observed for Canada. The relationship between interest rates and excess
reserves seems to appear as zero for all samples considered. The final sample period represents
the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in 1999. Evidence of the decoupling principle
seems especially strong in Canada, with the movement in excess reserves after 1999 eliciting
almost no response in the overnight interest rate.
5.4.3.3.4 Norway Figure 5.13 reflects the IRFs from an innovation in total liquidity holdings.
The pre-IT samples indicate no significant result from the perturbation in liquidity. The post-IT
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Figure 5.10: Impulse response functions for South Africa
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Figure 5.11: Impulse response functions for USA
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Figure 5.12: Impulse response functions for Canada
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Figure 5.13: Impulse response functions for Norway
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samples suggest the possibility of a liquidity effect. This is an interesting result in that one
would expect the Norwegian money market rates to be completely immune to movements in the
level of bank reserves, since the Norges bank maintains a high level of liquidity in the market
(in excess of demand), as indicated by line ms2 in Figure 5.4. Owing to the arbitrary nature
of selecting sample spaces in this exercise, it might be more useful to look at a methodology
that combines the time-varying nature of the parameters together with elements of a structural
modelling approach.
5.4.4 Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression
VARs have been highly influential in macroeconomic research during the last three decades. In
particular, these models have proven valuable in the process of identifying comovements among
multiple economic variables (Doh and Connolly, 2012). Estimating impulse response functions
have given researchers a way to determine the effect of imposing structural shocks on a system
of variables. There are, however, two general concerns with the usage of VARs. First, the
VAR approach assumes time-invariant coefficients and variances, which turns out to be a quite
strong and perhaps too restrictive assumption (Doh and Connolly, 2012; Koop and Korobilis,
2010; Charleroy, 2013). In recent years it has been posited that the data generating process
of economic variables has “drifting coefficients and shocks of stochastic volatility” (Nakajima,
2011). Pursuant to this notion, the hypothesis of this paper points to the potential time-varying
impact of changes in monetary policy implementation. In the context of the SVAR used, regime
shifts were identified based on the analysis of country-specific historical readings. A TVP-VAR
model could potentially reduce the subjective nature of subsample selection, by combining the
strengths of both the rolling regression and the traditional VAR model.
Second, even for VARs of moderate size, like the model utilised in Chapter 5.4.3.1, the number
of parameters become quite large in relation to the observations, which translates to wider
confidence regions (i.e. less precise estimates) for the impulse response functions (Eisenstat
et al., 2013). This problem is exacerbated in the case of TVP-VAR models, which have high
dimensionality due to the introduction of time variation in coefficients and/or volatility. Bayesian
methods have been proposed to address concerns of “tractability and over-parameterisation
in small samples” (Doh and Connolly, 2012). To this end, this paper employs a multivariate
Bayesian time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) model.
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5.4.4.1 Methodology
The introduction of time variation in either the coefficients or volatility started in the late 1990s
(Doh and Connolly, 2012). One of the first papers to incorporate time-varying coefficients into a
VAR model, was that of Cogley and Sargent (2001), with the objective of defining the contours
of the US inflation and unemployment dynamics over the post-war period. Their research was
criticised by Sims (2001) and Stock (2001) for making the assumption of constant variance,
while the data clearly indicates the presence of stochastic volatility. It was argued that the
“variance of exogenous shocks may have changed over time; which motivates the inclusion
of multivariate stochastic volatility to VAR models” (Koop and Korobilis, 2010). In response
to these claims of model misspecification, Cogley and Sargent (2005) proceeded to include
volatility in their time-varying coefficient model. This framework provided the platform for the
hugely influential paper by Primiceri (2005).
The biggest contribution of Primiceri’s (2005) paper was the fact that all parameters are
allowed to vary over time, even the simultaneous relations of the structural shock. Several
macroeconomic issues have been evaluated under this framework, as it captures the “time-
varying nature of the underlying structure in the economy in a flexible and robust manner”
(Nakajima, 2011). The major drawback to this method is that estimation is difficult, with
the likelihood function becoming intractable (i.e. almost impossible to solve analytically). In
response to this problem, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, in the context of
Bayesian inference, have been suggested.
In order to comprehend the structure of the TVP-VAR it is easiest to start with the SVAR
framework, as presented in Chapter 5.4.3.1. Following the work of Primiceri (2005) and
Nakajima (2011), one can rewrite (5.5) as,
yt = Xtβ + A
−1Σεt, (5.6)
where the rows of the Bis have been stacked to form β and Xt = Ik ⊗ (y′t−1, . . . ,y′t−s). The
coefficients and volatility in this SVAR are time-invariant, which means that there is no need
to elevate this equation to a state-space dimension. All state variables are observed and the
distinction between measurement and the state transition equation is superfluous. In order
to extend this model to the TVP-VAR framework, I allowed the various parameters to change
over time. Accordingly, the specification became a state-space representation of the VAR with
time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility:
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where the coefficients βt and parameters At and Σt all become time-varying46. The variables
and sample period used in the application of the TVP-VAR model are identical to those used in
Chapter 5.4.3.1. Four lags were used in this VAR. There are several plausible ways to model the
process of the time-varying parameters. Let at = (a21, a31, a32, . . . , ak,k−1)′ be a stacked vector of
lower triangular elements in the At matrix and ht = (h1t, . . . , hkt)′ with hjt = log σ2jt. Adopting
the methodology of Primiceri (2005), the dynamics of the parameters in (5.7) are specified as
follows,
βt+1 = βt + uβt (5.8)
at+1 = at + uat (5.9)
ht+1 = ht + uht (5.10)
The elements of βt+1, the free elements of matrix At, and the standard deviations (σt), are
assumed to evolve as random walks. A popular alternative to the random walk process is
to select one of the more general autoregressive processes. However, the assumption of a
random walk process enables the model to take permanent shifts into account, as opposed
to the gradual nature of shifts associated with autoregressive processes. In addition, there
are fewer parameters to be estimated under the random walk assumption. The distributional








I 0 0 0
0 Σβ 0 0
0 0 Σa 0
0 0 0 Σh


for t = s+ 1, . . . , n, where βs+1 ∼ N(µβ0 , σβ0), as+1 ∼ N(µa0 , σa0) and hs+1 ∼ N(µh0 , σh0). In
this chapter I followed the convention of assuming that the variance-covariance structure for
the innovations of the time-varying parameters (Σa, Σh) are diagonal matrices.
The TVP-VAR model relies on the implementation of Bayesian inference through MCMC methods,
which means that prior selection will come into play. For the purpose of this study, an uninforma-
tive prior was assumed for the initial state: µβ0 = µa0 = µh0 = 0 and Σβ0 = Σa0 = Σh0 = 10× I.
This indicates that no a priori information was available to the researcher47. A popular alterna-
tive is the training sample prior, used by Primiceri (2005), where parameters are set according
to OLS estimates taken from a small presample of the data. The following priors were selected
46Equation 5.5 is known as the measurement equation.
47For a detailed discussion on prior selection in TVP-VAR models, refer to the monograph of Koop and Korobilis
(2010).
151
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
for the i-th diagonals of the covariance matrices:
(Σβ)i
−2 ∼ IW (25, 0.01I), (Σa)i−2 ∼ Γ(4, 0.02), (Σh)i−2 ∼ Γ(4, 0.02) (5.11)
where IW and Γ are the inverse Wishart and Gamma distributions, respectively. An in-depth
discussion on the estimation methodology is omitted 48. Gibbs sampling, a Bayesian estimation
algorithm, was used to obtain the joint posterior distribution of parameters. This MCMC algo-
rithm iteratively draws parameters and unobserved states from lower dimensional conditional
posteriors (drawing one parameter at a time while keeping other parameters constant). Compu-
tation of the posterior estimates was achieved through a draw of 10 000 samples, after the first
1000 burn-in draws were disposed of49.
5.4.4.2 Results
The IRFs for the TVP-VAR are interpreted in a similar fashion to the rolling regression estimates.
The three IRF lines in, for example, Figure 5.14, depict the first, second and fourth period
impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock in non-borrowed reserves at different
points in time. In other words, each point in time has three corresponding impulse responses.
The reason for the selection of the first, second and fourth period ahead IRFs is that I was trying
to capture the short-run effect of reserves on interest rates.
5.4.4.2.1 South Africa In contrast to the results shown for the rolling regression parameter
estimates in Chapter 5.4.2 and somewhat similar to IRFs in Chapter 5.4.3.1, the IRFs for the
TVP-VAR (at one, two and four periods ahead) indicate that there is a negative relationship
between non-borrowed reserves and the banker’s acceptance rate that deepens at each point in
time with subsequent impulse responses. This relationship is stable throughout the sample and
parameter volatility abates even further after adopting the inflation targeting regime in 1998.
This relationship indicates a strong liquidity effect for the South African reserve regime. This
result is in line with the traditional model of monetary policy implementation. It appears that
the South African Reserve Bank does not insulate its interest rate from movements in reserves,
which means that the decoupling or separation of monetary policy instruments is not plausible.
48Interested parties are referred to the work of Primiceri (2005) or Nakajima (2011).
49Computational results are achieved in MATLAB R2014a using the TVP-VAR code provided by Jouchi Nakajima
at https://sites.google.com/site/jnakajimaweb/tvpvar.
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5.4.4.2.2 United States The narrative elicited from the SVAR for the United States in
Chapter 5.4.3.1 was one of a waning liquidity effect over time. The results obtained from the
TVP-VAR, from Figure 5.15, preserves this narrative and confirms the intuition that monetary
policy implementation has undergone a significant metamorphosis. In particular, it is believed
that a transition has been facilitated by the changing of the guard at the Federal Reserve. Looking
at Figure 5.15, which delineates the different eras of the Federal Reserve chairpersons since the
Second World War, one observes a clear deterioration of the liquidity effect corresponding to
the changeover of incumbents. The most distinct change in the liquidity effect occurs with the
induction of Volcker as chairman; with a clear upward trajectory originating in the late 1970’s
in all three IRFs. This corresponds to the literature on the liquidity effect, with researchers
finding it particularly difficult to identify this effect as time progresses.
5.4.4.2.3 Canada The Bank of Canada appears to be quite adept at insulating its interest
rate from movements in excess reserves. This sentiment rings true for the entire sample, but is
most palpable after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. The post inflation targeting
sample reflects a lower volatility of the IRFs, as well as movement on both sides of the horizontal
axis. This pattern is similar to the one observed in the rolling regression from Chapter 5.4.2. It
is therefore plausible that there is a decoupling of balance sheet movements from interest rate
policy in Canada.
5.4.4.2.4 Norway The final case to consider is that of Norway. One would expect that with
the floor regime enacted by the Norges Bank since 1992, there would be a distinct separation of
the movements in liquidity and overnight interest. This is not exactly the case, and perhaps
requires a more detailed investigation as to why. Consider the TVP-VAR IRFs from Figure 5.17,
with particular interest paid to the post-1990 period. The precipitous dip in the period from
1990 to 1995 could be attributed, in part, to the European Monetary system crisis of the early
1990s. During this period commercial banks were stockpiling liquidity in the expectation of
liquidity drying up in the interbank market. In addition, the Norges Bank reduced the interest
rate to bolster economic growth.
The combination of these events has produced a liquidity effect, which is potentially spurious
considering that the overnight interest rate movement was not necessarily driven by the demand
for reserves, but rather was a policy response to the economic environment. It is entirely
possible that some deviation in the overnight rate was caused by the liquidity hoarding, but the
magnitude of the effect would be difficult (if not impossible) to identify. The only thing that is
certain in this case is that the magnitude of the effect is exaggerated in Figure 5.17. After this
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period the relationship rapidly moves toward zero, becomes positive, and then turns negative
again. Identifying a clear narrative here is difficult.
5.5 Chapter Conclusion
The hypothesis of the paper is that no clear and stable link exists between liquidity and interest
rates, so that various levels of reserves can exist for a given interest rate. One can gather from
the VAR results that the relationship between money market interest rates and the various
reserve concepts used changes significantly with the sample used. This result is corroborated by
the rolling regression and TVP-VAR results for the USA, Canada and Norway.
The most patent proof of decoupling was observed in the USA and Canada. One would expect
Norway to show signs of decoupling because of their floor system; however, there is evidence
to suggest a small liquidity effect exists. The result is surprising, but the negative relationship
recorded could be due to several factors, in particular, it could reflect a combination of the
expansionary stance of the Norges Bank and the liquidity-seeking behaviour of banks during
a credit crunch. In the case of our reserve regime, South Africa, the results seem to indicate
that a liquidly effect is plausible. It would be wrong to claim that the decoupling principle was
in full force. This means that the South African market for reserves is not insulated fully from
movements in the short-term interest rate and vice versa.
A tentative conclusion is that the decoupling principle exists for countries that do not employ a
reserve regime. The implication for monetary policy is that central banks might be able to use
their balance sheets independently from their interest rate instrument, providing an additional
dimension to monetary policy conduct. This result is significant in the wake of the events of
the financial crisis of 2007. Central banks could potentially use their balance sheets to combat
financial instability while retaining their key policy rate as a tool with which to combat inflation.
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Figure 5.14: Impulse response functions from TVP-VAR for South Africa
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Figure 5.15: Impulse response functions from TVP-VAR for USA
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Figure 5.16: Impulse response functions from TVP-VAR for Canada
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Figure 5.17: Impulse response functions from TVP-VAR for Norway
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Chapter 6
Model
In this chapter, the basis of the DSGE model used for the analysis in the next two chapters is
formulated. In addition to a discussion on the general setup of the model, the chapter includes
a discussion on the financial stability implications of changes to the size of the central bank’s
balance sheet. Expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet is often referred to as quantitative
easing, but within the more specific typology of Borio and Disyatat (2010), this increase of
central bank liabilities is called bank reserves policy1. An extension of the model to include
changes in the composition of the assets of the central bank’s balance sheet is deferred to the
next chapter.
6.1 Introduction
The policy arsenal of central banks has undergone a noticeable expansion in recent years.
Policymakers are no longer limited to the one monetary policy instrument, a short-term interest
rate, which was central to the New Neoclassical synthesis (Woodford, 2003). Balance sheets
of monetary authorities are playing an increasingly important role in policy formulation, as
recently emphasised by Bernanke (2011). Policies that increase the size and composition of
central bank balance sheets are now used in conjunction with interest rate policy to achieve,
simultaneously, price- and financial stability2.
1Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) classify this as reserve-supply policy.
2Macroprudential policy measures, as later discussed, are also being used to varying degrees by central banks,
existing on occasion as part of the monetary policy space and at other times separated by independence from
monetary authorities.
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Central banks have traditionally, since the 1970s, considered the balance sheet only in its
capacity to steer the overnight rate towards the policy target. The objective of this paper is
to determine in what capacity central bank lending can be used to support financial stability.
My hypothesis is most similar to that of Goodhart et al. (2011), who consider the potential
role of the central bank’s balance sheet in the pursuit of financial stability, but I differ on a few
specifics.
First, my model is set in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, which - unlike a comparative
static setting - allows the researcher to consider the dynamics of the economy. The model
presented here is similar to the approach adopted in de Walque et al. (2010). However,
I embedded the essential properties of their real business cycle (RBC) model into a New-
Keynesian setting with price and wage rigidities, which allows for a richer understanding of the
implications of monetary policy.
Second, I endeavoured to provide a more realistic presentation of central bank lending. In
Goodhart et al. (2011), the monetary base is mapped one-to-one onto the interest rate, which is
not an accurate representation of modern central bank practice. Two important contributions
to the literature that also look at the impact of monetary injections on financial stability are
de Walque et al. (2010) and Dib (2010a). However, in both of these papers, the monetary
authority is structured with direct money injections from the central bank to the commercial
(merchant/lending) bank. My paper differs in that it includes collateralised repurchase agree-
ments, as first modelled in Reynard and Schabert (2009) and more recently in Schabert (2015)
and Hörmann and Schabert (2015).
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide an overview of the related literature, ranging
from issues pertaining to financial frictions in DSGE models to methods for employing central
bank lending in mainstream models. Second, the model is presented, with the integration of
the mechanism proposed by Schabert (2015) in the banking and public sector. The model is
kept as simple as possible, abstracting from financial frictions in the demand side of the credit
market. Third, a discussion follows on the results of the impulse response functions following (i)
a balance sheet expansion and (ii) an increase in the policy rate (monetary tightening). Finally,
the last section concludes.
6.2 Literature Review
The two decades preceding the Great Recession were marked by an unprecedented consensus
on the “intellectual and institutional framework for monetary policy” (Bernanke, 2011). At the
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heart of the consensus is the dynamic general equilibrium framework, which was pioneered
by Leeper and Sims (1994) and Schorfheide (2000). It was then further propelled into the
mainstream by the seminal contributions of, among others, Woodford (2003), Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007) and Christiano et al. (2005). This macroeconometric modelling paradigm
has been implemented universally by central banks, who were able to utilise the models
successfully to understand the consequences of policy actions better, and thereby achieve
macroeconomic stability. However, these models were not equipped to forestall financial market
failure.
Economics, as a discipline, has developed with the use of theoretical frameworks that often
ignore knotty real-world frictions in order to remain tractable and computationally feasible
(de Walque et al., 2010). Theorists make assumptions that reduce complex real-world interac-
tions into digestible mathematical equations. Some of these assumptions have been questioned
in the wake of the international financial crisis. A particular concern is the idea that financial
markets are perfect and complete, with the implication that financial shocks are irrelevant to
real economic outcomes (Roger and Vlcek, 2012). There was a commonly held belief that
finance, in the first approximation, was irrelevant to business cycle movements (Woodford,
2003). However, owing to recent events, it has been acknowledged that the financial crisis
originated from a collapse of financial intermediation, which has cemented the idea that credit
market frictions have real implications (Ahn and Tsomocos, 2013). The shortcomings of macroe-
conomic models revealed during the crisis have led many, such as Kirman (2010), Caballero
(2010), Stiglitz (2011), Krugman (2011), DeLong (2011) and Kay (2012), to question the
underlying assumptions of DSGE models. The next section discusses several approaches to
introducing endogenous financial frictions into the existing New-Keynesian framework.
6.2.1 Financial Frictions in DSGE Models
Prudent monetary policy, as defined in pre-crisis policy models, is primarily understood with
respect to price stability. Financial stability is often considered as a by-product of inflation
targeting3, with financial sectors curiously absent from the majority of mainstream models
(Borio, 2014). However, it is now recognised that the “achievement of price stability [. . . ]
does not guarantee financial stability” (Goodhart, 2011). The dearth of financial markets in
core models is contrasted by a rich vein of research in the periphery that accentuates the role
of financial market conditions in propagating cyclical fluctuations. Fisher (1933) and Keynes
(1936) were among the earliest to develop an alternative narrative that explained how impaired
3This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
161
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
credit markets4 could substantially contribute to a decline in the real economy5. More recently,
in the post-war period, these points have been brought to the fore by the contributions of
Minsky (1957, 1982) and Kindleberger (2000). Their argument is directly at odds with the
assumption of perfectly competitive financial markets, as used by Modigliani and Miller (1958)
in their capital structure irrelevance proposition6.
6.2.1.1 Demand-Side Frictions
In perfectly competitive financial markets there are no frictions that limit access to credit, which
allows no insight into scenarios where agents are credit constrained. Financial frictions have
been introduced into DSGE models to address this limitation. Pioneering contributions to the
literature, to include information asymmetries and non-convex transaction costs, were put
forward by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Both of these veins
of research proposed alterations to the consensus approach, introducing frictions in the demand
side of the credit market, where banks act exclusively as intermediaries between households and
firms. Financial market conditions in these models serve to frame a more complete narrative of
the forces that propagate economic growth.
6.2.1.1.1 External Finance Premium Bernanke and Gertler (1989) were the first to consol-
idate successfully the financial accelerator mechanism and general equilibrium framework. The
inclusion of a financial accelerator is significant as it allows endogenous credit market devel-
opments to act both as a source of business cycle fluctuations and as an amplification device.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) postulate that, in the light of tightened financial market conditions,
temporary credit shocks could have a strong and persistent effect on the business cycle. To
sufficiently constrain credit markets, they integrate the costly state verification framework
proposed by Townsend (1979) into a general equilibrium environment.
Costly state verification entails the existence of information asymmetries that obscure the
borrower-lender relationship. In the model developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), a newly
proposed agent, namely the entrepreneur, plays a central role. One of the noteworthy functions
of this entrepreneur is its ability to produce capital from consumption goods. In addition,
entrepreneurs invest out of their own wealth, as well as taking loans from households. The
4Examples of impaired credit conditions include, “sharp increases in insolvencies and bankruptcies, rising real
debt burdens, collapsing credit prices, and bank failures” (Bernanke et al., 1999).
5Theories were developed owing to the events surrounding the Great Depression.
6This assumption asserts that the capital structure of banks is largely irrelevant and indeterminate for lending
decisions, and thereby, real economic outcomes.
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entrepreneur’s net worth is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, where the outcome of the shock
is directly observed by the entrepreneur but not the originator of the loan. Lenders would
ideally want to know whether entrepreneurs will be able to repay their debt. However, lenders
are forced to pay a monitoring cost if they wish to gain information as to the solvency of the
entrepreneur. Therefore, borrowing is limited, because monitoring a loan applicant is costly
(Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2011). Efficiency in the process of matching potential borrowers and
lenders is reduced (Bernanke et al., 1999).
In this framework, borrowers face a risk premium that decreases with their net worth (Roger
and Vlcek, 2012). Standard debt contracts include a premium on the interest rate to cover
the cost of default in case of negative wealth shocks (Christiano et al., 2010). An endogenous
wedge between the lending and risk free rates is created and is called the external finance
premium (Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2011). In other words, the price of loans is directly affected
in this economy. A decrease in price negatively affects the net worth of the entrepreneur and
increases the financial friction. The result is lower levels of investment in the next period,
coupled with a lower net worth. This feedback mechanism results in strong persistence as the
result of tight financial market conditions.
This model setup was further improved by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), who incorporated the
dynamics into a New-Keynesian DSGE model. Bernanke et al. (1999) added nonlinear capital
adjustment costs, to become the workhorse financial accelerator model that is used in many
central banks around the world7. Important contributions that built on this structure were made
by Christiano et al. (2003, 2008) and De Fiore and Uhlig (2005). More recently, Christiano
et al. (2014) contributed to the existing paradigm by introducing “idiosyncratic uncertainty in
the allocation of capital”. Entrepreneurs face uncertainty in the process of converting capital
into effective capital, where the magnitude of this uncertainty is modelled as ‘risk’.
6.2.1.1.2 Collateral Constraint The financial accelerator proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) operates in terms of a different friction than the external finance premium. In this
model, the agents differ regarding their time preference. As dictated by their preference, agents
are identified as either a lender or borrower. Intermediation exists between these two specific
groups. Borrowers differ in this market and are required, by the financial intermediary, to
provide collateral for loans. Whereas the friction in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) is based in
asymmetric information and affects the price of loans, this friction functions on the basis of
incomplete contracts and directly impacts on the specific quantity of loans (Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997).
7Nonlinear capital adjustment costs added another amplification effect to the model.
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Owing to criticism by Kocherlakota (2000) regarding the ability of credit constraint frameworks
to generate an empirically valid amplification of shocks, several signficant attempts were made
to develop a more realistic setting. Cooley et al. (2004) stand out as one of the early attempts
at providing a more quantitatively accurate representation. This was achieved by not focusing
exclusively on collateralised debt as the primary form of financing for the firm, but rather by
including state-contingent financial contracts. Iacoviello (2005) combined elements of the
financial accelerator model developed by Bernanke et al. (1999) and the collateral constraint,
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The original contribution of this model is that firms need to
provide real estate as collateral, which he motivates both on practical and substantive grounds.
Financial frictions were initially introduced almost exclusively on the demand side of credit
markets, with an explicit focus on the balance sheets of non-financial borrowers (Meh and
Moran, 2010). Unfortunately, these models neglect the role of financial intermediaries, treating
them as a veil (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Recent events surrounding the financial crisis
highlighted the importance of financial shocks originating in the banking sector as a source
of business cycle fluctuations (Dib, 2010a). This has resulted in a concerted effort to develop
models that explore disruptions in the supply of credit in financial markets (Falagiarda and Saia,
2013). In a liquidity crisis, financial intermediaries become credit constrained and this friction
reveals how shocks in the financial economy could have implications for the real economy
(de Walque et al., 2010).
6.2.1.2 Supply-Side Frictions
The international financial crisis has highlighted the central role of financial shocks in driv-
ing macroeconomic indicators in the real economy (Quadrini, 2011). Researchers are now
tasked with the advancement of models that better incorporate frictions on the supply side of
credit markets, specifically fostering models with persuasive, well-founded, banking sectors.
Investigation has revealed several components that are believed to be crucial in capturing the
essence of a sophisticated banking sector. Some of the particular characteristics that need to
be incorporated are related to bank capital, interest rate spreads, interbank markets and the
possibility of default. I now briefly touch on some of these issues8.
6.2.1.2.1 Banking Sectors and Bank Capital Several authors have endeavoured to con-
struct realistic banking sectors. The first wave of models had the specific goal of approximating
8These themes do not provide a comprehensive account of all the important issues related to developing a
functioning banking sector. Some papers will also belong to more than one specific theme.
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the bank capital channel. Previously, it was thought that, in line with the assumptions found
in Modigliani and Miller (1958), the structure of bank capital was unimportant in lending
decisions. However, empirical evidence suggests that the capital position of a bank directly
affects bank lending and thereby real economic activity (Roger and Vlcek, 2012). There has
been a large influx of these types of models, with many central banks adopting them as the
new workhorse. The reason for this is that policymakers wish to incorporate the recent changes
to Basel III regulatory requirements. Generally, these models still follow either the collateral
constraint or financial accelerator framework9, with the addition of a bank capital/equity
channel.
Early incarnations of this type of model that try to develop the bank capital channel are those of
Markovic (2006), Van den Heuvel (2008) and Angeloni and Faia (2009). The work of Markovic
(2006)10 is particularly influential. The most important contribution in his paper, which builds
on the financial accelerator framework, is the introduction of a banking sector where banks
face adjustment costs in capital accumulation. Asymmetric information between a bank and its
shareholders is the source of the adjustment cost, as shareholders need to incur search costs
before investing, creating an environment where the continued procurement of bank capital is
considered costly (Markovic, 2006).
6.2.1.2.2 Interest Rate Spreads While the focus on bank capital is crucial, one has to
consider that the financial crisis was characterised by widening credit spreads and disruptions
in equity markets. Adrian and Shin (2011) point out that financial shocks were transmitted
to the real sector, primarily through these channels. Remarkably, in the case of a perfectly
competitive banking sector, only one interest rate is considered significant, namely the policy
rate (Gerali et al., 2010). The importance of including a time-varying interest rate spread
is highlighted in the work of Cúrdia and Woodford (2009, 2010). They include an ad hoc
friction in financial intermediation that gives rise to a spread between the loan and policy
rate. Increases in the credit spreads are indicative of constrained credit markets, referred to as
‘tighter’ financial conditions by Cúrdia and Woodford (2009). This credit friction challenges the
unrealistic assumption that a single interest rate governs the behaviour of all agents.
Gerali et al. (2010) also indicate a role for the rate at which different interest rates adjust.
Their model is built on the back of contributions by Bernanke et al. (1999), Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Iacoviello (2005). In this model, financial intermediaries are permitted to set the
interest rate charged for deposits collected from households. In this imperfectly competitive
9Sometimes even a hybrid of the two.
10A model developed at the Bank of England.
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banking sector, one observes a wedge between loan rates and the interbank (policy) rate set
by the central bank. These authors find that including sticky bank rates produces a financial
decelerator (attenuator) effect11.
In the work of Gertler and Karadi (2011), households are randomly assigned roles as workers
or bankers. Bankers provide credit to firms, but constraints are imposed as to the resources
they can obtain from deposits and the interbank market. Binding constraints induce a spread
between deposit and loan rates. Christiano et al. (2014) present a similar framework, with a
spread generated by the possibility of firm failure.
Empirically, one observes time-varying credit spreads, with notable increases in spreads during
times of financial turmoil. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) hypothesise that spreads need to be
taken into account by the monetary authority when making policy decisions, specifically through
adjustment of the Taylor Rule to incorporate these spreads. Modifying the Taylor Rule in this
fashion affords central bankers the opportunity to respond better to shocks originating in the
financial sector. Charles Goodhart, in his commentary on the work of Cúrdia and Woodford
(2009), welcomes the introduction of the modelled disruption in financial intermediation but
provides a scathing critique on the absence of default risk.
6.2.1.2.3 Interbank Markets and Default The failure of interbank markets is increasingly
viewed as central to the damage caused by the financial crisis. In order to model this risk,
researchers have to develop an active banking sector where banks are allowed to interact and
possibly default. Relatively few papers have incorporated banking sectors and default (Roger
and Vlcek, 2012). Perhaps the first to include an explicit banking sector is that of Gerali et al.
(2010). Their model includes a constraint on bank balance sheets, which affects bank capital,
profit and thereby the supply of loans in the economy. Unfortunately, there is no interaction
among wholesale banks in this model.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) take another approach to the interbank market. Financial insti-
tutions in this setup are exposed to liquidity shocks that distinguish them from one another.
These idiosyncratic shocks can potentially disrupt the intermediation process and thereby real
economic activity. The biggest shortcoming of this model is that financial institutions resemble
a homogenous intermediary in aggregate. In other words, the banking sector does not consist
of heterogenous agents, and therefore, can not truly represent an interbank market. However,
the work of Gertler et al. (2016) builds on their earlier model, introducing a wholesale banking
sector, alongside the retail banking sector. The purpose of this work was to include components
11In addition to the financial accelerator and bank capital channel identified in their model.
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of the failure of the shadow banking system during the recent crisis by allowing for runs on
the wholesale banks. Several papers, such as Robatto (2014), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and
Ferrante (2015), have started to develop the possibility of bank runs in dynamic models.
A relatively new stream of research, which was built on the model developed by Goodhart et al.
(2006)12, provides advances in the development of interbank markets and default. One of the
most important contributions of their body of work has been the inclusion of a heterogenous and
endogenous banking sector. They abstract from the representative agent approach in modelling
the banking system. This allows for the interaction of banks on the interbank market and
thereby the possibility of modelling the reactions of commercial banks to certain shocks. Failure
of banks, or endogenous default as developed by Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Dubey et al.
(2005), is one of the primary features of this model. Failure is a function of the risk preference
of banks in this system, with the riskiest banks assigned the highest probability of default. These
failures are not isolated events in this model and have system-wide implications for the survival
of other banks.
Several authors have adopted this framework to explore various macroeconomic issues. Some
of the important articles in this tradition are those of Goodhart et al. (2009), de Walque et al.
(2010), Dib (2010a,b), Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011), Martinez and Tsomocos (2011), Carrera
and Vega (2012) and Ahn and Tsomocos (2013). My model most closely resembles the work of
de Walque et al. (2010).
6.2.1.2.4 Macroprudential Policy In this chapter, financial stability is defined in terms of
endogenous default, but several other definitions exist13. After the crisis, a large body of
literature developed around the idea of financial instability and how to combat it. The avenue
explored most frequently to target financial stability is that of macroprudential regulation.
Approaches that capture the interaction of balance sheet policies and financial stability are more
limited.
Galati and Moessner (2013) provide an excellent discussion on macroprudential policies, while
the articles by Friedrich et al. (2015) and Collard et al. (2015) discuss the introduction of
these policy measures into DSGE models14. Of particular interest in this thesis is an article by
Woodford (2016) that looks at both the role of quantitative easing and macroprudential policy
12This article is the culmination of years of research and several other articles are linked in the model’s
construction (see, for example, Aspachs et al. (2006a); Tsomocos and Zicchino (2005); Aspachs et al. (2006b);
Goodhart and Tsomocos (2006)).
13In fact, there is little consensus in the literature on the exact definition of financial stability, see the article by
Borio and Drehmann (2009) for a discussion.
14While the literature is interesting in its own right, a full literature review is not attempted here.
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in combating financial instability. He found that among the three policy instruments15 available
to the central bank, quantitative easing generates the lowest risk for financial instability for a
given increase in aggregate demand (Woodford, 2016). In fact, quantitative easing can be used
in conjunction with macroprudential policy to almost entirely negate the build-up of financial
imbalances.
6.2.2 Central Bank Lending as Prudential Policy Tool
This section explores the effect of a change in the size of the balance sheet on financial stability16,
through central bank lending. Goodhart et al. (2011) ask a similar question by incorporating
the monetary base into their financial fragility framework and analysing its potential for use as
a prudential policy tool17. It differs from the model presented in this paper in a few significant
ways, as depicted in the next section. Their paper can be seen as an intellectual successor to
William Poole’s (1970) solution of the instrument problem, in that they explore the effectiveness
of both the monetary base and interest rates as tools of monetary policy, in a setting where the
liquidity effect functions perfectly.
Several papers have considered the optimal instrument choice in achieving price stability. The
work of Poole (1970) signified a watershed in the discussion on the instrument problem, with
the interest rate winning out as the most effective in achieving price stability. Poole (1970)
argued that the policy rate encompasses all the desired characteristics, especially in its tightness
to inflation18. Sargent and Wallace (1975) add forward-looking features in their model and
find, in contrast to Poole (1970), that money growth policies have an advantage over interest
rate policies. This result has been contested by several authors, namely, McCallum (1981),
Woodford (2003) and, more recently Atkeson et al. (2007) and Woodford (2008). However, I
am not interested in the instrument problem as it pertains to price stability.
In fact, the question posed here is much simpler. The objective is to design a model that
formalizes the idea from the post-crisis discourse that balance sheets matter19 for financial
stability (du Plessis, 2012). Monetary policy research in the last few years has been focused
on the central bank’s balance sheet, because the short-term interest rate as a conventional tool
15Short-term policy rate, macroprudential policy and quantitative easing.
16There are several definitions of financial stability in the literature. I follow the approach of Goodhart et al.
(2006) in this paper.
17The paper by Grauwe and Gros (2009) poses a question is in the same vein. They endeavoured to determine
whether there is a trade-off between price and financial stability in the use of monetary policy tools.
18An instrument “is tighter than another if it is more closely linked to the feature it is meant to influence”
(Atkeson et al., 2007).
19This includes the balance sheet of the central bank, as well as those of financial institutions.
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of monetary policy is limited in its scope to address financial stability. The policy rate is often
regarded as a blunt tool against the build-up of financial imbalances accompanying movements
in asset prices and credit aggregates (Bernanke, 2011)20. In addition, as stated in the Tinbergen
principle, “if the number of policy targets surpasses the number of instruments, then some
targets may not be met” (Tinbergen, 1952).
Ultimately, policymakers should not overburden policy tools with too many targets, as it impedes
the proper functioning of that instrument. Following this logic, several developed country central
banks have already used balance sheet operations - by altering the size and composition of their
balance sheets - to address dysfunctional markets (Bernanke, 2011). The primary contribution
of this model is in the addition of a more realistic representation of central bank lending.
6.2.2.1 Central Bank Lending in DSGE Models
Several papers have been developed with the goal of capturing a more realistic discount window
lending function of the central bank in DSGE models. An early contribution is that Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010), who looked to develop a model of discount window lending in a DSGE
model. In this setup, as previously mentioned, financial intermediaries are credit constrained
and have access to the central bank’s lending facilities. However, these commercial banks do
not offer collateral in return for central bank liquidity. In a similar fashion, the work of Bocola
(2015) builds on the framework of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) to determine the effect of LTROs.
However, borrowing is still not collateralised in this model.
The model of van der Kwaak (2015) is based on the work of Gertler and Karadi (2011) but
restructures the way in which commercial banks are financed. Commercial banks receive
financing through “net worth, deposits and [central bank] liquidity” (van der Kwaak, 2015).
His model deviates from Gertler and Karadi (2011) in that obtaining central bank liquidity
requires government bonds as collateral, with private sector assets not being eligible. While
there are several similarities between the model from this chapter and and that of van der
Kwaak (2015), his structure does not include a dimension for the heterogeneous interbank
sector and endogenous default.
In order to model central bank lending accurately, I looked to the early work of Reynard and
Schabert (2009), and more recently Schabert (2015) and Hörmann and Schabert (2015).
Their framework, as was discussed in the section on financial intermediaries, uses a haircut
20It is generally believed that monetary policy is not effective in ‘leaning’ against an upswing in the credit cycle
and should rather assume an accommodative position to ‘clean’ after the bubble has burst (White, 2009).
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mechanism to facilitate collateralised lending. This approach is also tied to a broader literature
that uses haircuts as tools for monetary policy. Some of the relevant readings in this regard are
Adrian and Shin (2009), Ashcraft et al. (2011), Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) and Hilberg and
Hollmayr (2011). The model presented in the next section aims to deliver insight into how
agents (primarily financial intermediaries and firms) respond to changes in the size of a central
bank’s balance sheet.
6.3 The Model
This section provides an account of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model,
which draws from the work of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), de Walque et al. (2010),
Schabert (2015) and Hörmann and Schabert (2015). The model consists of six sectors. Both the
household and firm sectors are closely related to the canonical New-Keynesian DSGE formulation
of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007)21. One significant difference is that the firm is allowed
to default on its loans, as in de Walque et al. (2010). In addition, financial intermediation is
included in the banking sector, which consists of two heterogenous banks, both with the option
to default on loans (but not on deposits).
The deposit bank receives deposits from households and provides loans to the interbank market,
while the merchant bank borrows from the interbank market and issues loans to firms. Merchant
banks are also able to hold bonds issued by the government. These bonds serve as collateral in
open market operations. The banking sector is similar to that of de Walque et al. (2010) but
adds a form of collateralised central bank lending in the vein of Schabert (2015) and Hörmann
and Schabert (2015). The government can potentially purchase goods, raise lump-sum taxes
and issue bonds. I extend this model in the following chapter to include both short- and
long-term bonds, with the long-term bonds modelled as perpetuities, as in Chen et al. (2012a).
The central bank sets the main refinancing rate according to a Taylor-type rule, supplies reserves
in exchange for eligible collateral and decides through the haircut mechanism on the size (and
potentially composition) of its balance sheet.
6.3.1 Households
The household sector in this model closely follows that of Smets and Wouters (2003), which
consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Households
21In other words, the model combines advancements in real business cycle (RBC) methodology with sticky prices
and wages gathered from the New Keynesian framework.
170
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za




















Utility depends positively on the consumption of j goods, Cj,t (relative to an external habit
variable Ht = h · Cj,t−1) and negatively on the labour supply Nj,t. The coefficient of relative risk
aversion is σc, which is also known as the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.





+ Cj,t = wj,tNj,t + Aj,t +
Dj,t−1
πt
+ T rt . (6.3)
The household invests in deposits, Dj,t at the risk-free rate of Rdt and supplies labour at the
real wage rate, wj,t. The government taxes households in the form of Tt, and the central
bank provides seignorage revenue, T rt
22. It is also assumed, as in Smets and Wouters (2003),
that state-contingent securities, Aj,t, insure against idiosyncratic shocks, leaving households
“homogenous with respect to consumption and asset holdings” in equilibrium (Christiano et al.,
2005).
At this point, it is worth mentioning that several components of the standard DSGE framework
are excluded. First, there is no explicit role for money in this model, which is ostensibly the
biggest shortcoming in this model. However, the focus of this thesis is not on the cash holdings of
households. Extensions of this model will include a cash-in-advance constraint as the preferred
method of delivery23. Second, investment opportunities are limited to deposits, but could
potentially include several other securities and investment vehicles. Third, households are not
subject to preference shocks, which are considered part and parcel of the modern modelling
approach in the DSGE literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007). These additions could
potentially be added to the framework, but they are not the focus of the analysis and, therefore,
are excluded initially.
22The public sector is not consolidated in this model
23The paper by Schabert (2015) includes a CIA constraint in favour of the popular MIU method. The exclusion
of money in this model is briefly discussed in Appendix B.3.
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6.3.1.1 Consumption and Savings
The objective function (6.1) is maximised taking into consideration the flow budget constraint
(6.3), which yields the following first-order conditions for consumption and deposit holdings.





















The Euler equation encapsulates the intertemporal consumption and saving decisions of the
household. In the next two sections I identify the labour supply and wage-setting behaviour of
the household, as presented in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2006).
6.3.1.2 Labour Supply
Households supply homogenous labour to an intermediate labour union. Each household j
has monopolistic power over the supply of its labour services (which means it can set its own
price in the labour market). The labour union differentiates these labour services (Smets and











Labour packers buy the differentiated labour from the unions, and package and resell the
services to intermediate goods producers. The maximisation problem for the labour packers,










where wht represents the households’ differentiated labour wages and wt, the aggregate wage.
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η − wj,t = 0 (6.9)

















In this economy, the households set their wages according to Calvo’s setting. In this scheme,
households can optimally adjust their wages after receiving a random signal with probability
(1 − θw). A household j that receives this signal will be able to set a new nominal wage to
maximise its utility subject to the demand for labour services. Households that do not receive




where τw is the degree of wage indexation. This implies that if the household cannot change the






The maximisation problem relies not only on the optimisation of (6.1) with respect to the
budget constraint in (6.3), but also on the labour demand function presented in (6.10) and the


































All households set the same wage because, as stated in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez
(2006), “complete markets allow them to hedge the risk of the timing of wage change”; this











































































The equality f 1t = f
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Since f 1t = f
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24w∗t is the common reset price
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Finally, given equation (6.11), the optimal wage-setting problem delivers the following real








1−η + (1− θw)(wt∗)1−η (6.22)
Having defined the first-order conditions that govern the behaviour of the household, I move on
to a model of the firm in the next section.
6.3.2 Firms
Firms in this paper resemble those in the standard New-Keynesian literature, which translates
to a single final good and continuum of intermediate goods being produced. In this setting, the
final goods sector is perfectly competitive, while one encounters monopolistic competition in
the markets for intermediate goods. Intermediate goods are indexed by i, where i is distributed
over the unit interval. These firms produce differentiated goods and sell them to aggregators
– who combine them into the final good. In other words, final goods producers package the
intermediate goods and sell them to households for consumption.
6.3.2.1 Final-Good Sector
Final goods producers are the aggregators in this economy. They produce a homogenous good











where yi,t is the quantity of the intermediate good used in production, ε is the elasticity of
substitution (time-varying markup in the goods market). Final goods producers maximise their
profits subject to the production function in (6.23), taking as given all intermediate goods prices
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6.3.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
In this section, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods produc-
ers of unit mass. Firms set their prices, pi,t, according to the Rotemberg pricing assumption to
maximise profit, πf 25. In addition to setting their prices they choose the a level of employment,
Ni,t, and the amount they wish to borrow from merchant banks, Lbi,t. These firms also default
on their loan repayment, with probability 1− ψt. In the case of default, firms experience both
disutility and pecuniary costs. Combining these elements, one finds that the firm maximises













where Bf is the firm’s discount factor, and dψ is the disutility parameter associated with default.






where Ki,t is the capital rented by the firm and Ni,t the number of workers employed (i.e. labour
input rented). Capital accumulation for this firm is characterised by










25The Rotemberg pricing mechanism is used because interest rates are predetermined, which means that marginal
cost is unique to the firm. I did not want price setting to interfere with the default decision which meant that
the symmetry of Rotemberg wourld be most appropriate, see de Walque and Pierrard (2010) for a discussion.
Rotemberg and Calvo present with the same reduced-form New Keynesian Phillips Curve, representing similar
dynamics for inflation and output. In other words, up to the first order, the dynamics of these two mechanisms are
the same (Blanchard and Galí, 2007).
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where ϕ is the rate at which capital depreciates and Γ is a convex investment adjustment cost26.


























where ωψ is the pecuniary cost of default parameter, % is a quadratic price adjustment cost and
π̄ is the steady-state value of inflation. The FOCs with respect to capital and labour for this
problem are
(∂Ni,t) wt = (1− α)Kαi,tLi,t−α (6.31)
(∂Ki,t) λ
f







which means that the constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function delivers the














































)2+ (βf )2Et [ωψ(1− ψt+1)2Lbi,t]
(6.34)
26This convex investment adjustment cost function Γ(·) is equal to zero at steady state. In addition, the first
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6.3.2.2.1 Price setting I used the Rotemberg pricing assumption, so that all intermediate
firms set the same prices and produce the same quantities (de Walque et al., 2010). The price
was set by taking into account the marginal cost, price adjustment cost and the market demand


























































The first-order condition with respect to pi,t is,



















Aggregate over all retailer prices, i.e. pt =
∫ 1
0
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6.3.3 Banking Sector
The banking sector consists of two specialised banks. Deposit banks receive deposits from
households at the deposit rate and lend money to the interbank market at the interbank rate.
The merchant bank is the link to the firm; it borrows from the interbank market and supplies
loans to the firms. Both of these banks may face defaults on their loans.
6.3.3.1 Deposit Banks
Deposit banks lend Llt to the interbank market at the interbank rate R
l
t. It is possible, with
probability (1 − δt), that the bank is not reimbursed for its loan. These banks also receive
deposits Dlt =
∫
Dj,tdj from households, which they must pay at a deposit rate of Rdt . There
is no possibility for deposit banks to default on the loans of households. The maximisation




























The formulation of the bank in this model abstracts from real security holdings27, a supervisory
authority and own funds, when compared with the setup in de Walque et al. (2010). The
balanced budget condition here is Dlt = L
l
t. The most important contribution to the paper lies























where U̇ lt = (π
l
t + 1)
−σl and Ξt is the multiplier on the balanced budget condition. These
first-order conditions are the Euler equations for deposits from households and loans to the
interbank market, respectively (de Walque et al., 2010). Combining them gives the following
27Future versions of this model will include an array of security options
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Merchant banks complete the financial intermediation narrative for the banking sector. These
banks, referred to by Goodhart et al. (2006) as retail banks, borrow money from the interbank
market Llt at the interbank rate R
l
t, receive government debt Bt (which is issued at the price
1/Rbt and delivers a payoff of one in t+ 1) and receive reserves from the central bank Mt at the
nominal policy rate Rmt . Merchant banks may choose not to repay their debt, with a probability
of (1− δt). Default takes on a very specific character in this model. Banks that default are not
excluded from the interbank market. They experience disutility (dδ) and non-pecuniary costs
as a result of this decision. These banks are also the originators of loans for the firms. They
provide loans Lbt at the credit rate of R
c
t . Firms may also choose not to repay their debt, with
probability (1− αt).
The reserves received, Mt, are from outright purchases of securities by the central bank (i.e.
permanent open market operations). The monetary authority can perform this operation to
change the size of its balance sheet (Akhtar, 1997). It is also possible to include temporary
repurchase agreements, as presented in Schabert (2015). These repurchase agreements entail
overnight transactions in the reserve market so that the overnight rate is kept in line with the
policy rate. This type of fine-tuning is not included in this model.
6.3.3.2.1 Collateralised Lending It is worthwhile taking some time to explain the mecha-
nism underlying outright purchases. The collateralised lending in this model of Schabert (2015)
uses “Treasury bills as collateral for central bank money”, with the price of these liabilities being
the policy rate Rmt . Reserves can be gained, at this policy rate (or repo rate) by exchanging
treasuries, ∆Bct , in the following way
28:
Mt = κ ·∆
Bct
Rmt
where ∆Bct ≤ Bt−1 (6.43)
28I followed the nomenclature of Schabert (2015) and Bredemeir et al. (2015) in this regard.
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The second part of this equation relays the fact that the merchant bank is limited to the amount
of treasuries exchanged for reserves by the stock of treasuries carried over from the previous
period. Following Schabert (2015), I then combined these equations and introduced the
collateralised lending constraint on the merchant bank, in the form of









. The role of this constraint is embodied in the ability of the merchant
bank to “acquire money, Mt, in exchange for the discounted value of treasury bills carried
over from the previous period” as elucidated by Bredemeir et al. (2015). Alternatively, this
equation could be interpreted as a central bank money supply constraint. In this equation, κt
represents a monetary policy instrument in addition to the policy rate. This instrument allows
the central bank to control the supply of reserves as a fraction of the discounted market value
of government bonds held by the private sector
6.3.3.2.2 Defining κ Before continuing, it is important to conceptualise the meaning of κ,
as it is central to the dynamics of this model. This parameter29 represents different values for
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, ranging from 0 < κ ≤ 1. It is often referred to as the haircut
parameter, where a haircut is represented by (1−κ). Finally, it could also be called the collateral
requirement. In this thesis it will be referred to either as the haircut parameter/variable or
as the collateral requirement. This is done in order to avoid confusion with the LTV ratios of
macroprudential policy from the Basel Accords.
The lower values of κ represent a higher required amount of bonds to acquire reserves. As
an example, if the value of the parameter is 0.9, then it represents a 10% haircut30. To further
illustrate this point, consider a treasury security with a value of $100 where the haircut on this
relatively safe security is 10%. This security would then be accepted as collateral for a loan up
to the value of $90, while a riskier security with a higher haircut is only eligible for a relatively
smaller loan (Hilberg and Hollmayr, 2011). Increases in the parameter represent an increase
in the size of the central bank balance sheet, as the collateral can be used to obtain greater
amounts of liquidity.
29Important is important to note that I initially defined κ as a parameter, where the model of Schabert (2015)
considers it only as a variable. Defining it as a parameter allows the setting of specific scenarios relevant to the
central question of the chapter. I did utilise it in its capacity as a variable, following an AR(1) process, in some
scenarios. This is discussed in more detail in the results section.
30The naming convention can be somewhat counter-intuitive. I ideally would have wanted to refer to κ as the
LTV instead of the haircut (the two are complements).
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6.3.3.2.3 Budget Constraint Finally, merchant banks are subject to the constraint that
liabilities equal assets, i.e. liquidity borrowed from the interbank market should equal the
expected payoffs from assets. This means that in this model there is a balanced budget constraint,
as in Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) and Christoffel and Schabert (2014), which is the following:
Llt = M
p
t +Bt + L
b
t (6.45)
The balance sheet constraint means that merchant banks need to pay for the interbank liquidity
that they obtain through money holdings, bonds or the extension of loans. Another potentially
useful constraint to generate demand for money is a cash-in-advance style minimum reserve
requirement, such as ΘLlt−1 ≤M
p
t . This was originally included in the model, but its inclusion
did not alter the results significantly. A further discussion on this reserve requirement is included
in Appendix B.3.
The banks aim to maximise the present value of profits subject to (6.44), (6.45) and the profit









































]2 −Mt(Rmt − 1) (6.47)
where ωb represents a pecuniary cost from defaulting. The first-order conditions for this
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where U̇ bt = (π
b
t + 1)
−σb , ηt is the multiplier associated with the collateralised lending constraint
and Υt is the multiplier on the balanced budget constraint. For the latter, it can be defined





− U̇ bt . Substituting this into the above equations to eliminate it gives the
following set of equations,




t + ηt) (6.48)
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6.3.4 Public Sector
6.3.4.1 Government
The government in this economy buys goods, has access to lump-sum transfers Tt and issues
debt (in the form of bonds). Bonds are held by either the merchant banks Bt or the central
bank Bct . The total stock of newly issued bonds by the government is B
g
t = Bt +B
c
t . Following
Reynard and Schabert (2009) and Schabert (2015) the growth of the bond supply is constant,




where Ω > 1. As shown with the calibration, the growth of these short-term securities is close to
that of inflation. Only short-term risk-free bonds, similar to treasury bills, are considered in this
chapter, with bonds of longer maturity introduced in the next chapter. The budget constraint









The monetary authority is able to supply reserves outright through open market purchases,





. The central bank collects
government bonds in return for newly issued reserves. In addition, interest accrues at the main
refinancing rate Rmt , which translates into a return of Mt·Rmt at period t.
The budget constraint for the central bank, following Schabert (2015) is,








Following Reynard and Schabert (2009) and Bredemeir et al. (2015), seignorage revenues are
presented as







+ (Rmt − 1)Mt (6.56)
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The public sector is not consolidated, and the central bank transfers go directly to households.
When I substituted the central bank transfers, as in the central bank budget constraint, bond








Following Schabert (2015), I restricted the initial values, Bc−1 = M
p
−1, which leads to a central
bank balance sheet condition, with Bct = M
p
t . In addition, the central bank sets the policy rate
according to a feedback rule, which takes into account how the central bank adjusts the p














To summarise, in this model the central bank has two instruments. As delineated by Hörmann
and Schabert (2013), these instruments are presented as the following:
1. Conventional instrument: The policy rate, Rmt .
2. Quantitative easing (size of balance sheet): Increase reserves available against eligible
assets (short-term bonds) in open market operations by increasing κ.
Quantitative easing in this setting consists only of changes in the size of the balance sheet,
although the next chapter includes a dimension for the composition. Selecting a value for κ
determines the size, with larger values resulting in a greater selection of bonds available as
collateral.
6.3.5 Market Clearing/Aggregation
The final goods market is in equilibrium. Firms and banks directly consume their profits (not
owned by households). The aggregate resource constraint is





































Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za






The aggregated law of motion for capital is











In this section a partial equilibrium analysis is conducted, with specific reference to monetary
transmission and endogenous default in the model. Evaluating the equations analytically
provides intuition as to the results expected from the model. First, a discussion on the monetary
transmission mechanism is provided. There is a vast amount of literature on the transmission of
conventional interest rate policy to real activity. Figure 2.3 from Chapter 2 gives an idea of the
agreed upon channels for the transmission of a change in the policy rate, with a brief discussion
on these channels provided below. Second, I provide a look at the conditions that need to be
met for the collateral constraint on merchant banks to be binding. Third, I provide an analysis
on the relationship between default, interest rates and loan activity in the economy.
6.4.1 Interest Rates
This section highlights the relationship between the policy rate and selected market interest
rates. In order to properly frame the discussion, some simplifying assumptions are stipulated.
I assume that the non-pecuniary default cost is equal to zero, ωδ = 0, repayment rates are
constant, δ and ψ, and the momentary utility for banks is linear. This means that in σb = 1 and
σl = 1, which effectively translates to (πbt + 1)
−σb ≈ 1 in steady state.
6.4.1.1 Interest Rate Spreads
First, I consider the relationship between the deposit rate, Rd, and the interbank loan rate, Rl.
Intuitively, the presupposition is that the deposit rate should be lower than the interbank loan
rate, since the depository institutions would traditionally finance their lending primarily through
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deposits, making a profit from the difference between rates. To explore this relationship, I
unified the first order conditions of the deposit bank. In equilibrium Rd = Rl·δ, which means
that Rd < Rl since 0 < δ < 1. In other words, the level of the interbank loan rate is intrinsically
linked to the possibility of default, by reflecting a risk premium derived from default. Therefore,
in this model, the deposit banks charge a higher rate on interbank loans because they take on a
small default risk in issuing these loans. In the case that δ = 1, the transmission from Rd to Rl
would be direct, in that Rd = Rl.
Furthermore, one can think about this relationship as one between savers, borrowers and
intermediaries. In this case, the saver is represented by the household, while the merchant bank
takes on the role of the borrower. Intermediaries, represented by the deposit bank, generate
a spread between the “interest received by savers and that paid by borrowers” (Cúrdia and
Woodford, 2010). Early attempts to fashion such an interest rate spread between borrowers
and savers include Sudo et al. (2008), Hülsewig et al. (2009), Cúrdia and Woodford (2010)
and Gerali et al. (2010). A more recent attempt that delivers a qualitatively similar mechanism
is found in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Second, I analysed the link between the credit and interbank loan rates by looking at the
first-order conditions of the merchant bank. We see that Rc · ψ = Rl · δ, with the intuition being
that a higher repayment rate is associated with a lower interest rate. As calibrated in this model
δ > ψ, which, in turn, means that firms are believed to repay less frequently, which means that
the risk premium is relatively higher for credit extended to firms. In other words, merchant
banks institute a premium on the financing they receive from the interbank market, making
firm loans costlier.
Interestingly, this relation also shows that defaults on firm loans can indirectly impact on deposit
banks, through their effect on merchant banks, as also illustrated in Christiano et al. (2014).
Another way to think about this, in the context of a disruption to financial intermediation, is
that a disturbance in the interbank market will indirectly affect the borrowing conditions for
firms, as described in Gertler and Karadi (2013).
Third, the bond rate is related to the interbank loan rate through the following equation, as
derived in the first-order conditions of the merchant bank:
Rl · δ = Rb(1 + ηκ)
In the case where the haircut parameter is positive, κ > 0, then Rb < Rl, which aligns with our
intuition, seeing that the interbank loan rate is linked to a risky asset and short-term government
bonds (treasuries) are considered completely safe. In addition, the spread between the bond
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rate and the loan rate is also positive, owing to default risk and the potential for the bonds to
be used as liquidity.
Finally, consider the case of how the policy rate is transmitted to the interbank loan rate.
Combining the first-order condition on newly issued reserves, money holdings, interbank and
firm loans gives the following relation to the interbank rate: Rm(η + 1) = Rl · δ · (δ + 1)−1. In
this setting, with Rm < Rl, the central bank directly impacts the interbank loan rate through
setting the policy rate. In the literature there are several articles, such as those of Goodfriend
(2007b), De Fiore and Tristani (2011) and Cúrdia and Woodford (2015), that emphasise the
spread between the loan and policy rates in particular.
6.4.1.2 Monetary Transmission Path
Having completed the transmission path, the relationship between rates reads as Rm < Rb <
Rd < Rl < Rc. We can use this to determine the transmission from the policy rate to the broader
range of interest rates in the economy. For example, lowering the policy rate lowers the cost of
credit and potentially increases the supply of loanable funds in the economy. This behaviour is
in line with a narrow credit, or bank lending, channel (Bernanke et al., 1999; Cova and Ferrero,
2015). To gain a better understanding of this transmission path, it is useful to look at some of
the more popular channels identified in the literature.
6.4.1.2.1 Transmission Channels Some of the different channels through which a change
in the policy rate is thought to affect market rates and loan supply, and thereby the rest of
the economy, are presented here31. This discussion is useful in that some of the channels are
referenced in the results section of the chapter. The channels, as identified in Mishkin (2001),
Kuttner and Mosser (2002) and Ireland (2006) are as follows: (i) interest rate channel, (ii)
equity price channel, (iii) balance sheet / broad credit channel, (iv) bank lending / narrow
credit channel, and (v) exchange rate channel. Some have also argued for the inclusion of the
risk channel32 of monetary policy, as first discussed in Rajan (2005). I provide a brief discussion
on the first four channels.
First, the interest rate channel is the traditional mechanism for the transmission of the policy
rate to aggregate demand, as emphasised in conventional Keynesian IS-LM models (Mishkin,
2001)33. In this channel an increase in the policy rate would mean an increase in the real
31The effects are summarised in Figure 2.3 from the discussion of transmission channels in Chapter 2
32This was briefly discussed in the third chapter. A substantial literature has developed around this topic, with
the article by Smets (2014) providing an interesting take on the role of monetary policy in contributing to financial
stability.
33See the article by (Taylor, 1995) for a good discussion on the empirical validity of the interest rate channel.
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interest rate, which translates into an increase in the cost of investment/durable goods. Firms
and households invest less as a result, which adversely affects aggregate demand.
Second, the equity price channel contains two separate channels, one which originates from
contributions made by Tobin (1969) in his q-theory of investment and the other from the
life-cycle hypothesis as presented in Ando and Modigliani (1963). First, consider an increase
in money supply, which generally means that households will have more money to spend in
stock markets, in turn generating demand for equity and raising its price. In Tobin’s q theory,
an increase in the price of equity will result in increased investment spending (Mishkin, 2001).
Second, the wealth channel as discussed in Ando and Modigliani (1963), specifically looks at
changes in household behaviour as a result of asset price movements (Kuttner and Mosser,
2002). Increasing interest rates can have the effect of reducing the value of durable assets (such
as bonds with a longer maturity), which decreases the wealth of individuals. A reduction in
wealth naturally leads to lower levels of consumption, which means that aggregate demand is
impacted.
Third, the broad credit/balance sheet channel was developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and discusses the role that the balance sheet position of key financial institutions play in the
transmission of monetary policy. In particular, interest rate movements often bring about
changes to the balance sheet, cash flow and net worth of banks and firms (Mishkin, 2001). An
increase in the interest rate could, for example, negatively impact cash flow and net worth,
which would lead to less collateral being available for loans in the economy. Financial frictions
play a key role in this channel, as discussed earlier in this chapter.
Finally, the narrow credit/bank lending channel was first developed by Roosa (1951) and was
reformulated by Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988). In this channel,
an increase in the policy rate is met with an equal decrease in bank reserves, which means
that demand deposits will decrease. As a result of the fact that banks are reliant on deposits to
generate loans, this also causes loans to decrease. Bank financing is an important part of credit
in the economy. With a reduced supply of credit, households and firms will reduce spending,
which means lower aggregate demand (Ireland, 2006).
The final two channels are often referred to as the credit channel and are seen more in the light
of an amplification device on existing transmission channels, as argued by Bernanke and Gertler
(1995). In addition, clear empirical support for certain channels, such as the bank lending
channel, have been difficult to come by, with conflicting evidence in the literature.
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6.4.2 Collateral Constraint
Importantly, for the collateral constraint to be binding, the policy rate should be lower than
that of interbank liquidity. The central bank needs to supply money at a lower price than banks
are willing to pay in the interbank market. The merchant bank must be incentivised to hold
reserves (i.e. there is some liquidity premium on the holding of reserves). When we compare









This condition implies that the constraint is binding if the central bank sets the policy rate below
the interbank rate. If η = 0 and the collateral constraint is not binding, changes to the policy
rate will not impact the equilibrium allocation of reserves (Hörmann and Schabert, 2015). In
this setting merchant banks will use as many eligible assets as possible to get money at the








As before, several simplifying assumptions are made, similar to those established in de Walque
and Pierrard (2010), to shed light on the role of endogenous default. I assumed that there is no
discounting β = 1, no inflation πt = 1 and utility functions are linear (by setting σb = σl = 1).
First, we look at the supply side of the credit market. The supply of interbank liquidity, which is




This expression captures the negative relationship between Rl and δ. In other words, a higher





This equation shows the negative relationship between the repayment and credit rates. Second,
we explore the demand side of the credit market. Combining the merchant bank’s first-order
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= 1− dδ(1− δ)
Ll
This indicates a negative relationship between the quantity of interbank loans and the interbank
rate, while a positive relationship is observed with respect to the default rate, (1 − δ), and




= 1− dψ(1− ψ)
Lb
This has similar implications for the firm. For example, an increase in the credit rate will lead to
a lower quantity of loans to firms. de Walque et al. (2010) refer to this as “negatively sloped
credit demand”. In addition, an increase in the default rate, (1− ψ), is associated with a lower
quantity of loans, indicating that increases in liquidity to the firms will generally lead to lower
default.
6.5 Calibration
Calibration of the household, firm and government largely follows the work of Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007), while monetary policy and the banking sector is calibrated to reflect
the values in line with de Walque and Pierrard (2010). Model parameters are partitioned into
sets or groups, similar to those of Christiano et al. (2014). In this tradition, the first group
contains parameters that are set a priori. Within this set, calibrated parameters are summarised
in Table C.1, while imposed steady states and steady-state ratios are presented in Table C.2.
The second set consists of implied steady state values, such as those on search costs and default
disutility, which are provided in the appendices. The discussion in this section highlights the
motivation for the first set of parameters.
6.5.1 Real Sector
The calibration of the real sector arises predominantly from widely accepted parameter estimates
found in the New-Keynesian literature. As seen in Table C.1, habit formation h = 0.57, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion σc = 1.35 and inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
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σn = 2.4 are similar to those found in Smets and Wouters (2003). The elasticity of substitution
with respect to labour η and goods ε varieties are both set to 3. In terms of price/wage setting,
the wage indexation and Calvo parameters are set to τw = 0.62 and θw = 0.2, respectively.
Output is normalised to 1. Employment/labour hours is normalised to 0.33. The production
function takes on a Cobb-Douglas form, with α = 0.3, implying that steady-state labour share of
total output is 70%. The depreciation rate ϕ is calibrated to 0.03, with annual depreciation on
capital equal to 12%. The consumption steady-state ratio is assumed to be 0.42, while the firm
profit steady state ratio is 0.134. Calibration implies that the capital to output ratio is K/Y ≈ 8
and the loan to output ratio is Lb/Y ≈ 0.2, which is similar to those of Smets and Wouters
(2003) and de Walque et al. (2010). The government spending and taxation ratio to total
output is 0.185 and 0.187, respectively. There are three parameters associated with adjustment
costs in this model; these are defined in terms of price % = 120, wage γp = 0.47 and investment
θ = 6.77.
6.5.2 Banking Sector
Calibration in this section largely follows the work of de Walque and Pierrard (2010). Several
interest rates are quoted in this paper. The quarterly real deposit rate is 0.66%, and the quarterly
real policy rate is 0.55%. The discount factor is calculated as β = πss/Rdss, which I fixed to be
the discount factor for all agents in the model35. Following data from Castrén et al. (2010),
the quarterly probability of default for banks is 0.5%, whereas the firm default rate in steady
state is 2.5%. Deposit and merchant bank profits are quite small related to total output, namely
πb/Y = πl/Y = 0.0001. I also imposed a ratio of interbank loans to firms loans in steady state
as in de Walque and Pierrard (2010), with Ll/Lb = 0.8 36.
6.6 Model Dynamics
In this section, I looked at the impact on financial stability originating from shocks to (i) the
haircut mechanism, κt, and (ii) the nominal short-term policy rate with selected levels for
κ. First, I looked at the financial market impact of implementing a balance sheet expansion,
34The consumption ratio is normally larger, refer to Smets and Wouters (2003), but in our case firm and bank
profits are not distributed to the household
35Relaxing this assumption allows different discount rates for the households, firms and banks.
36Changes to these ratios do not significantly impact results, but they do influence some of the implied parameter
values. Ratios were chosen close to the ones cited in de Walque et al. (2010) but are not exactly the same, in order
to retain a positive value for the endogenous disutility and search cost parameters.
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through an increase in the value of κt. This first scenario is similar to the analysis of de Walque
et al. (2010), Dib (2010a), Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011) and Goodhart et al. (2011), who
employ expansionary monetary policy through an increase in the monetary base. The model
differs, primarily, in the way that the balance sheet expansion is implemented. In this model, the
collateralised lending mechanism provides an endogenous provision of liquidity, as in Schabert
(2015), rather than a pure injection.
Second, I conducted an experiment that simulates a scenario, similar to the exit strategy recently
performed by the Fed, whereby the nominal short-run policy rate is increased, with varying
degrees of change to the size of the central bank balance sheet, reflected by different κ values.
The similarity of this scenario to that of an exit strategy lies in the fact that the Fed was able to
increase the federal funds rate without significantly impacting the size of the balance sheet. In
this model, values of κ can be set so that reserves move independently from the policy rate, in
order to achieve a similar result. In this scenario the point of departure does not have to be
from the ZLB. I implemented this Contractionary interest rate policy by the applying a shock to
the Taylor rule (6.58).
It is worth mentioning that model estimation was not attempted. The contribution of the paper
is in its theoretical construction, with calibration being sufficient for the purpose of exposition.
Clear data adherence in the model is a topic for future research. The analysis starts with the
expansion of the central bank balance sheet.
6.6.1 Balance Sheet Expansion
One can think about this expansion as an increase in the availability of reserves. In other words,
it represents a ‘pure’ form of QE, such as that stipulated in Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Reis
(2009), Woodford (2012) and Christensen and Krogstrup (2016). First, I describe the real
sector impact from the balance sheet expansion. Second, I look at the effect on the financial
sector, which is of the greatest importance for this discussion, as I want to determine the impact
on financial stability from balance sheet expansion. The results from this section should be
quite similar to those of a decrease in the policy rate, as the level of reserves and policy rate are
inextricably linked through the collateralised borrowing mechanism.
6.6.1.1 Clarification: Variable (κt) vs Parameter (κ)
Clarification on one possible point of confusion is required before I continue with a discussion
on the model dynamics. In this section I consider an exogenous shock process for the collateral
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requirement, κt, which follows an autoregressive process. With the balance sheet expansion,
the law of motion for this process is κt = ρκ(κt−1) + ξκt , where ξ
κ
t is an exogenous i.i.d shock.
However, in the next section, I consider a fully adjustable haircut parameter κ, in the form
of a scalar. For the scenarios presented in the next section, where a contractionary interest
rate policy is considered, I believe it to be more instructive to simply set parameter values that
remain constant over time37, which allows our analysis effectively to be comparable to the
study of Goodhart et al. (2011), where the value of κ is implicitly set to one. In terms of an
approximation to reality, haircuts are not generally time-varying as they are officially fixed by
central banks (Falagiarda and Saia, 2013). This means that fixing κ to certain value over time is
considered a better representation of actual implementation.
6.6.1.2 Real Sector
Illustrating the effect of a shock to κt entails setting the starting value of κt to below one38. In my
experiment the value is fixed at 0.5 initially, which implies that agents are liquidity constrained,
with only a fraction of securities available as collateral39. With the policy adjustment, the value
for κt increases so that the LTV ratio is close to, but not exceeding, 100%. An increase in κt
means that more bonds are becoming liquid (Hörmann and Schabert, 2015). The expansion of
the central bank balance sheet (often referred to as QE) is reflected in a positive innovation to
κt, which affects the pertinent real variables, showing the expected sign and trajectory. Real
consumption, expenditure and employment all increased with the expected hump shape, a
characteristic of the Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) framework. Real sector results from the
next section, with contractionary monetary policy through an increase in the policy rate, almost
identically mirror the results from this increase in κt.
6.6.1.3 Financial Sector
While real sector results are important to determine whether the model provides an accurate
description of the broader macroeconomy, I am primarily interested in the banking sector
behaviour. The central hypothesis of this chapter pivots on the response of financial institutions
37Technically this is similar to setting the autoregressive parameter on the haircut process to one, which also
delivers a constant value over time.
38With a value of κ = 1 representing complete relaxation of the constraint on the amount of collateral eligible
for the purpose of transformation to a more liquid asset. Seeing as a positive innovation is applied to κ, with
0 < κ ≤ 1, the initial value needs to be below one, otherwise the constraint is violated.
39This starting value is in fact close to the haircut imposed on some private sector investors in the recent financial
crisis.
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to variation in the collateralised borrowing constraint. Therefore, I focus the greatest part of the
discussion on the relevant actions of the agents involved in financial intermediation, specifically
looking at the behaviour of the firm, deposit bank, merchant bank and central bank.
6.6.1.3.1 Deposit Bank First, the reduction in the price of interbank funds (i.e. the interbank
rate), as a result of the increase in liquidity, translates to increased interbank activity. This
finding is shared in the work of Dib (2010b), which points to a possible increase in interbank
borrowing following a negative shock to the haircut. My results are further corroborated by
the findings of Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011). In their study lowering the haircut results in a
decrease in the interbank market rate as well as an increase in interbank lending activity40.
Balance sheet expansion and lower interbank rates mean that fewer merchant banks are likely
to default on interbank loans. This result agrees with that of Goodhart et al. (2011), who state
that the expectation of a higher level of credit in the economy causes the probability of default
to decline. The profitability of the deposit bank increases because the marginal benefit from
extending loans exceeds the cost.
6.6.1.3.2 Firm Second, the expansionary balance sheet policy increases the firm’s profit, due
to reduced capital costs and an increase in cheap liquidity available from merchant banks41. The
increase in liquidity originating from the shock to the collateral requirement causes a decrease
across a wide range of interest rates in the economy, with the credit rate exhibiting a sharp
contraction. With borrowing conditions improved, one observes an increase in loans extended
to firms. Easier credit market conditions manifests in an increase in the repayment rate on loans
(i.e. the default rate decreases); effectively improving financial stability with respect to the firm.
Improved balance sheet health is one of the primary goals of liquidity extension on the part
of the central bank (Bernanke, 2012). In the wake of the financial crisis several central banks
established liquidity facilities and enacted quantitative easing programs in order to generate
firm borrowing. Results presented here provide confirmation that liquidity injections should be,
in principle, able to accomplish this.
6.6.1.3.3 Merchant Bank Third, reserves held on the balance sheet of the central bank
increases as a result of the shock. Merchant banks increase their demand for reserves, as
short-term bonds can now easily be traded for liquidity. In fact, they increase their stock of
40Banks are structured in a slightly different way in their model, with the deposit bank the one with direct access
to the central bank’s reserves
41In this model the merchant bank is the firm’s only source of funding for investment
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short-term bonds - which serve as collateral for reserves - to finance their spending, which drives
down the price on these bonds. This result is supported by the work of Kandrac and Schlusche
(2015), who show that “lending growth accelerates in response to increases in reserves”. It is
even argued as far back as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) that the creation of reserves leads
banks to hold more than the sufficient level, which would then translate into an increase in
investments and loans extended in the economy. This result is also consistent with the empirical
evidence, as the recent study by Boeckx et al. (2016) shows that balance sheet expansion on
the part of the ECB significantly increased bank lending. In addition, the credit supply to firms
is increasing due to a positive spread between the credit and interbank rates. The central bank’s
role as an intermediary is clearly felt in this economy, with borrowing conditions improving in
all markets when the collateral requirement is relaxed.
6.6.1.3.4 Central Bank Finally, the increase in the reserves held on the balance sheet of
the central bank is met with an increase in the policy rate. While this movement might seem
counterintuitive, the increase in the policy rate is also observed in the work of Niestroj et al.
(2013). It is believed that this is the result of the way in which the feedback mechanism from
the Taylor rule is structured. The increase in output resulting from the increase in the size of
the balance sheet means that the policy rate increases to counter the movement. However, the
net effect of the balance sheet expansion is positive in this case, with movement in the short-run
nominal policy rate not being able to counter the effect of the expansion, as seen by the fact
that all other interest rates in the economy are declining (in contrast to the policy rate). In the
next section, I look at the impact on the economy from implementing a contractionary interest
rate policy.
6.6.2 Contractionary Interest Rate Policy
In this section, I consider the response of the economy when the short-term nominal policy rate
has been increased, known as contractionary monetary policy. I introduced multiple scenarios
with a choice over different values for an exogenously controlled haircut parameter42. Four
values for the haircut at different intervals, 1, 0.7, 0.3 and 0.05 were chosen for the analysis.
These values represent a 100%, 70%, 30% and 5% LTV ratio, respectively. The value of κ = 1
was chosen to reflect the situation in which there is no collateralised lending restriction: all
short-term bonds are eligible. This formed my baseline specification.
42As opposed to the shock form the previous section.
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For the second value, the literature provides an LTV ratio of κ = 0.7 as a realistic representation
from data for the Euro area on mortgages offered as collateral, such as quoted in Gerali et al.
(2010). Although mortgage securities are not directly relatable to short-term bonds, one can
think of this as realistic to some asset classes with lower eligibility as collateral. The true value
for short-term bonds would be closer to κ = 0.9, but this would not allow the exaggeration
of the effect required, as it is too close to the baseline model where κ = 1. Finally, a value of
κ = 0.3 was chosen to reflect a deepened but not entirely unrealistic haircut43, representing a
scenario of low interest rate sensitivity44. Finally, the value of κ = 0.05 is an effective decoupling
of the interest rate and reserves.
6.6.2.1 Real Sector
The first few panels show the traditional hump-shaped responses to a monetary policy tightening,
as in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). The results are similar for all iterations of κ. In all the
stated scenarios a drop in output, inflation, employment and investment is observed, as expected
in the case of a policy rate increase. All these variables fall and then gradually converge to their
steady states.
In this scenario, it appears that with lower the value of κ, the more the effect of the interest
rate increase is dampened. For example, the realised impulse response values for consumption
in Figure 6.3 are progressively higher with successive reductions in the haircut parameter.
Intuitively, this is the result of a relatively more accommodative central bank balance sheet
position, which is captured by the relatively lower values of κ.
6.6.2.2 Financial Sector
Real sector results from my model largely corroborate the empirical findings from comparable
dynamic general equilibrium models. With the discussion on real sector effects exhausted in
other studies, it affords me the opportunity to shift the focus of the analysis to the financial
sector. The discussion follows a simple template. First, the impulse responses associated with
each financial institution are evaluated on the basis of the benchmark case, with no constraint
on central bank lending (i.e. κ = 1). Second, the baseline is compared with the scenarios in
43In fact, the ECB under their liquidity provision programs extended loans to some financial institutions where
the haircut was close to 30%; normally on bottom tier asset classes (Gerali et al., 2010)
44A true decoupling would require a value of κ = 0, however, setting the value for κ too low causes indeterminacy
in the model. The value of 0.05 was chosen because lower levels deliver similar results.
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which the haircut constraint is imposed (i.e. κ = 0.7, κ = 0.3 and κ = 0.05). Another way to
frame this second scenario is to consider the usage of interest rate policy while balance sheet
policy is bounded, in the same vein as Harrison (2012).
6.6.2.3 Clarification: Decoupling Principle
In order to understand the results better, one important clarification is necessary, as there are
potentially conflicting effects occurring. Usually in open market operations conducted to affect
a negative impact on the short-term interest rate, the central bank would drain reserves from
the economy by selling short-term securities to (merchant) commercial banks. In the model
presented the initial decrease in the interest rate, with κ = 1, is met with a relatively large
decrease in the amount of reserves. This is expected, as the value of κ, along one dimension,
represents a sensitivity of reserves to the movement in the interest rate. Lower values of κ result
in lower initial decreases of reserves held by merchant banks (i.e. a higher relative level of
reserves), indicating a lower responsiveness of reserves to changes in the interest rate. This
relates to the discussion on the decoupling principle in the previous chapter.
However, on the other hand, merchant banks in the scenario where κ = 1 have accumulated
more short-term bonds to trade for reserves (as they yield higher returns with an increase in
the policy rate) and also have the means to convert these bonds to reserves, over the longer-
run. By this I mean that all their short-term bonds can be offered as collateral in obtaining
liquidity: there is no collateral restriction. In comparison, while the initial reduction in reserves
is relatively low for lower values of κ, the exchange of short-term bonds for reserves operates
more slowly with lower values of κ. Therefore, in the case where κ = 1, for example, the initial
reduction in reserves is sharp due to the interest rate increase. However, in this instance the
merchant bank has greater means to obtain (now higher yielding) reserves in exchange for
short-term bonds, allowing a potentially quicker recovery.
6.6.2.3.1 Deposit Bank (κ = 1) First, in the case of the deposit bank - which provides
liquidity in the interbank market - an increase in the policy rate gets partially transmitted
through to the interbank interest rate, creating a positive spread between the policy and
interbank rate. As indicated in the partial equilibrium analysis, this spread is generated
primarily by the size of the merchant bank default parameter, δ.
Given the higher price on interbank market investment, the demand for interbank loans
decreases (Goodhart et al., 2011). Deposit bank profits are negatively affected by the con-
tractionary policy at first, but then steadily increase over the next few quarters to surpass
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its steady-state value. Profits increase, with interbank loans starting to accumulate and the
interbank rate returning to its pre-shock levels. While this result might seem counter-intuitive,
there is evidence to support it in the literature45. Giri (2014) states that the policy rate increase
appears to benefit the net creditor/surplus bank in the economy. In fact, Goodhart et al. (2011)
refer to the deposit bank as the net lender in their paper. The intuition is that net creditors are
eventually able to take advantage of the fact that interbank lending now occurs at a higher
price.
6.6.2.3.2 Deposit Bank (κ = 0.7; κ = 0.3; κ = 0.05 ) Reducing the value of κ induces a
relative increase in central bank reserves in the short-run, as the result of reduced interest rate
sensitivity of reserves. To be clear, this initial expansion of the central bank balance sheet is a
relative one, as it is in comparison to the case where reserves are more reactive to movements in
the interest rate, namely κ = 1. The most striking impact from this relative increase in reserves
is the relatively higher level of loans extended on the interbank market, which is most readily
observed with κ = 0.05. Interestingly, it appears that the price of interbank lending is a function
of the amount of loans, with the pass-through of the policy rate on the interbank rate being
relatively stronger in the increased liquidity environment.
Deposit bank profit decreases less sharply to the contractionary interest rate shock with lower
values of κ, dampening the negative effect of the policy stance. However, profit recovery is
faster with higher values of κ, leaving the deposit bank with a marginally higher level of profit
in the longer-run. This appears to be linked to the movement of the interbank rate, showing the
interest rate sensitivity of profits.
6.6.2.3.3 Firm (κ = 1) Second, I look to the response of the firm. As expected, firm loans
decrease due to the increase in the loan rate imposed by the monetary policy shock. Firm profits
decrease, which confirms my intuition. In addition, firm repayment decreases, which translates
into an increase in the probability of firm default. There appears to be a positive correlation
between loans to the firm and the repayment rate, as highlighted by the partial equilibrium
analysis. In other words, the lower the number of loans extended to firms, the higher the
probability of default. This could indicate that in times when firms are credit constrained it
becomes more difficult to repay their debt. The number of loans to firms decreases with the
increase in the real credit rate and decline in the value of firms’ capital.
45In the bank lending channel, it is possible for a supply-driven bank to be profitable with an increase in the
interest rate (Kuttner and Mosser, 2002).
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6.6.2.3.4 Firm (κ = 0.7; κ = 0.3; κ = 0.05 ) When the central bank broadens its role as
intermediary, through a decrease in κ, there is a relative decrease in the credit rate. Also, the
quantity of firm loans continues to increase in line with the initial expansion in the central
bank’s balance sheet. The increase in firm loans contains elements of both demand and supply.
On the one hand, firm demand could be heightened because of easier borrowing conditions.
However, an increase in the liquidity available to the merchant bank is also a factor in the
increased number of loans extended, indicating that the determination of loan quantity is not
purely based on movements in the credit rate.
6.6.2.3.5 Merchant Bank (κ = 1) Third, I considered the case of the merchant bank. Before
discussing the result, it is important, once again, to highlight the context for the scenario at
hand. Looking at the collateralised lending equation (6.44), one observes that central bank
intermediation directly affects the merchant bank in the model, as it receives reserves from the
central bank in return for government bonds proportional to the haircut parameter. Another
important interpretation of the equation, in the case where κ = 1, is that the relationship
between the policy rate and newly issued reserves is one-to-one. In other words, interest rate
sensitivity is defined by this parameter. In this case, with κ = 1, an increase in the policy rate
should result in a commensurately negative response in reserves, i.e. as used in Goodhart et al.
(2011). However, the results from Chapter 5 indicate that this sensitivity parameter might take
on a range of values, depending on the monetary policy regime in question46.
As expected, merchant banks experience a negative effect on their profit from the contractionary
policy, due to the increased cost in external financing. The number of bonds in the merchant
bank portfolio increases initially, for several plausible reasons. First, open market operations by
the central bank place short-term securities with the merchant bank in return for reserves. It is
difficult to see from the figure, but newly issued reserves are decreasing initially. This decrease
is overshadowed by the accompanying increase in demand for reserves, with merchant banks
aggressively pursuing liquidity as a result of the contractionary policy imposed.
Second, an increase in short-term bonds - as they are convertible to reserves in future - reflects
the substitution away from the relatively more expensive interbank market as source of liquidity.
This finding is corroborated by Giri (2014), who finds that these banks move away from the
interbank market toward the purchases of government bonds in the case of monetary tightening.
After the initial increase, the merchant bank short-term bond supply decreases rapidly, as it
46The results from Chapter 5 also reveal that there is rarely occasion to believe that the value for κ would strictly
be equal to one. The only instance where this is truly possible is in a reserve regime, but even in this regime it is
likely that the sensitivity is lower than one. In other words, the elasticity of demand for reserves might be lower on
the money demand curve.
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is exchanged for reserves. This then, leads to sharp, but temporary, increase in total reserves.
With the increase in the policy rate, the merchant banks want to deposit more reserves at the
central bank, a result that is shared by Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011). Finally, the increasing cost
of borrowing, as a result of the monetary policy shock, increases default rates for the merchant
bank.
6.6.2.3.6 Merchant Bank (κ = 0.7; κ = 0.3; κ = 0.05 ) Decreasing the value of κ decreases
the level of bonds held by the merchant bank, relative to the benchmark (i.e. κ = 1). Importantly,
this increased collateral requirement reduces the amount of reserves that can be acquired by
the merchant bank (Niestroj et al., 2013). In other words, after a few periods, the tightening of
the collateral constraint (with lower values of κ) results in a relatively lower level of reserves
being available to the merchant bank.
Lowering the value of κ results in an increase in the repayment rate on interbank loans. In
addition, an increase in the repayment rate from loans issued to firms is observed. Merchant
banks are affected by lower borrowing costs and, therefore, lend more to their customers,
i.e. the firms (Goodhart et al., 2011). With lower values of κ, the liquidity position of the
merchant bank improves to the extent that it can better service firm loan demand. Both firm
and merchant bank profitability increase as a result of the liquidity improvement. In summary,
banks anticipate that the increase in liquidity/credit would mean an overall higher level of
credit extension. The probability of default for both banks and firms will decrease, because of
the liquidity position and the increase in profitability associated with this constraint (Goodhart
et al., 2011).
6.6.2.3.7 Central Bank Finally, the central bank increases the policy rate, which results in
an initial decrease in both total and newly issued reserves47. This negative relationship indicates
that the decoupling is not complete, with lower levels of κ generating a greater decoupling of
the quantity and price of reserves. In other words, for lower values of κ, we see that the reserve
sensitivity to interest rate changes declines, with a subdued effect on the reserves for κ = 0.3.
Selecting a parameter value at the lower end of the spectrum produces an interest rate increase
with little impact on the number of reserves.
6.6.2.3.8 Interest Rates The spread between interest rates changes significantly with differ-
ent values of κ. Decreasing the value of the haircut parameter narrows the spread between the
47Once again the initial decline in total reserves is difficult to see on the graph.
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bond rate and other market rates. This decreased spread could be indicative of improvement
in the market conditions. As discussed in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), one would expect
tighter financial conditions to be met with an increase in interest rate spreads. In addition,
higher values of κ represent an increased ability for the policy rate to affect market rates. The
pass-through of the policy rate increase is experienced most intensely in the movement of the
bond rate.
6.6.2.3.9 Exit Strategy In order to generate an exit from the ZLB, the value of κ would have
to be as close to zero as possible. The current model would, however, have to be extended along
several dimensions to capture the full effects of such a strategy. The work from this section
points to the possibility that there would be a short-run gain from severing ties with the balance
sheet in the case of an interest rate increase. This is because reserves do not decrease with a
rise in the policy rate under decoupling. In the longer-run, in this model, money supply might
be higher with a decoupling, even if banks are constrained by their inability to exchange bonds
for reserves. The decoupling effect dominates in this model, with improved financial stability
and real economic performance associated with lower values of κ. However, this analysis does
not capture the full complexity of the strategy, which is why it is deferred to future research.
This result does, however, raise an important question. In the case where central banks increase
the interest rate, with the balance sheet completely decoupled (such as a floor regime) it
would mean that banks hold a higher than normal level of reserves. This might act to partially
counteract some of the influence of the interest rate increase. Policymakers need to weigh the
cost and benefits of implementing these policies in the light of this result.
6.7 Chapter Conclusion
In developing the model for this chapter, I attempted to address some of the shortcomings
of modern DSGE models. Several attractive features are combined into one model, with the
purpose of looking at changes in the size of the balance sheet of the central bank. Some of
the important amendments to the traditional New-Keynesian DSGE model are endogenous
default, an interbank market with heterogeneous banks, interest rate spreads and a role for
balance sheet policies. In particular, the addition of the collateralised borrowing mechanism
from Schabert (2015) provides an elegant way to present endogenous changes in the size of the
balance sheet of the central bank.
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Central banks, in the model, have the ability to inject liquidity into the financial system through
open market operations. Injections are specifically directed at the merchant bank, as dictated by
the collateralised borrowing constraint. Merchant banks, are similar, in reality, to commercial
banks with direct access to central bank reserves. As depicted by an increase in the value
of κt, a balance sheet expansion results in improved borrowing conditions for these banks,
which, in turn, improves interbank market activity and reduces firm and interbank loan default.
The finding from this chapter illustrates that expanding the balance sheet of the central bank
can have system-wide implications, especially with respect to the agents responsible for credit
extension to the broader economy.
In addition, central banks have full control over the haircut mechanism, κ, which affords them
the ability to alter the size of the balance sheet autonomously. It is plausible that in some
scenarios this will allow them to implement interest rate policy in conjunction with balance sheet
policy, amplifying, or perhaps detracting from, the effect of interest rate policy. As illustrated in
the last part of the chapter, the central bank can increase the interest rate and decide on varying
degrees of balance sheet size, dependent on the value of κ. Smaller values of κ, for example,
will impose stricter lending conditions and reduce the availability of credit in the system. In the
next chapter, I determine what effect changes in the composition of the balance sheet might
have on financial stability and economic activity.
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Chapter 7
Model with Long-term Bonds
This chapter extends the model presented in Chapter 6 to include long-term securities, allowing
the central bank to affect the economy through changes in the composition of its balance sheet.
Balance sheet policy of this type usually attempts to influence the price of a specific asset class.
However, there are other avenues through which asset purchases in my model might impact
the macroeconomy, specifically in the financial sector. Changes to the baseline model primarily
affect three sections of the model, namely the merchant bank, central bank and government.
7.1 Literature Review
The literature on large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) identifies several important channels
for the transmission of nonstandard policies1. One of the primary channels identified in the
literature is the portfolio balance channel. As mentioned in the second chapter, asset purchases
are often ineffective in New Keynesian DSGE models, as expertly demonstrated in Eggerston
and Woodford (2003). Wallace’s irrelevance result posits that reserves and government bonds
are perfect substitutes, which means that the portfolio balance effects are not observed in the
event of strategic asset purchases. Changes to the central bank balance sheet, in terms of size
and composition, effectively have no role to play in affecting real variables. As shown by Cúrdia
and Woodford (2011), this result holds even in models with demand-side credit frictions where
agents believe assets to be perfect substitutes. However, the recent strand of empirical evidence
on LSAPs highlights the fact that portfolio balance effects do exist2 and contribute substantially
1There is a discussion on this literature in Chapter 2.5.1.
2Chapter 4.1 provides a discussion on the empirical evidence on large-scale asset purchases.
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to changes in long-term rates3. Keeping this in mind, it could be fruitful to look at models of
asset purchases that have some degree of imperfect asset substitutability.
7.1.1 LSAPs in DSGE
7.1.1.1 ‘Flattening the Yield Curve’
After the initial shock of the financial crisis, with the policy rate of most advanced economies
nearing the ZLB, central banks considered several alternative tools to stimulate economic
activity and address dysfunctional financial markets. As a recourse, most central banks initiated
asset purchase programs in order to affect longer-term interest rates. Lowering longer-term
rates is thought to assist the traditional monetary policy mechanism by reducing private sector
borrowing rates (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). Broad channels of operation in achieving this
goal, as identified in the literature, are the expectations (or signalling) and portfolio balance
channels (Woodford, 2012). The model developed in this chapter exploits the transmission
mechanism under portfolio rebalancing. In order to generate the impact from LSAPs in a DSGE
model, one requires some assumptions on the substitutability of assets. Models that incorporate
this channel have to justify why investors value securities used in asset purchases beyond their
risk-adjusted payoff (Chodorow-Reich, 2014).
7.1.1.1.1 Preferred Habitat One of the earliest DSGE models to capture imperfect asset
substitution is the model by Andres et al. (2004). In this model the agents have heterogeneous
preferences with regard to long-term government bonds, which generate the portfolio balance
effects. Models in this tradition are often referred to as ‘preferred habitat’ models. In this model,
the central bank has the power to influence a specific segment of the yield curve through its
manipulation of the relative asset supply. Vayanos and Vila (2009) build on the work of Andres
et al. (2004) to develop a general equilibrium preferred habitat model with segmented markets.
Apart from these two papers, very few dynamic general equilibrium models incorporating
central bank asset purchases existed before the crisis. However, the implementation of balance
sheet policies during the financial crisis resulted in a surge in the DSGE literature on the impact
of large-scale asset purchases.
Chen et al. (2012a) estimate the impact of long-term security purchases in a DSGE model with
segmented asset markets. Their preferred habitat approach, in the vein of Vayanos and Vila
3It should be noted that, although there is a fair number of studies that register the portfolio balance effects,
there are some who contest its existence - see the discussion in Chapter 4.1
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(2009), allows monetary policy to still be effective at the ZLB, with purchases of long-term
securities resulting in local supply effects. Transaction costs added to the supply of long-term
securities allow LSAPs to operate while the short-term policy rates is fixed at the ZLB, in that it
would be able to flatten the yield curve through the reduction of a risk premium (Chen et al.,
2012a). Asset purchases in a preferred habitat framework are also proposed in the work of
Harrison (2012), and Falagiarda and Saia (2013) to study the impact of unconventional policies,
with some minor adjustments to each model to answer specific policy questions.
7.1.1.1.2 Constrained Borrowing Another line of research attempts to look specifically at
LSAPs as a form of central bank intermediation, with the work of Gertler and Karadi (2011)
among the first to incorporate asset purchases as a monetary policy tool into a DSGE framework.
In the process of intermediation, a financial market agent acquires an asset by issuing the
relevant counterparty some form of short-term debt (Gertler and Karadi, 2013). In QE1,
for example, the central bank acted as an intermediary by providing short-term government
debt (borrowed from the Treasury) in return for illiquid assets to failing financial institutions.
LSAPs in this type of model matter only when there is a disruption in the process of financial
intermediation. Without constraints on borrowing, any premium arising from activity in the
asset market will be eliminated through arbitrage. In this setup, LSAPs will be effective only if
private intermediaries face borrowing constraints.
Continuing in this vein is the work of Del Negro et al. (2013), who employ the credit market
frictions of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) in a DSGE model. In their model, firms are allowed
to invest only a certain proportion of their illiquid assets, known as a resaleability constraint,
whereas government bonds are free from any such restrictions. Government bonds are, therefore,
more liquid and the constraint generates a liquidity premium on the unaffected asset. Gertler
and Karadi (2013) argue that this type of model is not only applicable to credit policy, but also to
the purchase of long-term bonds (i.e. quasi-debt management). The argument is that, without
any limits to arbitrage, there should be no premium to exploit on either short- or long-term
government bonds. With constraints on private intermediaries and financial market frictions
that increase the term premium, long-term rates may be reduced by targeted purchases by the
central bank (Gertler and Karadi, 2013). Finally, the model of Cahn et al. (2014) builds on
the models of Smets and Wouters (2007), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Gertler and Karadi
(2011) to allow for securities of longer maturity in order to assess the impact of the VLTROs as
implemented by the ECB.
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7.1.1.2 Targeted Asset Purchases
During times of financial distress, the rationale behind credit easing lies in its ability to affect
long-term interest rates. However, another consideration is the scenario where economic activity
picks up again after the crisis. One would expect banks to exit the current deleveraging phase
and for asset prices to rejoin their upward trajectory. The danger lies in asset prices that grow to
exceed their fundamental value, thereby creating an asset price bubble. White (2009) suggests
“pre-emptive tightening” of monetary policy to rein in credit cycles and resist credit bubbles.
However, it is generally believed that monetary policy is not effective in “leaning” against an
upswing in the credit cycle and should rather assume an accommodative position to “clean” up
after the bubble has burst. This result is considered part of the Jackson Hole Consensus, whereby
it is considered important to focus the attention of monetary policy on low and stable inflation.
As argued by Bernanke and Gertler (2000), attempts to influence asset price movements (i.e.
‘leaning against the wind’) detracts from the pursuit of the inflation objective. In addition, in
a recent article Ajello et al. (2015) find that the benefit from increasing the interest rate to
counter the build-up of financial imbalances to be negligible.
This type of reaction also distorts the price stability mandate, assigning a dual mandate to
interest rate policy. Tinbergen (1952) comments that policymakers should have “one instrument
for one goal”, while Mundell (1962) states that “policies should be paired with objectives on
which they have the most influence”. However, mopping up after a bubble has burst is risky in
that policymakers cannot be certain that they will be able to clean up in the aftermath, as is
evident by the macroeconomic challenges currently faced. In that case it would be sensible to
assign balance sheet measures the role of depressing asset values once a bubble is identified4.
Balance sheet measures have the added advantage that they could target a specific asset of
interest, whereas interest rates would affect all asset values5. In my model the central bank
could plausibly attempt targeted asset purchases of risky securities (longer-term bonds) in an
attempt to improve the health of financial institution balance sheets. The next section presents
the extension to the model in the previous chapter to include long-term bond purchases.
7.2 The Model
The model presented here gives the central bank the ability to influence the supply of long-term
government bonds. In particular, it combines elements of the papers by Chen et al. (2012a),
4Identification of asset bubbles is another complicated matter and will not be addressed in this dissertation
5Naturally, purchases of a specific asset class would also impact on other interest rates
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Niestroj et al. (2013), Hörmann and Schabert (2015), and Schabert (2015). In this section the
amendments to the model in Chapter 6 are presented, with only the affected sectors shown.
Of particular importance are the changes to the merchant bank sector, which gains a new
investment vehicle (namely long-term securities). Imperfect asset substitutability is enforced
by the collateralised borrowing mechanism. The irrelevance result is overcome through the
introduction of multiple assets that are viable as collateral for reserves (Niestroj et al., 2013). A
liquidity premium is generated through the interest rate spread on eligible versus non-eligible
assets. This embedded premium can be manipulated by the central bank through its setting of
the relevant haircut parameter (Schabert, 2015). Government and central bank sectors are also
implicated by the introduction of these bonds.
7.2.1 Merchant Bank
The following section describes the behaviour of merchant banks, with the important intro-
duction of long-term securities in both the budget and collateral constraints. I have chosen
to adopt the approach of Woodford (1998, 2001) in modelling the stock of long-term bonds.
This method is widely accepted and is also used in the work of Andres et al. (2004), Chen et al.
(2012a), Harrison (2012), van der Kwaak (2015), and Chin et al. (2015).
7.2.1.1 Long-term Bonds
In this setting government bonds are modelled as perpetuities6 that cost pLt at time t and pay an
exponentially decaying coupon Φs at time t+ s+ 1, where 0 < Φ ≤ 1. Introducing long-term
bonds into the profit function (6.47) from Chapter 6 results in the following addition:
πbt = . . .+
∞∑
s=1
Φs−1BLt−s − pLt BLt . . . (7.1)
In order to simplify this equation, one can take advantage of the fact that the period t price of
a long-term bond issued s periods ago, pLt−s, in period t − s, is a function of the coupon and




6As explained in Woodford (2001), this perpetuity generates a constant, infinite, stream of interest payments. A
practical example of this is the British consol. An interesting paper by Cochrane (2015) suggests using perpetuities
in dealing with US Federal debt.
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Using this equation, the profit equation (7.1) can be rewritten in a “recursive formulation”, as




function of BLt . This simplification allows long-term bonds to be expressed as one-period bonds
that pay their nominal return after one period, similar to the way in which short-term bonds
are represented.
A long-term bond issued s− 1 periods ago is equal to Φs−1 new bonds. At time t− 1, with no



























In addition, as given in Chen et al. (2012a), the gross yield to maturity (long-term interest rate)





Perpetuity redeems all old bonds in each period, where the bond pays the following:















t ). Substituting it with p
L
t we get, at time t,




t − Φ)]) = pLt RLt BLt−1.




































]2 −Mt(Rmt − 1) (7.5)
In addition to the change on the budget constraint, the introduction of long-term bonds impacts
the open market operation mechanism, adding another dimension to policy action. Now we
are not concerned only with changing the size of the balance sheet; we wish to change the
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composition as well. This means that our collateral constraint changes to become











An increase in both κs and κl will result in a change in the size and composition of the balance
sheet of the bank. However, if there is a change in κl, with a corresponding sterilising change
in κs, then the size will remain the same but the composition will change (Hörmann and
Schabert, 2015). The central bank, in this regard, has full control over its balance sheet,
providing intermediation services to merchant banks (Niestroj et al., 2013). Effective demand
for securities of differing maturities is determined by the exogenous combination of κ values.
The balanced budget condition also changes to incorporate the newly introduced security. It
















The first-order conditions for the merchant bank remain the same, with the exception of an




















































In general, the public sector consists of a treasury (government) and a central bank. The
government performs the same functions discussed in the previous chapter. The exception
introduced in this chapter is that of its issuance of long-term bonds. Short-term bonds still grow
at a constant rate, where Γ ≥ 1. Long-term bonds, however, are modelled as perpetuities (as
214
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
alluded to in the section on the merchant bank). The growth of long-term bonds follows an













where ρb ∈ (0, 1) and ξL,t is an i.i.d. exogenous shock. Similar to Chapter 6.3.4.1, BTSt is the
total stock of short-term bonds, which is held either in the banking sector BSt or by the central






t . In a similar vein, we




t . Introducing long-term
















t + Tt (7.10)
The left-hand side of the equation represents spending in real terms, while the right represents
treasury income. The first term on the left-hand side represents real government spending,
while the other components are the real cost of servicing bonds that are maturing in the current
period. On the right-hand side, we have the market value of the total amount of short- and
long-term bonds issued in the current period, in addition to tax collected (Chen et al., 2012a).
7.2.2.2 Central Bank
The monetary authority is able to supply money outright through open market purchases (Mpt ).
The central bank collects government bonds in return for newly issued money. In addition,
interest accrues at the main refinancing rate, Rmt , which translates into a return of Mt·Rmt at





, for which the central bank
receives government bonds.
The interest earnings of the central bank, as in Schabert (2015), is














− pLt−1BCLt−1 +Mt(Rmt − 1) (7.11)
The central bank reinvests the wealth exclusively in government bonds, which means the budget
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In this setting the central bank now controls three instruments. As stated in Chapter 6.3.4.1,
the first two tools are the policy rate and quantitative easing (increasing the size of the balance
sheet). In this chapter, with the introduction of long-term bonds, it has been shown that the
central bank is able to change the composition of its balance sheet by adjusting the fraction of
short-term bonds relative to long-term bonds eligible for reserves. In other words the central
bank can now change both κs and κl.
For the purpose of this model, 0 < κs ≤ 1 and 0 < κl ≤ 1. The sum of these can be greater than
one, 0 < (κs +κl) ≤ 2. Importantly, for the purpose of affecting a change only in the composition
of balance sheet it must be the case that the sum of κs and κl remain the same. This is best
explained through an example. Consider a case where κs = 0.5 and κl = 0.5. If a change in
the composition alone was to be generated, I would have to match the decrease in one value
of κ, with an increase in the other. This sterilising change can be the following, κs = 0.2 and
κl = 0.8. In this new setting, long-term bonds are more eligible as collateral, which makes them
relatively more attractive. In addition, it changes the relative bond-holdings of the central bank,
which will now accept more long-term debt. This does not, however, change the size of the
balance sheet, as the allotment of bonds for liquidity is still the same.
The model from the previous chapter is nested in this model. By allowing κl = 0, it removes the
credit easing component from the model, and once again the model is left with only two tools
of operation. In summary, this brings about three instruments, interest rate policy, quantitative
easing and credit easing. The rest of the chapter investigates the implications of changing the
composition of the assets held on the central bank’s balance sheet.
To summarise, in this model the central bank has three instruments, namely the following:
1. Conventional instrument: The policy rate, Rmt .
2. Quantitative easing (size of balance sheet): Increase reserves against eligible assets (short-
term or long-term bonds) in open market operations by increasing κs or κl.
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3. Credit easing (composition of balance sheet): Changes in the composition of the balance
sheet, without affecting size, implemented by a change in κl, and met with a sterilising
change in κs.
Finally, it is also important to point out that the central bank can decide to use these policies in
combination, potentially increasing the size and composition of the balance sheet. In the next
section, I conduct a partial equilibrium analysis, similar to that of the previous chapter.
7.3 Equilibrium Conditions
In this section I provide an analytical evaluation of the monetary transmission mechanism.
In order to evaluate properly the equilibrium conditions some hermeneutic simplifications
are stipulated. Equilibrium conditions for endogenous default are quite similar to those of
Chapter 6.4.1. Changes in long-term bond rates affect default through their relationship with
credit and interbank rates. This relationship is discussed in the following section.
7.3.1 Monetary Transmission
As discussed in the previous chapter, interest rate spreads are at the heart of the transmission
mechanism in models that include several markets and differing asset classes. These spreads
are indicative of the health of the financial system at large, as experienced during the recent
crisis7. In order to evaluate the conditions effectively, I reduced complexity by adopting the
same assumptions as in Chapter 6.4.1. I also added the assumption that inflation is zero, π = 1.
In our current setting, the only new addition to the pool of interest rates is that of the long-term
bond rate. The new monetary transmission path relies on the relationship between the short-






This relationship indicates the importance of Φ in creating a wedge between the short- and
long-term rates. If Φ = 0, then the long-term bonds have the same maturity as their short-term
counterparts. The larger the value of Φ, the greater the interest rate spread (i.e. a higher
long-term rate is achieved). Extending the maturity increases the overall riskiness and, thereby,
the yield of the underlying asset.
7See the article by Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) for a discussion on the importance of interest rate spreads.
Also look at the brief discussion in Chapter 6.2.1.2.
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7.4 Calibration
Changes in terms of calibration occur primarily in the banking and central bank sectors. This
discussion highlights only the differences between the model in this chapter and that of the
previous chapter, with a summary of the newly calibrated parameters and imposed steady-state
values provided in Table C.1 and Table C.2 in Appendix C.
The long-term rate was imposed and set at RLss = 1.075, which is close to the calibrated value
presented in Niestroj et al. (2013) for the Euro area. This value maintains the hierarchy of
interest rates, as discussed in the monetary transmission section. The average duration of the
long-term bond was set at 5.5 years8, which means that the coupon rate of the perpetuity can
be calculated as Φ = (5.5 ·RLss −RLss)/5.5. Implied steady-state values are further discussed in
Appendix C.
7.5 Model Dynamics
Following the structure of Chapter 6, I analyse the impact of several different shocks and
associated scenarios. First, a shock is applied to κlt, which represents the proportion of long-term
bonds eligible as collateral in open market operations. This shock produces results similar to
those of large-scale asset purchases, by inducing demand for a long-term bonds. I compare this
result with (i) a shock to the long-term bond growth rate, and (ii) the balance sheet expansion
result from Chapter 6. Second, I introduced contractionary monetary policy with different
combinations of κs and κl, to affect changes to the composition of the balance sheet. I am
particularly interested in the impact that varying these parameters could have on default rates,
the extension of loans to firms, and interbank trading. In addition, long-term yields and several
interest rate spreads were examined to determine whether the policy performed as expected.
7.5.1 Large-scale Asset Purchases
Large-scale asset purchases in this section of the model entail both an expansion of, and a
change in the composition of assets of the balance sheet of the central bank. In other words, it
will be a combination of quasi-debt management and reserve-supply policy from the typology
8This was modelled on the average duration of 7-year US Treasury bills, but the value could be changed, with a
duration of 7.5 years as an alternative in the case of a 10 year Treasury (Chen et al., 2012a).
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of Borio and Disyatat (2010), similar to actual LSAPs conducted during the crisis. The way I
approached this was to apply a shock to κlt, which represents the eligibility of long-term bonds
as collateral, while keeping κs fixed. An increase in κlt is intended to simulate the effect of
increasing the quantity demanded of long-term bonds (relative to short-bonds) for the merchant
bank. Modelling the LSAPs in this way aligns more with the LTROs implemented by the ECB.
In this scenario assets are not directly purchased by the central bank, rather, there is a change
made in the bonds that are eligible for collateral (Gertler and Karadi, 2013).
In order to do this, κlt is presented as a time-varying variable following an autoregressive process.





t, with ρl ∈ (0, 1) and ξl,t an i.i.d. exogenous shock, while keeping the haircut
on short-term bonds, κs, constant over time (i.e. takes on a scalar value). Both the haircut
mechanisms on short- and long-term bonds will have the same initial value, with a shock then
imposed on the long-term bond haircut value. This expansionary shock should simulate the
general function of LSAP policies.
7.5.1.1 Financial Sector
The real sector effects of LSAPs are not discussed but are presented in Figure 7.1. However, the
results in terms of real activity are consistent with those found in Chen et al. (2012a), Harrison
(2012), and Falagiarda and Saia (2013). To be clear, the goal is not to replicate the events of
the financial crisis, nor the unconventional policies that tried to remedy failing economies. The
approach is purely theoretical, considering several plausible scenarios that might materialise
from intervention in long-term bond markets by the central bank. The initial values for the
collateral requirement, before applying the shock, are κs = 0.5 and κlt = 0.5. A shock to κ
l
t in the
magnitude of approximately 0.5 was imposed, while κs was fixed. The shock implies both an
increase in the size of the balance sheet of the central bank, in addition to a greater allotment
of long-term bonds available as eligible collateral.
7.5.1.1.1 Deposit Bank First, deposit banks experience an increase in profitability as a
result of increased deposits from households and a greater volume of loans extended. This
expansionary shock increases the repayment rate for merchant banks, indicating that LSAPs
have the potential to increase interbank activity. However, a decrease in interbank rates mean
that, although the deposit bank is extending more credit, the price of that credit has declined.
Profit made in the first few quarters is supported by the increase in deposits made by households,
as the LSAP program increases their relative wealth, which affords them the opportunity to
deposit money at the bank.
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Note: Y-axis values represent percentage deviation from steady state, 
resulting from 100% shock to long-term collateral requirement.
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Note: Y-axis values represent percentage point deviation from steady state, 
resulting from 100% shock to long-term collateral requirement.
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7.5.1.1.2 Firm Second, borrowing conditions are easier for firms under a large-scale asset
purchase program, as the amount of acquirable reserves are increasing, with merchant banks
now allowed to offer up more of their previously illiquid debt as collateral (Niestroj et al., 2013).
This is reflected in the significant decrease of the credit rate. In addition to an increase in loans
to firms, there is a decrease in the probability of default on these loans.
7.5.1.1.3 Merchant Bank Third, the merchant bank gains the most from the increase in
κl, with profitability improving significantly in the wake of the shock. Imposing the shock
significantly alters the behaviour of these banks, causing them to sell the majority of their
holdings of long-term bonds - as can be seen by the decrease in long-term bonds on their
balance sheets - in return for reserves. One could argue that this enacts a portfolio balance
effect, with merchant banks moving their asset holdings away from long-term bonds. This effect
spreads to several asset markets, moving beyond local supply effects (Dai et al., 2013). Newly
issued, and total reserves, are increasing, which reflects the exchange of long-term bonds for
reserves.
A significant portion of these long-term bonds are sold and then used to extend credit to firms.
This process entails converting long-term bonds to reserves, which can be seen in the increase
in total liabilities at the central bank. A portion of merchant bank reserves are then used to fuel
an extension of loans. In addition, the merchant bank decides to trade a large portion of its
short-term bonds in the same manner as its long-term securities. The central bank has achieved
its goal, with more activity in the interbank markets as well as relaxation of the borrowing
conditions for firms. In addition, the long-term rate has been depressed, which further improves
borrowing conditions.
7.5.1.1.4 Central Bank Finally, the composition of the central bank balance sheet has
certainly been affected through the application of this shock. It now holds more liabilities,
primarily against long-term bonds. Gertler and Karadi (2013) refer to this as central bank
intermediation, in that the central bank has “financed its asset purchases with variable interest-
bearing liabilities”. The benefit of central bank intermediation in this setting is that it is
effectively limitless, as the central bank liabilities are essentially government debt. Having
purchased these long-term securities off the balance sheet of the merchant bank, it now holds a
significant portion of the long-term debt from the private sector, as also found in the work of
Falagiarda and Saia (2013). In addition, the central bank has accepted some short-term debt in
return for reserves.
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7.5.1.1.5 Interest Rates The long-term interest rate has been reduced at the hand of the
LSAP program, which is one of the intended goals of implementing the policy initiative (Fala-
giarda and Saia, 2013). All other interest rates, except the policy rate9, experience a negative
shock as a result of the portfolio balance effect generated from the expansionary policy (Dai
et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, the long-term rate is depressed the most of all the affected interest
rates, as it is most closely tied to the increased purchase of long-term securities. This translates
into a flattening of the yield curve and signifies a decrease in the term premium associated with
the long-term rate, similar to the result of Harrison (2012) and Falagiarda and Saia (2013).
7.5.2 Comparisons with LSAPs
7.5.2.1 Large-scale Asset Purchases vs Increase in Long-term Bonds
An alternative way to think about large-scale asset purchases, is simply to increase the overall
stock of long-term bonds in the economy. In order to generate a meaningful impact from the
asset purchases, some agents need to have a preference for long-term bonds in order to establish
imperfect asset substitutability. In this case, central banks can influence the relative supply
of assets, reducing long-term security scarcity. I expect private sector agents to balance their
portfolios toward the scarce asset, buying short-term bonds in order to obtain more of the scarce
resource. However, this will depend on the preferences of agents in our model. To that end,
the ad hoc ‘preference’ structure for the merchant bank will be one where short- and long-term
bonds serve equally well as collateral. In reality, I did not explicitly model preferences. However,
I approximated them by altering the ability of merchant banks10 to convert bonds of differing
maturities into reserves. This result is compared with the LSAP scenario of the previous section.
7.5.2.1.1 Shock to growth of BTLt with κ
s = 0.5 and κl = 0.5 In this scenario the merchant
bank can transform both short- and long-term bonds into reserves with the same relative ease.
In comparison with the results from the previous section, it is clear that in both cases the
direction of the movement in the selected values is almost identical. Only a few differences
were recorded. First, in the case of the long-term bond growth shock, the merchant banks have
a sharper initial increase in the demand for liquidity. This is the result of the direct injection of
reserves. Second, the overall movement of variables in the case of the haircut shock is sustained
across a longer period. In particular, the long-term bond shock generates a sharp, brief, impact
9I believe this is the result of the increase in output, with the feedback mechanism from the Taylor Rule causing
the policy rate to increase.
10Could be perceived as our preferred habitat investor.
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Note: Y-axis values represent percentage deviation from steady state. 
The black line (right axis) is from a 100% shock to long-term collateral requirement,
while the red dotted line (left axis) is from a shock to the long-term bond growth rate.
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Note: Y-axis values represent percentage point deviation from steady state. 
The black line (right axis) is from a 100% shock to long-term collateral requirement,
while the red dotted line (left axis) is from a shock to the long-term bond growth rate.
225
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
on interest rates, while LSAPs produces a smoother transition. This can be attributed to the
autoregressive nature of the haircut process, with a high level of persistence imposed.
Third, firm profit decreases in the case of a long-term bond shock, while the opposite is true in
the alternative scenario. This could be a result of more loans extended by merchant banks under
the LSAP scenario. Finally, the long-short interest rate spread in the case of LSAPs is negative,
while the spread is positive in the alternative. In addition, a greater spread variability between
market rates is generated by the shock to the collateral requirement on long-term bonds.
While there are some minor differences, the overall results are highly similar. Importantly, this
indicates that the mechanism presented in this model can generate effects similar to those
already established in the literature (i.e. the long-term bond growth innovation). It carries the
benefit of allowing collateralised lending to occur naturally within the confines of the model, as
opposed to a forced exogenous injection of liquidity. Merchant banks are left with more options
with respect to balance sheet actions performed by the central bank.
7.5.2.2 Reserve vs Quasi-debt Management Policies
Using the complete framework affords the ability to draw a comparison between the reserve-
supply (‘pure’ QE) model from Chapter 6 and the quasi-debt management model in this chapter.
In order to conduct this comparison, the following initial values for, and shocks to κs and κl are
used. First, κst = 0.5, as in Chapter 6, but κ
l is now fixed to equal 0.01. The value of κl is allowed
to be close - but not equal - to zero, as this leads to indeterminacy in the model. In this setup
there are virtually no long-term bonds held on the balance sheet of the central bank, which is
similar to the model of Chapter 6. In this first scenario, a shock is imposed on κst , equal to that
of Chapter 6, which generates κs + κl ≈ 1. In essence this is a balance sheet expansion with
short-term bonds offered exclusively as eligible collateral. Christensen and Krogstrup (2016)
argue that this type of ‘pure’ QE delivers a reserve-induced portfolio balance effect.
In the comparative scenario, an initial value of κs = 0.5 was fixed. However, in this instance
a shock was imposed on κlt, which has an initial value of κ
l = 0.01. The shock imposed raises
the value of κl close to 0.5, which means that the combined post shock value is κs + κl ≈ 1.
With this shock the central bank is implementing a change in the composition of its balance
sheet, which initially contained only short-term bonds, to now incorporate long-term bonds.
From this comparison one could potentially distinguish the reserve and supply-induced portfolio
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Note: Y-axis values represent percentage (point) deviation from steady state. 
The black solid line is from a 100% shock to long-term collateral requirement,
while the red dotted line is 100% shock to short-term collateral requirement.
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balance effects from each another, as defined in Christensen and Krogstrup (2016)11. Only the
important differences observed from these shocks are discussed and depicted in Figure 7.5.
To reiterate, the different scenarios allow the identification of two types of balance sheet policies:
one results in only short-term assets held on the balance sheet of the central bank, while the
other comprises a mix of short- and long-term securities. From Figure 7.5, one can see that
the most observable differences across these scenarios are primarily related to the relative
movement of interest rates in the economy. With the introduction of long-term securities on the
balance sheet of the central bank, the long-term rate reacts more sharply, exhibiting stronger
downward movement. As discussed in Chapter 4, this idea is supported in the literature, as
it was one of the primary goals of implementing LSAPs. In other words, the yield curve is
sufficiently flattened by the introduction of long-term bonds. This reduction in the long-term
rate gets transmitted to other market rates, with the interbank, credit and deposit rates all
significantly lower in the second scenario, with long-term bonds.
Another important result is that greater interbank and firm lending is generated in the long-term
asset purchase scenario. This translates into better merchant bank and firm repayment rates,
which means greater financial stability. Deposit bank and firm profit is also increased, while
merchant bank profit is similar across these scenarios. Finally, while the level of reserves in
the economy increases, the balance sheet of the central bank in the quasi-debt management
scenario contains a greater selection of short and long-term bonds.
From these results it can be concluded that LSAPs might have the added benefit of being able
to relax market conditions through their impact on interest rates. This is corroborated by the
work of Cahn et al. (2014), who find “that lengthening the maturity of LTROs helps relax
the bankers incentive constraint above and beyond the direct effect of short-term liquidity
injections”. Liquidity provided with the acquisition of short-term bonds is still invaluable,
however, and its impact should not be overlooked. The question as to the relative contribution
of increasing reserves versus purchasing illiquid assets is an interesting one, which could be a
topic for future research, as pointed out by Kandrac and Schlusche (2015) and Christensen and
Krogstrup (2016).
7.5.3 Contractionary Interest Rate Policy
In this section I follow on from the discussion in the previous chapter, looking now at changing
the composition of the balance sheet12. Changes in the composition of central bank assets is
11These channels are discussed in Chapter 2, under the discussion of the portfolio balance channel. I do not
attempt to assign a weight to any of the channels in this thesis.
12Looking at a contractionary monetary policy shock gives us grounds for comparison with the previous chapter.
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represented in two scenarios, with the selection of different values for the haircut parameters
under the control of the central bank. First, the baseline scenario is presented, with a 10%
haircut on long-term bonds and an accompanying 90% haircut on short-term bonds. This setup
is closest to the model from the previous section where κs = 1 and κl = 0, which is why I look
to it as a point of departure. Another way to frame this scenario is to think in terms of the
preference of the central bank. In this scenario the central bank welcomes the fact that the
merchant bank considers short-term securities a convenient way to access reserves, providing
the central bank with more short-term bonds in return for its unique form of liability.
Second, I developed a scenario which entails a 10% haircut on short-term bonds in relation to a
sterilising 90% haircut on long-term bonds. This action changes the overall risk profile of the
merchant and central banks (and, by extension, the government). In this scenario the merchant
bank finds it easier to part with longer-term securities, which reduces the riskiness associated
with the assets on the merchant bank’s balance sheet. Conceptually, these assets are modelled
to resemble long-term government debt, as well as MBS or agency debt, in that they are more
risky than short-term bonds. One can think of this scenario as being similar to LSAPs, with the
central bank indicating a preference for riskier longer-term securities (making them easier to
convert to liquidity). This is regarded as an endogenous form of LSAPs, because one expects
firms to sell more of their longer-term bonds under this scenario, with the central bank being
able to steer the quantity of long-term bonds through its usage of the relevant parameters in
the collateralised lending mechanism.
7.5.3.1 Baseline: κs = 0.9 and κl = 0.1
The first scenario places a greater emphasis on the central bank’s issue of short-term bonds
to commercial banks. I consider this to be the baseline case, as it most closely resembles the
functioning of central bank intermediation as depicted in Chapter 6. Collateralised open market
operations are usually conducted on the basis of a trade between short-term government bonds
and central bank liabilities (reserves). In addition to normal open market operations, the
merchant bank is allowed access to central bank liabilities by offering up a fraction of its illiquid
long-term bonds. Under the current constraint imposed, it is more convenient to obtain reserves
by offering short-term bonds as collateral. It is also necessary to state that long-term bonds
are higher yielding (higher interest rate) than reserves and short-term bonds. The reason for
this being that there is a term premium associated with holding this asset, making it inherently
more risky.
I identify the firm, deposit bank and merchant bank activities as being of particular importance
in this analysis. Therefore, they are each discussed in turn, providing a template for discussion
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resulting from a one percentage point shock to the policy rate. The black solid line 
represents the baseline scenario, while the red dotted line represents the scenario
with long-term bond preferences.
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that I will utilise for the different scenarios. Refer to the IRFs from Figure 7.6 for the ensuing
exposition.
First, the credit rate decreases initially in response to the increase in the policy rate. This result
is counter-intuitive, as we would expect a positive pass-through. However, it is short-lived
and represents the only sign reversal among the different market rates13. After the first period
decline, the credit rate becomes positive, which is more in line with expectations. As a result of
the behaviour of the credit rate, firm profits initially increase, but then fall below the pre-shock
value in response to the monetary policy shock. The eventual decline in profitability is similar to
the result from the setup without long-term bonds, where κl = 0 and κs = 1. Loans extended to
the firm increase in the first quarter after the shock, but then decrease by a substantial amount,
which is in line with the behaviour of the credit rate. The repayment rate on loans exhibits an
initial increase, but then we have a steep decrease in repayment as the firms respond to the rise
in the credit rate.
Second, the policy shock has a significant negative impact on interbank loans. In addition to the
policy rate impact, the decrease in interbank loans can be explained by the increase in demand
for short- and long-term bonds on the part of the merchant bank, indicating a substitution
away from interbank loans to relatively abundant and easily convertible government securities.
The pass-through of the policy rate is greater to the short- than the long-term rate. This is in
line with expectations, considering the structure of the collateralised borrowing mechanism,
with the haircut allowing a greater transfer of the shock to the short-term rate. Repayments
on interbank loans declines following the shock, as a result of the increased cost of borrowing.
Deposit bank profit suffers at the hand of the policy shock and takes several quarters to return to
normal. Furthermore, merchant bank profit decreases sharply following the shock, and remains
low for a few quarters.
Finally, central bank liabilities decrease initially given the increase in the policy rate. Merchant
banks buy relatively cheap short- and long-term debt, which increases the quantity of both
assets on their portfolio, while decreasing the amount reserves held. This highlights the action
of commercial banks given an increased availability of investment vehicles. Ultimately, the
central bank holds a greater absolute amount of short- and long-term bonds on its balance sheet
in this scenario.
Interest rates on assets eligible for collateral carry the greatest weight of the pass-through from
the shock. The short-term bond rate does not fully absorb the movement in the policy rate14,
13The fact that the deviation is so brief leads me to believe that it is an artefact in the model, rather than an
explicit feature.
14In this scenario the magnitude of the increase in the short-term bond rate is just above 60% of the movement
in the policy rate.
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but is more reactive than the long-term bond rate. There is a liquidity premium placed on
short-term bonds in this case. Both of these rates are above the deposit, credit and interbank
loan rates, which reflects the spread on bonds offered as collateral versus those that are not.
7.5.3.2 LSAPs: κs = 0.1 and κl = 0.9
This scenario is similar to the preferred habitat approach, in that investors ‘prefer’ to invest in
longer-term assets. In this scenario merchant banks face a limited supply of money in return
for their short-term bonds, relative to long-term bonds. This means that short-term bonds are
limited in their capacity to be converted to central bank liabilities. Converting long-term bonds
to money (an illiquid to liquid asset) is facilitated by a lower haircut on long-term bonds. This
is quite similar to the LSAP programs implemented by the US in the first few rounds of so-called
quantitative easing. I compare the results to those of the first (baseline) scenario.
First, firms behave similarly in the different scenarios posed, with the most obvious difference
being in the repayment rate of the firm. Under increased long-term bond purchases, the
repayment rate decreases more gradually and remains persistently below the pre-shock value.
In addition, the credit rate also moves less severely in this instance, with the initial drop being
more moderate. Second, interbank loans once again decrease, but by a smaller magnitude.
This means that merchant banks are increasing their exposure to the interbank market in this
scenario. One interpretation would be that these merchant banks are finding it more lucrative
to access wholesale funding than to exchange their long-term bonds for reserves. It might also
be that long-term bonds are yielding such a high return that it is not worth trading them in. In
addition, the deposit bank makes slightly smaller losses in this scenario.
Third, the lower interbank rate translates into an associated decrease in merchant bank default.
Although the impact from the change is small in terms of the merchant bank default, it is
important. It indicates that inducing sales of long-term bonds to the central bank has resulted in
a slight decrease in the default rate. This does not mean that merchant banks got rid of all their
long-term securities, but a large portion ended up on the balance sheet of the central bank. In
addition, the total level of short-term bonds held by the central bank decreases, with merchant
banks looking to purchase short-term bonds, but being constrained by the haircut imposed.
Ultimately, in this setup the central bank balance sheet contains more long-term securities and
fewer short-term bonds. The overall level of liabilities decreases as merchant banks appear to
favour securities over reserves. The increased long-run interest rate sensitivity dictates that the
increase in the policy rate will have a greater effect on the long-term rate than in the previous
scenario.
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7.6 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter I have included long-term bonds available for collateral in open market operations.
The introduction of these bonds in a non-trivial way affords the central bank the opportunity to
change the composition of the assets held on its balance sheet, with a significant impact on the
financial markets and the real sector. In particular, the introduction of long-term government
bonds draws a comparison to quasi-debt management operations, such as those conducted
by the Fed by means of the Maturity Extension Program (MEP). It is clear from the scenarios
presented here that adding long-term bond purchases further assists, beyond that of reserve-
supply policy, in providing liquidity and securing financial stability. The primary mechanism
through which the introduction of long-term bonds is realised is in lowering the long-term rate,
which results in easier borrowing conditions for the broader economy.
In comparison with the previous chapter, which entailed only the purchase of short-term assets,
the economic conditions were relaxed even further under long-term bond purchases, with the
effect most clearly represented in a reduction of the price of the asset targeted. With large-scale
asset purchases being potentially more beneficial to financial stability than ‘pure’ QE, they might
be used in a complementary fashion with interest rate and macroprudential policy to combat
the build-up of financial imbalances in specific sectors, such as the mortgage market. This does,
however, increase the financial market footprint of the central bank, which should be considered
before conducting such a policy. Financial market exposure notwithstanding, targeted purchases
could present a sharper instrument than the short-term policy rate.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Lord Cobbold, former Governor of the Bank of England, is reputed once to have said “A
Central Bank is a bank, not a study group”. What I take this to mean is that the essence
of Central Banking lies in its power to create liquidity, by manipulating its own balance
sheet. The question is often asked whether a Central Bank that sets interest rates
should also manage financial stability. This question is put the wrong way around. The
question should be whether a Central Bank that manages both liquidity and financial
stability should also be given the task of setting interest rates.
— Charles Goodhart (2011)
Central banks were designed with the unique ability to generate liquidity, in the form of bank
reserves, providing them with a monopoly over the issuance of their liabilities (Tucker, 2014).
As originally envisaged, the principal role for the central bank is the provision of liquidity to
key financial institutions in times of crisis, the so-called lender-of-last-resort function as first
described by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873). Framed in this way, achieving financial
stability through control of the central bank balance sheet is at the heart of monetary policy.
The nominal short-run policy rate has only recently become the conventional tool for monetary
policy, with William Poole’s (1970) success in solving the instrument problem shifting the focus
of monetary policy toward the management of the policy rate. In the process, the modern
central bank started to more closely resemble a ‘study group’, with countless hours of research
devoted to determine the optimal path of the policy rate. However, the international financial
crisis has served as a reminder to central bankers that the primary function of any central bank
is the management of its balance sheet.
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Since 2007 there has been a significant transformation in the way monetary policy is imple-
mented and perceived, with an increased awareness of central bank balance sheets. While the
adoption of balance sheet policies have been staggering in terms of magnitude and rapidity, the
change in operational frameworks have been more subtle. New monetary policy tools found
under corridor, floor and hybrid regimes have been introduced without attracting significant
public attention.
The goal of this thesis, and its importance to the literature, was threefold. First, to bring clarity
to the notion of balance sheet policies and their implementation. Some important questions
were, for example, what is meant by quantitative easing or large-scale asset purchases? What
are liquidity facilities and how do they differ from other balance sheet policies? What are
the channels of transmission of the different balance sheet policies? How were these policies
implemented by different countries?
Providing clarity to the public and policymakers alike, as to what balance sheet policies are, will
help define their role in the future. While balance sheet policies have been used in the past, the
crisis exposed a potentially new role for these policy instruments. It is still uncertain to what
extent, and in which conditions, they need to be applied.
Second, to determine the changing nature of monetary policy implementation, through an
empirical investigation on the relationship between central bank liabilities and the short-term
nominal policy rate. New monetary policy regimes have emerged that will completely alter the
way in which the operational procedures of central banks will have to be presented. Integrating
new tools, such as interest on excess reserves and reverse repurchase agreements, into public
consciousness is vital if policy objectives are to be achieved. Misunderstanding of policy actions
in newly adopted regimes might make policy changes ineffective, with markets not knowing
how to respond appropriately to the signals of central banks.
Third, to incorporate balance sheet policies into a DSGE model, in order to determine the
impact of changes in the size and composition of central bank balance sheets on financial
stability. Several papers have considered the broader macroeconomic implications of central
bank intermediation. However, it is important to know in what capacity the central bank can
use its balance sheets to foster financial stability, whether it be in providing short-term funding
or combating the buildup of financial imbalances.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a discussion on the results from the relevant chapters,
as well as their contribution to the literature. In addition, shortcomings of each chapter are
presented individually. Afterward, I point to some of the practical implications of this thesis.
Finally, I conduct a discussion on the possible future dimensions for research.
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8.1 Chapter Discussion
8.1.1 Chapter 2, 3, 4
In order to promote a coherent structure, I will bundle the discussion of these chapters together
in the form of one collective literature review. Brief summaries of each chapter that contributed
to the literature review are provided. This is followed by a discussion on the contribution and
shortcomings of the literature review as a whole.
Chapter 2 starts by providing a historical perspective on the idea of balance sheet policies,
with the origin reaching back to the experience of Japan in the early part of 2001. Japan
implemented their quantitative easing program, with an expansion of the balance sheet, in
order to strengthen their zero interest rate policy commitment. While not immediately regarded
as successful, future iterations of this policy strategy helped the Japanese economy escape their
two-decade slump. Unfortunately, their progress was short-lived, as in 2007-08 the financial
crisis caused a global recession.
Chapter 2 also provided a typology of balance sheet policies, distinguishing between operations
along the dimensions of size and composition. In addition to this broad division, a more
narrow classification, as presented in Borio and Disyatat (2010), yielded a sharper, more refined,
understanding of the mechanisms used to affect market activity. Transmission of these policies
was discussed by considering theoretical arguments as to how balance sheet policies will impact
financial markets and the broader macroeconomy.
In Chapter 3, the discussion started with the financial crisis, its triggers, amplification mecha-
nisms and potential impact on the global economy. While this introduction to the proximate
causes of the crisis, and the implications for monetary policy, is useful as context to the policy
response, it was not meant as a comprehensive review. The primary interest was in providing a
chronicle of the different balance sheet policies used by central banks across the globe. Different
strategies were implemented by central banks, reflecting shortcomings and exposures to risk in
their economies.
While the Fed, for example, immediately implemented an expansion of their balance sheet after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the ECB only recently, in January 2015, underwent its
first round of unsterilised asset purchases. This does not mean that the ECB did not attempt
liquidity injections, in fact they implemented a LTRO programme that injected more than $1.3
trillion into the Euro area (Carpinelli and Crosignani, 2015). This chapter helped to frame the
response of the identified central banks in terms of developments in their respective economies.
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Chapter 4 evaluated whether policies implemented by central banks were successful in achieving
their stated goals by conducting a survey on the empirical evidence. In this chapter, as suggested
by the evidence, programmes initiated by central banks were largely effective. As can be seen
from the counterfactuals without intervention, there was a clear possibility of systemic failure,
both in the US and abroad. In other words, without the stimulating impact of balance sheet
policies, it is plausible that another Great Depression would have resulted.
With central bank balance sheets inflated by attempts to improve the health of financial markets
and bolster real activity, questions arose as to the possible consequences of using balance sheet
policies. Some of the most frequently highlighted topics are that of international spillover
effects, plausible exit strategies and issues of central bank independence.
8.1.1.1 Contribution
Although the literature review contained no original empirical work, I still consider it an
important contribution. Due to the relative novelty of the way central bank balance sheets have
been used in the crisis, there is considerable confusion as to the definitions and transmission
mechanisms of balance sheet policies. The goal of this chapter was to provide clarity, or remove
the ‘mystique’ as stated by Reis (2013), with respect to the central bank balance sheet, as
concepts are often confused in both academic research and the media. Policymakers might also
want to take note of the instruments available to them, as clearly delineated in this part of the
thesis. It also set the scene for the empirical work and modelling done in the rest of thesis, by
making the gap in the literature more apparent and thereby illustrating the importance of the
research question of the thesis.
A particularly important discussion is found in Chapter 4, where the idea of exit strategies are
mentioned. The Federal Reserve, for example, has initiated their ‘liftoff’, with an increase in
the short-term policy rate in December 2015. However, even before this, they were testing the
tools to accompany this rate hike, implementing short-term reverse repurchase agreements to
firm the interest rate floor, from as early as 2013. However, this strategy is still relatively new
and untested. It will, by all accounts, be a cause for debate in the years to come. In this thesis I
provided a foundation for such a discussion, by going into detail on the mechanism proposed.
8.1.1.2 Shortcomings
As stated before, while this chapter provided a theoretical foundation to the thesis, it contains
no relevant empirical work. In this sense, a contribution that could have been made is to include
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revised estimates of the impact of balance sheet policies found in some of the more influential
studies.
One of the biggest shortcomings of the literature review is that financial (in)stability was not
explicitly defined. This was purposefully done. In fact, earlier iterations of the thesis started
with a lengthy discussion on the issues pertaining to financial stability, with the initial idea
to develop a financial stability index. However, it soon became apparent that this would be a
particularly nettlesome endeavour, as there is little consensus in the literature on the definition
of financial stability and the metrics used to measure it.
While the concept of financial cycles and stability have been a topic of discussion for several
decades, there is still no agreed upon way to think about it. The work of Borio and Drehmann
(2009), in this regard, is a useful point of departure on how to identify financial cycles. In
addition, they provide a detailed discussion on the different approaches used to model financial
stability.
After a period of deliberation it was decided that the best approach would be to settle on
a specific way to model financial stability. Ultimately, it felt that a protracted discussion on
theories and measurement of financial stability detracted from the central focus of the thesis,
which is about the possible uses for balance sheet policies. Financial stability was not entirely
neglected however, as the literature review in Chapter 6 discusses, at length, the inclusion of
financial market imperfections into DSGE models.
Another topic that was omitted from the discussion is that of macroprudential regulation. After
the financial crisis, a large literature started to develop on this topic, with an excellent early
survey provided by Galati and Moessner (2013). Macroprudential policy is relevant because it
represents a vital tool in preventing the buildup of financial imbalances, avoiding concerns of
systemic risk. In fact, if used correctly it could be a perfect complement to balance sheet policies,
as indicated by Woodford (2016). However, it was not directly relevant to the discussion of
balance sheet policies and therefore only mentioned on occasion.
8.1.2 Chapter 5
Recent developments in the way that central banks conduct monetary policy motivated the
empirical work in this chapter. The first part of this chapter attempted to highlight the different
monetary policy regimes and operational frameworks currently implemented. Regimes have
shifted from the traditional reserve regime, where the policy rate is largely determined through
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the interaction of money supply and demand (as in the textbook IS-LM model), to more modern
interpretations, where liquidity management is less evident and policy rate announcement
dominates as primary lever, such as the corridor, floor or hybrid regimes.
In order to quantify the evolution of the changes in monetary policy implementation several
empirical methods were used. In particular, I was interested to uncover the relationship between
reserves and the policy rate, where the theorised negative relationship is known as the liquidity
effect. First, a rolling regression was conducted to determine if the relationship between
reserves and the policy rate was stable over time. Second, a SVAR was constructed, to provide
theoretical backing to my estimation. The SVAR was then divided into subsamples, which were
identified according to potential shifts in monetary policy regimes in different countries. Finally,
a TVP-VAR was estimated for each country. This approach combined the best elements from the
SVAR and rolling regression strategies. The goal being to trace the relationship of the policy
rate and reserves over time.
The results largely followed theoretical predictions on the operation of monetary policy, with
the reserve regime indicating the only significant liquidity effect. In the case of the US, for
example, the fading liquidity effect over time was clearly observed, something that was captured
in the literature on the topic. The implication is that under certain regimes it might be possible
to expand the balance sheet of the central bank, without impacting a shift in the policy rate.
Independent movement of the policy rate from the balance sheet of the central bank is known
as the decoupling, or separation, principle.
8.1.2.1 Contribution
The discussion on the operational frameworks contributes to an understanding of different
monetary policy regimes. Indicating that the traditional mechanism needs to be adapted to
better reflect the way that several advanced economies implement monetary policy. Since the
late 1990s monetary policy has, in several advanced economies, shifted to an announcement of
the policy rate, and integration of several standing facilities, which should change the way in
which monetary policy is taught.
Due to the relative novelty of the empirical model used, this was, to my knowledge, the first
occasion that the liquidity effect problem has been approached with a TVP-VAR. It appears to be
an appropriate method to answer the question at hand, resolving some of the concerns from
other modelling approaches. This study updates earlier work on the liquidity effect in some
countries, while, in the case of South Africa, it was the first of its kind.
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8.1.2.2 Shortcomings
The biggest shortcoming of this chapter is the fact that the liquidity effect is modelled in terms
of monthly data. Higher frequency data, such as daily or intradaily data, would better reflect
the liquidity management operations of these central banks to keep the interest rate around the
policy target. More sophisticated modelling of reserve management is also a part of these high
frequency studies, which is neglected in this paper.
However, it is important to model lower frequency representations of the liquidity effect as well.
Several modern DSGE models with developed central bank lending have an explicit role for
the liquidity effect, with monetary models often incorporating a shock to money supply that
affects a change in the policy rate, as discussed in Christiano et al. (1999). As many of these
models are calibrated on monthly and quarterly data, it is necessary to provide a measure of
the relationship between reserves issued and the movement of the interest rate. The one-to-one
representation of the movement of reserves to interest rates, as in Goodhart et al. (2011), is not
an accurate reflection of the relationship across all regimes. Monetary expansion is not always
the dual of the interest rate.
8.1.3 Chapter 6
The first part of the chapter introduced the role of financial frictions in DSGE models. Starting
with the seminal contributions of both Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Models that generate frictions in the demand side of the credit market were considered the
workhorse of modern macroeconomics before the financial crisis. However, since 2007-08 a
large literature has developed that looks at the supply of credit and how it can be disrupted.
Some crucial elements in this vein are the development of a banking sector with an interbank
market, spreads between relevant interest rates and incorporating some measure of financial
(in)stability. In our case this meant the introduction of endogenous default as originally
developed by Goodhart et al. (2006) and later extended by de Walque et al. (2010).
The model developed in this chapter combines several attractive features from other models in
the literature. It builds on the RBC model of de Walque et al. (2010) in particular, extending it
to a New-Keynesian DSGE setting. In addition, the model incorporated a role for collateralised
central bank lending, as found in the work of Schabert (2015) and Hörmann and Schabert
(2015). The mechanism from Schabert (2015) was then adapted so that the liquidity effect
result from Chapter 5 could be included.
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According to the result from the first scenario of the model, increases in the size of the balance
sheet of the central bank allow greater lending and reduce the probability of default for both
commercial (merchant) banks and firms. Balance sheet policies in this sense can be used to
inject liquidity into the economy and improve functioning of financial markets. In addition,
the second scenario shows that balance sheet policies can potentially be used in conjunction
with interest rate policy. I looked at the case where the central bank increased the policy rate,
which was then met with a small contraction of the balance sheet. This meant that even though
lending conditions were tightened by the interest rate increase, liquidity withdrawn was not as
drastic. This scenario could be seen as similar to the exit strategy recently implemented by the
Fed.
8.1.3.1 Contribution
The biggest contribution of this chapter was the inclusion of collateralised central bank lending
into a model with an active banking sector and endogenous default. Several models in the
literature follow similar strategies, but few have a realistic dimension for the relationship
between the commercial and central bank. In addition, only a limited amount of studies
consider the role of balance sheet policy in promoting financial stability. Most of the literature is
only concerned with the impact on real activity, while the role for balance sheet policies should
extend beyond this.
In addition, the usage of the haircut parameter, κ, in this model, could be managed in such a
way as to reflect the new operational frameworks currently implemented by central banks. In
particular, one could construct a scenario that resembles the current exit strategy of the Federal
Reserve. In this instance, the value for κ is set quite close to zero, to reflect a situation whereby
there is an increase in the policy rate, with a limited impact on the size of the balance sheet.
Setting the value for κ close to zero represents a simple way to model the decoupling principle.
8.1.3.2 Shortcomings
Naturally one of the big shortcomings of this purely calibrated approach is that I have neglected
estimation. For an extension to the current work one could use Bayesian priors and estimation
techniques to more closely tailor the model to a specific economy. In addition, another apparent
shortcoming is not including demand side frictions, such as the financial accelerator from
Bernanke et al. (1999). Several demand side frictions were initially included in the model, but
caused interpretation of results to be unclear.
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Additionally, incorporating a mechanism for the decoupling of the interest rate from reserves is
a relatively new idea, fraught with dangers not yet uncovered. Policy tools could be working
against each other in this scenario to potentially weaken the effect of traditional interest rate
policy. However, in as far as monetary policy operates along a signalling channel, the central
bank might be able to center inflation expectations on a certain target while performing balance
sheet operations.
If balance sheet operations are not seen to deter from achieving the inflation target, it could be
a potential tool for the provision of liquidity or, if need be, to prevent the buildup of financial
imbalances. It would perhaps also be useful to do a historical decomposition to determine the
contribution of balance sheet policies relative to interest rate policy in the economy, in terms of
financial market impact.
Another perceived shortcoming is that I did not consider the case at the zero lower bound. This
is intentional. In this model I wanted to consider scenarios outside of a crisis situation. I believe
it to be clear that these policies could be used in times of financial distress. However, this model
provided a look into the behaviour of the central bank and financial intermediaries in normal
times, with new operational frameworks in place.
8.1.4 Chapter 7
Having considered the role that an increase in the size of the central bank balance sheet can play,
the natural extension was to include the change in the composition. In this model I followed the
approach of Woodford (1998, 2001) to introduce long-term bonds into the model of Chapter 6.
Having long-term bonds affords the opportunity to look at large-scale asset purchases, such as
those performed by the Fed. These quasi-debt management operations were primarily meant to
decrease long-term rates and improve borrowing conditions across the economy. LSAPs were
modelled in the first scenario, entailing both an expansion and maturity transformation of the
central bank balance sheet. While these policies were normally implemented when the policy
rate had reached the zero lower bound, it was a sufficient but not necessary condition for their
usage. This LSAP scenario was then compared to the an increase in long-term bond growth, as
well as the results from Chapter 6.
In the second scenario, changes were implemented to the composition of the assets on the
balance sheet of the central bank, together with an increase in the policy rate. This shows
what impact changes in the composition of the balance sheet can have when monetary policy
functions as normal.
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The findings of the chapter was in line with intuition on the topic. First, the quasi-debt
management operations delivered a decrease in the long-term rates, and brought about greater
borrowing in the economy. Merchant banks gained the most from these operations, with
increased profitability and loans extended to firms. Results were similar to that of the increase
in long-term bond growth. However, in comparison to the result of Chapter 6, the effects were
more pronounced. Second, it was found that large-scale asset purchases could potentially
be used alongside interest rate policy. This gives central banks the ability to target specific
asset prices and lean against the wind of financial imbalances. In this sense, long-term bond
purchases can be used in conjunction with both macroprudential and interest rate policy to
affect financial stability.
8.1.4.1 Contribution
There is a dearth of literature on the financial stability implications of changes in composition
of the central banks balance sheet. Most papers fall in two categories. First, they consider
the impact of reserve-supply policy on financial stability and the broader economy, normally
modelled as pure liquidity injections. Second, models that consider the implications of LSAPs on
real activity. The contribution then, was adding a non-trivial role for changes in the composition
of the central bank balance sheet, to measure the impact on financial institutions. In addition,
the way that the model is structured allows for a comparison between short-term liquidity
injections and maturity transformations.
8.1.4.2 Shortcomings
A shortcoming of this model is that it is limited to the broad dimensions of balance sheet policies,
namely changes in the size and composition of the central bank balance sheet. Therefore, the
result was quite general, not specifically tailored to a particular event or market. For example,
the model only has space for the purchases of short- and long-term bonds, while a more complete
model would include purchases of risky illiquid assets such as agency debt and mortgage-backed
securities.
8.2 Practical Implications
Although the practical implications of the research in this thesis is generally limited to the
second section, which covers my empirical work, there is also some practical use to be gained
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from the literature review. I believe the review to be a comprehensive account of balance sheet
policies, making it useful for researchers or policymakers to use as a reference or starting point
if they wish to compare a range of policy options. The experience of other central banks might
dictate which policies and monetary policy regimes they could adopt. In addition, it could
be used by media representatives to frame a more detailed discussion on issues pertaining to
balance sheet policies.
The work of Chapter 5 will be important to both researchers and future teachers of monetary
policy. As argued by Ihrig and Meade (2015), changes in monetary policy implementation will
need to be included in future iterations of textbooks at both undergraduate and postgraduate
level. If changes are not made to curricula, confusion with respect to monetary policy imple-
mentation will be the order of the day, as students struggle to match real world application
to theoretical constructs. The current textbook model of monetary policy implementation is
undoubtedly incorrect and will take some time to adjust.
The results from Chapter 6 and 7 can be viewed collectively, and can guide the behaviour of
policymakers when it comes to implementing balance sheet policies in normal times, under
newly formed monetary policy regimes. The benefits to financial markets are stressed in these
chapters, which gives another perspective, and is not limited to the discussion of the effect on
the real sector. Even though many countries will not implement these balance sheet policies, it
might start a discussion on their usage within the current policy space.
8.3 Future Research
In this section I briefly discuss some avenues for future research. There is a specific focus on the
later chapters of the thesis, as this is where empirical contributions were made. Improvements
are suggested both in terms of alternative methodological and theoretical approaches.
8.3.1 Chapter 5
The literature on the liquidity effect is already quite saturated, with little left to contribute in
terms of theoretical developments. However, in terms of methodology there are several newly
developed econometric techniques that could contribute to the further development of a liquidity
effect narrative. First, Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) models have been gaining popularity in
recent years. These models combine elements of factor analysis, Bayesian estimation and SVAR
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modelling, which affords the opportunity to incorporate information from large datasets. One of
the earliest models in this tradition is that of Bernanke et al. (2005), which attempts to address
the price puzzle in the monetary transmission mechanism. Second, the Markov-Switching
SVAR can be used to incorporate nonlinearities, such as structural breaks, into the model. This
could, for example, help to explain some of the irregularities experienced in the analysis on the
Norwegian case study (Krolzig, 2000).
8.3.2 Chapter 6, 7
The usage of DSGE models has become pervasive in the last decade. Due to the rapidly growing
contributions of models in the field, there is enormous room for growth, both in terms of the
theoretical and, especially, methodological contributions of this thesis. I will not, however, cover
the breadth of the potential methodological features that could be implemented in this model.
In its calibrated form, the model is in the initial phase of development and can be expanded
upon with several sophisticated techniques.
In terms of theory, several avenues for future research can emanate from these chapters. Most
importantly, I believe, is adding a mechanism that represents macroprudential policy. A large
literature has developed on the role of macroprudential regulation in its capacity to prevent
systemic instability. In particular, the paper by Smets (2014) has stirred a discussion on the
role of monetary versus macroprudential policy in leaning against the wind of the buildup
of financial imbalances. In this vein, a natural extension of the thesis would be to compare
and contrast the contributions of macroprudential and balance sheet policies in achieving
financial stability. Some work in this regard has already been attempted, with the contribution
of Woodford (2016), for example, offering some insight. He considered the role of quantitative
easing, macroprudential policy and conventional interest rate policy as complementary policy
dimensions in promoting financial stability.
The topic of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy also ties into this discussion. The idea
that monetary policy can contribute to a search-for-yield was discussed before the financial
crisis by Rajan (2005). In the wake of the crisis, the work of Borio and Zhu (2012) and Smets
(2014) emphasise that the risk-taking channel of monetary policy should be implemented into
the new monetary framework. It is, however, not only the monetary policy stance that can
lead to a search for yield. Excessive lending on the part of the central bank can also generate
risk-taking behaviour, as illustrated in the models of Collard et al. (2015) and Kandrac and
Schlusche (2015). My model could benefit from the inclusion of excessive risk-taking on the
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part of financial market participants. Incorporating this behaviour could dampen, or eliminate,
the positive impact on financial stability that the model currently enjoys.
This thesis is one of the first to discuss implementation of a decoupling principle in a DSGE
framework. In terms of DSGE models, the only paper, to my knowledge, that incorporates this
idea is that of Cahn et al. (2014). They consider the effect, of what they call, the separation
principle, specifically looking at the ECB and LTROs. In their model this allows for the ECB
to conduct balance sheet policies without affecting the policy rate. It is clear to me that more
papers of this nature will come to light once the discussion on issues such as interest on reserves
become part of the mainstream research agenda. There are already papers that look to model
the mechanisms underlying interest on reserves, such as Kashyap and Stein (2012) and Ireland
(2012).
Tying in with the idea of interest on reserves, is the concept of exit strategies. Seeing as the Fed
recently implemented an increase in the federal funds rate, it might be useful to fully develop
the implications for central bank balance sheets. Some notable contributions in the literature
are Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011), Del Negro et al. (2013), Angeloni et al. (2014) and Palley
(2015). Another avenue to consider is the international spillover effects from implementing
these balance sheet policies. In this sense, one could develop a small open economy model to
observe the financial stability impact from international spillovers, such as Alpanda and Kabaca
(2015) and Chen et al. (2015).
8.4 Concluding Remarks
The central question of this thesis is uncomplicated. What is the role of balance sheet policies in
achieving financial stability? The actions of central banks across the globe speak to the ability
of central bank balance sheets to affect dysfunctional financial markets. The consensus is that,
in times of distress, central banks should use their balance sheets to avoid economic collapse.
However, it remains to be seen whether the usage of balance sheet policies will become the new
status quo. I have attempted to show that, even in normal times, balance sheet policies could
provide another plausible policy dimension in achieving financial stability, performing the role
they were designed to play since their inception. In this sense, the central bank can reclaim its
position as a bank, and not a study group.
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Ćorić, T. and Cvrlje, D. (2009). Central Bank Independence: The Case of Croatia. University of
Zagreb Working Paper Series, (14):1–14.
Corsetti, G. and Dedola, L. (2013). The Mystery of the Printing Press: Self-fufilling Debt Crises
and Monetary Sovereignty. CEPR Discussion Paper.
257
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Cour-Thimann, P. and Winkler, B. (2012). The ECB’s Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures:
The Role of Institutional Factors and Financial Structure. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
28(4):765–803.
Cova, P. and Ferrero, G. (2015). The Eurosystem’s Asset Purchase Programmes for Monetary
Policy Purposes. Banca dItalia Occasional Papers, (270):1–22.
Cross, M., Fisher, P., and Weeken, O. (2010). The Bank’s Balance Sheet During the Crisis. Bank
of England Quarterly Report, (February):34–42.
Cukierman, A., Miller, G. P., and Neyapti, B. (2002). Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and
Inflation in Transition Economies an International Perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics,
49(2):237–264.
Cukierman, A., Web, S. B., and Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the Independence of Central
Banks and its Effect on Policy Outcomes. World Bank Economic Review, 6(3):353–398.
Culbertson, J. M. (1957). The Term Structure of Interest Rates. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 71(4):485–517.
Cúrdia, V. and Woodford, M. (2009). Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy. Working
Paper, pages 1–82.
Cúrdia, V. and Woodford, M. (2010). Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 42:3–35.
Cúrdia, V. and Woodford, M. (2011). The Central-Bank Balance Sheet as an Instrument of
Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1):54–79.
Cúrdia, V. and Woodford, M. (2015). Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy. Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper, (20):1–77.
Dai, M., DuFourt, F., and Zhang, Q. (2013). Large Scale Asset Purchases with Segmented
Mortgage and Corporate Loan Markets. Aix-Marseille School of Economics Working Paper.
D’Amico, S., English, W., Lopez-Salido, D., and Nelson, E. (2012). The Federal Reserve’s
Large-scale Asset Purchase Programmes: Rationale and Effects. The Economic Journal,
122(564):F415–F446.
Darracq-Paries, M. and De Santis, R. A. (2015). A Non-Standard Monetary Policy Shock: The
ECB’s 3-year LTROs and the Shift in Credit Supply. Journal of International Money and Finance,
54:1–34.
De Fiore, F. and Tristani, O. (2011). Credit and the Natural Rate of Interest. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 43(2-3):407–440.
258
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
De Fiore, F. and Uhlig, H. (2005). Bank Finance Versus Bond Finance: What Explains the
Differences between the US and Europe? Discussion Paper Series- Centre for Economic Policy
Research London.
De Gregorio, J. (2012). Price and Financial Stability in Modern Central Banking. Economía,
(November):1–7.
De Michelis, A. and Iacoviello, M. (2016). Raising an Inflation Target: the Japanese Experience
with Abenomics. European Economic Review, pages 1–33.
de Walque, G. and Pierrard, O. (2010). Banking Shocks and Monetary Reactions in a New
Keynesian Model. ECB Working Paper.
de Walque, G., Pierrard, O., and Rouabah, A. (2010). Financial (In) Stability, Supervision
and Liquidity Injections: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach. The Economic Journal,
120:1234–1261.
Del Negro, M., Eggertsson, G., Ferrero, A., and Kiyotaki, N. (2013). The Great Escape? A
Quantitative Evaluation of the Fed’s Liquidity Facilities. Balance Sheet, (October):1–48.
Del Negro, M. and Sims, C. A. (2015). When Does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require
Fiscal Support? Journal of Monetary Economics, 73:1–19.
DeLong, J. B. (2011). Economics in Crisis. The Economists Voice, 2(2):1–2.
Diamond, D. (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Economic
Studies, 51(3):393–414.
Dib, A. (2002). Nominal Rigidities and Monetary Policy in Canada Since 1981. Bank of Canada
Working Paper.
Dib, A. (2010a). Banks, Credit Market Frictions, and Business Cycles. Bank of Canada Working
Paper, (24):1–48.
Dib, A. (2010b). Capital Requirement and Financial Frictions in Banking. Bank of Canada
Working Paper, pages 0–46.
Dicecio, R. and Gascon, C. S. (2008). New Monetary Policy Tools ? Monetary Trends, (May).
Dingle, J. F., Sparks, G. R., and Walker, M. A. (1972). Monetary Policy and the Adjustment of
Chartered Bank Assets. Canadian Journal of Economics, 5:494–514.
Disyatat, P. (2008). Monetary Policy Implementation: Misconceptions and their Consequences.
BIS Working Paper, (269).
259
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Doh, T. and Connolly, M. (2012). The State Space Representation and Estimation of a Time-
Varying Parameter VAR with Stochastic Volatility. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Research
Working Papers, 12-04(July):1–19.
Driffill, J. (2016). Unconventional Monetary Policy in the Euro Zone. Open Econ Review,
27:387–404.
du Plessis, S. (2011). Collapse. The Story of the International Financial Crisis, Its Causes and
Policy Consequences. In Van Beek, U. and Wnuk-Lipinski, E., editors, Democracy under stress:
The global crisis and beyond, chapter 2, pages 1–28. Barbara Budrich Publishers, Berlin, 1
edition.
du Plessis, S. (2012). Assets Matter: New and Old Views of Monetary Policy. Stellenbosch
Working Paper, pages 1–20.
Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., and Shubik, M. (2005). Default and Punishment in General
Equilibrium. Econometrica, 73(1):1–37.
Dudley, W. C. (2013). Unconventional Monetary Policies and Central Bank Independence. In
Central Bank Independence Conference - Progress and Challenges, pages 13–15.
Dueker, M. J. (2005). Dynamic Forecasts of Qualitative Variables : A Qual VAR Model of U.S .
Recessions. Journal of Business Economics and Statistics, 23:96–104.
Economist (2008). Grossly Distorted Picture. The Economist, pages 13–15.
Economist (2016). How Shadow Banking Works. The Economist.
Edmonds, T., Jarrett, T., and Woodhouse, J. (2010). The Credit Crisis: A Timeline. House of
Commons Standard Note, SN/BT/4991.
Eggerston, G. and Woodford, M. (2003). The Zero Interest-Rate Bound and Optimal Monetary
Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:139–211.
Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., Gürkaynak, R. S., and Swanson, E. T. (2010). Convergence and
Anchoring of Yield Curves in the Euro Area. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1):350–364.
Eichengreen, B. and Gupta, P. (2015). Tapering Talk: The Impact of Expectations of Reduced
Federal Reserve Security Purchases on Emerging Markets.
Eisenstat, E., Chan, J., and Strachan, R. (2013). Stochastic Model Specification Search for
Time-Varying Parameter VARs. Australian National University Working Paper, pages 1–29.
Emerson, M. (2016). The Economics of a Brexit. Intereconomics.
260
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Ennis, H. and Keister, T. (2008). Understanding Monetary Policy Implementation. Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, 94(3):235–263.
Eser, F. and Schwaab, B. (2016). Evaluating the Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy
Measures: Empirical Evidence from the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme.
Falagiarda, M., McQuade, P., and Tirpák, M. (2015). Spillovers from the ECB’s Non-standard
Monetary Policies on Non-Euro Area EU Countries: Evidence from an Event-study Analysis.
ECB Working Paper Series, (1869).
Falagiarda, M. and Reitz, S. (2015). Announcements of ECB Unconventional Programs: Impli-
cations for the Sovereign Spreads of Stressed Euro Area Countries. Journal of International
Money and Finance, 53:276–295.
Falagiarda, M. and Saia, A. (2013). Credit , Endogenous Collateral and Risky Assets : A DSGE
Model. ECB Working Paper Series.
Fawley, B. W. and Neely, C. J. (2013). Four Stories of Quantitative Easing. Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, (February):51–88.
Fernández-Villaverde, J. and Rubio-Ramírez, J. F. (2006). A Baseline DSGE Model. Mimeo,
pages 1–51.
Feroli, M., Mishkin, F. S., Greenlaw, D., Hooper, P., and Sufi, A. (2016). Language after Liftoff :
Fed Communication Away from the Zero Lower Bound. In US Monetary Policy Forum.
Ferrante, F. (2015). A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow
Banking System. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, (21).
Filardo, A. and Grenville, S. (2012). Central Bank Balance Sheets and Foreign Exchange Rate
Regimes: Understanding the Nexus in Asia. BIS Papers, (66):76–110.
Fischer, S. (2015a). Conducting Monetary Policy with a Large Balance Sheet. In 2015 U.S.
Monetary Policy Forum.
Fischer, S. (2015b). Monetary Policy Lessons and the Way Ahead. In Economic Club of New York.
Fisher, I. (1930). The theory of interest. Fairfield, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley.
Fisher, I. (1933). The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. The Econometric Society,
1(4):337–357.
Fleming, J. M. (1962). Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange
Rates. Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund, 9(3):369–380.
261
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Fortin, P. (1979). Monetary Targets and Monetary Policy in Canada: A Critical Assessment. The
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue . . . , 12(4):625–646.
Fratzscher, M., Lo Duca, M., and Straub, R. (2012). A Global Monetary Tsunami? On the
Spillovers of US Quantitative Easing. CEPR Discussion Papers 9195, C.E.P.R. Discussion
Papers.
Fratzscher, M., Lo Duca, M., and Straub, R. (2013). On the International Spillovers of US
Quantitative Easing. DIW Berlin - Discussion Papers, No. 1304:1–29.
Friedman, B. M. and Kuttner, K. N. (2010). Implementation of Monetary Policy: How Do Central
Banks Set Interest Rates? Working Paper 16165, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Friedman, M. (1956). The Quantity Theory of Money: A Restatement. In Studies in the Quantity
Theory of Money, pages 3–21.
Friedman, M. (1959). A Program for Monetary Stability. Fordham University Press (New York).
Friedman, M. (1964). Postwar Trends in Monetary Theory and Policy. National Banking Review,
2:1–9.
Friedman, M. (1968). The role of monetary policy. American Economic Review, (59):1–17.
Friedman, M. (1969). The Optimum Quantity of Money. In The Optimum Quantity of Money
and Other Essays. Chicago, Aldine.
Friedman, M. (1972). Factors Affecting the Level of Interest Rates. Money supply, money demand,
and macroeconomic models, (200).
Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A. J. (1963). A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.
Number frie63-1 in NBER Books. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A. J. (1982). Monetary Trends in the United States and the United
Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975.
Friedrich, C., Hess, K., and Cunningham, R. (2015). Monetary Policy and Financial Stability:
Cross-Country Evidence. Bank of Canada Staff Discussion Paper, 41(February):1–68.
Frost, J., Logan, L., and Martin, A. (2015). Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy
Tool: Some Design Considerations. FRB of New York Staff Paper.
Fujiki, H., Okina, K., and Shiratsuka, S. (2001). Monetary Policy under Zero Interest Rate:
Viewpoints of Central Bank Economists. Monetary and Economic Studies, (February):89–130.
Fukuda, S. (2015). Abenomics: Why Was It So Successful in Changing Market Expectations?
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 37:1–20.
262
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Fullwiler, S. (2008). Modern Central Bank Operations - The General Principles. Available at
SSRN 1658232, (June):1–47.
Fung, B. and Gupta, R. (1997). Cash Setting, The Call Loan Rate, and the Liquidity Effect in
Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics, 30(4):1057–1082.
Gagnon, J., Raskin, M., Remache, J., and Sack, B. (2011). The Financial Market Effects of
the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases. International Journal of Central Banking,
7(1):3–43.
Galati, G. and Moessner, R. (2013). Macroprudential Policy - A Literature Review. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 27(5):846–878.
Gali, J. (1992). How Well Does the IS-LM Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 107(2):709–38.
Galí, J. and Gertler, M. (2007). Macroeconomic Modeling for Monetary Policy Evaluation.
Journal of Economic Perpectives, 21(4):25–45.
Gambacorta, L., Hofmann, B., and Peersman, G. (2014). The Effectiveness of Unconventional
Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Cross-Country Analysis. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 46(4):615–642.
García Posada, M. and Marchetti, M. (2015). The Bank Lending Channel of Unconventional
Monetary Policy: The Impact of the VLTROs on Credit Supply in Spain. ECB Working Paper.
Gerali, A., Neri, S., Sessa, L., and Signoretti, F. M. (2010). Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model
of the Euro area. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42:107–141.
Gerlach, S. and Lewis, J. (2010). The Zero Lower Bound, ECB Interest Rate Policy and the
Financial Crisis. DNB Working Paper, 1(254):0–44.
Gertler, M. and Karadi, P. (2011). A Model of Unconventional Monetary Policy. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 58(1):17–34.
Gertler, M. and Karadi, P. (2013). QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3...: A Framework for Analyzing Large-
Scale Asset Purchases as a Monetary Policy Tool. International Journal of Central Banking,
9(SUPPL.1):5–53.
Gertler, M. and Kiyotaki, N. (2010). Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business
Cycle Analysis. In Handbook of Monetary Economics, volume 3, pages 547–599.
Gertler, M. and Kiyotaki, N. (2015). Banking, Liquidity, and Bank Runs in an Infinite Horizon
Economy. 105(7):2011–2043.
263
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Gertler, M., Kiyotaki, N., and Prestipino, A. (2016). Wholesale Banking and Bank Runs in
Macroeconomic Modelling of Financial Crises. NBER Working Paper, No. 21892.
Ghosh, S. and Saggar, M. (2016). Volatility Spillovers to the Emerging Financial Markets During
Taper Talk and Actual Tapering. Applied Economics Letters, pages 1–6.
Ghysels, E., Idier, J., Manganelli, S., and Vergote, O. (2014). A High Frequency Assessment of
the ECB Securities Markets Programme. ECB Working Paper Series, 1642(February).
Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H., and Reichlin, L. (2011). Non-standard Monetary Policy
Measures and Monetary Developments. ECB Working Paper Series, (No 1290).
Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H., and Reichlin, L. (2012). The ECB and the Interbank Market.
Economic Journal, 122(564).
Gidlow, R. (1995). South African Reserve Bank Monetary Policies under Dr. Gerhard de Kock,
1981-89. South African Reserve Bank.
Giri, F. (2014). Does Interbank Market Matter for Business Cycle Fluctuation? An Estimated
DSGE Model with Financial Frictions for the Euro Area. Quaderni Di Ricera, (398).
Gjedrem, S. (2001). Monetary Policy in Norway. Policy, (October):1–3.
Glick, R. and Leduc, S. (2012). Central Bank Announcements of Asset Purchases and the Impact
on Global Financial and Commodity Markets. Journal of International Money and Finance,
31(8):2078–2101.
Glick, R. and Leduc, S. (2013). The Effects of Unconventional and Conventional U.S. Monetary
Policy on the Dollar. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper, (May):1–34.
Glick, R. and Leduc, S. (2014). Unconventional Monetary Policy and the Dollar: Conventional
Signs, Unconventional Magnitudes.
González-Páramo, J. M. (2011). The ECB’s Monetary Policy During the Crisis. In Tenth Economic
Policy Conference.
Goodfriend, M. (1997). Monetary Policy Comes of Age: A 20th Century Odyssey. FRB Richmond
Economic Quarterly, 83:1–22.
Goodfriend, M. (2002). Interest on Reserves and Monetary Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Economic Policy Papers, pages 1–8.
Goodfriend, M. (2007a). Elements of Effective Central Banking: Theory, Practice, and History.
eSocialSciences.
264
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Goodfriend, M. (2007b). How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 21(4):47–68.
Goodfriend, M. (2014). Monetary Policy as a Carry Trade. Monetary and Economic Studies,
32:29–44.
Goodhart, C. A. E. (1988). The Evolution of Central Banks. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Goodhart, C. A. E. (2011). The Changing Role of Central Banks. Financial History Review,
18(2):135–154.
Goodhart, C. A. E., Osorio, C., and Tsomocos, D. P. (2009). Analysis of Monetary Policy and
Financial Stability: A New Paradigm.
Goodhart, C. A. E., Peiris, M. U., Tsomocos, D. P., and Vardoulakis, a. P. (2010). On Dividend
Restrictions and the Collapse of the Interbank market. Annals of Finance, 6(4):455–473.
Goodhart, C. A. E., Sunirand, P., and Tsomocos, D. (2011). The Optimal Monetary Instrument
for Prudential Purposes. Journal of Financial Stability, 7(2):70–77.
Goodhart, C. A. E., Sunirand, P., and Tsomocos, D. P. (2006). A Model to Analyse Financial
Fragility. Economic Theory, 27(1):107–142.
Goodhart, C. A. E. and Tsomocos, D. P. (2006). Financial Stability: Theory and Applications.
Annals of Finance, 3(1):1–4.
Gordon, D. B. and Leeper, E. M. (1994). The Dynamic Impacts of Monetary Policy: An Exercise
in Tentative Identification. Journal of Political Economy, 102(6):1228–47.
Gorton, G. (2010). Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007. New York Oxford University
Press, (2008).
Gorton, G. (2014). Some Reflections on the Recent Financial Crisis. Trade, Globalization and
Development, (November).
Gorton, G. (2015). The Maze of Banking: History, Theory, Crisis. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2010). Regulating the Shadow Banking System. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 2010(2):261–297.
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012). Getting up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One Weekend
Readers Guide. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1):158–178.
Gorton, G. B. (2008). The Panic of 2007. Proceedings - Payments System Research Conferences,
(August):131–262.
265
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Grauwe, P. D. and Gros, D. (2009). A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB. Centre for European
Policy Studies, (191):1–12.
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., and Pagano, M. (1991). Political and
Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. Economic
Policy, 6(13):342–392.
Guthrie, G. and Wright, J. (2000). Open Mouth Operations. Journal of Monetary Economics,
46:489–516.
Haidar, J. I. and Hoshi, T. (2015). Implementing Structural Reforms in Abenomics: How to
Reduce the Cost of Doing Business in Japan. NBER Working Paper Series.
Hamilton, J. D. (1996). The Daily Market for Federal Funds. Journal of Political Economy.
Hamilton, J. D. (1997). Measuring the Liquidity Effect. The American Economic Review, 87(1):pp.
80–97.
Hamilton, J. D. (1998). The Supply and Demand for Federal Reserve Deposits. UCSD Economics
Discussion Paper, (97).
Hamilton, J. D. and Wu, J. C. (2012). The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in
a Zero Lower Bound Environment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44(SUPPL. 1):3–46.
Harrigan, J. and Kuttner, K. (2004). Lost Decade in Translation: Did the US Learn from Japan’s
Post-Bubble Mistakes? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 10938.
Harrison, R. (2012). Asset Purchase Policy at the Effective Lower Bound for Interest Rates.
Bank of England Working Paper, (444).
Hausman, J. K. and Wieland, J. F. (2015). Overcoming the Lost Decades? Abenomics after
Three Years. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (510).
Hicks, J. R. (1937). Mr. Keynes and the Classics. Econometrica, 5(2):147–59.
Hilberg, B. and Hollmayr, J. (2011). Asset Prices, Collateral and Unconventional Monetary
Policy in a DSGE Model. ECB Working Paper.
Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. (1993). Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring. Journal of
Political Economy, 101(4):678–709.
Hörmann, M. and Schabert, A. (2013). A Monetary Analysis of Balance Sheet Policies. University
of Cologne Working Paper Series, (68):1–38.
Hörmann, M. and Schabert, A. (2015). A Monetary Analysis of Balance Sheet Policies. The
Economic Journal, 125(589):1888–1917.
266
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Hülsewig, O., Mayer, E., and Wollmershäuser, T. (2009). Bank Behavior, Incomplete Interest
Rate Pass-through, and the Cost Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission. Economic Modelling,
26(6):1310–1327.
Iacoviello, M. (2005). House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business
Cycle. American Economic Review, 95:739–764.
Ihrig, J. E. and Meade, E. E. (2015). Rewriting Monetary Policy 101: What’s the Fed’s Preferred
Post-Crisis Approach to Raising Interest Rates? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(Fall):177–
198.
IMF (2013). Unconventional Monetary Policies - Recent Experience and Prospects. Staff Report,
page 48.
Ingves, S. (2014). Banking on Leverage. In 10th Asia-Pacific High-Level Meeting on Banking
Supervision, pages 1–5.
Ireland, P. (2012). The Macroeconomic Effects of Interest on Reserves. NBER Working Paper,
(18409).
Ireland, P. N. (2006). The Monetary Transmission Mechanism. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Working Paper, 6(1):1–6.
Ito, T. and Mishkin, F. (2006). Two Decades of Japanese Monetary Policy and the Deflation
Problem. In Monetary Policy with Very Low Inflation in the Pacific Rim, pages 131 – 201.
University of Chicago Press.
Jaffee, D., Lynch, A. W., Richardson, M., and Nieuwerburgh, S. V. (2009). Mortgage Origination
and Securitization in the Financial Crisis. In Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a
Failed System, pages 1–418.
Jinushi, T., Kuroki, Y., and Miyao, R. (2000). Monetary Policy in Japan Since the Late 1980s :
Delayed Policy Actions. In Japan’s Financial Crisis, pages 115–148.
Joyce, M. A. S., Lasaosa, A., Stevens, I., and Tong, M. (2012a). The Financial Market Impact
of Quantitative Easing in the United Kingdom. International Journal of Central Banking,
7(3):113–161.
Joyce, M. A. S., Liu, Z., and Tonks, I. (2014). Institutional Investor Portfolio Allocation,
Quantitative Easing and the Global Financial Crisis. Bank of England Working Paper, (510).
Joyce, M. A. S., Miles, D., Scott, A., and Vayanos, D. (2012b). Quantitative Easing and
Unconventional Monetary Policy - An Introduction. Economic Journal, 122:F271–F288.
267
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Joyce, M. A. S. and Woods, R. (2011). The United Kingdom’s Quantitative Easing Policy: Design,
Operation and Impact. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin,, 51(Quarter 3):200–12.
Judson, R. and Klee, E. (2010). Whither the Liquidity Effect: The Impact of Federal Reserve
Open Market Operations in Recent Years. Journal of Macroeconomics.
Kahn, G. (2010). Monetary Policy under a Corridor Operating Framework. Economic Review,
pages 5–34.
Kandrac, J. and Schlusche, B. (2015). Quantitative Easing and Bank Risk Taking: Evidence
from Lending. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Kapetanios, G., Mumtaz, H., Stevens, I., and Theodoridis, K. (2012). Assessing the Economy-
wide Effects of Quantitative Easing. Economic Journal, 122(564).
Kashyap, A. and Stein, J. (2012). The Optimal Conduct of Monetary Policy with Interest on
Reserves. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(1):266–282.
Kay, J. (2012). The Map Is Not the Territory: An Essay on the State of Economics. Critical
Review, 5(1):87–99.
Keister, T., Martin, A., and McAndrews, J. (2008). Divorcing money from monetary policy.
Economic Policy Review, (September):41–56.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
Kilian, L. (2011). Structural Vector Autoregressions. Handbook of Research Methods and
Applications in Empirical Macroeconomics, (734):1–54.
Kindleberger, C. P. (2000). Manias, Panics and Crashes. Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Kirman, A. (2010). The Economic Crisis is a Crisis for Economic Theory. CESifo Economic
Studies, 56:498–535.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 105:211.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (2012). Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy. Policy,
49(April):1–32.
Klee, K. N. and Butler, B. C. (2002). Asset-Backed Securitization, Special Purpose Vehicles and
Other Securitization Issues. Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal, 35(2):23–68.
Kliesen, K. (2013). The Fed’s Strategy for Exiting from Unconventional Policy: Key Principles,
Potential Challenges. The Regional Economist, July(10):1–4.
Kocherlakota, N. R. (2000). Creating Business Cycles through Credit Constraints. Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 24(3):2–10.
268
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Koop, G. and Korobilis, D. (2010). Bayesian Multivariate Time Series Methods for Empirical
Macroeconomics. Foundations and Trends(R) in Econometrics, 3(4):267–358.
Kopchak, S. J. (2011). The Liquidity Effect for Open Market Operations. Journal of Banking &
Finance, 35(12):3292–3299.
Krampf, A. (2016). From Transparency to Ambiguity: The Impact of the ECB’s Unconventional
Policies on the EMU. Journal of European Integration, (March).
Krishnamurthy, A., Nagel, S., and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2014). ECB Policies Involving Govern-
ment Bonds Purchases: Impact and Channels. NBER Working Paper Series, pages 1–57.
Krishnamurthy, A. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2011). The Effects of Quantitative Easing on
Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
2011(2):215–287.
Krolzig, H.-M. (2000). Predicting Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressive Processes. pages
1–30.
Krugman, P. R. (1998). It’s Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 29(2):137–206.
Krugman, P. R. (2000). Thinking About the Liquidity Trap. Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies, 14(4):221–237.
Krugman, P. R. (2011). The Profession and the Crisis. Eastern Economic Journal, 37(3):307–312.
Kumar, N. and Barua, A. (2013). The Impact of Fed Tapering in Emerging Economies: Struggling
with the Ebb. Global Economic Outlook 7.
Kuttner, K. (2014). Monetary Policy during Japan’s Great Recession: From Self-Induced Paralysis
to Rooseveltian Resolve. Working Paper.
Kuttner, K. N. and Mosser, P. C. (2002). The Monetary Transmission Mechanism : Some
Answers and Further Questions. Federal Reserve Bank of New YOrk Economic Policy Review,
(May):15–26.
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of
Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3):473–491.
Labonte, M. (2015). Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Conditions.
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 1:20.
Laidler, D. (1999). The Quantity of Money and Monetary Policy. Bank of Canada Working Paper,
99(5):1–40.
269
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Laidler, D., Crow, J., Robson, W., and Siklos, P. (2010). Securing Monetary Stability: Canada’s
Monetary Policy Regime after 2011. C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto.
Lange, R. H. (2010). Regime-switching Monetary Policy in Canada. Journal of Macroeconomics,
32(3):782–796.
Lavigne, R., Sarker, S., and Vasishtha, G. (2014). Spillover Effects of Quantitative Easing on
Emerging-Market Economies. Bank of Canada Review, pages 23–33.
Lavoie, M. (2010). Changes in Central Bank Procedures During the Subprime Crisis and their
Repercussions on Monetary Theory. International Journal of Political Economy, (606).
Leeper, E. and Gordon, D. (1992). In Search of the Liquidity Effect. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 29(3):341–69.
Leeper, E. M. and Sims, C. A. (1994). Toward a Modern Macroeconomic Model Usable for Policy
Analysis. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, Volume 9, 9(1994):81–140.
Lenza, M., Pill, H., Reichlin, L., and Ravn, M. (2012). Monetary Policy in Exceptional Times. In
Economic Policy 62, pages 295–339.
Lim, J. J., Mohapatra, S., and Stocker, M. (2014). Tinker, Taper, QE, Bye? The Effect of
Quantitative Easing on Financial Flows to Developing Countries. The World Bank - Policy
Research Working Paper, No. 6820(March):1–44.
Litterman, R. B. and Weiss, L. M. (1984). Money, Real Interest Rates, and Output: A Reinterpre-
tation of Postwar U.S. Data. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staff Report, (89).
Lucas, R. E. (1976). Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique. Carnegie-Rochester Confer. Series
on Public Policy, 1(C):19–46.
Lütkepohl, H. (2011). Vector Autoregresssive Models. In Handbook of Research Methods and
Applications in Empirical Macroeconomics.
Mankiw, N. G. (2006). The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 20(4):29–46.
Mark Jickling (2010). Causes of The Financial Crisis. Technical report.
Markovic, B. (2006). Bank Capital Channels in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. Bank of
England Working Paper No., 313.
Martin, A., McAndrews, J., Palida, A., and Skeie, D. (2013). Federal Reserve Tools for Managing
Rates and Reserves. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, September(642):1–34.
270
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Martin, C. and Milas, C. (2013). Quantitative Easing: A Sceptical Survey. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 28(4):750–764.
Martinez, J. F. and Tsomocos, D. P. (2011). Liquidity Effects on Asset Prices, Financial Stability
and Economic Resilience. LSE Working Paper.
Matsuki, T., Sugimoto, K., and Satoma, K. (2015). Effects of the Bank of Japan’s Current
Quantitative and Qualitative Easing. Economics Letters, 133:112–116.
McCallum, B. T. (1981). Price Level Determinacy with an Interest Rate Policy Rule and Rational
Expectations. Journal of Monetary Economics, 8(3):319–329.
McCallum, B. T. (2003). Japanese Monetary Policy, 1991-2001. FRB Richmond Economic
Quarterly, 89(1):1–31.
McKinnon, R. I. and Ohno, K. (1997). Resolving Economic Conflict between the United States and
Japan. MIT Press.
Mclaren, N., Banerjee, R. N., and Latto, D. (2014). Using Changes in Auction Maturity Sectors
to Help Identify the Impact of QE on Gilt Yields. Economic Journal, 124(576):453–479.
Meaning, J. and Zhu, F. (2011). The Impact of Recent Central Bank Asset Purchase Programmes.
BIS Quarterly Review, (12):73–83.
Meh, C. A. and Moran, K. (2010). The Role of Bank Capital in the Propagation of Shocks.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(3):555–576.
Meier, A. (2009). Panacea, Curse, or Nonevent? Unconventional Monetary Policy in the United
Kingdom. IMF Working Paper, (09/163).
Meinusch, A. and Tillmann, P. (2015). The Macroeconomic Impact of Unconventional Monetary
Policy Shocks. Journal of Macroeconomics.
Meltzer, A. H. (1998). Time to Print Money. Financial Times.
Meltzer, A. H. (2010). A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 2. University of Chicago Press.
Meulendyke, A. (1988). A Review of Federal Reserve Policy Targets and Operating Guides in
Recent Decades. Quarterly Review, (Aut):6–17.
Minsky, H. (1957). Central Banking and Money Market Changes. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 71(2):171–187.
Minsky, H. P. (1982). Can "It" Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance. Routledge.
Mishkin, F. S. (1986). A Rational Expectations Approach to Macroeconometrics. University of
Chicago Press.
271
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Mishkin, F. S. (2001). The Transmission Mechanism and The Role of Asset Prices in Monetary
Policy. NBER Working Paper 8617, (December).
Mishkin, F. S. (2007). Will Monetary Policy Become More of a Science? FRB Finance and
Economics Discussion Series, 44:1–44.
Mishra, P. and Montiel, P. (2013). How Effective Is Monetary Transmission in Low-Income
Countries? : A Survey of the Empirical Evidence. Economic Systems.
Mishra, P., Moriyama, K., N’Diaye, P., and Nguyen, L. (2014). The Impact of Fed Tapering
Announcements on Emerging Markets. IMF Working Paper, No. 14/109:1–34.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory
of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3):261–297.
Modigliani, F. and Sutch, R. (1966). Innovations in Interest Rate Policy. The American Economic
Review, 56:178–197.
Mollentze, S. (2000). Monetary Policy in South Africa on the Threshold of a New Era. South
African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 2(2).
Momma, K. and Kobayakawa, S. (2014). Monetary Policy after the Great Recession: Japan’s
Experience. In Monetary Policy after the Great Recession, pages 73–99.
Morais, B., Peydre, J., and Ruiz, C. (2015). The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary
Policy Rates and Quantitative Easing: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects. World
Bank Policy Research Working PaperPolicy Research Working Paper, 7216(March):1–47.
Mundell, R. (1962). The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External
Stability. Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund, (March):70–73.
Mundell, R. (1963). Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange
Rates. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29(4):475–485.
Nakajima, J. (2011). Time-Varying Parameter VAR Model with Stochastic Volatility: An Overview
of Methodology and Empirical Applications. Monetary and Economic Studies, (November
2011).
Naraidoo, R. and Gupta, R. (2010). Modeling Monetary Policy In South Africa: Focus On
Inflation Targeting Era Using A Simple Learning Rule. International Business and Economics
Research Journal, 9(12):89–98.
Nechio, F. (2014). Fed Tapering News and Emerging Markets. FRBSF Economic Letter, 2014-
06(March 3 2014):1–6.
272
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Neely, C. J. (2015). Unconventional Monetary Policy had Large International Effects. Journal of
Banking and Finance, 52:101–111.
Niestroj, B., Schabert, A., and Winkler, R. (2013). The Effects of Quantitative Easing in an
Estimated DSGE Model of the US Economy. University of Cologne Working Paper Series.
Okina, K. and Shiratsuka, S. (2004). Policy Commitment and Expectation Formation: Japan’s
Experience under Zero Interest Rates. North American Journal of Economics and Finance,
15(1):75–100.
Olivei, G. (2002). Norway’s Approach to Monetary Policy. New England Economic Review.
Orphanides, A. (2008). Central Bank Independence. In Oxford University Society Cyprus Branch
Meeting, pages 1–13, Limassol.
Orphanides, A. and Wieland, V. (2000). Efficient Monetary Policy Design Near Price Stability.
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 14(4):327–365.
Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2004). Regulating finance: balancing freedom and risk. Oxford University
Press.
Pagan, A. and Robertson, J. (1994). Structural Models Of The Liquidity Effect. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 80(2):202–217.
Pagan, A. and Robertson, J. (1995). Resolving the Liquidity Effect. Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Review, (77):33–54.
Palley, T. I. (2015). Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound and After: A Reassessment of
Quantitative Easing and Critique of the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Exit Strategy. Metroeco-
nomica, 66(1):1–27.
Park, W., Bhattarai, S., and Chatterjee, A. (2015). Effects of US Quantitative Easing on Emerging
Market Economies. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper, 255:1–68.
Pattipeilohy, C. (2016). A Comparative Analysis of Developments in Central Bank Balance Sheet
Composition. BIS Working Papers, (559):1–44.
Pattipeilohy, C., van den End, J. W., Tabbae, M., Frost, J., and de Haan, J. (2013). Uncon-
ventional Monetary Policy of the ECB During the Financial Crisis: An Assessment and New
Evidence. DNB Working Paper Series, May(381).
Peersman, G. (2014). The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policies. Ghent University
Economics Working Papers, (875):1–17.
Peersman, G. and Smets, F. (2001). The Monetary Transmission Mechanis in the Euro Area:
More Evidence from VAR Analysis. European Central Bank Working Paper Series, (91).
273
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Phillips, A. W. (1958). The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of
Money Wages in the United Kingdom 1861-1957. Economica, 25(100):283–299.
Pill, H. and Reichlin, L. (2014). Exceptional Policies for Exceptional Times: The ECB’s Response
to the Rolling Crises of the Euro area, and How it has Brought Us Towards a New Bargain.
CEPR Discussion paper, (No. 10193):39.
Plosser, C. I. (2009). Ensuring Sound Monetary Policy in the Aftermath of Crisis. Economic
Policy.
Poole, W. (1970). Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro
Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(2):197–216.
Pooter, D., Desimone, R., Martin, R. F., and Pruitt, S. (2015). Cheap Talk and the Efficacy of
the ECB’s Securities Market Programme: Did Bond Purchases Matter? International Finance
Discussion Papers, (1139).
Potter, S. M. (2015). Money Markets and Monetary Policy Normalization. In Money Marketeers
of New York University.
Powell, J. H. (2013). Advanced Economy Monetary Policy and Emerging Market Economies
Remarks. In 2013 Asia Economic Policy Conference: Prospects for Asia and the Global Economy.
Primiceri, G. (2005). Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Policy. The
Review of Economic Studies, 72(3):821–852.
Quadrini, V. (2011). Financial Frictions in Macroeconomic Fluctuations. FRB Richmond,
97(3):209–254.
Rai, V. and Suchanek, L. (2014). The Effect of the Federal Reserve’s Tapering Announcements
on Emerging Markets. Bank of Canada Working Paper.
Rajan, R. G. (2005). Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? NBER Working Paper
Series, 11728:42.
Ramakrishnan, R. T. S. and Thakor, A. V. (1984). Information Reliability and a Theory of
Financial Intermediation. The Review of Economic Studies, 51(3):415–432.
Reichenstein, W. (1987). The Impact of Money on Short-term Interest Rates. Economic Inquiry,
25(1):67–82.
Reifschneider, D. and Williams, J. C. (2000). Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low
Inflation Era. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32(4):936–66.
Reinhart, C. M. and Reinhart, V. R. (2008). Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View of
the Past and Present. NBER Working Paper Series, pages 1–68.
274
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2009). This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.
Princeton University Press.
Reis, R. (2009). Interpreting the Unconventional US Monetary Policy of 2007-09. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, (2):119–182.
Reis, R. (2013). The mystique surrounding the central bank’s balance sheet, applied to the
european crisis. American Economic Review, 103(3):135–140.
Reis, R. (2015). Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Cental Role of Seignorage.
NBER Working Paper, May(21226).
Reynard, S. and Schabert, A. (2009). Modeling Monetary Policy. Tinbergen Institute Discussion
Papers, 45(2):4–20.
Ricardo, D. (1888). Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank. In McCulloch, J. R., editor,
The Works of David Ricardo. With a Notice of the Life and Writings of the Author, page 648.
London.
Riefler, W. (1958). Open Market Operations in Long-term Securities. Federal Reserve Bulletin,
44(11):1260–74.
Robatto, R. (2014). Financial Crises and Systemic Bank Runs in a Dynamic Model of Banking.
University of Wisconsin-Madison Working Paper, pages 1–68.
Rodríguez, C. and Carrasco, C. A. (2014). ECB Policy Responses Between 2007 and 2014: A
Chronological Analysis and a Money Quantity Assessment of Their Effects. FESSUD Working
Paper, 65.
Roger, S. and Vlcek, J. (2012). Macrofinancial Modeling at Central Banks: Recent Developments
and Future Directions. IMF Working Paper, 12/21:1–39.
Rogers, J. H., Scotti, C., and Wright, J. H. (2014). Evaluating Asset-Market Effects of Unconven-
tional Monetary Policy : A Cross-Country Comparison. (1101):67.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2004). Choosing the Federal Reserve Chair: Lessons from
History. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(1):129–162.
Roosa, R. V. (1951). Interest Rates and the Central Bank. Money, Trade, and Economic Growth:
Essays in Honor of John Henry Williams.
Rosa, C. (2012). How “Unconventional” are Large-Scale Asset Purchases? The Impact of
Monetary Policy on Asset Prices. FRB of New York Staff Report No. 560.
Rosengren, E. S. (2016). Early Observations on Gradual Monetary Policy Normalization. In
Presentation to the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, Boston, Massachusetts.
275
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Rossi, S. (2013). Post-crisis Challenges to Central Bank Independence. In The LBMA/LPPM
Precious Metals Conference, pages 1–10.
Sack, B. P. (2009). The Fed’s Expanded Balance Sheet. In Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Speeches.
Sack, B. P. (2010). Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve’s Role as Liquidity Provider.
In Remarks at the New York Association for Business Economics, New York City, pages 1–4.
Saft, J. (2014). You Must Be Joking, Mr. Bernanke. Reuters.
Sahay, R., Arora, V., Arvanitis, T., Faruqee, H., and Diaye, P. N. (2014). Emerging Market
Volatility: Lessons from the Taper Tantrum. IMF Staff Discussion Note, (September):1–29.
Samuelson, P. A. and Solow, R. M. (1960). Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy. American
Economic Review, 50(2):177–194.
Sargent, T. J. and Smith, B. D. (1987). Irrelevance of Open Market Operations in Some
Economies with Government Currency Being Dominated in Rate of Return. American Economic
Review, 77(1):78–92.
Sargent, T. J. and Wallace, N. (1975). “Rational” Expectations, the Optimal Monetary In-
strument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule. Journal of Political Economy, 83(2):pp.
241–254.
Schabert, A. (2015). Optimal Central Bank Lending. Journal of Economic Theory, 157:485–516.
Schenkelberg, H. and Watzka, S. (2013). Real Effects of Quantitative Easing at the Zero Lower
Bound: Structural VAR-based Evidence from Japan. Journal of International Money and
Finance, 33:327–357.
Schoombee, A. (1996). Recent Developments in Monetary Control Procedures in South Africa.
South African Journal of Economics, 64(1):84–97.
Schorfheide, F. (2000). Loss Function-based Evaluation of DSGE Models. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 15(6):645–670.
Sengupta, R. and Tam, Y. (2008). The LIBOR-OIS Spread as a Summary Indicator. Economic
Synopses, (25):2008.
Shirakawa, M. (2013). Central Banking: Before, During, and After the Crisis. International
Journal of Central Banking, 9(SUPPL.1):373–387.
Shiratsuka, S. (2010). Size and Composition of the Central Bank Balance Sheet: Revisiting
Japan’s Experience of the Quantitative Easing Policy. Bank of Japan, (November):79–106.
276
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Shubik, M. and Wilson, C. (1977). The Optimal Bankruptcy Rule in a Trading Economy using
Fiat Money. Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 37(3-4):337–354.
Sims, C. A. (1980). Macroeconomics and Reality. Econometrica, 48:1–48.
Sims, C. A. (1986). Are Forecasting Models Usable for Policy Analysis? Quarterly Review,
(Win):2–16.
Sims, C. A. (1992). Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: The Effects of Monetary
Policy. European Economic Review, 36(5):975–1000.
Sims, C. A. (2001). Comment on Sargent and Cogley’s ‘Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inflation
Dynamics’. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 16:373–379.
Sims, C. A. and Zha, T. (2006). Were There Regime Switches in US Monetary Policy? American
Economic Review, (110).
Smets, F. (2014). Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked? Interna-
tional Journal of Central Banking, 10(2 SPEC. ISS.):263–300.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2003). An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5):1123–1175.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2007). Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE
Approach. The American Economic Review.
Steeley, J. M. (2015). The Side Effects of Quantitative Easing: Evidence from the UK Bond
Market. Journal of International Money and Finance, 51:303–336.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2011). Rethinking Macroeconomics: What Failed, and How to Repair It. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 9(August):591–645.
Stock, J. H. (2001). Discussion of Sargent and Cogley’s ‘Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inflation
Dynamics’. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 16:379–387.
Strohsal, T. (2013). Testing the Preferred Habitat Theory: The Role of Time-Varying Risk
Aversion. SFB Discussion Paper, (649):1–34.
Strongin, S. (1995). The Identification of Monetary Policy Disturbances: Explaining the Liquidity
Puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics.
Sudo, N., Teranishi, Y., and Studies, E. (2008). Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous
Banks. Bank of Japan Working Paper, (July).
Summers, L. H. and Alesina, A. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic
277
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Performance : Some Comparative Evidence. Jounal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(2):151–
162.
Svensson, L. E. (1999). How Should Monetary Policy Be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability?
New challenges for monetary policy, pages 277–316.
Svensson, L. E. (2003). Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and
Others. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4):145–166.
Svensson, L. E. (2012). Comment on Michael Woodford, “Inflation Targeting and Financial
Stability”. Sveriges Riksbank Economic Journal, pages 33–39.
Svensson, L. E., Houg, K., Solheim, H., and Steigum, E. (2002). An Independent Review of
Monetary Policy and Institutions in Norway. Norges Bank Watch.
Swanson, E. T. (2011). Let’s Twist Again: A High-Frequency Event-study Analysis of Operation
Twist and Its Implications for QE2. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 42(1 (Spring)):151–
207.
Syrstad, O. (2012). The Daily Liquidity Effect in a Floor System: Empirical Evidence from the
Norwegian Market. Norges Bank Working Paper, (14).
Szczerbowicz, U. (2015). The ECB Unconventional Monetary Policies: Have They Lowered
Market Borrowing Costs for Banks and Governments? International Journal of Central
Banking, 11(4):91–127.
Takahashi, W. (2013). Japanese Monetary Policy: Experience from the Lost Decades. Interna-
tional Journal of Business, 18(4):288–306.
Taylor, J. B. (1995). The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: An Empirical Framework. The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4):11–26.
Taylor, J. B. (1998). Five Things We Know for Sure. Hoover Digest, 3.
Taylor, J. B. (1999). A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules. Monetary policy rules,
I(January):319–348.
Taylor, J. B. (2001). Low Inflation, Deflation, and Policies for Future Price Stability. Monetary
and Economic Studies, 19:35–51.
Taylor, J. B. (2007a). Housing and Monetary Policy. NBER Working Paper Series, pages 1–18.
Taylor, J. B. (2007b). The Explanatory Power of Monetary Policy Rules. NBER Working Paper,
(13685).
278
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Taylor, J. B. (2008). The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of
What Went Wrong. NBER Working Paper, (14631):1–18.
Thornton, D. L. (1988). The Effect of Monetary Policy on Short-term Interest Rates. FRB of St.
Louis Review, (May):53–72.
Thornton, D. L. (2005). Open Market Operations and the Federal Funds Rate. FRB of St. Louis
Review, (89):549–570.
Thornton, D. L. (2006). The Daily Liquidity Effect. FRB of St. Louis Working Paper.
Thornton, D. L. (2010). Policy-Relevant Liquidity Effects. FRB of St. Louis, (1969):73–88.
Thornton, D. L. and Guidolin, M. (2008). Predictions of Short-Term Rates and the Expectations
Hypothesis of the Term Structure of Interest Rates. ECB Working Paper Series, (977):1–32.
Thornton, H. (1802). An enquiry into the nature and effects of the paper credit of Great Britain.
Tillmann, P. (2016). Unconventional Monetary Policy and the Spillovers to Emerging Markets.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 66:136–156.
Tinbergen, J. (1952). On The Theory of Economic Policy. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Tobin, J. (1961). Money, Capital, and Other Stores of Value. The American Economic Review,
51(2):26–37.
Tobin, J. (1969). A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 1(1):15–29.
Tolstoy, L. (1894). The Kingdom of God Is Within You.
Townsend, R. M. (1979). Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State
Verification. Journal of Economic Theory, 21(2):265–293.
Trichet, J. (2009). The ECB’s Enhanced Credit Support. CESifo Working Paper, 2833.
Tsomocos, D. P. and Zicchino, L. (2005). On Modelling Endogenous Default. Bank of England
Discussion Paper, pages 1–19.
Tucker, P. (2009). The Repertoire of Official Sector Interventions in the Financial System âĂŞ
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Appendix A
Chapter 5
A.1 Rolling Regression Figures
Presented on the next page, are some of the extra rolling regression results from Chapter 5.
These results are from the usage of alternative liquidity measures.
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Figure A.1: Rolling regression results for SA with alternative liquidity measures
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Figure A.2: Rolling regression results for the USA with alternative liquidity measures
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Figure A.3: Rolling regression results for Canada with alternative liquidity measures
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Figure A.4: Rolling regression results for Norway with alternative liquidity measures
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In order to illustrate the approach followed to linearise the model in this thesis, an example is
provided with respect to marginal utility of consumption. This is the FOC for the household
w.r.t consumption,
(Ct − hCt−1)−σc − hβEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−σc = λht
The first step is to define Ωt = (Ct − hCt−1), which gives us,
(Ωt)
−σc − hβEt(Ωt+1)−σc = λht
Using Uhlig’s method, log-linearisation gives,
(Ωss)
−σc(1 + Ω̂t)
−σc − (Ωss)−σchβEt(1 + Ω̂t+1)−σc = λhss(1 + λ̂ht )
(Ωss)
−σc(1− σc · Ω̂t)− (Ωss)−σchβEt(1− σc · Ω̂t+1)−σc = λhss(1 + λ̂ht )
Using the fact that in steady state (Ωss)−σc(1− hβ) = λhss, we have that,
σcΩ
−σc
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Next we can log-linearise, Ωt = (Ct − hCt−1).
Ωss(1 + Ω̂t) = Css(1 + Ĉt)− h·Css(1 + Ĉt−1)
Using the steady state Ωss = Css − hCss we can reduce the equation to,









































































Ĉt−1 = (1− hβ)λ̂ht
The work below shows the complete linearised version of the model for Chapter 6.
B.1.2 Household
B.1.2.1 Euler Equation
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B.1.2.2 Wage Setting













































f̂t+1 − (1− η)[π̂t+1 − τwπ̂t + ŵ∗t+1 − ŵ∗t ]
]
In steady state we have that, fss − βθwfssπ(τw−1)(1−η)ss = η−1η (wss)
1−ηλhssw
η
ssNss, which we can use











f̂t+1 − (1− η)[π̂t+1 − τwπ̂t + ŵ∗t+1 − ŵ∗t ]
]
(B.2)
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f̂t+1 + η(1 + σn)[π̂t+1 − τwπ̂t + ŵ∗t+1 − ŵ∗t ]
)

















f̂t+1 + η(1 + σn)[π̂t+1 − τwπ̂t + ŵ∗t+1 − ŵ∗t ]
)
(B.3)
B.1.2.3 Real Wage Index
























Which can then be log-linearised, to give,
θwπ
(τw−1)(1−η)











(π̂t − τwπ̂t−1 + π̂wt ) = ŵ∗t − ŵt (B.4)
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B.1.3 Firm
B.1.3.1 Labour
The first order condition with respect to labour is,
wt = (1− α)Kαt Nt−α
This can be log-linearised to give,
ŵt = αK̂t − αN̂t (B.5)
B.1.3.2 Capital
The first order condition with respect to capital is,







This can be log-linearised to give,
λfssλ̂
f

















)1−α(λft − βfEt[(1− ϕ)λft+1]
α
)α
where we can redefine rt = λ
f
t − βfEt[(1− ϕ)λ
f








Log-linearising this equation gives,
m̂ct = (1− α)ŵt + αr̂t
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The log-linearisation of rt leaves us with,
r̂t =
λ̂ft − βfEt[(1− ϕ)λ̂
f
t+1]
1− βf (1− ϕ)
This gives us the final linearisation of the marginal cost function as,
m̂ct = (1− α)ŵt +
1
1− βf (1− ϕ)
[





B.1.3.4 Loans from merchant bank
















































































The first order condition with respect to default is,
Lbt−1
πt





This equation can be written in log-linear form as,
Lbss
πss
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B.1.3.6 Price Setting












































− ε[mcss(1 + m̂ct)]
%
Further simplification yields,
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B.1.4.2 Interbank Loans










































The first order condition with respect to money holdings,


















B.1.5.2 Newly Issued Reserves
The first order condition with respect to newly issued reserves is,
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B.1.5.3 Interbank Loans























































B.1.5.4 Loans to Firms

































B.1.5.5 Short Term Bonds

































[−π̂t+1 + κ̂t+1 + η̂t+1]−ΥssΥ̂t (B.15)
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B.1.5.6 Default









































The budget constraint of the central bank is,





























Collateralised lending equation is,
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B.1.6.3 Feedback Rule


















t−1) + (1− ρr)
[




B.1.7.1 Government Budget Constraint






















B.1.7.2 Growth Rate of Bonds
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B.1.8 Market Clearing
B.1.8.1 Market Clearing
The market clearing condition is,

















































































Ŷt = αK̂t + (1− α)N̂t (B.23)
B.1.8.3 Capital
The aggregated law of motion for capital is,
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Log-linearisation gives,
K̂t = (1− ϕ)K̂t−1 +
Lbss
RcssKss
(L̂bt − R̂ct) (B.24)
B.1.9 Extra Equations
B.1.9.1 Household Budget Constraint
Household budget constraint is,
Dlt
Rdt





















− T rss(T̂ rt ) (B.25)
B.1.9.2 Indexing Rule




ŵt+1 − ŵt = (πss)τw (τwπ̂t) (B.26)
B.1.9.3 Balancing equations
There are several budget balancing equations,
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Besides the shock on the feedback rule, the shock I impose on κt is similar to that of Hilberg and
Hollmayr (2011). The equation for κ is defined as κt = ρκκt−1ξκ,t, where is ξκ,t is the innovation.
Log-linearisation gives,
κ̂t = ρκκ̂t−1 + ξκ,t (B.31)
Another plausible way to impose a shock on liquidity, as in Niestroj et al. (2013), is to simply
add it in this equation, as follows,




This method was also attempted, but the haircut method was favored, as it framed the question
more accurately.
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B.2 Calibration and Steady States
In the following section there is a brief discussion on the implied steady state values for this
model. The value of the β parameter is set by imposing a value for the deposit rate, Rd = 1.006,
and inflation, π = 1.0051, in steady state. From the household’s first order conditions one gets,
β = πss/R
d
ss. The discount factor is structured to be the same for all sectors, as in de Walque
et al. (2010). Discussion on the interest rate transmission in provided in the chapter. The value
of the multiplier on the household budget constraint, with habit formation set at h = 0.57 and
coefficient of relative risk aversion at σc = 1.35, is,
λhss = h(Css − hCss)−σc
In the instance above the value for Css is found by imposing a steady state consumption to
output ratio. The Calvo parameter on wages is calibrated to be τw = 0.62 and the elasticity of









With this value established, the following value for fss can be found, given the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labour supply, σn = 2.4, and the wage indexation parameter, τw = 0.62. The

















The value for output is normalised to one, while the labour steady state value is Nss = 0.33.









Given this value of Kss and the depreciation rate of, ϕ = 0.03, the steady state of loans
extended to firms is defined as Lbss = KssR
c
ssϕ. Next, the steady state wage is given by
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The value of the marginal cost in steady state is given by mcss = (ε− 1)/ε, where ε = 3. Having
normalised merchant bank profit in steady state to πbss = 0.0001, the value of the multiplier on


































The repayment rate of interbank loans is calibrated to be δ = 0.995, which means the utility






















In addition, with ωδ determined, one can back out the value of ωψ from the market clearing
condition, as follows,
ωψ =
(Yss − Css −Gss − πfss − πlss − πbss − ϕKss − ωδ)
(1− ψss(Lbss)2) [(1− δss)(Llss)2]
−1
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In the above equation the values for Gss, πfss and π
l
ss are determined from steady state ratios
imposed, and similar to de Walque et al. (2010), Llss = 0.7L
b









With Tss given by the imposed steady state ratios, and Dlss = L
L
ss from the deposit bank balanced
budget constraint, remittances to households is given by,








Total bond supply is reflected in the following equation,







This allows me to write, Bcss = B
g
ss − Bss, which gives Mpss = Bcss from the initial condition.
Finally, the reserves steady state is Mss = κBss(Rmssπss)
−1.
B.3 Reserve Requirement
One of the potential shortcomings mentioned in the thesis is that there is no explicit role for
money. In this largely cashless economy it could be useful to introduce some cash-in-advance
constraints on the household, deposit and merchant banks. These constraints were initially
attempted, but introduced a much greater deal of complexity, somewhat detracting from the
central message. Consider the merchant bank for a moment. A CIA constraint on this bank
can be motivated as a minimum reserves requirement. Below is a representation of what such
requirement might look like.
In particular, it would require the merchant bank to hold a certain fraction of its interbank loans
in the form of liquidity, generating demand for Mpt . Normally with this type of constraint the
commercial banks is forced to hold a fraction of deposits, but the merchant bank does not have




with Θ the fraction of interbank loans held. The first order conditions of the merchant bank will
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be altered in the following way,

















































where ζ is the newly introduced multiplier on the reserve requirement. There are several
differences visible when incorporating these changes. For example it can be already be seen
with the partial equilibrium analysis that the relationship between deposit, credit, interbank









(1−Rbss − ζss ·Rbss) · κssηss
)−1
While it is worthwhile to introduce this constraint, the question has to be asked, does it alter
the result in a significant way? In general, the results obtained are highly similar. Does it add
to the understanding of the model? In this instance, it might provide additional motivation as
to the merchant bank’s demand for money, but on the other hand it makes the model more
complex and difficult to navigate. For the sake of brevity, and clarity, it was excluded.
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The household, firms and deposit banks are the same as in the previous chapter. This section
only represents the log-linearised equations that are introduced in this chapter. Namely those
that are related to the introduction of long-term bonds.
C.1.1 Merchant Bank
C.1.1.1 Long-Term Bonds
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U̇ bt+1 + κ


















































































C.1.2.1 Government Budget Constraint

















































C.1.2.2 Growth Rate of Long-Term Bonds
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(B̂CSt−1 − π̂t) +
BCSss
Rbss




































t − π̂t) (C.3)
C.1.3.2 Eligible Assets
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C.1.4 Extra Equations
C.1.4.1 Balanced Budget Constraints
























































C.2 Calibration and Steady States
Calibration for the household, firm and deposit bank remain the same. However, with respect to
the merchant bank, central bank and government there are a few changes. The determination
of the value of Φ requires setting the RLss. I follow the work of Chen et al. (2012a) in this regard,
which delivers,
Φ = (5.5 ·RLss −RLss)/5.5
The next change observed is with the merchant bank. With equations becoming unwieldy as this
point, I had to break them into parts. Presented below are some of the selected substitutions
made, arising from the the equations in the model. These equations are named, Xs, Xl, Zs and
Zl. The values of Xs and Xl come from a combination of the collateralised borrowing constraint
and the central bank budget constraint, while Zs and Zl come from the addition of the balanced
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With these components, I can now show how the rest of the implied values are achieved. First,























)2] · (ZsXl/Xs + Zl)−1
With the value for BSss determined, I can now establish the value of B
L





















































Finally, the values for BCSss and B
CS
ss are determined form the balanced budget conditions for











This concludes the discussion on implied steady state values for Chapter 7.
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Table C.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
h Habit formation (consumption) 0.57
σc Coefficient of relative risk aversion 1.35
σn Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 2.4
σl Coefficient for deposit bank (NB) 1.35
σb Coefficient for merchant bank (NB) 1.35
η Elasticity of substitution between labor varieties 3
ε Elasticity of substitution between goods varieties 3
τw Wage indexation parameter 0.62
θw Calvo parameter (wages) 0.2
α Capital share of output 0.3
ϕ Depreciation rate 0.03
θ Firms’ investment adjustment cost 6.77
% Price adjustment cost – Calvo parameter (prices) 120
γp Another component of wage adjustment cost 0.47
Γ Bond supply growth rate 1.055
ρr Interest rate smoothing coefficient (Taylor Rule) 0.5
ρπ Feedback coefficient to inflation in monetary policy rule 1.68
ρy Feedback coefficient to output growth deviation 0.01
ρdy Feedback coefficient to output growth deviation 0.16
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Table C.2: Imposed steady states and ratios
Parameter Description Value
π Inflation 1.051
Rd Deposit rate 1.065
Rm Policy rate (Central Bank) 1.06
RL Long-term bond rate 1.075
δ Repayment rate (deposit bank) 0.995
ψ Repayment rate (merchant bank) 0.975
N Labour steady state 0.33
C/Y Consumption spending to output ratio 0.42
πf/Y Firm profit to output ratio 0.1
πl/Y Deposit bank profit to output ratio 0.0001
πb/Y Merchant bank profit to output ratio 0.0001
G/Y Government spending to output ratio 0.1854
T/Y Taxation to output ratio 0.187
Ll/Lb Interbank to firm loan ratio 0.65
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C.3 Code
This section includes the code used for the final model with long-term bonds. It depicts the
contractionary interest rate shock from Chapter 7.
//=========================================================================





var c_hat // consumption
lambdah_hat // Lagrange multiplier (household)
Rd_hat // nominal (interest) deposit rate
PI_hat // inflation
f_hat // variable for recursive formulation of wage setting
w_hat // real wage
wstar_hat // optimal real wage
N_hat // aggregate labour demand
K_hat // capital
lambdaf_hat // Lagrange multiplier (firm)
mc_hat // marginal cost
Rc_hat // credit rate (rate at which loans are provided)
Lb_hat // loans to firms
psi_hat // default rate on loan repayment for firms is (1-psi)
Rl_hat // interbank rate, rate at which loans are provided to merchant banks
deltta_hat // default rate on loan repayment for merchant banks is (1-delta)
Ll_hat // loans to merchant bank (interbank loans)
Rm_hat // refinancing rate (policy rate)
t_hat // tax
y_hat // aggregate output
Dl_hat // deposit holdings
pil_hat // deposit bank profit
pif_hat // firm profit
pib_hat // merchant bank profit
tr_hat // central bank transfers
Rb_hat // bond rate
I_hat // newly issued reserves
Bs_hat // merchant bank short-term bond holdings
Bts_hat // total short-term bond supply
Bcs_hat // central bank short-term bond holdings
eeta_hat // multiplier on collateral constraint
g_hat // government spending
RL_hat // yield to maturity
Bcl_hat // central bank long-term bond holdings
Btl_hat // total supply of long-term bonds
Bl_hat // merchant bank long-term bond holdings
mp_hat; // outright purchases of reserves
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parameters h // consumption habit formation
// betta_h // discount factor (household)
// betta_f // discount factor (firm)
// betta_l // discount factor (deposit bank)
// betta_b // discount factor (merchant bank)
sigmac // coefficient of relative risk aversion (consumption)
sigman // inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
eta // elasticity of substitution between labor varieties
epsilon // elasticity of substitution between goods varieties
tauw // wage indexation parameter
thetaw // Calvo parameter wages (portion that can no change their wage)
alppha // capital share of output
// dpsi // disutility associated with default (firm)
varphi // depreciation rate
theta // investment adjustment cost (firm)
// wpsi // pecuniary cost of default (firm)
varrho // price adjustment cost (firm) (Calvo parameter for prices)
gammap // wage adjustment cost
// ddelta // disutility from default (merchant bank)
// wdelta // pecuniary cost from default (merchant bank)
varpi // bond supply growth rate
kappal // haircut (long-term bonds - composition)
kappas // haircut (short-term - size)
rhoR // interest smoothing coefficient Taylor rule
rhoPI // feedback coefficient to inflatioon monetary policy rule
rhoy // feedback coefficient to output growth deviation in monetary policy rule
rhody // similar to the previus one (think on this one a bit)
vartheta // fraction of repos, set exogenously by the central bank
mu // minimum reserve ratio
Phii // paramater to solve indeterminancy
sigmal // coefficient for deposit bank
sigmab // coefficient for merchant bank
gaama // bond growth rate
chii // paramater to solve indeterminancy
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//=========================================================================

























// CALIBRATED PARAMETER VALUES (IMPOSED)
//=========================================================================
h = 0.57; // DW DSGE. Alternative is 0.55 from CS or 0.97 from FV.
sigmac = 1.35; // DW DSGE
sigman = 2.4; // DW DSGE. Alternative is 2 from CS or 1.17 from FV.
sigmal = 1.35; // DW DSGE
sigmab = 1.35; // DW DSGE
eta = 3; // CS. Alternative is 3 from DW DSGE or 10 from FV.
epsilon = 3; // CS. Alternative is 3 from DW DSGE or 10 from FV.
tauw = 0.62; // FV. This is an estimated parameter, form the data.
thetaw = 0.2; // FV. Estimated parameter.
alppha = 0.33; // CS. This is the same as DW. However, FV estimated 0.22.
varphi = 0.025; // DW DSGE. FV has it as 0.025, CS as 0.03, SW as 0.025.
theta = 6.77; // DW DSGE.
varrho = 260; // DW DSGE. Alternative is 120 from Niestroj.
gammap = 0.47; // DW DSGE.
varpi = 2; // Niestroj.
kappas = 0.9; // This is the haircut on short-term bonds
kappal = 0.1; // Haircut on long-term bonds
rhoR = 0.7; // CS. Parameter estimate. The prior chosen is 0.7.
rhoPI = 1.68; // CS. Parameter estimate. Prior chosen is 1.5.
rhoy = 0.01; // CS. Parameter estimate. Prior chosen is 0.01.
rhody = 0.16; // DW DSGE. Alternate in Smets and Wouters.
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vartheta = 0.1; // CS. Fraction of money held outright.


















// CALIBRATED RATIOS (IMPOSED)
//=========================================================================
gy_ss = 0.1854; // This is the government spending to gdp ratio
cy_ss = 0.45; // Consumption to gdp ratio
pify_ss = 0.1; // Firm profit to gdp ratio
pily_ss = 0.0001; // Deposit bank profit to gdp ratio











// STEADY STATES (IMPLIED)
//=========================================================================
// Steady states as functions of parameters and calibrated values
# Rc_ss = Rd_ss/psi_ss;
# Rl_ss = Rd_ss/deltta_ss;
# PSI = (5.5*RL_ss - RL_ss)/5.5;
# mc_ss = (epsilon - 1)/epsilon;
# betta_h = PI_ss/(Rd_ss);
316
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
# betta_f = betta_h;
# betta_l = PI_ss/(Rl_ss*deltta_ss);
# betta_b = PI_ss/(Rc_ss*psi_ss);
# PIstarw_ss = ((1 - thetaw*(PI_ss)^((1 - eta)*(tauw - 1)))/((1 - thetaw))^(1/(1 - eta)));
# f_ss = (((PIstarw_ss)^(-eta*(1 + sigman)))*(N_ss)^(1 + sigman))/
(1 - betta_h*thetaw*(PI_ss)^(eta*(1 - tauw)*(1 + sigman)));
# K_ss = (y_ss/(N_ss^(1-alppha)))^(1/alppha);
# Lb_ss = K_ss*Rc_ss*varphi;
# ky_ss = K_ss/y_ss;
# g_ss = gy_ss*y_ss;
# c_ss = cy_ss*y_ss;
# pif_ss = pify_ss*y_ss;
# pil_ss = pily_ss*y_ss;
# pib_ss = piby_ss*y_ss;
# eeta_ss = ((pib_ss+1)^(-sigmab))*(1/(Rm_ss)-1);
# Rb_ss = Rd_ss*((pib_ss+1)^(-sigmab)/(eeta_ss*kappas + ((pib_ss+1)^(-sigmab))));
# Dl_ss = 0.7*Lb_ss;
# Ll_ss = Dl_ss;
# w_ss = (1-alppha)*(K_ss^(alppha))*(N_ss^(-alppha));
# t_ss = ty_ss*y_ss;
# lambdaf_ss = (alppha*((K_ss)^(alppha-1))*((N_ss)^(1-alppha)))/(1-(betta_f*(1-varphi)));
# lambdah_ss = h*((c_ss-h*c_ss)^(-sigmac));
# wstar_ss = (1 - betta_h*thetaw*(PI_ss^((1-eta)*(tauw-1)))*f_ss)/
((eta-1/eta)*(lambdah_ss)*(PIstarw_ss^(-eta))*N_ss);
# wdelta = ((1/Rl_ss) - ((betta_b*(deltta_ss))/PI_ss))/((betta_b^2)*Ll_ss*((1-deltta_ss)^2));
# wpsi = ((y_ss - c_ss - g_ss - pif_ss - pib_ss - pil_ss - varphi*K_ss - (wdelta)*((1-deltta_ss)*Ll_ss)^2)/
(((1-psi_ss)*Lb_ss)^2));
# dpsi = (Lb_ss/PI_ss) - (betta_f*((wpsi/2)*(1-psi_ss))*Lb_ss^2);
# ddelta = (((Ll_ss/PI_ss) - (wdelta/2)*betta_b*(1-deltta_ss)*Ll_ss^2))/((pib_ss+1)^(sigmab));
# tr_ss = -(Dl_ss/Rd_ss + c_ss + t_ss - w_ss*N_ss - Dl_ss/PI_ss);
# Xs = (PI_ss/(PI_ss-1))*(kappas/(Rm_ss*PI_ss)) + 1;
# Xl = (PI_ss/(PI_ss-1))*(kappal*RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss*Rm_ss)) + (1/(RL_ss - PSI));
# Zs = (1/PI_ss - 1/Rb_ss - kappas/(Rm_ss*PI_ss));
# Zl = (RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss) - 1/(RL_ss - PSI) - kappal*RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss*Rm_ss));
# Bs_ss = (Ll_ss/Rl_ss - deltta_ss*Ll_ss/(PI_ss) + psi_ss*Lb_ss/PI_ss -
Lb_ss/Rc_ss - pib_ss - (wdelta/2)*((1-deltta_ss)*Ll_ss)^2)/((Zs*Xl)/Xs + Zl);
# Bl_ss = (Ll_ss/Xl - (Xs/Xl)*Bs_ss - Lb_ss/Xl);
# I_ss = ((kappas*Bs_ss)/(Rm_ss*PI_ss) + kappal*Bl_ss*RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss*Rm_ss));
# mp_ss = (I_ss*PI_ss/(PI_ss-1));
# Yl = ((1/(RL_ss - PSI))*((1/PI_ss) - (1/Rb_ss)) + RL_ss/((PI_ss)*(RL_ss - PSI)));
# Bcl_ss = (I_ss*Rm_ss)/Yl - tr_ss;
# Bcs_ss = mp_ss - (Bcl_ss/(RL_ss - PSI));
# Btl_ss = Bl_ss + Bcl_ss;
# Bts_ss = Bs_ss + Bcs_ss;
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//=========================================================================
// LOG LINEARISED MODEL
// ========================================================================




// 1. Euler Equation
(h/(Rd_ss*((c_ss - h*c_ss)^(sigmac))))*((sigmac/(1-h))*(c_hat - c_hat(-1)) + Rd_hat) + (chii)*Dl_hat =
(h*betta_h/(PI_ss*((c_ss - h*c_ss)^(sigmac))))*((sigmac/(1-h))*(c_hat(+1) - c_hat) + PI_hat(+1));
// 2 + 3. Wage setting
f_hat = (1-betta_h*thetaw*(PI_ss)^((tauw-1)*(1-eta)))*((1-eta)*wstar_hat + lambdah_hat + eta*w_hat + N_hat) +
betta_h*thetaw*(PI_ss)^((tauw-1)*(eta-1))*
(f_hat(+1)-(1-eta)*(PI_hat(+1) - tauw*PI_hat + wstar_hat(+1) - wstar_hat));
f_hat = (1-betta_h*thetaw*(PI_ss)^(eta*(1-tauw)*(1+sigman)))*((eta*(1+sigman))*(w_hat - wstar_hat) + (1+sigman)*N_hat) +
betta_h*thetaw*((PI_ss)^(eta*(1-tauw)*(1+sigman)))*
(f_hat(+1) + eta*(1+sigman)*(PI_hat(+1) - tauw*PI_hat + wstar_hat(+1) - wstar_hat));
// 4. Real wage index
((thetaw*(PI_ss)^((tauw-1)*(1-eta)))/(1-thetaw)*((PIstarw_ss)^(1-eta)))*(PI_hat - tauw*PI_hat(-1) + w_hat - w_hat(-1))




// 5. FOC Labour
w_hat(+1) = alppha*(K_hat(+1)) - alppha*(N_hat(+1));
// 6. FOC Capital
lambdaf_hat*lambdaf_ss - betta_f*(1-varphi)*lambdaf_ss*lambdaf_hat(+1) =
alppha*(K_ss^(alppha-1))*(N_ss^(1-alppha))*((alppha-1)*K_hat + (1-alppha)*N_hat);
// 7. Marginal cost
mc_hat = (1-alppha)*w_hat + (1/(1-betta_f*(1-varphi)))*(lambdaf_hat - betta_f*(1-varphi)*lambdaf_hat(+1));
// 8. FOC Loans from merchant bank
(lambdaf_ss/Rc_ss)*(lambdaf_hat - Rc_hat) - ((theta*lambdaf_ss)/(Rc_ss))*(Lb_hat - Lb_hat(-1)) +
((betta_f*theta*lambdaf_ss)/(Rc_ss))*(Lb_hat(+1) - Lb_hat) =
((betta_f*psi_ss)/(PI_ss))*(psi_hat(+1) - PI_hat(+1)) +
(betta_f^2)*(wpsi/2)*((1-psi_ss)^2)*Lb_ss*(-2*(psi_ss/(1-psi_ss))*psi_hat(+1) + Lb_hat);
// 9. FOC Default
(Lb_ss/PI_ss)*(1+ Lb_hat(-1) - PI_hat) = dpsi +
betta_f*(wpsi/2)*(1-psi_ss)*(Lb_ss^2)*(1 - (psi_ss/(1-psi_ss))*psi_hat + 2*Lb_hat(-1));
// 10. Price setting
PI_hat = (betta_f/(1+betta_f*gammap))*PI_hat(+1) + (gammap/(1+betta_f*gammap))*PI_hat(-1) +
(1/(1+betta_f*gammap))*((1-epsilon)/varrho)*mc_hat;
318




// 11. FOC Deposits
(1/Rd_ss)*(-Rd_hat - (pil_ss/(pil_ss+1))*sigmal*pil_hat) =
betta_l*((1)/PI_ss)*(-(pil_ss/(pil_ss+1))*sigmal*pil_hat(+1) - PI_hat(+1))
- (1/Rl_ss)*(Rl_hat + (pil_ss/(pil_ss+1))*sigmal*pil_hat)




// 12. FOC Interbank loans





+(pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat - ((pib_ss/(pib_ss+1)/PI_ss)*sigmab*pib_hat(+1) + PI_hat(+1));
// 13. FOC Loans to firms
(1/(Rc_ss))*(-Rc_hat - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat) =
betta_b*(psi_ss/(PI_ss))*(psi_hat(+1) - PI_hat(+1) - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat(+1))
+(pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat - ((pib_ss/(pib_ss+1)/PI_ss)*sigmab*pib_hat(+1) + PI_hat(+1));
// 14. FOC Newly Issued Reserves
-(((pib_ss + 1)^(-sigmab))*Rm_ss)*(Rm_hat - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat) +
((pib_ss + 1)^(-sigmab))*(pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat = Rm_ss*eeta_ss*(Rm_hat + eeta_hat);
// 15. FOC Short Term Bonds
((pib_ss + 1)^(-sigmab))*(1/Rb_ss)*(-Rb_hat - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat) =
betta_b*((pib_ss + 1)^(-sigmab))*(1/PI_ss)*(-PI_hat(+1) - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat(+1)) +
betta_b*(kappas*eeta_ss/PI_ss)*(-PI_hat(+1) + eeta_hat(+1)) +
(pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat - ((pib_ss/(pib_ss+1)/PI_ss)*sigmab*pib_hat(+1) + PI_hat(+1));
// 16. FOC Long Term Bonds
((pib_ss + 1)^(-sigmab))*(1/(RL_ss-PSI))*(-(RL_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat) =
betta_b*((pib_ss + 1)^(-sigmab))*(1/PI_ss)*(-PI_hat(+1) - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat(+1)) +
betta_b*(kappal*eeta_ss*RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss))*(-PI_hat(+1) + eeta_hat(+1)
- (PSI/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat(+1))
-betta_b*(RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss*(pib_ss + 1)^(sigmab)))*(-PI_hat(+1) -
(pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat - (PSI/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat(+1))
+(RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*(pib_ss + 1)^(sigmab)))*(- (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat
- (PSI/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat(+1));
// 17. FOC Default
(Ll_ss/(PI_ss*(pib_ss+1)^(sigmab)))*(1 + Ll_hat(-1) - PI_hat - (pib_ss/(pib_ss+1))*sigmab*pib_hat)








// 18. Budget constraint
tr_ss*(tr_hat) - (Bcs_ss/PI_ss)*(Bcs_hat(-1) - PI_hat) + (Bcs_ss/Rb_ss)*(Bcs_hat - Rb_hat) =
(RL_ss*Bcl_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss))*(Bcl_hat(-1) - (PSI/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat - PI_hat) -
Bcl_ss/(RL_ss - PSI)*(Bcl_hat - (RL_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat) + mp_ss*Rm_ss*(mp_hat + Rm_hat) -
((mp_ss*Rm_ss)/PI_ss)*(mp_hat(-1) + Rm_hat - PI_hat);
// 19. Feedback rule
Rm_hat = rhoR*Rm_hat(-1) + (1-rhoR)*(rhoPI*PI_hat + rhoy*y_hat + rhody*(y_hat - y_hat(-1))) + em*std_m;
// 20. Eligible assets
I_ss*I_hat = (kappas*Bs_ss/((PI_ss)*Rm_ss))*(Bs_hat(-1) - PI_hat - Rm_hat) +
(kappal*Bl_ss*RL_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss*Rm_ss))*(Bl_hat(-1) - (PSI/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat - PI_hat - Rm_hat);
// 21. Newly issued reserves
I_ss*I_hat = mp_ss*mp_hat - (mp_ss/PI_ss)*(mp_hat(-1) - PI_hat) + emp*std_mp;
// 22. Balanced budget condition
mp_ss*mp_hat = Bcs_ss*Bcs_hat + (Bcl_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*(Bcl_hat - (RL_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat);
// ========================================================================
// MARKET CLEARING + MISC
// ========================================================================
// 23. Market clearing
y_ss*y_hat = c_ss*c_hat + g_ss*g_hat + pif_ss*pif_hat + pil_ss*pil_hat
+ pib_ss*pib_hat + K_ss*K_hat - (1-varphi)*(K_ss)*K_hat(-1) +
(wdelta)*((1-deltta_ss)^2)*(Ll_ss^2)*(-2*(deltta_ss/(1-deltta_ss))*deltta_hat(-1) + 2*Ll_hat(-2)) +
(wpsi/2)*((1-psi_ss)^2)*(Lb_ss^2)*(-2*(psi_ss/(1-psi_ss))*psi_hat(-1) + 2*Lb_hat(-2));
// 24. Law of motion for K_hat
K_ss*K_hat = K_ss*(1-varphi)*K_hat(-1) + (Lb_ss/Rc_ss)*(Lb_hat - Rc_hat);
// 25. Indexing rule
w_hat(+1) - w_hat = (tauw*PI_hat);
// 26. Household BC
(Dl_ss/Rd_ss)*(Dl_hat - Rd_hat) + c_ss*(c_hat) - t_ss*t_hat
= (w_ss*N_ss)*(w_hat + N_hat) + (Dl_ss/PI_ss)*(Dl_hat(-1) - PI_hat) - tr_ss*tr_hat;
// 27. Firm profit
pif_ss*(pif_hat) = y_ss*(y_hat) - (w_ss*N_ss)*(w_hat + N_hat) - ((psi_ss*Lb_ss)/PI_ss)*(psi_hat + Lb_hat(-1) - PI_hat) -
(wpsi)*((1-psi_ss)^2)*(Lb_ss^2)*(-2*(psi_ss/(1-psi_ss))*psi_hat(-1) + 2*Lb_hat(-2));
// 28. Deposit bank profit
pil_ss*(pil_hat) = (Dl_ss/Rd_ss)*(Dl_hat - Rd_hat) - (Dl_ss/PI_ss)*(Dl_hat(-1) - PI_hat) +
((deltta_ss*Ll_ss)/PI_ss)*(deltta_hat + Ll_hat(-1) - PI_hat) -
(Ll_ss/Rl_ss)*(Ll_hat - Rl_hat);
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// 29. Merchant bank profit
pib_ss*(pib_hat) = - (I_ss*Rm_ss)*(I_hat - Rm_hat)
+ (Ll_ss/Rl_ss)*(Ll_hat - Rl_hat) - ((deltta_ss*Ll_ss)/PI_ss)*(deltta_hat + Ll_hat(-1) - PI_hat) +
((psi_ss*Lb_ss)/PI_ss)*(psi_hat + Lb_hat(-1) - PI_hat) - (Lb_ss/Rc_ss)*(Lb_hat - Rc_hat) -
(wdelta)*((1-deltta_ss)^2)*(Ll_ss^2)*(-2*(deltta_ss/(1-deltta_ss))*deltta_hat(-1) + 2*Ll_hat(-2)) +
+ (Bs_ss/PI_ss)*(Bs_hat(-1) - PI_hat) - (Bs_ss/Rb_ss)*(Bs_hat - Rb_hat) +
(RL_ss*Bl_ss/((RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss))*(Bl_hat(-1) - PI_hat - (PSI/(RL_ss - PSI))*Rl_hat) -
(Bl_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*(Bl_hat - (RL_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat);
// 30. Production function
y_hat = alppha*(K_hat) + (1-alppha)*(N_hat);
// 31 + 32. Balanced budget conditions
Dl_hat = Ll_hat;
Ll_ss*Ll_hat = mp_ss*mp_hat + (RL_ss*Bl_ss/(RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss)*(Bl_hat - PI_hat(+1)




// 33. Gov Budget
g_ss*g_hat + (Bts_ss/PI_ss)*(Bts_hat(-1) - PI_hat) +
(RL_ss*Btl_ss/(RL_ss - PSI)*PI_ss)*(Btl_hat(-1) - PI_hat - (PSI/(RL_ss - PSI))*Rl_hat)
= (Bts_ss/Rb_ss)*(Bts_hat - Rb_hat) + (Btl_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*(Btl_hat - (RL_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat) + t_ss*t_hat ;
// 34. This is a budget balancing condition, need to include it.
Bts_ss*(Bts_hat) = Bcs_ss*(Bcs_hat) + Bs_ss*(Bs_hat);
// 35. Long run balanced budget condition
Btl_ss*(Btl_hat) = Bcl_ss*(Bcl_hat) + Bl_ss*(Bl_hat);
// 36. Growth rate of short run bonds
Bts_hat = gaama*(Bts_hat(-1) - PI_hat);
// 37. Growth rate of long-term bonds
Btl_hat = (RL_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat + rhob*(Btl_hat(-1) - (RL_ss/(RL_ss - PSI))*RL_hat(-1) - PI_hat) + elb*std_lb;
// 38 + 39. Shock to haircut
//kappas = rho_kap*kappas(-1) + ekp*std_kp;
//kappal*kappal_hat = rho_kapl*kappal*kappal_hat(-1) + ekp*std_kp;
end;
// ========================================================================
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